Search results for 'simulation argument' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  96
    Jonathan Birch (2013). On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism. Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good (...)
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  2.  37
    Peter J. Lewis (2013). The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument. Synthese 190 (18):4009-4022.
    The Simulation Argument and the Doomsday Argument share certain structural similarities, and hence are often discussed together. Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in one case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. Indeed, the two arguments do share strong structural (...)
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  3. Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Simulation Hypothesis. Think.
    In this paper, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (or ‘designer’). If (...)
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  4. Paul Franceschi, The Simulation Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption.
    I present in this paper a line of refutation of the Simulation Argument. I recall first Bostrom's Simulation Argument. I draw then a comparison between the Emerald Case and the core analogy underlying the Simulation Argument. I also discuss the justification of the Self-Indication Assumption and its relationship with the Simulation Argument. I show lastly that the Simulation Argument is a disguised reformulation of an application of an extended form of (...)
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  5. Nick Bostrom (2009). The Simulation Argument: Some Explanations. Analysis 69 (3):458-461.
    Anthony Brueckner, in a recent article, proffers ‘a new way of thinking about Bostrom's Simulation Argument’ . His comments, however, misconstrue the argument; and some words of explanation are in order.The Simulation Argument purports to show, given some plausible assumptions, that at least one of three propositions is true . Roughly stated, these propositions are: almost all civilizations at our current level of development go extinct before reaching technological maturity; there is a strong convergence among (...)
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  6.  38
    Lyle Crawford (2013). Freak Observers and the Simulation Argument. Ratio 26 (3):250-264.
    The simulation hypothesis claims that the whole observable universe, including us, is a computer simulation implemented by technologically advanced beings for an unknown purpose. The simulation argument (as I reconstruct it) is an argument for this hypothesis with moderately plausible premises. I develop two lines of objection to the simulation argument. The first takes the form of a structurally similar argument for a conflicting conclusion, the claim that I am a so-called freak (...)
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  7.  82
    Nick Bostrom (2011). A Patch for the Simulation Argument. Analysis 71 (1):54 - 61.
    This article reports on a newly discovered bug in the original simulation argument. Two different ways of patching the argument are proposed, each of which preserves the original conclusion.
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  8.  10
    Paul Franceschi, The Simulation Argument and the Reference Class Problem: The Dialectical Contextualist's Standpoint.
    I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist's standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing Bostrom’s Simulation Argument step-by-step. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to several references classes: aware-simulations, rough-simulations and cyborg-type simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels (...)
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  9.  13
    István A. Aranyosi, The Doomsday Simulation Argument. Or Why Isn't the End Nigh and You 'Re Not Living in a Simulation'.
    According to the Carter-Leslie Doomsday Argument, we should assign a high probability to the hypothesis that the human species will go extinct very soon. The argument is based on the application of Bayes’s theo-rem and a certain indifference principle with respect to the temporal location of our observed birth rank within the totality of birth ranks of all humans who will ever have lived. According to Bostrom’s Simulation Argument, which appeals to a weaker indifference principle than (...)
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  10. Eric Steinhart (2010). Theological Implications of the Simulation Argument. Ars Disputandi 10:23-37.
    Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (SA) has many intriguing theological implications. We work out some of them here. We show how the SA can be used to develop novel versions of the Cosmological and Design Arguments. We then develop some of the affinities between Bostrom's naturalistic theogony and more traditional theological topics. We look at the resurrection of the body and at theodicy. We conclude with some reflections on the relations between the SA and Neoplatonism (friendly) and between the (...)
     
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  11.  50
    By Nick Bostrom (2005). The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):90–97.
    I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my 'simulation argument'. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on 'grue'-like predicates.
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  12.  6
    Paul Franceschi, On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument.
    I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I point out that such disanalogy is also present (...)
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  13.  23
    Peter J. Lewis, A Note on the Simulation Argument.
    The point of this note is to compare the Doomsday Argument to the Simulation Argument. The latter, I maintain, is a better argument than the former.
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  14.  20
    Nick Bostrom (2005). The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):90 - 97.
    I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my 'simulation argument'. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on 'grue'-like predicates.
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  15.  3
    Claus Beisbart (2014). Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What This Means for the Simulation Argument. The Monist 97 (3):399-417.
    N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and (...)
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  16.  88
    Johan E. Gustafsson & Martin Peterson (2012). A Computer Simulation of the Argument From Disagreement. Synthese 184 (3):387–405.
    In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit (...)
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  17. Anthony Brueckner (2008). The Simulation Argument Again. Analysis 68 (299):224–226.
  18.  5
    Anthony Brueckner (2008). The Simulation Argument Again. Analysis 68 (299):224-226.
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  19.  42
    Nick Bostrom (2010). The Simulation Argument. The Philosophers' Magazine 50 (50):28-29.
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  20.  4
    N. Bostrom & M. Kulczycki (2011). A Patch for the Simulation Argument. Analysis 71 (1):54-61.
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  21.  20
    Jo’C. (2013). Testing the Simulation Argument. The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):7-7.
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  22. Alexander A. Berezin (2006). Simulation Argument in the Context of Ultimate Reality and Meaning. Ultimate Reality and Meaning 29 (4):244-261.
     
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  23.  12
    Jo’C. (2013). Testing the Simulation Argument. The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):7-7.
  24.  11
    Jo’C. (2013). Testing the Simulation Argument. The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):7-7.
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  25.  16
    David W. Green, Ronit Applebaum & Simon Tong (2006). Mental Simulation and Argument. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):31 – 61.
    We examine how opinion on a controversial real-world issue shifts as a function of reading relevant arguments and engaging in a specific mental simulation about a future, fictional state of affairs involving the target issue. Individuals thought either counterfactually about a future event (“if only X had not happened …”) or semifactually about it (“even if X had not happened …”). In Experiment 1, as expected, individuals became more in favour of a course of action (the electronic tagging of (...)
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  26.  2
    Timothy L. Short & Kevin J. Riggs (2016). Defending Simulation Theory Against the Argument From Error. Mind and Language 31 (2):248-262.
    We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn (...)
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  27.  78
    R. Saxe (2005). Against Simulation: The Argument From Error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.
  28.  22
    Jason P. Mitchell (2005). The False Dichotomy Between Simulation and Theory-Theory: The Argument's Error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):363-364.
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  29.  19
    A. GoldmAn & N. SebaNz (2005). Simulation, Mirroring, and a Different Argument From Error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (7):320-320.
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  30.  2
    Alasdair M. Richmond (2016). Why Doomsday Arguments Are Better Than Simulation Arguments. Ratio 29 (2).
    Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully-conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior-probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti-simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti-simulation arguments herein use more robust reference classes (...)
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  31.  72
    Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson (2013). Do Computer Simulations Support the Argument From Disagreement? Synthese 190 (8):1437-1454.
    According to the Argument from Disagreement (AD) widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by moral facts, either because there are no such facts or because there are such facts but they fail to influence our moral opinions. In an innovative paper, Gustafsson and Peterson (Synthese, published online 16 October, 2010) study the argument by means of computer simulation of opinion dynamics, relying on the well-known model of Hegselmann and (...)
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  32. Monika Dullstein (2013). Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein's Account of Empathy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a (...)-based approach—the account given by de Vignemont and Jacob—is compatible with the direct-perception view. My argument has two parts: My first step is to show that the conflict between these accounts is not—as it seems at first glance—a disagreement on the mechanism by which empathy comes about. Rather, it is due to the fact that their proponents attribute two very different roles to empathy in understanding others. My second step is to introduce Stein’s account of empathy. By not restricting empathy to either one of these two roles, her process model of empathy helps to see how the divergent intuitions that have been brought forward in the current debate could be integrated. (shrink)
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  33. Margaret Morrison (2009). Models, Measurement and Computer Simulation: The Changing Face of Experimentation. Philosophical Studies 143 (1):33 - 57.
    The paper presents an argument for treating certain types of computer simulation as having the same epistemic status as experimental measurement. While this may seem a rather counterintuitive view it becomes less so when one looks carefully at the role that models play in experimental activity, particularly measurement. I begin by discussing how models function as “measuring instruments” and go on to examine the ways in which simulation can be said to constitute an experimental activity. By focussing (...)
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  34. Olaf Müller (2001). Does Putnam's Argument Beg the Question Against the Skeptic? Bad News for Radical Skepticism. Erkenntnis 54 (3):299-320.
    Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation (...)
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  35.  49
    Eric Steinhart (2014). Your Digital Afterlives: Computational Theories of Life After Death. Palgrave.
    Our digital technologies have inspired new ways of thinking about old religious topics. Digitalists include computer scientists, transhumanists, singularitarians, and futurists. Digitalists have worked out novel and entirely naturalistic ways of thinking about bodies, minds, souls, universes, gods, and life after death. Your Digital Afterlives starts with three digitalist theories of life after death. It examines personality capture, body uploading, and promotion to higher levels of simulation. It then examines the idea that reality itself is ultimately a system of (...)
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  36.  63
    Mitchell Herschbach (2012). Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation. Synthese 189 (3):483-513.
    Mirror neurons and systems are often appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people’s mental states. Such neural mirroring processes are often treated as instances of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation as specified by the simulation theory of mindreading. I begin by more precisely characterizing “mirroring” (Sect. 2) and “simulation” (Sect. (...)
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  37.  7
    Petri Ylikoski (2014). Agent-Based Simulation and Sociological Understanding. Perspectives on Science 22 (3):318-335.
    This article discusses agent-based simulation (ABS) as a tool of sociological understanding. I argue that agent-based simulations can play an important role in the expansion of explanatory understanding in the social sciences. The argument is based on an inferential account of understanding (Ylikoski 2009, Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010), according to which computer simulations increase our explanatory understanding by expanding our ability to make what-if inferences about social processes and by making these inferences more reliable. The inferential account also (...)
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  38.  66
    Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation À la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.
    Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986 ) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (...)
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  39.  65
    Barry Dainton (2012). On Singularities and Simulations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1):42.
  40. Aaron Smuts, Devil Simulation: Why We Couldn't, Shouldn't, and Wouldn't.
    In this paper I critically evaluate the Devil Simulation Argument for cognitive immoralism—the position that moral flaws with a work of art can be cognitively virtuous, and thereby artistically valuable. I focus on Matthew Kieran's version of the argument. Kieran holds that by simulating the attitudes of fictional devils we can come to gain important moral insights. In response, I argue that we have no reason to believe that we can effectively adopt immoral attitudes, that any successful (...)
     
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  41.  82
    Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2010). A New Approach to Argument by Analogy: Extrapolation and Chain Graphs. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):1058-1069.
    In order to make scientific results relevant to practical decision making, it is often necessary to transfer a result obtained in one set of circumstances—an animal model, a computer simulation, an economic experiment—to another that may differ in relevant respects—for example, to humans, the global climate, or an auction. Such inferences, which we can call extrapolations, are a type of argument by analogy. This essay sketches a new approach to analogical inference that utilizes chain graphs, which resemble directed (...)
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  42.  77
    Richard Brown (2012). Zombies and Simulation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (7-8):21-25.
    In his engaging and important paper David Chalmers argues that perhaps the best way to navigate the singularity is for us to integrate with the AI++ agents. One way we might be able to do that is via uploading, which is a process in which we create an exact digital duplicate of our brain. He argues that consciousness is an organizational invariant, which means that a simulation of that property would count as the real thing (a simulation of (...)
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  43.  37
    Meredith R. Wilkinson & Linden J. Ball (2012). Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):263-291.
    The Theory Theory (TT) versus Simulation Theory (ST) debate is primarily concerned with how we understand others’ mental states. Theory theorists claim we do this using rules that are akin to theoretical laws, whereas simulation theorists claim we use our own minds to imagine ourselves in another’s position. Theorists from both camps suggest a consideration of individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) can help resolve the TT/ST debate (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; Carruthers 1996a; Goldman 2006). We present a three-part (...)
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  44.  62
    Stefaan Blancke, Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2011). Simulation of Biological Evolution Under Attack, but Not Really: A Response to Meester. Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):113-118.
    The leading Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MD, 2002) argued that the first No Free Lunch theorem, first formulated by Wolpert and Macready (IEEE Trans Evol Comput 1: 67–82, 1997), renders Darwinian evolution impossible. In response, Dembski’s critics pointed out that the theorem is irrelevant to biological evolution. Meester (Biol Phil 24: 461–472, 2009) agrees with this conclusion, but still thinks that the theorem does apply to simulations of evolutionary processes. According to Meester, the theorem shows (...)
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  45.  48
    Larry Hauser, Chinese Room Argument. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong (...)
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  46.  39
    Bill Wringe (2009). Simulation, Theory and Collapse. Erkenntnis 71 (2):223 - 232.
    Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get (...)
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  47.  11
    Li Huang & Adam D. Galinsky (2010). No Mirrors for the Powerful: Why Dominant Smiles Are Not Processed Using Embodied Simulation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):448-448.
    A complete model of smile interpretation needs to incorporate its social context. We argue that embodied simulation is an unlikely route for understanding dominance smiles, which typically occur in the context of power. We support this argument by discussing the lack of eye contact with dominant faces and the facial and postural complementarity, rather than mimicry, that pervades hierarchical relationships.
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  48.  11
    Ronan G. Reilly (2001). The Relationship Between Object Manipulation and Language Development in Broca's Area: A Connectionist Simulation of Greenfield's Hypothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):145-153.
    In her Behavioral and Brain Sciences target article, Greenfield (1991) proposed that early in a child's development Broca's area may serve the dual function of coordinating object assembly and organizing the production of structured utterances. As development progresses, the upper and lower regions of Broca's area become increasingly specialized for motor coordination and speech, respectively. This commentary presents a connectionist simulation of aspects of this proposal. The results of the simulation confirm the main thrust of Greenfield's argument (...)
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  49.  9
    David B. Suits (1999). Steep Cliff Arguments. Argumentation 13 (2):127-138.
    In recent philosophical debates a number of arguments have been used which have so much in common that it is useful to study them as having a similar structure. Many arguments – Searle's Chinese Room, for example – make use of thought experiments in which we are told a story or given a narrative context such that we feel we are in comfortable surroundings. A new notion is then introduced which clashes with our ordinary habits and associations. As a result, (...)
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  50.  10
    Anne Ruth Mackor (2005). Erklären, Verstehen and Simulation: Reconsidering the Role of Empathy in the Social Sciences. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):237-262.
    A basic naturalistic epistemological intuition that Theo Kuipers and I share is the idea that the differences between the natural and the social sciences do not stand in the way of co-operative, integrative, and perhaps even reductive relations between them. In several papers I have offered a teleofunctional argument against interpretationalist autonomy claims and Kuipers (2001), Chapter 6 seems to favor this type of rebuttal. However, within the last 15 years or so, there has been a revival of another (...)
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