Search results for 'sequential choice' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  93
    José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Pitfalls for Realistic Decision Theory: An Illustration From Sequential Choice. Synthese 176 (1):23 - 40.
    Decision theory is a theory of rationality, but the concept of rationality has several different dimensions. Making decision theory more realistic with respect to one dimension may well have the result of making it less realistic in another dimension. This paper illustrates this tension in the context of sequential choice. Trying to make decision theory more realistic by accommodating resoluteness and commitment brings the normative assessment dimension of rationality into conflict with the action-guiding dimension. In the case of (...)
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  2.  1
    Jerome L. Myers, Raymond E. Reilly & Harvey A. Taub (1961). Differential Cost, Gain, and Relative Frequency of Reward in a Sequential Choice Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (4):357.
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  3.  16
    Katie Siobhan Steele (2010). What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting. Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for (...)
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  4.  2
    Gonçalo Gutierres (2008). On Countable Choice and Sequential Spaces. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 54 (2):145-152.
    Under the axiom of choice, every first countable space is a Fréchet-Urysohn space. Although, in its absence even ℝ may fail to be a sequential space.Our goal in this paper is to discuss under which set-theoretic conditions some topological classes, such as the first countable spaces, the metric spaces, or the subspaces of ℝ, are classes of Fréchet-Urysohn or sequential spaces.In this context, it is seen that there are metric spaces which are not sequential spaces. This (...)
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  5.  5
    G. Gutierres (2003). Sequential Topological Conditions in &Unknown; in the Absence of the Axiom of Choice. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 49 (3):293.
    It is known that – assuming the axiom of choice – for subsets A of ℝ the following hold: A is compact iff it is sequentially compact, A is complete iff it is closed in ℝ, ℝ is a sequential space. We will show that these assertions are not provable in the absence of the axiom of choice, and that they are equivalent to each.
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  6.  2
    Robert J. Remington (1969). Analysis of Sequential Effects on Choice Reaction Times. Journal of Experimental Psychology 82 (2):250.
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  7. Roger W. Schvaneveldt & William G. Chase (1969). Sequential Effects in Choice Reaction Time. Journal of Experimental Psychology 80 (1):1.
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  8.  48
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations. Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting (...)
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  9.  2
    Leonard Katz (1964). Effects of Differential Monetary Gain and Loss on Sequential Two-Choice Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (3):245.
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  10.  4
    Louis Miller, David E. Meyer & John T. Lanzetta (1969). Choice Among Equal Expected Value Alternatives: Sequential Effects of Winning Probability Level on Risk Preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (3p1):419.
  11.  2
    Norman H. Anderson & Richard E. Whalen (1960). Likelihood Judgments and Sequential Effects in a Two-Choice Probability Learning Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 60 (2):111.
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  12. Delmer C. Nicks (1959). Prediction of Sequential Two-Choice Decisions From Event Runs. Journal of Experimental Psychology 57 (2):105.
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  13.  1
    Shirley C. Peeke & George C. Stone (1972). Sequential Effects in Two- and Four-Choice Tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology 92 (1):111.
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  14. Charles P. Whitman & E. Scott Geller (1972). Sequential Effects of Stimulus Probability and Prediction Outcome on Choice Reaction Time. Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (2):373.
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  15.  2
    Norbert Brunner (1983). Sequential Compactness and the Axiom of Choice. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (1):89-92.
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  16. A. Camacho (1975). Social Choice in a Sequential Environment. Theory and Decision 6 (4):419-437.
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  17. E. Soetens & J. Hueting (1991). Sequential Effects in Bimanual and Unimanual Serial 2-Choice Reaction-Time. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6):523-523.
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  18. E. Soetens & J. Hueting (1990). Sequential Effects in a Serial 4-Choice Reaction-Time-Task. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 28 (6):507-508.
     
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  19.  14
    Johan E. Gustafsson (2015). Sequential Dominance and the Anti-Aggregation Principle. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1593–1601.
    According to the widely held anti-aggregation principle, it is wrong to save a larger number of people from minor harms rather than a smaller number from much more serious harms. This principle is a central part of many influential and anti-utilitarian ethical theories. According to the sequential-dominance principle, one does something wrong if one knowingly performs a sequence of acts whose outcome would be worse for everyone than the outcome of an alternative sequence of acts. The intuitive appeal of (...)
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  20. Jake Chandler (2014). Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be (...)
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  21.  65
    Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). The Puzzle of the Hats. Synthese 172 (1):57 - 78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  22.  11
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (1997). On Seidenfeld‘s Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom. Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292.
    An agent who violates independence can avoid dynamic inconsistency in sequential choice if he is sophisticated enough to make use of backward induction in planning. However, Seidenfeld has demonstrated that such a sophisticated agent with dependent preferences is bound to violate the principle of dynamic substitution, according to which admissibility of a plan is preserved under substitution of indifferent options at various choice nodes in the decision tree. Since Seidenfeld considers dynamic substitution to be a coherence condition (...)
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  23.  6
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2000). Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld. Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.
    Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In (...)
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  24. Fuad Aleskerov & Yetkin Çinar (2008). 'Q-Pareto-Scalar' Two-Stage Extremization Model and its Reducibility to One-Stage Model. Theory and Decision 65 (4):325-338.
    A two-stage sequential choice model is studied, the first stage being defined by q-Pareto multicriterial choice rule, and the second stage being defined by scalar extremization model. In this model, at the first stage the q-Pareto rule choses alternatives which are not only undominated in terms of Pareto comparison, but also includes into choice the alternatives which are dominated by no more than q alternatives. Since the choice set of the first-stage usually contains too many (...)
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  25.  48
    Adam Morton (1992). Review of McLennen *Rationality and Dynamic Choice*. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (402):381-383.
    review of McLennen's *Rationality and Dynamic Choice*. The topic is important and the discussion is powerful. Some connection with modelling and simulation would be valuable.
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  26.  6
    Marianne Morillon (2010). Notions of Compactness for Special Subsets of ℝ I and Some Weak Forms of the Axiom of Choice. Journal of Symbolic Logic 75 (1):255-268.
    We work in set-theory without choice ZF. A set is Countable if it is finite or equipotent with ${\Bbb N}$ . Given a closed subset F of [0, 1] I which is a bounded subset of $\ell ^{1}(I)$ (resp. such that $F\subseteq c_{0}(I)$ ), we show that the countable axiom of choice for finite sets, (resp. the countable axiom of choice AC N ) implies that F is compact. This enhances previous results where AC N (resp. the (...)
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  27. Joseph Halpern & Leonard Poon (1971). Human Partial Reinforcement Extinction Effects: An Information Processing Development From Capaldi's Sequential Theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89 (1):207-227.
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  28.  39
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers. Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.
    In the standard money pump, an agent with cyclical preferences can avoid exploitation if he shows foresight and solves his sequential decision problem using backward induction (BI). This way out is foreclosed in a modified money pump, which has been presented in Rabinowicz (2000). There, BI will lead the agent to behave in a self-defeating way. The present paper describes another sequential decision problem of this kind, the Centipede for an Intransitive Preferrer, which in some respects is even (...)
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  29.  4
    Teddy Seidenfeld (2000). Substitution of Indifferent Options at Choice Nodes and Admissibility: A Reply to Rabinowicz. Theory and Decision 48 (4):305-310.
    Tiebreak rules are necessary for revealing indifference in non- sequential decisions. I focus on a preference relation that satisfies Ordering and fails Independence in the following way. Lotteries a and b are indifferent but the compound lottery f, 0.5b> is strictly preferred to the compound lottery f, 0.5a>. Using tiebreak rules the following is shown here: In sequential decisions when backward induction is applied, a preference like the one just described must alter the preference relation between a and (...)
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  30.  16
    Nils‐Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich (2014). Unsharp Sharpness. Theoria 80 (1):100-103.
    In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's, Gärdenfors and Sahlin's, and Kyburg's, though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.
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  31.  10
    Jared M. Hotaling & Jerome R. Busemeyer (2012). DFT-D: A Cognitive-Dynamical Model of Dynamic Decision Making. Synthese 189 (S1):67-80.
    The study of decision making has traditionally been dominated by axiomatic utility theories. More recently, an alternative approach, which focuses on the micro-mechanisms of the underlying deliberation process, has been shown to account for several "paradoxes" in human choice behavior for which simple utility-based approaches cannot. Decision field theory (DFT) is a cognitive-dynamical model of decision making and preferential choice, built on the fundamental principle that decisions are based on the accumulation of subjective evaluations of choice alternatives (...)
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  32.  5
    Fany Yuval (2002). Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto. Theory and Decision 53 (4):343-369.
    The research reported here was the first empirical examination of strategic voting under the Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV) voting procedure, proposed by Mueller (1978). According to this procedure, a sequence of n voters must select s out of s+m alternatives (m=n=2; s>0). Hence, the number of alternatives exceeds the number of participants by one (n+1). When the ith voter casts her vote, she vetoes the alternative against which a veto has not yet been cast, and the s remaining (...)
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  33. Kyriakos Keremedis & Eleftherios Tachtsis (2003). On Sequentially Compact Subspaces Of. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (3):175-184.
    We show that the property of sequential compactness for subspaces of.
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  34. Kyriakos Keremedis & Eleftherios Tachtsis (2003). On Sequentially Compact Subspaces Of. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (3):175-184.
    We show that the property of sequential compactness for subspaces of.
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  35. Kyriakos Keremedis & Eleftherios Tachtsis (2003). On Sequentially Compact Subspaces Of. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (3):175-184.
    We show that the property of sequential compactness for subspaces of.
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  36.  90
    Remco Heesen (2015). How Much Evidence Should One Collect? Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2299-2313.
    A number of philosophers of science and statisticians have attempted to justify conclusions drawn from a finite sequence of evidence by appealing to results about what happens if the length of that sequence tends to infinity. If their justifications are to be successful, they need to rely on the finite sequence being either indefinitely increasing or of a large size. These assumptions are often not met in practice. This paper analyzes a simple model of collecting evidence and finds that the (...)
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  37.  8
    Houy Nicolas (2007). Rationality and Order-Dependent Sequential Rationality. Theory and Decision 62 (2):119-134.
    We show that an individual using a choice function is sequentially rational and the decisions he makes are independent of the order of implementation of the rationales if and only if he is rational with the union of the rationales as a base binary relation. When he makes his decisions following a choice correspondence, the sufficiency part of this claim still holds, the necessity part of it does not.
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  38.  17
    Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our (...)
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  39.  36
    Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also (...)
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  40.  3
    Arvid O. I. Hoffmann, Sam F. Henry & Nikos Kalogeras (2013). Aspirations as Reference Points: An Experimental Investigation of Risk Behavior Over Time. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 75 (2):193-210.
    This paper examines the importance of aspirations as reference points in a multi-period decision-making context. After stating their personal aspiration level, 172 individuals made six sequential decisions among risky prospects as part of a choice experiment. The results show that individuals make different risky-choices in a multi-period compared to a single-period setting. In particular, individuals’ aspiration level is their main reference point during the early stages of decision-making, while their starting status (wealth level at the start of the (...)
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  41.  10
    Arnon Avron & Beata Konikowska (2009). Proof Systems for Reasoning About Computation Errors. Studia Logica 91 (2):273-293.
    In the paper we examine the use of non-classical truth values for dealing with computation errors in program specification and validation. In that context, 3-valued McCarthy logic is suitable for handling lazy sequential computation, while 3-valued Kleene logic can be used for reasoning about parallel computation. If we want to be able to deal with both strategies without distinguishing between them, we combine Kleene and McCarthy logics into a logic based on a non-deterministic, 3-valued matrix, incorporating both options as (...)
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  42. Kyriakos Keremedis & Eleftherios Tachtsis (2003). On Sequentially Compact Subspaces of Without the Axiom of Choice. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (3):175-184.
    We show that the property of sequential compactness for subspaces of.
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  43.  6
    Rachael Briggs (2016). Costs of Abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):827-840.
    Risk-weighted expected utility theory permits preferences which violate the Sure-Thing Principle. But preferences that violate the STP can lead to bad decisions in sequential choice problems. In particular, they can lead decision-makers to adopt a strategy that is dominated – i.e. a strategy such that some available alternative leads to a better outcome in every possible state of the world.
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  44. Seamus Bradley and Katie Steele (2015). Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist. Philosophy of Science 83 (1):1-28.
    This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid `free' evidence before making a decision, and rational agents may have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good's theorem concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is (...)
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  45.  21
    Michael Bacharach (1992). Backward Induction and Beliefs About Oneself. Synthese 91 (3):247-284.
    According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by backward induction or folding back. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the depth of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is (...)
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  46. Michael J. Almeida (2014). The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings. Routledge.
    _The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings_ addresses the problems an Anselmian perfect being faces in contexts involving unlimited options. Recent advances in the theory of vagueness, the metaphysics of multiverses and hyperspace, the theory of dynamic or sequential choice, the logic of moral and rational dilemmas, and metaethical theory provide the resources to formulate the new challenges and the Anselmian responses with an unusual degree of precision. Almeida shows that the challenges arising in the unusual contexts involving (...)
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  47. Michael J. Almeida (2012). The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings. Routledge.
    _The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings_ addresses the problems an Anselmian perfect being faces in contexts involving unlimited options. Recent advances in the theory of vagueness, the metaphysics of multiverses and hyperspace, the theory of dynamic or sequential choice, the logic of moral and rational dilemmas, and metaethical theory provide the resources to formulate the new challenges and the Anselmian responses with an unusual degree of precision. Almeida shows that the challenges arising in the unusual contexts involving (...)
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  48. Isaac Levi (2012). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our (...)
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  49. Jacob Stegenga (2015). Theory Choice and Social Choice: Okasha Versus Sen. Mind 124 (493):263-277.
    A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the Arrow analogue for (...)
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  50.  70
    Melissa Fusco (2015). Deontic Modality and the Semantics of Choice. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (28).
    I propose a unified solution to two puzzles: Ross's puzzle and free choice permission. I begin with a pair of cases from the decision theory literature illustrating the phenomenon of act dependence, where what an agent ought to do depends on what she does. The notion of permissibility distilled from these cases forms the basis for my analysis of 'may' and 'ought'. This framework is then combined with a generalization of the classical semantics for disjunction — equivalent to Boolean (...)
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