Search results for 'simplicity of mental acts' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  18
    Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2009). Jerónimo Pardo on the Unity of Mental Propositions. In J. Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'Âge Classique. Peeters Publishers
    Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of (...) propositions is developed into several specific thesis about mental propositions: a) it is not judgement which gives its unity to mental propositions, but judicative acts always follow some previous apprehensive act that is simple in its own right; b) this simplicity is compatible with a certain kind of complexity, that can be explained in terms of the "causal history" of the acts of knowing; c) traditional conceptions about subject and predicate must be recast, while keeping their usual explicative power concerning logical properties; d) of course, the traditional conception about the copula has been modified, giving rise to a fully innovative conception of the nature of mental propositions. Nevertheless, this innovative conception of mental language seems still infected by certain "common sense" prejudices, which lead Pardo to propose also a provocative conception of vocal language, which I consider unnecessary. (shrink)
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  2.  91
    Gilbert Ryle (2000). Courses of Action or the Uncatchableness of Mental Acts. Philosophy 75 (3):331-344.
    We falter and stammer when trying to describe our own mental acts. Many mental acts, including thinking, are what the author calls ‘chain-undertakings’, that is, courses of action with some over-arching purpose governing the moment-by-moment sub-acts of which we are introspectively aware. Hence the intermittency and sporadicness of the passage of mental activity which constitutes thinking about something.
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  3.  62
    Richard W. Taylor (1963). The Stream of Thoughts Versus Mental Acts. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):311-321.
  4.  29
    Richard E. Aquila (1976). Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts. Penn St University Press.
    This book is a critical and analytical survey of the major attempts, in modern philosophy, to deal with the phenomenon of intentionality—those of Descartes, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Russell, Bergmann, Chisholm, and Sellars. By coordinating the semantical approaches to the phenomenon, Dr. Aquila undertakes to provide a basis for dialogue among philosophers of different persuasions. "Intentionality" has become, since Franz Brentano revived its original medieval use, the standard term describing the mind's apparently paradoxical capacity to relate itself to objects existing (...)
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  5.  15
    M. M. Large, C. J. Ryan, O. B. Nielssen & R. A. Hayes (2008). The Danger of Dangerousness: Why We Must Remove the Dangerousness Criterion From Our Mental Health Acts. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):877-881.
    Objectives: The mental health legislation of most developed countries includes either a dangerousness criterion or an obligatory dangerousness criterion (ODC). A dangerousness criterion holds that mentally ill people may be given treatment without consent if they are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. An ODC holds that mentally ill people may be given treatment without consent only if they are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. This paper argues that the dangerousness criterion is (...)
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  6.  10
    Matthew M. Large, Christopher J. Ryan, Olav B. Nielssen & R. A. Hayes (2008). The Danger of Dangerousness: Why We Must Remove the Dangerousness Criterion From Our Mental Health Acts. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):877-881.
    Objectives: The mental health legislation of most developed countries includes either a dangerousness criterion or an obligatory dangerousness criterion . A dangerousness criterion holds that mentally ill people may be given treatment without consent if they are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. An ODC holds that mentally ill people may be given treatment without consent only if they are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. This paper argues that the dangerousness criterion is (...)
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  7.  30
    Dallas Willard (1981). Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1):132-134.
  8. David Barnett, On the Simplicity of Mental Beings.
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  9.  5
    Robert E. Innis (1973). Polanyi's Model of Mental Acts. New Scholasticism 47 (2):147-178.
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  10.  1
    Gilbert Ry le (2000). Courses of Action or the Uncatchableness of Mental Acts. Philosophy 75:331.
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  11.  10
    Yiwei Zheng (1998). Metaphysical Simplicity and Semantical Complexity of Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental Language. Modern Schoolman 75 (4):253-264.
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  12.  4
    Kathleen R. Gibson (1991). Genetically Determined Neural Modules Versus Mental Constructional Acts in the Genesis of Human Intelligence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):308-309.
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  13. Joëlle Proust (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese 129 (1):105-128.
    A prominent but poorly understood domain of human agency is mental action, i.e., thecapacity for reaching specific desirable mental statesthrough an appropriate monitoring of one's own mentalprocesses. The present paper aims to define mentalacts, and to defend their explanatory role againsttwo objections. One is Gilbert Ryle's contention thatpostulating mental acts leads to an infinite regress.The other is a different although related difficulty,here called the access puzzle: How can the mindalready know how to act in order to (...)
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  14. Indrek Reiland (2012). Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):239-245.
    Peter Hanks and Scott Soames have recently developed similar views of propositional attitudes on which they consist at least partly of being disposed to perform mental acts. Both think that to believe a proposition is at least partly to be disposed to perform the primitive propositional act: one the performance of which is part of the performance of any other propositional act. However, they differ over whether the primitive act is the forceless entertaining or the forceful judging. In (...)
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  15.  76
    Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular (...)
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  16.  12
    David Gil (1983). Intuitionism, Transformational Generative Grammar and Mental Acts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 14 (3):231-254.
    A remarkable philosophical affinity may be observed between the intuitionistic conception of mathematics and the transformational generative approach to the study of language: both disciplines profess a mentalistic ontology, both posit an idealized subject, and both insist on their autonomy with respect to other disciplines. This philosophical parallel is formalized in terms of a generalization of the intuitionistic notion of creative subject; resulting are the foundations of a unified theory of mental acts based on intuitionistic logic — capturing, (...)
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  17. Joëlle Proust (2013). Mental Acts as Natural Kinds. In Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press 262-282.
    This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given (...)
     
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  18. Simone Gozzano (2008). Tropes' Simplicity and Mental Causation. Ontos Verlag.
    In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving (...)
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  19. Shashi Motilal (1986). An Analysis of Searle's Theory of the Intentionality of Speech Acts. Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
    It is an indubitable fact that our thoughts are always about something or some state of affairs in the world. Again, it is true that we use language to express some of our thoughts, and that in such a use of language which philosophers call a speech act, language also comes to be about something or some state of affairs in the world. E.g., when someone asserts that Peter is married to Mary, the sentence, 'Peter is married to Mary', comes (...)
     
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  20.  15
    Rachel Goodman (2016). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):437-461.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular (...)
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  21.  22
    Alister Browne (2010). Mental Health Acts in Canada. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (3):290-298.
    There are 12 different Mental Health Acts in Canada, all of which provide for the involuntary confinement of the mentally disordered to protect both them from themselves and others from them. The Acts differ in many ways, but three issues stand out above all: involuntary admission criteria, the right to refuse treatment, and who has the authority to authorize treatment. I first describe how the MHAs differ on these issues. I then take up the methodological question of (...)
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  22. Robert Welsh Jordan (1973). Being and Time: Some Aspects of the Ego's Involvement in His Mental Life. In Fred Kersten & Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns. Springer 105-113.
    The most obvious cases of ego-involvement in conscious life are those which Husserl calls conscious acts or cogitationes.[2] They are the most obvious cases because they are the ones in which the ego explicitly involves himself in some way ; they exhibit the character of being engaged in by the ego or having been engaged in by him. This ego-quality or character belongs demonstrably to every conscious process in which the ego engages or lives. In the ego's conscious life, (...)
     
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  23.  17
    Alister Browne (2016). Mill on Mental Health Acts. Utilitas 28 (1):1-18.
    Mental health acts allow for interference with the liberty of the individual. As such, they serve as test cases for theories of liberty, and thus the question of what Mill would think about them arises. My aim is to answer this question. I argue that Mill would embrace mental health acts to protect mentally disturbed individuals from themselves and others from them, and that they should have broad admission criteria, allow capable patients to refuse treatment, and (...)
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  24.  21
    Fabrizio Amerini (2009). William of Ockham and Mental Synonymy. The Case of Nugation. Franciscan Studies 67 (1):375-403.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. William of Ockham and Mental SynonymyIn recent years an important point of discussion among the scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham's mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an (...)
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  25.  15
    Martin Pickavé (2010). On the Intentionality of the Emotions (and of Other Appetitive Acts). Quaestio 10 (1):45-63.
    In recent philosophical debates about the nature of human emotions the intentionality of emotions plays a key part. The article explores how medieval philosophers of the late 13th and early 14th centuries accounted for the fact that our emotions, such as love, hate, anger and the like, are intentional mental states, states that are ‘of’ or ‘about something’. Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader (...)
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  26.  17
    Andrew Gleeson (2010). More on the Power of God: A Rejoinder to William Hasker. Sophia 49 (4):617-629.
    In ‘The Power of God’ (Gleeson 2010) I elaborate and defend an argument by the late D.Z. Phillips against definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. In ‘Which God? What Power? A Response to Andrew Gleeson’ (Hasker 2010), William Hasker criticizes my defense of Phillips’ argument. Here I contend his criticisms do not succeed. I distinguish three definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. Hasker agrees that the first fails. The second fails because negative properties (like disembodiedment and (...)
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  27.  29
    Lorne Falkenstein (1995). Hume and Reid on the Simplicity of the Soul. Hume Studies 21 (1):25-45.
    Reid is well known for rejecting the "philosophy of ideas"--a theory of mental representation that he claimed to find in its most vitriolic form in Hume. But there was another component of Hume's philosophy that exerted an equally powerful influence on Reid: Hume's attack on the notion of spiritual substance in _Treatise 1.4.5. I summarize this neglected aspect of Hume's philosophy and argue that much of Reid's epistemology can be explained as an attempt to buttress dualism against the effects (...)
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  28. Michael Wilby (2010). The Simplicity of Mutual Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):83-100.
    Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer’s iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations (...)
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  29. Gary Hatfield (2008). Mental Acts and Mechanistic Psychology in Descartes' Passions. In Neil Robertson, Gordon McOuat & Tom Vinci (eds.), Descartes and the Modern. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 49-71.
    This chapter examines the mechanistic psychology of Descartes in the _Passions_, while also drawing on the _Treatise on Man_. It develops the idea of a Cartesian “psychology” that relies on purely bodily mechanisms by showing that he explained some behaviorally appropriate responses through bodily mechanisms alone and that he envisioned the tailoring of such responses to environmental circumstances through a purely corporeal “memory.” An animal’s adjustment of behavior as caused by recurring patterns of sensory stimulation falls under the notion of (...)
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  30.  1
    Joëlle Proust, A Plea for Mental Acts.
    An attempt at solving two puzzles raised by the notion of a mental act is made, and a definition of a mental action escaping these puzzles is offered.
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  31.  69
    Peter T. Geach (1957). Mental Acts: Their Content And Their Objects. Humanities Press.
    ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT THE TITLE I have chosen for this work is a mere label for a set of problems; the controversial views that have historically been ...
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  32. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  33. Philip J. Walsh (2013). Husserl's Concept of Motivation: The Logical Investigations and Beyond. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:70-83.
    Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project, even if it is not essen- tial for defining expression in the First Investigation. For Husserl, motivation is a relation between mental (...) whereby the content of one act make some fur- ther meaningful content probable. I explicate the nature of this relation in terms of “evidentiary weight” and differentiate it from Husserl’s notion of Evidenz, often translated as “self-evidence”. I elucidate the importance of motivation in Husserl’s overall phenomenological project by focusing on his analyses of thing-perception and empathy. Through these examples, we can better understand the continuity between the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s later work. (shrink)
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  34.  66
    Peter Geach (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT THE TITLE I have chosen for this work is a mere label for a set of problems; the controversial views that have historically been ...
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  35.  63
    Luca Malatesti & Marko Jurjako (2016). Vrijednosti u psihijatriji i pojam mentalne bolesti (Eng. Values in psychiatry and the concept of mental illness). Moralni, Politički I Epistemološki Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Epistemological Responses to Antisocial Deviation).
    The crucial problem in the philosophy of psychiatry is to determine under which conditions certain behaviors, mental states, and personality traits should be regarded as symptoms of mental illnesses. Participants in the debate can be placed on a continuum of positions. On the one side of the continuum, there are naturalists who maintain that the concept of mental illness can be explained by relying on the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences, such as biology and neuroscience. On (...)
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  36.  11
    Catherine Kemp (2000). Two Meanings of the Term "Idea": Acts and Contents in Hume's Treatise. Journal of the History of Ideas 61 (4):675-690.
    Hume uses the term 'idea' to refer to both mental acts and mental contents.
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  37. W. B. Gallie (1947). Does Psychology Study Mental Acts or Dispositions, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 134:134-153.
     
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  38. C. A. Mace (1947). Does Psychology Study Mental Acts or Dispositions, Part III. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 164:164-174.
     
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  39. W. J. H. Sprott (1947). Does Psychology Study Mental Acts or Dispositions, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 154:154-163.
     
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  40. Joseph Shieber (2013). Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):266-294.
    In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage’s discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition. If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the (...)
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  41.  32
    Barry Smith (1987). Husserl, Language and the Ontology of the Act. In D. D. Buzzetti & M. Ferriani (eds.), Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language. John Benjamins
    The ontology of language is concerned with the relations between uses of language, both overt and covert, and other entities, whether in the world or in the mind of the thinking subject. We attempt a first survey of the sorts of relations which might come into question for such an ontology, including: relations between referring uses of expressions and their objects, relations between the use of a (true) sentence and that in the world which makes it true, relations between (...) acts on the one hand and underlying mental states (attitudes, beliefs), on the other, relations between my acts and states, associated uses of language and overt actions on my part and on the part of those other subjects with whom I communicate. (shrink)
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  42.  35
    Gyula Klima, Semantic Complexity and Syntactic Simplicity in Ockham's Mental Language.
    In these comments I am going to argue that Yiwei Zheng's paper, by postulating an imaginary mental language in a proposed new interpretation of Ockham's conception of mental language, provides us with an imaginary solution to what turns out to be an imaginary problem. Having said this, however, I hasten to add that the paper has undeniable merits in pointing us in the right direction for revealing the imaginary character of the problem.
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  43. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press 38-71.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we (...)
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  44.  31
    Rachel Cooper, Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
    Classifying Madness (Springer, 2005) concerns philosophical problems with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, more commonly known as the D.S.M. The D.S.M. is published by the American Psychiatric Association and aims to list and describe all mental disorders. The first half of Classifying Madness asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that reflects natural distinctions makes sense. Chapters examine the nature of mental illness, and also consider whether mental disorders (...)
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  45.  30
    Irina Basieva & Andrei Khrennikov (2014). Complementarity of Mental Observables. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):74-78.
    The aim of this note is to complete the discussion on the possibility of creation of quantum-like (QL) representation for the question order effect which was presented by Wang and Busemeyer (2013). We analyze the role of a fundamental feature of mental operators (given, e.g., by questions), namely, their complementarity.
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  46.  44
    Panagiotis Oulis (2012). On the Nature of Mental Disorder: Towards an Objectivist Account. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (5):343-357.
    According to the predominant view within contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorders involve essentially personal and societal values, and thus, the concept of mental disorder cannot, even in principle, be elucidated in a thoroughly objective manner. Several arguments have been adduced in support of this impossibility thesis. My critical examination of two master arguments advanced to this effect by Derek Bolton and Jerome Wakefield, respectively, raises serious doubts about their soundness. Furthermore, I articulate an alternative, thoroughly objective, though (...)
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  47.  10
    Singh Sa Singh Ar (2011). Brain-Mind Dyad, Human Experience, the Consciousness Tetrad and Lattice of Mental Operations: And Further, The Need to Integrate Knowledge From Diverse Disciplines. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):6.
    Brain, Mind and Consciousness are the research concerns of psychiatrists, psychologists, neurologists, cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers. All of them are working in different and important ways to understand the workings of the brain, the mysteries of the mind and to grasp that elusive concept called consciousness. Although they are all justified in forwarding their respective researches, it is also necessary to integrate these diverse appearing understandings and try and get a comprehensive perspective that is, hopefully, more than the sum of (...)
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  48.  4
    Loveday Alexander (2003). Mapping Early Christianity Acts and the Shape of Early Church History. Interpretation 57 (2):163-173.
    It is no coincidence that the church in Luke's narrative bore the nickname “The Way.” The Evangelist's “mental map” of the early church's development is more fluid and open than the hierarchical model of later centuries.
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  49.  14
    Rachel Cooper (2014). Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Karnac.
    Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Karnac, 2014) evaluates the latest edition of the D.S.M.The publication of D.S.M-5 in 2013 brought many changes. Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders asks whether the D.S.M.-5 classifies the right people in the right way. It is aimed at patients, mental health professionals, and academics with an interest in mental health. Issues addressed include: How is the D.S.M. affected by financial links with the pharmaceutical (...)
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  50.  7
    Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Levels of Linguistic Acts and the Semantics of Saying and Quoting. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge UP
    This paper will outline a novel semantics of verbs of saying and of quotation based on Austin’s (1962) distinction among levels of linguistic acts (illocutionary, locutionary, rhetic, phatic, and phonetic acts). It will propose a way of understanding the notion of a rhetic act and argue that it is well-reflected in the semantics of natural language. The paper will furthermore outline a novel, unified and compositional semantics of quotation which is guided by two ideas. First, quotations convey properties (...)
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