Search results for 'sequential choice' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Pitfalls for Realistic Decision Theory: An Illustration From Sequential Choice. Synthese 176 (1):23 - 40.score: 90.0
    Decision theory is a theory of rationality, but the concept of rationality has several different dimensions. Making decision theory more realistic with respect to one dimension may well have the result of making it less realistic in another dimension. This paper illustrates this tension in the context of sequential choice. Trying to make decision theory more realistic by accommodating resoluteness and commitment brings the normative assessment dimension of rationality into conflict with the action-guiding dimension. In the case of (...)
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  2. Katie Siobhan Steele (2010). What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting. Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.score: 78.0
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for (...)
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  3. Jerome L. Myers, Raymond E. Reilly & Harvey A. Taub (1961). Differential Cost, Gain, and Relative Frequency of Reward in a Sequential Choice Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (4):357.score: 75.0
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  4. Gonçalo Gutierres (2008). On Countable Choice and Sequential Spaces. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 54 (2):145-152.score: 60.0
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  5. G. Gutierres (2003). Sequential Topological Conditions in &Unknown; in the Absence of the Axiom of Choice. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 49 (3):293.score: 60.0
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  6. Leonard Katz (1964). Effects of Differential Monetary Gain and Loss on Sequential Two-Choice Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (3):245.score: 60.0
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  7. Robert J. Remington (1969). Analysis of Sequential Effects on Choice Reaction Times. Journal of Experimental Psychology 82 (2):250.score: 60.0
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  8. Roger W. Schvaneveldt & William G. Chase (1969). Sequential Effects in Choice Reaction Time. Journal of Experimental Psychology 80 (1):1.score: 60.0
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  9. Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations. Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.score: 54.0
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting (...)
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  10. Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp. Erkenntnis:1-14.score: 45.0
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be (...)
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  11. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). The Puzzle of the Hats. Synthese 172 (1):57 - 78.score: 45.0
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  12. Wlodek Rabinowicz (1997). On Seidenfeld‘s Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom. Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292.score: 45.0
    An agent who violates independence can avoid dynamic inconsistency in sequential choice if he is sophisticated enough to make use of backward induction in planning. However, Seidenfeld has demonstrated that such a sophisticated agent with dependent preferences is bound to violate the principle of dynamic substitution, according to which admissibility of a plan is preserved under substitution of indifferent options at various choice nodes in the decision tree. Since Seidenfeld considers dynamic substitution to be a coherence condition (...)
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  13. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2000). Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld. Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.score: 45.0
    Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In (...)
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  14. Fuad Aleskerov & Yetkin Çinar (2008). 'Q-Pareto-Scalar' Two-Stage Extremization Model and its Reducibility to One-Stage Model. Theory and Decision 65 (4):325-338.score: 45.0
    A two-stage sequential choice model is studied, the first stage being defined by q-Pareto multicriterial choice rule, and the second stage being defined by scalar extremization model. In this model, at the first stage the q-Pareto rule choses alternatives which are not only undominated in terms of Pareto comparison, but also includes into choice the alternatives which are dominated by no more than q alternatives. Since the choice set of the first-stage usually contains too many (...)
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  15. Wallis J. (2010). Dynamic Value Encoding in Sequential Choice Utilizes Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 4.score: 45.0
  16. Shirley C. Peeke & George C. Stone (1972). Sequential Effects in Two- and Four-Choice Tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology 92 (1):111.score: 42.0
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  17. Norman H. Anderson & Richard E. Whalen (1960). Likelihood Judgments and Sequential Effects in a Two-Choice Probability Learning Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 60 (2):111.score: 42.0
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  18. Louis Miller, David E. Meyer & John T. Lanzetta (1969). Choice Among Equal Expected Value Alternatives: Sequential Effects of Winning Probability Level on Risk Preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (3p1):419.score: 42.0
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  19. Delmer C. Nicks (1959). Prediction of Sequential Two-Choice Decisions From Event Runs. Journal of Experimental Psychology 57 (2):105.score: 42.0
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  20. Charles P. Whitman & E. Scott Geller (1972). Sequential Effects of Stimulus Probability and Prediction Outcome on Choice Reaction Time. Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (2):373.score: 42.0
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  21. Marianne Morillon (2010). Notions of Compactness for Special Subsets of ℝ I and Some Weak Forms of the Axiom of Choice. Journal of Symbolic Logic 75 (1):255-268.score: 36.0
    We work in set-theory without choice ZF. A set is Countable if it is finite or equipotent with ${\Bbb N}$ . Given a closed subset F of [0, 1] I which is a bounded subset of $\ell ^{1}(I)$ (resp. such that $F\subseteq c_{0}(I)$ ), we show that the countable axiom of choice for finite sets, (resp. the countable axiom of choice AC N ) implies that F is compact. This enhances previous results where AC N (resp. the (...)
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  22. Norbert Brunner (1983). Sequential Compactness and the Axiom of Choice. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (1):89-92.score: 36.0
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  23. A. Camacho (1975). Social Choice in a Sequential Environment. Theory and Decision 6 (4):419-437.score: 36.0
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  24. E. Soetens & J. Hueting (1991). Sequential Effects in Bimanual and Unimanual Serial 2-Choice Reaction-Time. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6):523-523.score: 36.0
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  25. E. Soetens & J. Hueting (1990). Sequential Effects in a Serial 4-Choice Reaction-Time-Task. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 28 (6):507-508.score: 36.0
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  26. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers. Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.score: 33.0
    In the standard money pump, an agent with cyclical preferences can avoid exploitation if he shows foresight and solves his sequential decision problem using backward induction (BI). This way out is foreclosed in a modified money pump, which has been presented in Rabinowicz (2000). There, BI will lead the agent to behave in a self-defeating way. The present paper describes another sequential decision problem of this kind, the Centipede for an Intransitive Preferrer, which in some respects is even (...)
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  27. Joseph Halpern & Leonard Poon (1971). Human Partial Reinforcement Extinction Effects: An Information Processing Development From Capaldi's Sequential Theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89 (1):207-227.score: 33.0
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  28. Nils‐Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich (2014). Unsharp Sharpness. Theoria 80 (1):100-103.score: 30.0
    In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.
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  29. Kyriakos Keremedis & Eleftherios Tachtsis (2003). On Sequentially Compact Subspaces Of. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (3):175-184.score: 30.0
    We show that the property of sequential compactness for subspaces of.
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  30. Jared M. Hotaling & Jerome R. Busemeyer (2012). DFT-D: A Cognitive-Dynamical Model of Dynamic Decision Making. Synthese 189 (S1):67-80.score: 27.0
    The study of decision making has traditionally been dominated by axiomatic utility theories. More recently, an alternative approach, which focuses on the micro-mechanisms of the underlying deliberation process, has been shown to account for several "paradoxes" in human choice behavior for which simple utility-based approaches cannot. Decision field theory (DFT) is a cognitive-dynamical model of decision making and preferential choice, built on the fundamental principle that decisions are based on the accumulation of subjective evaluations of choice alternatives (...)
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  31. Stephanie Goldfarb, KongFatt Wong-Lin, Michael Schwemmer, Naomi Ehrich Leonard & Philip Holmes (2012). Can Post-Error Dynamics Explain Sequential Reaction Time Patterns? Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 27.0
    We investigate human error dynamics in sequential two-alternative choice tasks. When subjects repeatedly discriminate between two stimuli, their error rates and mean reaction times (RTs) systematically depend on prior sequences of stimuli. We analyze these sequential effects on RTs, separating error and correct responses, and identify a sequential RT tradeoff: a sequence of stimuli which yields a relatively fast RT on error trials will produce a relatively slow RT on correct trials and vice versa. We reanalyze (...)
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  32. Adam Morton (1992). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (402):381-383.score: 27.0
    review of McLennen's *Rationality and Dynamic Choice*. The topic is important and the discussion is powerful. Some connection with modelling and simulation would be valuable.
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  33. Teddy Seidenfeld (2000). Substitution of Indifferent Options at Choice Nodes and Admissibility: A Reply to Rabinowicz. Theory and Decision 48 (4):305-310.score: 27.0
    Tiebreak rules are necessary for revealing indifference in non- sequential decisions. I focus on a preference relation that satisfies Ordering and fails Independence in the following way. Lotteries a and b are indifferent but the compound lottery f, 0.5b> is strictly preferred to the compound lottery f, 0.5a>. Using tiebreak rules the following is shown here: In sequential decisions when backward induction is applied, a preference like the one just described must alter the preference relation between a and (...)
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  34. Martin Lages, Stephanie C. Boyle & Katarzyna Jaworska (2013). Flipping a Coin in Your Head Without Monitoring Outcomes? Comments on Predicting Free Choices and a Demo Program. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 27.0
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  35. Houy Nicolas (2007). Rationality and Order-Dependent Sequential Rationality. Theory and Decision 62 (2):119-134.score: 27.0
    We show that an individual using a choice function is sequentially rational and the decisions he makes are independent of the order of implementation of the rationales if and only if he is rational with the union of the rationales as a base binary relation. When he makes his decisions following a choice correspondence, the sufficiency part of this claim still holds, the necessity part of it does not.
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  36. Bradley C. Love W. Bradley Knox, A. Ross Otto, Peter Stone (2011). The Nature of Belief-Directed Exploratory Choice in Human Decision-Making. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 24.0
    In non-stationary environments, there is a conflict between exploiting currently favored options and gaining information by exploring lesser-known options that in the past have proven less rewarding. Optimal decision making in such tasks requires considering future states of the environment (i.e., planning) and properly updating beliefs about the state of environment after observing outcomes associated with choices. Optimal belief-updating is reflective in that beliefs can change without directly observing environmental change. For example, after ten seconds elapse, one might correctly believe (...)
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  37. Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs (...)
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  38. Fany Yuval (2002). Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto. Theory and Decision 53 (4):343-369.score: 21.0
    The research reported here was the first empirical examination of strategic voting under the Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV) voting procedure, proposed by Mueller (1978). According to this procedure, a sequence of n voters must select s out of s+m alternatives (m=n=2; s>0). Hence, the number of alternatives exceeds the number of participants by one (n+1). When the ith voter casts her vote, she vetoes the alternative against which a veto has not yet been cast, and the s remaining (...)
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  39. Ward Edwards (1956). Reward Probability, Amount, and Information as Determiners of Sequential Two-Alternative Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 52 (3):177.score: 21.0
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  40. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.score: 18.0
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those (...)
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  41. Susanne Bobzien (2014). Choice and Moral Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics Iii 1-5. In R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. 81-109.score: 18.0
    ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...)
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  42. William S. Wilkerson (2009). Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation. Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):97-116.score: 18.0
    Argues that choice, as a form of interpretation, is completely intertwined with the development of both sexual orientation and sexual identity. Sexual orientation is not simply a given, or determined aspect of personality.
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  43. Jacob Busch (2009). Underdetermination and Rational Choice of Theories. Philosophia 37 (1):55-65.score: 18.0
    The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists are reasonable in (...)
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  44. Gideon Elford (2013). Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):139-149.score: 18.0
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of (...)
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  45. Richard Holton (2006). The Act of Choice. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (3):1-15.score: 18.0
    Choice is one of the central elements in the experience of free will, but it has not received a good account from either compatibilists or libertarians. This paper develops an account of choice based around three features: (i) choice is an action; (ii) choice is not determined by one's prior beliefs and desires; (iii) once the question of what to do has arisen, choice is typically both necessary and sufficient for moving to action. These features (...)
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  46. Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.score: 18.0
    Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity (...)
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  47. Milena Ivanova & Cedric Paternotte (2013). Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1109-1132.score: 18.0
    There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in (...)
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  48. Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Rogeberg (2013). Addiction: Choice or Compulsion? Frontiers in Addictive Disorders and Behavioral Dyscontrol 4 (77):11.score: 18.0
    Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain (...)
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