Search results for 'singular causation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Bence Nanay (2009). The Properties of Singular Causation. The Monist 92 (1):112-132.score: 240.0
    Theories of singular causation have a genuine problem with properties. In virtue of what property do events (or facts) cause other events? One possible answer to this question, Davidson’s, is that causal relations hold between particulars and properties play no role in the way a particular causes another. According to another, recently fashionable answer, in contrast, events cause other events in virtue of having a trope (as opposed to a property-type). Both views face serious objections. My aim in (...)
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  2. Christian Jakob (2006). Hitchcock's (2001) Treatment of Singular and General Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3):277-287.score: 204.0
    Hitchcock (2001a) argues that the distinction between singular and general causation conflates the two distinctions ‘actual causation vs. causal tendencies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causation’. Based on a recent regularity account of causation I will show that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is an unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.
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  3. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2012). Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.score: 180.0
    For at least three decades, philosophers have argued that general causation and causal explanation are contrastive in nature. When we seek a causal explanation of some particular event, we are usually interested in knowing why that event happened rather than some other specified event. And general causal claims, which state that certain event types cause certain other event types, seem to make sense only if appropriate contrasts to the types of events acting as cause and effect are specified. In (...)
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  4. Gurol Irzik (1990). Singular Causation and Law. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:537 - 543.score: 180.0
    Humean accounts of law are at the same time accounts of causation. Accordingly, since laws are nothing but contingent cosmic regularities, to be a cause is just to be an instance of such a law. Every particular cause-effect pair, according to these accounts, instantiates some law of nature. I argue that this claim is false. Singular causation without being governed by any law is logically and physically possible. Separating causes from laws enables us to see the distinct (...)
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  5. María José García-Encinas (2011). Singular Causation Without Dispositions. Theoria 26 (1):35-50.score: 180.0
    Singular causation may be best understood within a dispositionalist framework. Although the details of just how a claim that this is in fact the case have not yet been fully worked out, different philosophers have made some positive contributions in this direction. In opposition to such suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions contains unresolvable flaws in its metaphysical foundations.First, I present two main constituents that I take (...)
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  6. M. J. García-Encinas (2002). Necessity in Singular Causation. Philosophia 29 (1-4):149-172.score: 180.0
    I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, (...)
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  7. Physical Causation (2008). To Psychological Causation. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 71--184.score: 180.0
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  8. María José García Encinas (2011). Singular Causation Without Dispositions. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (70):35-50.score: 180.0
    Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.
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  9. Stefan Dragulinescu (2012). On Anti Humeanism and Medical Singular Causation. Acta Analytica 27 (3):265-292.score: 168.0
    Abstract In this paper I offer an anti-Humean interpretation of the causal interactions in somatic medicine. I focus on life-threatening pathological states and show how Nancy Cartwright’s capacities can offer a plausible epistemology for medical processes and the singular causal claims advanced in medical diagnoses. I argue that the capacities manifested in the emergence of symptoms and signs could be tracked down if healthy organisms are construed as nomological machines and suggest that the causal reasoning from current medical practice (...)
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  10. Brian Ellis (2000). Causal Laws and Singular Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):329-351.score: 150.0
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  11. Michael Rota (2009). An Anti-Reductionist Account of Singular Causation. The Monist 92 (1):136--55.score: 150.0
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  12. M. J. García-encinas (2003). A Posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument. Dialectica 57 (1):41–55.score: 150.0
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  13. D. M. Armstrong (1997). Singular Causation and Laws of Nature. In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), The Cosmos of Science. University of Pittsburgh Press. 498--511.score: 150.0
  14. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1995). The Mishap at Reichenbach Fall: Singular Vs. General Causation. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.score: 120.0
  15. Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.score: 96.0
    One part of the true theory of actual causation is a set of conditions responsible for eliminating all of the non-causes of an effect that can be discerned at the level of counterfactual structure. I defend a proposal for this part of the theory.
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  16. M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2009). Tropes for Causation. Metaphysica 10 (2):157-174.score: 90.0
    Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.
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  17. Peter Menzies (1989). Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.score: 72.0
    This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition.
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  18. Monika Dullstein (2010). Verursachung und kausale Relevanz. Eine Analyse singulärer Kausalaussagen. mentis.score: 72.0
    Die philosophische Kausaldebatte hat in den vergangenen vier Jahrzehnten eine neue Blüte erlebt. Kontrafaktische, interventionistische, mechanistische und transfertheoretische Ansätze haben sich neben den bislang dominierenden Regularitätstheorien etabliert. Vertreter aller dieser Ansätze sehen sich jedoch mit Gegenbeispielen konfrontiert, keine Theorie scheint allen unseren intuitiven Kausalurteilen gerecht werden zu können. Dieses Buch führt anhand ausgewählter Beispiele in die aktuelle Debatte ein und liefert eine Erklärung für die derzeitige Patt-Situation. Der Grund dafür, dass sich zu jedem Ansatz offenbar mühelos Gegenbeispiele finden lassen, liegt, (...)
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  19. Christoph Hoerl (2011). Causal Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):167-179.score: 66.0
    The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, (...)
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  20. Eugen Zeleňák (2009). On Explanatory Relata in Singular Causal Explanation. Theoria 75 (3):179-195.score: 66.0
    Explanation is usually taken to be a relation between certain entities. The aim of this paper is to discuss what entities are suitable as explanatory relata of singular causal explanations, i.e., explanations concerning singular causality relating particular events or other appropriate entities. I outline three different positions. The purely causal approach stipulates that the same entities that are related in the singular causal relation are also linked by the explanatory relation. This position, however, has a problem to (...)
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  21. Yusuke Kaneko (2012). The Confirmation of Singular Causal Statements by Carnap’s Inductive Logic. Logica Year Book 2011.score: 66.0
    The aim of this paper is to apply inductive logic to the field that, presumably, Carnap never expected: legal causation. Legal causation is expressible in the form of singular causal statements; but it is distinguished from the customary concept of scientific causation, because it is subjective. We try to express this subjectivity within the system of inductive logic. Further, by semantic complement, we compensate a defect found in our application, to be concrete, the impossibility of two-place (...)
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  22. Jens Harbecke (2014). Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation. Philosophia 42 (2):363-385.score: 66.0
    Counterfactual conditionals have been appealed to in various ways to show how the mind can be causally efficacious. However, it has often been overestimated what the truth of certain counterfactuals actually indicates about causation. The paper first identifies four approaches that seem to commit precisely this mistake. The arguments discussed involve erroneous assumptions about the connection of counterfactual dependence and genuine causation, as well as a disregard of the requisite evaluation conditions of counterfactuals. In a second step, the (...)
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  23. G. E. M. Anscombe (1993). Causality and Determination. In E. Sosa M. Tooley (ed.), Causation. Oxford Up. 88-104.score: 66.0
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  24. Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred”. While counterfactual analyses have been given of type-causal concepts, most counterfactual analyses have focused on singular causal or token-causal claims of the form “event c caused event e”. Analyses of token-causation have become popular in the last thirty years, especially since the (...)
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  25. Phil Dowe (1999). The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):501.score: 60.0
    In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of 'misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to (...)
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  26. Dorothy Edgington (1997). Mellor on Chance and Causation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433.score: 60.0
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (...)
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  27. Geert Keil (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.score: 60.0
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On (...)
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  28. Thomas Müller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487 - 520.score: 60.0
    We provide a formally rigorous framework for integrating singular causation, as understood by Nuel Belnap's theory of causae causantes, and objective single case probabilities. The central notion is that of a causal probability space whose sample space consists of causal alternatives. Such a probability space is generally not isomorphic to a product space. We give a causally motivated statement of the Markov condition and an analysis of the concept of screening-off. Causal dependencies and probabilities 1.1 Background: causation (...)
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  29. M. J. Garcia-Encinas, On Singular Causality: A Definition and Defence.score: 60.0
    The object of this paper is to offer a conception of singular causality that lies between two main views in the literature, which I take to be paradigmatically represented by David Armstrong (1997) and by Michael Tooley (1987, 1990) respectively. Armstrong maintains that there is singular causation wherever there are singular facts that instantiate causal laws; these facts are otherwise independent regularities. Tooley maintains that singular causation is independent of causal laws together with any (...)
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  30. Glenn Shafer (1995). The Situation of Causality. Foundations of Science 1 (4):543-563.score: 60.0
    Causality in the abstract is a grand theme. We take it up when we want to penetrate to the bottom of things to understand general laws that govern the working at the world of the deepest and most detailed level.In this essay, I argue for a more situated understanding of causality. To counter our desire for ever greater generality, I suggest that causal relations, even those that hold only on average, require context. To counter our desire for ever greater detail, (...)
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  31. John W. Carroll (1988). General Causation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:311 - 317.score: 60.0
    The traditional model and the contextual unanimity model are two probabilistic accounts of general causation subject to many well-known problems; e.g. cases of epiphenomena, causes raising their own probability, effects raising the probability of the cause, et cetera. After reviewing these problems and raising a new problem for the two models, I suggest the beginnings of an alternative probabilistic account. My suggestion avoids the problems encountered by earlier models, in large part, by an appeal to singular causation.
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  32. Julian Reiss (2009). Counterfactuals, Thought Experiments, and Singular Causal Analysis in History. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):712-723.score: 54.0
    Thought experiments are ubiquitous in science and especially prominent in domains in which experimental and observational evidence is scarce. One such domain is the causal analysis of singular events in history. A long‐standing tradition that goes back to Max Weber addresses the issue by means of ‘what‐if’ counterfactuals. In this paper I give a descriptive account of this widely used method and argue that historians following it examine difference makers rather than causes in the philosopher’s sense. While difference making (...)
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  33. Max Urchs (1994). On the Logic of Event-Causation Jaśkowski-Style Systems of Causal Logic. Studia Logica 53 (4):551 - 578.score: 54.0
    Causality is a concept which is sometimes claimed to be easy to illustrate, but hard to explain. It is not quite clear whether the former part of this claim is as obvious as the latter one. I will not present any specific theory of causation. Our aim is much less ambitious; to investigate the formal counterparts of causal relations between events, i.e. to propose a formal framework which enables us to construct metamathematical counterparts of causal relations between singular (...)
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  34. Eyal Sagi & Lance J. Rips (2014). Identity, Causality, and Pronoun Ambiguity. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (3):n/a-n/a.score: 48.0
    This article looks at the way people determine the antecedent of a pronoun in sentence pairs, such as: Albert invited Ron to dinner. He spent hours cleaning the house. The experiment reported here is motivated by the idea that such judgments depend on reasoning about identity (e.g., the identity of the he who cleaned the house). Because the identity of an individual over time depends on the causal-historical path connecting the stages of the individual, the correct antecedent will also depend (...)
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  35. D. H. Mellor (1987). The Singularly Affecting Facts of Causation. In J. J. C. Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart. B. Blackwell.score: 40.0
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  36. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Resemblance-Based Resources for Reductive Singularism. The Monist 92 (1):153-190.score: 36.0
    Hume argued that experience could not justify commonly held beliefs in singular causal effcacy, according to which individual or singular causes produce their effects or make their effects happen. Hume's discussion has been influential, as motivating the view that Causal reductionism (denying that causal efficacy is an irreducible feature of natural reality) requires Causal generalism (according to which causal relations are metaphysically constituted by patterns of events). Here I argue that causal reductionists---indeed, Hume himself---have previously unappreciated resources for (...)
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  37. Paul D. Bowen (1983). Causation in Classical Physics. Synthese 57 (1):1 - 20.score: 36.0
    In summary, then, I have presented a program for analysis of physical causal statements in terms of the following metaphysical primitives: space (made up of ordered points), time (also ordered and punctiliar), causal density, haecceity and causal necessity. These can be ‘read off’ the theories in question. I claim that theevent-singular cases are crucial, and that other cases can be reduced to this via set theory and (causal) modal logic. I have given several examples of this sort of translation (...)
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  38. Stuart Glennan (2011). Singular and General Causal Relations: A Mechanist Perspective. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oup Oxford.score: 36.0
    My aim in this paper is to make a case for the singularist view from the perspective of a mechanical theory of causation (Glennan 1996, 1997, 2010, forthcoming), and to explain what, from this perspective, causal generalizations mean, and what role they play within the mechanical theory.
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  39. Carl Hoefer, Humean Effective Strategies.score: 30.0
    In a now-classic paper, Nancy Cartwright argued that the Humean conception of causation as mere regular co-occurrence is too weak to make sense of our everyday and scientific practices. Specifically she claimed that in order to understand our reasoning about, and uses of, effective strategies, we need a metaphysically stronger notion of causation and causal laws than Humeanism allows. Cartwright’s arguments were formulated in the framework of probabilistic causation, and it is precisely in the domain of (objective) (...)
     
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  40. Christoph Hoerl (2013). Jaspers on Explaining and Understanding in Psychiatry. In Thomas Fuchs & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), One Hundred Years of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    This chapter offers an interpretation of Jaspers’ distinction between explaining and understanding, which relates this distinction to that between general and singular causal claims. Put briefly, I suggest that when Jaspers talks about (mere) explanation, what he has in mind are general causal claims linking types of events. Understanding, by contrast, is concerned with singular causation in the psychological domain. Furthermore, I also suggest that Jaspers thinks that only understanding makes manifest what causation between one element (...)
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  41. Sharon Crasnow (2012). The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science: Evidence for Causal Claims. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):655-666.score: 30.0
    Political science research, particularly in international relations and comparative politics, has increasingly become dominated by statistical and formal approaches. The promise of these approaches shifted the methodological emphasis away from case study research. In response, supporters of case study research argue that case studies provide evidence for causal claims that is not available through statistical and formal research methods, and many have advocated multimethod research. I propose a way of understanding the integration of multiple methodologies in which the causes sought (...)
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  42. Gurol Irzik (1992). Cartwright, Capacities, and Probabilities. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:239 - 250.score: 30.0
    I argue that Nancy Cartwright's largely methodological arguments for capacities and against Hume's regularity account of causation are only partially successful. They are especially problematic in establishing the primacy of singular causation and the reality of mixed-dual capacities. Therefore, her arguments need to be supported by ontological ones, and I propose the propensity interpretation of causal probabilities as a natural way of doing this.
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  43. Douglas Kutach (2007). The Physical Foundations of Causation. In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    I defend what may loosely be called an eliminativist account of causation by showing how several of the main features of causation, namely asymmetry, transitivity, and necessitation (or sometimes probability-raising), arise from the combination of fundamental dynamical laws and a special constraint on the macroscopic structure of matter in the past. At the microscopic level, the causal features of necessitation and transitivity are grounded, but not the asymmetry. At the coarse-grained level of the macroscopic physics, the causal asymmetry (...)
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  44. David Papineau (2013). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 126.score: 27.0
    In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible.
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  45. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.score: 27.0
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality (...)
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  46. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility - On Causation and Responsibility in Spider-Man, and Possibly Moore. Critical Essays on Causation and Responsibility.score: 27.0
    Omissions are sometimes linked to responsibility. A harm can counterfactually depend on an omission to prevent it. If someone had the ability to prevent a harm but didn’t, this could suffice to ground their responsibility for the harm. We present an argument for this based on the WGPCGR-thesis: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility. -/- We argue, with reference to Moore’s account in Causation and Responsibility (Moore 2009), that moral and legal responsibility is based on the power we have (...)
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  47. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.score: 27.0
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of (...)
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  48. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2010). A Powerful Theory of Causation. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge. 143--159.score: 24.0
    Hume thought that if you believed in powers, you believed in necessary connections in nature. He was then able to argue that there were none such because anything could follow anything else. But Hume wrong-footed his opponents. A power does not necessitate its manifestations: rather, it disposes towards them in a way that is less than necessary but more than purely contingent. -/- In this paper a dispositional theory of causation is offered. Causes dispose towards their effects and often (...)
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  49. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.score: 24.0
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental (...). A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level. (shrink)
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