Search results for 'sensation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Walter Ott (2014). Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  2.  25
    Lauren Olin (2016). Burge on Perception and Sensation. Synthese 193 (5):1479-1508.
    In Origins of Objectivity Burge advances a theory of perception according to which perceptions are, themselves, objective representations. The possession of veridicality conditions by perceptual states—roughly, non-propositional analogues of truth-conditions—is central to Burge’s account of how perceptual states differ, empirically and metaphysically, from sensory states. Despite an impressive examination of the relevant empirical literatures, I argue here that Burge has not succeeded in securing a distinction between perception and “mere” sensation.
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  3.  1
    Daniel Heller-Roazen (2007). The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation. Distributed by the MIT Press.
    The Inner Touch presents the archaeology of a single sense: the sense of being sentient. Aristotle was perhaps the first to define this faculty when in his treatise On the Soul he identified a sensory power, irreducible to the five senses, by which animals perceive that they are perceiving: the simple "sense," as he wrote, "that we are seeing and hearing." After him, thinkers returned, time and again, to define and redefine this curious sensation. The classical Greek and Roman (...)
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  4. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1984). The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation-Perception Distinction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.
    The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation (...)
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  5.  14
    Davide Panagia (2009). The Political Life of Sensation. Duke University Press.
    Prologue : narratocracy and the contours of political life -- From nomos to nomad : Kant, Deleuze, and Rancière on sensation -- The piazza, the edicola, and the noise of the utterance -- Machiavelli's theory of sensation and Florence's vita festiva -- The viewing subject : Caravaggio, Bacon, and the ring -- "You're eating too fast!" slow food's ethos of convivium -- Epilogue : "the photographs tell it all" : on an ethics of appearance.
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  6. Peter Pagin (2000). Sensation Terms. Dialectica 54 (3):177-99.
    Are sensation ascriptions descriptive, even in the first person present tense? Do sensation terms refer to, denote, sensations, so that truth and falsity of sensation ascriptions depend on the properties of the denoted sensations? That is, do sensation terms have a denotational semantics? As I understand it, this is denied by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a denotational semantics for public language sensation terms, such as.
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  7.  67
    Steven M. Duncan, Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  8.  98
    Andrew Chignell (2009). Descartes on Sensation: A Defense of the Semantic-Causation Model. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (5):1-22.
    Descartes's lack of clarity about the causal connections between brain states and mental states has led many commentators to conclude that he has no coherent account of body-mind relations in sensation, or that he was simply confused about the issue. In this paper I develop what I take to be a coherent account that was available to Descartes, and argue that there are both textual and systematic reasons to think that it was his considered view. The account has brain (...)
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  9.  74
    Charles E. M. Dunlop (1984). Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'. Synthese 60 (September):349-368.
    This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how (...)
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  10.  36
    N. Jolley (1995). Sensation, Intentionality, and Animal Consciousness. Ratio 8 (2):128-42.
    In general, seventeenth‐century philosophers seem to have assumed that intentionality is an essential characteristic of our mental life. Malebranche is perhaps the only philosopher in the period who stands out clearly against the prevailing orthodoxy; he is committed to the thesis that there is a large class of mental items ‐ sensations ‐ which have no representational content. In this paper I argue that due attention to this fact makes it possible to mount at least a partial defence of his (...)
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  11.  52
    Andy Clark (2000). Phenomenal Immediacy and the Doors of Sensation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):21-24.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey offers a refreshingly progressive recipe for laying wide the doors of sensation: for understanding the peculiar features of qualitative or sensational experience in terms of the physical or functional facts about brains, bodies and environments. The key move in the treatment is the promotion of a kind of co- ordinated, double-sided tweaking: a careful restatement, with some amendments, of each side of the elusive identity statement ‘sensational property x = brain state y'. Only after such (...)
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  12.  14
    Sandra B. Rosenthal & Patrick L. Bourgeois (1990). Sensation, Perception and Immediacy: Mead and Merleau-Ponty. Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (1):105-111.
    A focus on the relation between sensation and the perceptual object in the philosophies of G H Mead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty points toward their shared views of perception as non-reductionistic and holistic, as inextricably tied to the active role of the sensible body, and as involving a new understanding of the nature of immediacy within experience. This essay explores these shared views.
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  13.  35
    Glenn D. Higginson (1935). Stimulus, Sensation, and Meaning. Journal of Philosophy 32 (24):645-650.
    We can find no place in psychology for the concept of stimulus as a physical agent to which an individual responds in a psychological manner. Moreover, we can find no place for sensation and image when considered as simple mental elements. We would also purge ...
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  14.  17
    Daniel D. De Haan (2010). Linguistic Apprehension as Incidental Sensation in Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84:179-196.
    In this paper I will delineate the psychological operations and faculties required for linguistic apprehension within a Thomistic psychology. This will require first identifying the proper object of linguistic apprehension, which will then allow me to specify the distinct operations and faculties necessary for linguistic apprehension. I will argue that the semantic value of any linguistic term is a type of incidental sensible and that its cognitive apprehension is a type of incidental sensation. Hence, the faculties necessary for the (...)
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  15.  2
    Alon Confino (2009). 1. Narrative Form and Historical Sensation: On Saul Friedländer's the Years of Extermination1. History and Theory 48 (3):199-219.
    wide as an exemplary work of history. Yet it was written by a historian who in the last two decades has strenuously asserted the limits of Holocaust representation. At the center of this essay is a problem of historical writing: how to write a historical narrative of the Holocaust that both offers explanations of the unfolding events and also suggests that the most powerful sensation about those events, at the time and since, is that they are beyond words. I (...)
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  16.  17
    Brian Massumi (2002). Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke University Press.
    Replacing the traditional opposition of literal and figural with new distinctions between stasis and motion and between actual and virtual,Parables for the ...
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  17.  2
    Marvin Zuckerman (1984). Sensation Seeking: A Comparative Approach to a Human Trait. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):413.
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  18. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Beyond Appearances : The Content of Sensation and Perception. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 434--460.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  19.  7
    Walter Ott (2016). Leibniz on Sensation and the Limits of Reason. History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2):135-153.
    I argue that Leibniz’s doctrine of sensory representation is intended in part to close an explanatory gap in his philosophical system. Unlike the twentieth century explanatory gap, which stretches between neural states on one side and phenomenal character on the other, Leibniz’s gap lies between experiences of secondary qualities like color and taste and the objects that cause them. The problem is that the precise arrangement and distribution of such experiences can never be given a full explanation. In response, Leibniz (...)
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  20.  92
    Walter Hopp (2008). Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):219-245.
    Husserl's theory of perception is remarkable in several respects. For one thing, Husserl rigorously distinguishes the parts and properties of the act of consciousness - its content -from the parts and properties of the object perceived. Second, Husserl's repeated insistence that perceptual consciousness places its subject in touch with the perceived object itself, rather than some representation that does duty for it, vindicates the commonsensical and phenomenologically grounded belief that when a thing appears to us, it is precisely that thing, (...)
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  21. Crispin Wright (1989). Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention. Journal of Philosophy 86 (11):622-634.
  22.  20
    Charles T. Wolfe (2015). Généalogie de la Sensation. Physique, Physiologie Et Psychologie En Europe, de Fernel À Locke. [REVIEW] Journal of Early Modern Studies 4 (2):165-171.
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  23.  78
    David W. Hamlyn (1994). Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which (...)
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  24. Sonia Sedivy (2004). Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Empiricism's Third Dogma: Why Perception is Not an Amalgam of Sensation and Conceptualization. Philosophical Investigations 27 (1):1-33.
  25.  72
    William C. Kneale (1951). Sensation and the Physical World. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (January):109-126.
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  26.  65
    James T. Culbertson (1942). A Physical Theory of Sensation. Philosophy of Science 9 (April):197-226.
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  27.  41
    Charles Hartshorne (1963). Sensation in Psychology and Philosophy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):3-14.
  28.  35
    E. L. Mascall (1964). Perception and Sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:259-272.
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  29.  13
    Norman M. Swartz (1974). Can the Theory of Contingent Identity Between Sensation-States and Brain-States Be Made Empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (March):405-17.
  30. J. Dokic (2003). The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 321–344.
  31.  30
    Frederik Kaufman (1990). Conceptual Necessity, Causality and Self-Ascriptions of Sensation. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
  32.  31
    Thomas C. Vinci (1981). Sellars and the Adverbial Theory of Sensation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (June):199-217.
  33.  31
    George Teschner (1981). The Undifferentiated Conjunction of Sensation and Judgment in Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):119-122.
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  34.  31
    Douglas Odegard (1972). Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects. Dialogue 11 (March):69-77.
  35.  1
    H. H. Price (1944). Touch and Organic Sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44 (1):i-xxx.
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  36. Raj Thiruvengadam (1996). Sensation Intelligibility in Sensibility. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  37.  34
    S. Dumpleton (1988). Sensation and Function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):376-89.
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  38.  32
    Patrick Mckee (1976). An Explanation-Model of Visual Sensation. Philosophical Studies 29 (June):457-464.
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  39.  17
    Richard W. Momeyer (1975). Is Pleasure a Sensation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September):113-21.
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  40.  2
    Joseph C. Stevens, Joel D. Mack & S. S. Stevens (1960). Growth of Sensation on Seven Continua as Measured by Force of Handgrip. Journal of Experimental Psychology 59 (1):60.
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  41. G. E. M. Anscombe (1974). The Subjectivity of Sensation. Ajatus 36:3-18.
     
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  42.  3
    C. E. Lauterbach & R. E. Crouser (1933). Sensation Cues to Moisture. Journal of Experimental Psychology 16 (2):328.
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  43.  3
    J. Donald Harris & Cecil K. Myers (1949). The Emergence of a Tonal Sensation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 39 (2):228.
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  44.  3
    G. K. Yacorzynski & M. Brown (1941). Studies of the Sensation of Vibration: 1. Variability of the Vibratory Threshold as a Function of Amplitude and Frequency of Mechanical Vibration. Journal of Experimental Psychology 28 (6):509.
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  45.  2
    A. Sweetland (1945). Fluctuation of Sensation of Liminal Visual Stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology 35 (6):459.
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  46.  2
    K. C. Mukherjee (1933). The Duration of Cutaneous Sensation (I) and the Improvement of its Sensible Discrimination by Practice (II). Journal of Experimental Psychology 16 (2):339.
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  47.  1
    R. T. Holland (1920). On the 'After-Sensation' of Pressure. Journal of Experimental Psychology 3 (4):302.
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  48. Jaakko Blomberg (1971). Psychophysics, Sensation and Information. Ajatus 33:106-137.
     
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  49. Fred Dretske (2003). Sensation and Perception (1981). In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press
  50. J. Michael Hinton (1974). This is Visual Sensation. In Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell
     
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