Search results for 'sentimentalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  11
    Michael B. Gill, Humean Sentimentalism & Non-Consequentialist Moral (2011). Index to Volume 37. Hume Studies 37 (2):295-295.
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  2.  44
    Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing. In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press
    For ambitious metaphysical neo-sentimentalists, all normative facts are grounded in fitting attitudes, where fittingness is understood in naturalistic terms. In this paper, I offer a neo-sentimentalist account of blameworthiness in terms of the reactive attitudes of a morally authoritative subject I label a Nagelian Imp. I also argue that moral impermissibility is indirectly linked to blameworthiness: roughly, an act is morally impermissible if and only if and because it is not *possible* in the circumstances to adopt a plan of performing (...)
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  3.  98
    Michael Slote (2010). Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press.
    There has recently been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence and/or caring and their place in morality. In Moral Sentimentalism Michael Slote attempts to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so, primarily, in terms of the notion or phenomenon of empathy. Hume sought to do something like this over two (...)
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  4.  78
    András Szigeti (2015). Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas. Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.
    It is sometimes said that certain hard moral choices constitute tragic moral dilemmas in which no available course of action is justifiable, and so the agent is blameworthy whatever she chooses. This paper criticizes a certain approach to the debate about moral dilemmas and considers the metaethical implications of the criticisms. The approach in question has been taken by many advocates as well as opponents of moral dilemmas who believe that analysing the emotional response of the agent is the key (...)
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  5. Fabian Dorsch (2007). Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations. Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.
    Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on, or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot (...)
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  6.  55
    Michael S. Brady (2003). Some Worries About Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153.
    In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slote's normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slote's normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of (...)
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  7.  85
    Justin D'Arms (2011). Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141.
    This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to (...)
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  8. John Skorupski (2010). Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125 - 136.
    The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: (i) there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons (ii) value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel. (iii) all practical reasons are in one way or another (...)
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  9.  68
    Andrew Jordan & Stephanie Patridge (2012). Against the Moralistic Fallacy: A Modest Defense of a Modest Sentimentalism About Humor. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):83-94.
    In a series of important papers, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson argue that all extant neo-sentimentalists are guilty of a conflation error that they call the moralistic fallacy. One commits the moralistic fallacy when one infers from the fact that it would be morally wrong to experience an affective attitude—e.g., it would be wrong to be amused—that the attitude does not fit its object—e.g., that it is not funny. Such inferences, they argue, conflate the appropriateness conditions of attitudinal responses with (...)
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  10. Daniel Callcut (2009). Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority. Utilitas 21 (1):22-35.
    Mill’s aim in chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation. Chapter 3 emphasizes two claims: (1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs and (2) Ethical feelings (...)
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  11.  39
    Antti Kauppinen, Moral Sentimentalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12.  39
    Michael Slote (2003). Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project. Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):131-143.
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  13. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
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  14. Michael Slote (2004). Moral Sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-13.
    In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a (...)
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  15. Michael B. Gill (2007). Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.
    One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists developed rich analogies. The (...)
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  16.  15
    Eric Vogelstein (2016). A New Moral Sentimentalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
    This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
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  17.  22
    Robert Cowan (2016). Epistemic Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view (...)
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  18. Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols (2008). Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.
    When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided (...)
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  19.  2
    Michael Slote (2010). Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press Usa.
    There has been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in meta-ethical questions or in normative issues about caring or benevolence. The present book seeks to offer a systematically unified picture of both sorts of topics by making central use of the notion of empathy. The hope is that such an approach will give sentimentalism a "second chance" against the ethical rationalism that has typically dominated (...)
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  20.  47
    Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
    Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its (...)
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  21. Shaun Nichols, Sentimentalism Naturalized.
    Sentimentalism, the idea that the emotions or sentiments are crucial to moral judgment, has a long and distinguished history. Throughout this history, sentimentalists have often viewed themselves as offering a more naturalistically respectable account of moral judgment. In this paper, I’ll argue that they have not been naturalistic enough. The early, simple versions of sentimentalism met with decisive objections. The contemporary sentimentalist accounts successfully dodge these objections, but only by promoting an account of moral judgment that is far (...)
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  22.  49
    Michael B. Gill (2010). From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):13-31.
    The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to the Cambridge Platonists only briefly and in passing. The surface of Hutcheson, (...)
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  23. Christine Tappolet (2011). Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press
    Neo-sentmentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concepts of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in (...)
     
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  24.  35
    Michael B. Gill (2013). Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking. Hume Studies 37 (2):165-188.
    Of the many objections moral rationalists have raised against moral sentimentalism, none has been more long-lived and central than the claim that sentimentalism cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. John Balguy raised an early version of the non-consequentialist objection just two years after Francis Hutcheson published the first systematic development of moral sentimentalism. As Balguy understood it, Hutcheson's sentimentalism implied that what makes an action virtuous is its effects, such as the advantages or (...)
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  25.  23
    Hanno Sauer (2014). The Wrong Kind of Mistake: A Problem for Robust Sentimentalism About Moral Judgment. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):247-269.
    IntroductionIn a 1971 interview broadcast on Granada TV Manchester, Woody Allen made one of his trademark self-deprecating remarks about an early film of his: “It was a boring picture, as I recall.” The interviewer responded with surprise: “I rather enjoyed it.” To which Allen replied: “Yes, but you’re mistaken.” In the world of humor, Allen’s reply sounds odd – which is why it is funny. In the moral domain, an exchange like this would not sound weird at all. What is (...)
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  26. Shirong Luo (2004). Early Confucian Ethics and Moral Sentimentalism. Dissertation, University of Miami
    In this dissertation, the author compares early Confucian ethics with some forms of moral sentimentalism. The ethical views of two Confucian moralists, Kongzi and Mengzi are compared with Michael Slote's agent-based moral sentimentalist virtue ethics and Nel Noddings' feminine relational ethics of caring; the Confucian ethicist Xunzi's theory is compared with David Hume's classical version of moral sentimentalism. Through argumentation and theoretical reconstruction, the author attempts to establish that Kongzi and Mengzi's ethical accounts are agent-based while Xunzi's is (...)
     
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  27.  15
    Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2013). Moral Sentimentalism and the Reasonableness of Being Good. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2013 (no. 263):9-27.
    In this paper, I discuss the implications of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s sentimentalist theories for the question of whether and how we can offer reasons to be moral. Hutcheson and Hume agree that reason does not give us ultimate ends. Because of this, on Hutcheson’s line, the possession of affections and of a moral sense makes practical reasons possible. On Hume’s view, that reason does not give us ultimate ends means that reason does not motivate on its own, and this makes (...)
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  28. Michael Gill, Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth Michael B. Gill Section.
    Moral rationalism is the view that morality originates in reason alone. It is often contrasted with moral sentimentalism, which is the view that the origin of morality lies at least partly in (non-rational) sentiment. The eighteenth century saw pitched philosophical battles between rationalists and sentimentalists, and the issue continues to fuel disputes among moral philosophers today.
     
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  29.  15
    Benjamin D. Crowe (2012). Herder's Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, Sentimentalism and Theism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1141-1161.
    While the last several decades have seen a renaissance of scholarship on J. G. Herder (1744?1804), his moral philosophy has not been carefully examined. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, and to point the way for further research, by reconstructing his original and systematically articulated views on morality. Three interrelated elements of his position are explored in detail: (1) his perfectionism, or theory of the human good; (2) his sentimentalism, which includes moral epistemology and a (...)
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  30.  22
    Lori Watson (2011). Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):142-147.
    I present two challenges to the theory of moral sentimentalism that Michael Slote defends in his book. The first challenge aims to show that there are cases in which we empathize with an agent and yet judge her actions to be morally wrong. If such cases are plausible, then we have good reason to doubt Slote's claim that moral judgments are an affective attitude of warmth or chill and, thus, are purely sentiments. The second challenge is more of a (...)
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  31.  7
    Fuyuki Kurasawa (2013). The Sentimentalist Paradox: On the Normative and Visual Foundations of Humanitarianism. Journal of Global Ethics 9 (2):201 - 214.
    This paper examines how Western humanitarianism has attempted to work through its simultaneous commitment to individualized moral universalism and ambivalence about substantive global egalitarianism via what is identified as humanitarian sentimentalism, namely an ensemble of narrative and visual mechanisms designed to cultivate charitable moral sentiments among Euro-American publics toward victims of humanitarian crises in the global South. After briefly discussing how the aforementioned ambivalence is rooted in the founding philosophical principles of humanitarianism, the paper examines the visual economy of (...)
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  32.  3
    Monica Gerrek, Normative Sentimentalism and Animal Ethics.
    The purpose of this dissertation is to present what I think is a particularly compelling normative version of sentimentalism. The moral principle which is the foundation of this ethic is: An act, or a failure to act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and any consequence is disliked by the impartial spectator. I begin this (...)
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  33.  1
    M. S. Brady, Some Worries About Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism.
    In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slote's normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slote's normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of (...)
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  34.  2
    Gabriela Remow (2009). A Sentimentalist Approach to Dirty Hands–Hume, Smith, Burke. Essays in Philosophy 10 (1):6.
    This paper explores what the three best-known thinkers in the sentimentalist tradition - David Hume , Adam Smith , and Edmund Burke – have to say about the topic of “dirty hands” . Although the views of these philosophers have often been declared inconsistent, my project is to defend and resurrect key elements of their position, which may have value for this debate. I contend that a coherent and unified view about dirty hands may be extracted from their work. By (...)
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  35. N. Roughley & T. Schramme (2015). Introduction: Moral Sentimentalism: Context and Critique. In Neil Roughley & Thomas Schramme (eds.), On Moral Sentimentalism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 1-18.
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  36.  6
    Michael Slote (2014). A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind. OUP Usa.
    Michael Slote argues that emotion is involved in all human thought and action on conceptual grounds, rather than merely being causally connected with other aspects of the mind. Such a sentimentalist view of the mind provides solutions to important problems about belief and action that other approaches fail to address.
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  37.  67
    Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1–21.
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  38. François Schroeter (2006). The Limits of Sentimentalism. Ethics 116 (2):337-361.
    Unlike traditional sentimentalists, sophisticated sentimentalists don’t think that the main linguistic function of evaluative terms is simply to express emotional responses. Instead, they contend that to predicate an evaluative term to an object is to judge that a particular emotion is justified toward that object. I will raise a fundamental difficulty for the sophisticated sentimentalists’ attempt to provide a credible account of the meaning of our most important evaluative terms. A more careful examination of the relations between the affective and (...)
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  39. Noriaki Iwasa (2010). Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs. Prolegomena 9 (2):271-286.
    This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or moral sentiments varies according to one's metaphysical beliefs. For this, the essay mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, (...)
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  40. Michael Slote (2006). Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press 219--239.
     
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  41.  61
    Joshua Gert (2005). Neo-Sentimentalism and Disgust. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3):345-352.
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  42. James Quigley (2011). Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):483-486.
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  43.  32
    Michael B. Gill (2004). Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth. Hume Studies 30 (1):149-181.
  44.  33
    Simon Blackburn (2006). Must We Weep for Sentimentalism? In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub. 6--144.
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  45.  32
    Karsten R. Stueber (2011). Moral Approval and the Dimensions of Empathy: Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):328-336.
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  46.  14
    Remy Debes (2012). Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1):91-115.
    By founding morality on the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith implied that the nature of moral judgment was far more intuitive and accessible than their rationalist predecessors and contemporaries would, or at least easily could, allow. And yet, these ‘Sentimentalists’ faced the longstanding belief that the human affective psyche is a veritable labyrinth – an obstacle to practical morality if not something literally brutish in us. The Scottish Sentimentalists thus implicitly tasked themselves with distinguishing (...)
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  47.  86
    M. Schroeder (2011). Moral Sentimentalism. Philosophical Review 120 (3):452-455.
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  48. Noriaki Iwasa (2011). Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (33):323-352.
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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  49.  37
    A. M. Smith (2010). Moral Sentimentalism * by Michael Slote. Analysis 71 (1):197-200.
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  50.  22
    Jeffrey Edwards (2006). Hutcheson's “Sentimentalist Deontology?”. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (1):17-36.
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