Search results for 'sentimentalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael B. Gill, Humean Sentimentalism & Non-Consequentialist Moral (2011). Index to Volume 37. Hume Studies 37 (2):295-295.score: 30.0
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  2. John Skorupski (2010). Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125 - 136.score: 24.0
    The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: (i) there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons (ii) value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel. (iii) all practical reasons are in one way or another (...)
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  3. Justin D'Arms (2011). Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141.score: 24.0
    This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to (...)
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  4. Andrew Jordan & Stephanie Patridge (2012). Against the Moralistic Fallacy: A Modest Defense of a Modest Sentimentalism About Humor. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):83-94.score: 24.0
    In a series of important papers, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson argue that all extant neo-sentimentalists are guilty of a conflation error that they call the moralistic fallacy. One commits the moralistic fallacy when one infers from the fact that it would be morally wrong to experience an affective attitude—e.g., it would be wrong to be amused—that the attitude does not fit its object—e.g., that it is not funny. Such inferences, they argue, conflate the appropriateness conditions of attitudinal responses with (...)
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  5. Michael Slote (2010). Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    There has recently been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence and/or caring and their place in morality. In Moral Sentimentalism Michael Slote attempts to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so, primarily, in terms of the notion or phenomenon of empathy. Hume sought to do something like this over two (...)
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  6. Daniel Callcut (2009). Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority. Utilitas 21 (1):22-35.score: 21.0
    Mill’s aim in chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation. Chapter 3 emphasizes two claims: (1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs and (2) Ethical feelings (...)
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  7. Michael S. Brady (2003). Some Worries About Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153.score: 21.0
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  8. Michael Slote (2003). Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project. Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):131-143.score: 21.0
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  9. Antti Kauppinen, Moral Sentimentalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 21.0
  10. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.score: 18.0
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
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  11. Michael B. Gill (2007). Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.score: 18.0
    One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists developed rich analogies. The (...)
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  12. Michael Slote (2004). Moral Sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-13.score: 18.0
    In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a (...)
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  13. Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols (2008). Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.score: 18.0
    When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided (...)
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  14. Shaun Nichols, Sentimentalism Naturalized.score: 18.0
    Sentimentalism, the idea that the emotions or sentiments are crucial to moral judgment, has a long and distinguished history. Throughout this history, sentimentalists have often viewed themselves as offering a more naturalistically respectable account of moral judgment. In this paper, I’ll argue that they have not been naturalistic enough. The early, simple versions of sentimentalism met with decisive objections. The contemporary sentimentalist accounts successfully dodge these objections, but only by promoting an account of moral judgment that is far (...)
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  15. Christine Tappolet (2011). Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Neo-sentmentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concepts of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in (...)
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  16. Michael Gill, Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth Michael B. Gill Section.score: 18.0
    Moral rationalism is the view that morality originates in reason alone. It is often contrasted with moral sentimentalism, which is the view that the origin of morality lies at least partly in (non-rational) sentiment. The eighteenth century saw pitched philosophical battles between rationalists and sentimentalists, and the issue continues to fuel disputes among moral philosophers today.
     
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  17. Michael B. Gill (2010). From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):13-31.score: 18.0
    The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to the Cambridge Platonists only briefly and in passing. The surface of Hutcheson, (...)
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  18. Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.score: 18.0
    Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its (...)
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  19. Lori Watson (2011). Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):142-147.score: 18.0
    I present two challenges to the theory of moral sentimentalism that Michael Slote defends in his book. The first challenge aims to show that there are cases in which we empathize with an agent and yet judge her actions to be morally wrong. If such cases are plausible, then we have good reason to doubt Slote's claim that moral judgments are an affective attitude of warmth or chill and, thus, are purely sentiments. The second challenge is more of a (...)
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  20. Michael B. Gill (2013). Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking. Hume Studies 37 (2):165-188.score: 18.0
    Of the many objections moral rationalists have raised against moral sentimentalism, none has been more long-lived and central than the claim that sentimentalism cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. John Balguy raised an early version of the non-consequentialist objection just two years after Francis Hutcheson published the first systematic development of moral sentimentalism. As Balguy understood it, Hutcheson's sentimentalism implied that what makes an action virtuous is its effects, such as the advantages or (...)
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  21. Hanno Sauer (2014). The Wrong Kind of Mistake: A Problem for Robust Sentimentalism About Moral Judgment. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):247-269.score: 18.0
    IntroductionIn a 1971 interview broadcast on Granada TV Manchester, Woody Allen made one of his trademark self-deprecating remarks about an early film of his: “It was a boring picture, as I recall.” The interviewer responded with surprise: “I rather enjoyed it.” To which Allen replied: “Yes, but you’re mistaken.” In the world of humor, Allen’s reply sounds odd – which is why it is funny. In the moral domain, an exchange like this would not sound weird at all. What is (...)
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  22. Benjamin D. Crowe (2012). Herder's Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, Sentimentalism and Theism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1141-1161.score: 18.0
    While the last several decades have seen a renaissance of scholarship on J. G. Herder (1744?1804), his moral philosophy has not been carefully examined. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, and to point the way for further research, by reconstructing his original and systematically articulated views on morality. Three interrelated elements of his position are explored in detail: (1) his perfectionism, or theory of the human good; (2) his sentimentalism, which includes moral epistemology and a (...)
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  23. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2013). Moral Sentimentalism and the Reasonableness of Being Good. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2013 (no. 263):9-27.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I discuss the implications of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s sentimentalist theories for the question of whether and how we can offer reasons to be moral. Hutcheson and Hume agree that reason does not give us ultimate ends. Because of this, on Hutcheson’s line, the possession of affections and of a moral sense makes practical reasons possible. On Hume’s view, that reason does not give us ultimate ends means that reason does not motivate on its own, and this makes (...)
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  24. Fuyuki Kurasawa (2013). The Sentimentalist Paradox: On the Normative and Visual Foundations of Humanitarianism. Journal of Global Ethics 9 (2):201 - 214.score: 18.0
    This paper examines how Western humanitarianism has attempted to work through its simultaneous commitment to individualized moral universalism and ambivalence about substantive global egalitarianism via what is identified as humanitarian sentimentalism, namely an ensemble of narrative and visual mechanisms designed to cultivate charitable moral sentiments among Euro-American publics toward victims of humanitarian crises in the global South. After briefly discussing how the aforementioned ambivalence is rooted in the founding philosophical principles of humanitarianism, the paper examines the visual economy of (...)
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  25. François Schroeter (2006). The Limits of Sentimentalism. Ethics 116 (2):337-361.score: 16.0
    Unlike traditional sentimentalists, sophisticated sentimentalists don’t think that the main linguistic function of evaluative terms is simply to express emotional responses. Instead, they contend that to predicate an evaluative term to an object is to judge that a particular emotion is justified toward that object. I will raise a fundamental difficulty for the sophisticated sentimentalists’ attempt to provide a credible account of the meaning of our most important evaluative terms. A more careful examination of the relations between the affective and (...)
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  26. Noriaki Iwasa (2010). Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs. Prolegomena 9 (2):271-286.score: 15.0
    This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or moral sentiments varies according to one's metaphysical beliefs. For this, the essay mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, (...)
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  27. James Quigley (2011). Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):483-486.score: 15.0
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  28. M. Schroeder (2011). Moral Sentimentalism. Philosophical Review 120 (3):452-455.score: 15.0
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  29. Noriaki Iwasa (2011). Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (33):323-352.score: 15.0
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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  30. Sunny Yang (2009). The Appropriateness of Moral Emotion and Humean Sentimentalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):67-81.score: 15.0
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  31. Michael B. Gill (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 3 (2):397–400.score: 15.0
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  32. Joshua Gert (2005). Neo-Sentimentalism and Disgust. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3):345-352.score: 15.0
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  33. Fabian Dorsch (2007). Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations. Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.score: 15.0
  34. Noriaki Iwasa (2013). On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism. Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.score: 15.0
    This essay shows that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. To this end, the essay analyzes three defenses of Francis Hutcheson's, David Hume's, and Adam Smith's moral sense theories against the relativism charge that a moral sense or moral sentiments vary across people, societies, cultures, or times. The first defense is the claim that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. However, even if they exist, a moral sense or moral sentiments alone (...)
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  35. Virginia Held (2011). Care, Empathy, and Justice: Comment on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):312-318.score: 15.0
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  36. Makoto Suzuki (2012). Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 184 Pages. ISBN: 9780195391442 (Hbk.). Hardback: $65.00. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):131-133.score: 15.0
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  37. A. M. Smith (2010). Moral Sentimentalism * by Michael Slote. Analysis 71 (1):197-200.score: 15.0
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  38. Anita M. Superson (2012). Slote , Michael . Moral Sentimentalism .New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 163. $65.00 (Cloth). Ethics 122 (2):448-453.score: 15.0
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  39. Jeffrey Edwards (2006). Hutcheson's “Sentimentalist Deontology?”. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (1):17-36.score: 15.0
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  40. Remy Debes (2012). Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1):91-115.score: 15.0
  41. Lawrence Pasternack (2008). Intrinsic Value and Sentimentalism. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):141-151.score: 15.0
  42. Karsten R. Stueber (2011). Moral Approval and the Dimensions of Empathy: Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):328-336.score: 15.0
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  43. Michael B. Gill (2004). Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth. Hume Studies 30 (1):149-181.score: 15.0
  44. Julia Driver (2013). Moral Sense and Sentimentalism. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press. 358.score: 15.0
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  45. Louis E. Loeb (2003). Hume's Agent-Centered Sentimentalism. Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2):309-341.score: 15.0
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  46. Simon Blackburn (2006). Must We Weep for Sentimentalism? In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub.. 6--144.score: 15.0
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  47. Christine Tappolet (2011). Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 117.score: 15.0
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  48. Michael B. Gill (1998). On the Alleged Incompatibility Between Sentimentalism and Moral Confidence. History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (4):411 - 440.score: 15.0
  49. S. K. Wertz (2008). Intrinsic Value and Sentimentalism: Comments on Pasternack. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (2):21-24.score: 15.0
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