Search results for 'sense of agency' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Costas Pagondiotis & Spyros Petrounakos (2007). The Sense of Agency and the Naturalization of the Mental. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:139-143.score: 729.0
    In this paper we examine whether the sense of agency represents an obstacle to the project of naturalizing the mental. On the basis of a thought experiment we suggest that the sense of agency is not an epiphenomenon. We also examine Frith's attempt to explain in functionalist terms the sense of agency through the comparator and metarepresentational mechanisms. Through a variety of arguments we try to show that explanation by recourse to these mechanisms is (...)
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  2. Glenn Carruthers (2012). The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.score: 720.0
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It (...)
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  3. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.score: 720.0
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it (...)
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  4. Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin (2010). Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.score: 720.0
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest (...)
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  5. Glenn Carruthers (2010). A Problem for Wegner and Colleagues' Model of the Sense of Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.score: 720.0
    The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency (...)
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  6. [deleted]Nicole David (2012). New Frontiers in the Neuroscience of the Sense of Agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 720.0
    The sense that I am the author of my own actions, including the ability to distinguish my own from other people’s actions, is a fundamental building block of our sense of self, on the one hand, and successful social interactions, on the other. Using cognitive neuroscience techniques, researchers have attempted to elucidate the functional basis of this intriguing phenomenon, also trying to explain pathological abnormalities of action awareness in certain psychiatric and neurological disturbances. Recent conceptual, technological and methodological (...)
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  7. Yochai Ataria (2013). Sense of Ownership and Sense of Agency During Trauma. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.score: 720.0
    This paper seeks to describe and analyze the traumatic experience through an examination of the sense of agency—the sense of controlling one’s body, and sense of ownership—the sense that it is my body that undergoes experiences. It appears that there exist (at least) two levels of traumatic experience: on the first level one loses the sense of agency but retains the sense of ownership, whilst on the second one loses both of these, (...)
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  8. [deleted]Sukhvinder S. Obhi Zeynep Barlas (2013). Freedom, Choice, and the Sense of Agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 720.0
    The sense of agency is an intriguing aspect of human consciousness and is commonly defined as the sense that one is the author of their own actions and their consequences. In the current study, we varied the number of action alternatives (one, three, seven) that participants could select from and determined the effects on intentional binding which is believed to index the low-level sense of agency. Participants made self-paced button presses while viewing a conventional Libet (...)
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  9. Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney (2013). Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.score: 696.0
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises (...)
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  10. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.score: 648.0
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence (...)
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  11. F. de Vignemont & P. Fourneret (2004). The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the "Who" System. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.score: 558.0
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is (...)
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  12. Pim Haselager (2013). Did I Do That? Brain–Computer Interfacing and the Sense of Agency. Minds and Machines 23 (3):405-418.score: 558.0
    Brain–computer interfacing (BCI) aims at directly capturing brain activity in order to enable a user to drive an application such as a wheelchair without using peripheral neural or motor systems. Low signal to noise ratio’s, low processing speed, and huge intra- and inter-subject variability currently call for the addition of intelligence to the applications, in order to compensate for errors in the production and/or the decoding of brain signals. However, the combination of minds and machines through BCI’s and intelligent devices (...)
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  13. Fernando Broncano (2006). Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency. Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 39:7-27.score: 558.0
    We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic (...)
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  14. Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Inner Sense of Action: Agency and Motor Representations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):23-40.score: 552.0
    Discusses the possibility of reconciling different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective. The author analyzes the relationship between agency and representation and how representation is intrinsically related to action control. The author also presents a new account of action, arguing against what is still commonly held as its proper definition, namely the final outcome of a cascade-like process that starts from the analysis of sensory data, incorporates the result of decision processes, and ends up with responses (actions) to (...)
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  15. Tim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.score: 543.0
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, (...)
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  16. Jakob Hohwy, The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.score: 522.0
    The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and (...)
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  17. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). A Metacognitive Model of the Feeling of Agency Over Bodily Actions. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research and Practice.score: 486.0
    I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation (...)
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  18. M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.score: 480.0
    There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that (...)
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  19. Daniel Cohen (2003). Review of Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):444 – 445.score: 480.0
    Review: Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology Jeanette Kennett New York Oxford University Press 2001 viii + 229 Hardback US$45 By Jeanette Kennett. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. viii + 229. Hardback:US$45.
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  20. Nicole David, Anna Stenzel, Till Schneider & Andreas Engel (2011). The Feeling of Agency: Empirical Indicators for a Pre-Reflective Level of Action Awareness. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 480.0
    The sense of agency has been defined as the sense that I am the author of my own actions. This sense, however, is usually not reflected upon but instead pre-reflectively experienced. Experimental approaches usually measure the sense of agency by judgments or verbal reports, despite evidence that the sense of agency is not sufficiently assessed on such a reflective level. Here we sought to identify non-verbal measures of the sense of (...), particularly testing the relevance of physiological activity such as skin conductance and heart rate. Manipulating the visual feedback to an executed movement, we investigated how well physiological activity and other movement parameters differed between real and false feedback (i.e., between actual agency and non-agency), and how they related to accuracy of agency judgments. Skin conductance and heart rate did not differ between agency and non-agency situations; neither did they inform agency judgments. In contrast, movement onsets—particularly, discrepancies between feedback and movement onsets—were related to agency judgments. Overall, our results indicate weak visceral-somatic associations with the sense of agency. Thus, physiological activity did not prove to be an empirical indicator for the feeling of agency. (shrink)
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  21. Axel Seemann (2009). Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the Feeling of Trust. Inquiry 52 (5):500-515.score: 477.0
    In this paper, I am going to be concerned with the capacity of human beings to act jointly. In particular, I will focus on the phenomenal aspect of collective action. I shall suggest that the experience of being jointly engaged with another is complex: it comprises both a practical grasp of oneself and of the other person as single agents participating in the joint pursuit, and an experience of collective immersion in the activity, which includes a sense of joint (...)
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  22. Anthony J. Marcel (2003). The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 48–93.score: 477.0
  23. Glenn Carruthers, A Metacognitive Model of the Sense of Agency Over Thoughts.score: 459.0
     A 41 year old housewife heard a voice coming from the house across the road. The voice went on incessantly in a flat monotone describing everything she was doing, with an admixture of critical comments ‘She is peeling potatoes, got hold of the peeler, she does not want that potato, she is putting it back, because she thinks it has a nobble like a penis, she has a dirty mind, she is peeling potatoes, now she is washing them ’ (...)
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  24. Patrick Haggard (2006). Conscious Intention and the Sense of Agency. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.score: 459.0
  25. Elizabeth Victor (2013). Agency, Identity, and Narrative: Making Sense of the Self in Same-Sex Divorce. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Issues 12 (2):16-19.score: 453.0
  26. James W. Moore, Anthony Dickinson & Paul C. Fletcher (2011). Sense of Agency, Associative Learning, and Schizotypy. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):792-800.score: 450.0
  27. James W. Moore, Daniel M. Wegner & Patrick Haggard (2009). Modulating the Sense of Agency with External Cues. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1056-1064.score: 450.0
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  28. N. David, A. Newen & K. Vogeley (2008). The “Sense of Agency” and its Underlying Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):523-534.score: 450.0
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  29. R. Curtis (1992). A Process View of Consciousness and the "Self": Integrating a Sense of Connectedness with a Sense of Agency. Psychological Inquiry 3:29-32.score: 450.0
  30. T. Asai, E. Sugimori & Y. Tanno (2008). Schizotypal Personality Traits and Prediction of One's Own Movements in Motor Control: What Causes an Abnormal Sense of Agency? Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1131-1142.score: 450.0
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  31. Eriko Sugimori, Tomohisa Asai & Yoshihiko Tanno (2011). Sense of Agency Over Thought: External Misattribution of Thought in a Memory Task and Proneness to Auditory Hallucination. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):688-695.score: 450.0
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  32. [deleted]Valã©Rian Chambon, Nura Sidarus & Patrick Haggard (2014). From Action Intentions to Action Effects: How Does the Sense of Agency Come About? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.score: 450.0
  33. Mikkel C. Vinding, Michael N. Pedersen & Morten Overgaard (2013). Unravelling Intention: Distal Intentions Increase the Subjective Sense of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):810-815.score: 450.0
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  34. P. C. Fletcher J. W. Moore, D. Middleton, P. Haggard (2012). Exploring Implicit and Explicit Aspects of Sense of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1748.score: 450.0
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  35. Kai Engbert, Andreas Wohlschläger & Patrick Haggard (2008). Who is Causing What? The Sense of Agency is Relational and Efferent-Triggered. Cognition 107 (2):693-704.score: 450.0
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  36. [deleted]Andreas Kalckert & H. Henrik Ehrsson (2012). Moving a Rubber Hand That Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6:40-40.score: 450.0
    During voluntary hand movement, we sense that we generate the movement and that the hand is a part of our body. These feelings of control over bodily actions, or the sense of agency, and the ownership of body parts are two fundamental aspects of the way we consciously experience our bodies. However, little is known about how these processes are functionally linked. Here, we introduce a version of the rubber hand illusion in which participants control the movements (...)
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  37. [deleted]Maria Cristina Cioffi, James W. Moore & Michael J. Banissy (2014). What Can Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia Tell Us About the Sense of Agency? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.score: 450.0
  38. [deleted]Anina Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Anke N. Karabanov, Mark S. Christensen & Jens Bo Nielsen (2014). 10 Hz rTMS Over Right Parietal Cortex Alters Sense of Agency During Self-Controlled Movements. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.score: 450.0
  39. J. Demanet, P. S. Muhle-Karbe, M. T. Lynn, I. Blotenberg & M. Brass (2013). Power to the Will: How Exerting Physical Effort Boosts the Sense of Agency. Cognition 129 (3):574-578.score: 450.0
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  40. Nicholas Hon, Jia-Hou Poh & Chun-Siong Soon (2013). Preoccupied Minds Feel Less Control: Sense of Agency is Modulated by Cognitive Load. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):556-561.score: 450.0
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  41. Sukhvinder S. Obhi, Kristina M. Swiderski & Sonja P. Brubacher (2012). Induced Power Changes the Sense of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1547-1550.score: 450.0
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  42. Takahiro Kawabe (2013). Inferring Sense of Agency From the Quantitative Aspect of Action Outcome. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):407-412.score: 450.0
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  43. James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi (2012). Intentional Binding and the Sense of Agency: A Review. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):546-561.score: 450.0
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  44. James W. Moore & P. C. Fletcher (2012). Sense of Agency in Health and Disease: A Review of Cue Integration Approaches. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):59-68.score: 450.0
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  45. Robrecht Prd van der Wel, Natalie Sebanz & Guenther Knoblich (2012). The Sense of Agency During Skill Learning in Individuals and Dyads. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1267-1279.score: 450.0
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  46. John A. Dewey & Thomas H. Carr (2013). When Dyads Act in Parallel, a Sense of Agency for the Auditory Consequences Depends on the Order of the Actions. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):155-166.score: 450.0
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  47. Chlöé Farrer, G. Valentin & J. M. Hupé (2013). The Time Windows of the Sense of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1431-1441.score: 450.0
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  48. James W. Moore, Daniel M. Wegner & Patrick Haggard (2011). Corrigendum to “Modulating the Sense of Agency with External Cues” [Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 1056–1064]. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1935.score: 450.0
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  49. James W. Moore, D. Middleton, Patrick Haggard & Paul C. Fletcher (2012). Exploring Implicit and Explicit Aspects of Sense of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1748-1753.score: 450.0
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  50. Vince Polito, Amanda J. Barnier & Erik Z. Woody (2013). Developing the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS): An Empirical Measure of Agency Disruption in Hypnosis. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):684-696.score: 450.0
    Two experiments report on the construction of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS), a new measure for quantifying alterations to agency. In Experiment 1, 370 participants completed a preliminary version of the scale following hypnosis. Factor analysis revealed two underlying factors: Involuntariness and Effortlessness. In Experiment 2, this two factor structure was confirmed in a sample of 113 low, medium and high hypnotisable participants. The two factors, Involuntariness and Effortlessness, correlated significantly with hypnotisability and pass rates (...)
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