Online research in philosophy

Moral philosophy in all its contemporary forms, whether consequentialist, formalist, contractarian, utilitarian, or virtue ethicist, presumes the possibility of formulating principles of conduct that apply universally to all human beings. Standard exceptions are infants and young children, persons who are clinically insane, and persons with reduced mental capacity. These exceptions are recognized by all modern systems of morality and law. The inability to distinguish right from wrong, due to immature age, mental disorganization, or insufficient intelligence is grounds to exempt any (...) given person from moral responsibility and moral agency.Human beings not bound by such conditions are distinguished by their capacity .. (shrink)

The primary goal of this essay is to clarify the concept of psychopathy and distinguish it from other, related, concepts. We contend that the paradigmatic trait of psychopathy is a propensity to violence that is accompanied by a lack of conscience. We also argue that conceptual clarity on this point is important for devising empirical criteria for identifying psychopaths. We also argue that a full theory of psychopathy will require one to utilize theories and assumptions that pertain to central issues (...) in meta-ethics. (shrink)

The lead text of this book is based on primatologist Frans de Waal’s 2003 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, to which he adds three short appendices. There are commentaries by Robert Wright, Christine Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher, and Peter Singer, followed by a 20-page response. Josiah Ober and Stephen Macedo provide a brief introduction. As befits a Tanner lecturer, de Waal’s scope is broad, his writing accessible, and the pace lively. He continues his crusade against the “veneer theory”—the idea that (...) humans are naturally sociopaths and that empathy, altruism, and morality are the result of recent cultural forces. The extent to which de Waal dichotomizes this debate, however, masks much of interest. One can agree with the seemingly obvious fact that humans are obligatorily gregarious organisms—replete with various prosocial mechanisms—while still expressing reasonable doubt that our capacity to make moral judgments is the result of an innate mechanism dedicated to that task. De Waal is an unparalleled source of rich first-hand primatological data, arguing cogently that humans show continuity with other apes regarding empathy, consolation behavior, peacemaking, and reciprocal relations. Yet he admits these “building blocks” are “by no means sufficient” (p. 20) for morality, and in his Response discusses two further levels of morality: rule enforcement for the community’s good, and disinterested moral reasoning. He doesn’t address whether this third, uniquely human, level is a distinct innate adaptation, apparently not appreciating that if it isn’t, and yet is necessary for being literally accorded a “moral sense” (as he seems to indicate on pp. 20, 49, 55), then moral nativism is false and at least some of human morality is “veneer.” In characteristic non-philosopher manner, de Waal ultimately rejects the question as “semantics” and thus “mostly a waste of time” (p. 181). It seems a surprising blemish that the author of a book subtitled “How Morality Evolved” should grow impatient with those wondering what precisely is necessary and sufficient for morality, and what specifically has evolved.. (shrink)

This essay attempts to establish an alternative and more accurate way of thinking about the modern business corporation, its role in society, and its frequently sociopathic behavior. It proposes that corporations as they currently exist are a product of rationalist, positivist thought of the nineteenth century, and have in recent decades emerged from their increasingly complex conditions of existence into autonomous, self-regulating entities that can best be described as cyber-corporations or cybercorps. The cybercorp, as an emergent being, is capable of (...) acting on the (human) subsystems from which it has emerged, determining their behavior. Human individuality, and in particular individual ethical sensibility, is sacrificed to the organizational culture of the cybercorp in a way that is analogous to the life-experience of ants in a colony. The pertinent organizational culture and its values are hegemonic and can be effectively challenged only if their source in the cybercorp is clearly recognized. (shrink)

This paper examines deviant managerial behavior, and compares such behavior to the clinical psychological sociopathic model. The scope of a multinational corporate operation can enhance or degrade the quality of life for individuals with more impact than at any previous time in history. Social costs are compared to the results of sociopathic behavior and examined as the result of amoral or immoral behavior. The idea of the sociopathic manager is discussed, and theoretical causes of sociopathic development are examined with bases (...) in behavioral, economic and criminological literature. Future research and recommendations for prevention of sociopathic behavior are advanced. (shrink)