Search results for 'sorites paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
    The naive theory of vagueness holds that the vagueness of an expression consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. The naive theory is contrasted with the nowadays dominant approach to vagueness, holding that the vagueness of an expression consists in its presenting borderline cases of application. The two approaches are briefly compared in their respective explanations of a paramount phenomenon of vagueness: our ignorance of any sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. These (...)
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  2. Leib Litman & Mark Zelcer (2013). A Cognitive Neuroscience, Dual-Systems Approach to the Sorites Paradox. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25 (3):355-366.
    Typical approaches to resolving the sorites paradox attempt to show, in one way or another, that the sorites argument is not paradoxical after all. However, if one can show that the sorites is not really paradoxical, the task remains of explaining why it appears to be a paradox. Our approach begins by addressing the appearance of paradox and then explores what this means for the paradox itself. We examine the sorites from the (...)
     
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  3. Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray (2002). Vagueness And The Sorites Paradox. Noûs 36 (s16):419-461.
    A sorites argument is a symptom of the vagueness of the predicate with which it is constructed. A vague predicate admits of at least one dimension of variation (and typically more than one) in its intended range along which we are at a loss when to say the predicate ceases to apply, though we start out confident that it does. It is this feature of them that the sorites arguments exploit. Exactly how is part of the subject of (...)
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  4.  45
    J. M. Goodenough (1996). Parfit and the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):113-20.
    This paper aims to establish that Sorites reasoning, a fundamental part of Parfit's work, is more destructive that he intends. I establish the form that Parfit's arguments take and then substitute premises whose acceptability to Parfit I show. The new argument demonstrates an eliminativism or immaterialism concerning persons which Parfit must find repugnant.
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  5.  53
    David Wolach (2007). Wittgenstein and the Sorites Paradox. Sorites 19:58-60.
    Any discussion regarding the famous Sorites Paradox is incomplete without considering the value of contextual logic and its meta-language of vagueness. Wittgenstein, though he did not write extensively on the Sorites Paradox in particular, is deeply concerned with its supposed implications. The later Wittgenstein's treatment of logical vagueness in natural and formal languages, and his accompanying treatment of logical soundness as it applies to ordinary languages is thus of considerable help when thinking about the Sorites (...)
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  6.  76
    J. A. Burgess (1990). The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can (...)
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  7.  46
    Richmond Campbell (1974). The Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):175-191.
    The premises that a four foot man is short and that a man one tenth of an inch taller than a short man is also short entail by universal instantiation and "modus ponens" that a seven foot man is short. The negation of the second premise seems to entail there are virtually no borderline cases of short men, While to deny the second premise and its negation conflicts with the principle of bivalence, If not excluded middle. But the paradox (...)
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  8.  54
    Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The sorites paradox is the name given to a class of paradoxical arguments, also known as little by little arguments, which arise as a result of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of the predicates involved. For example, the concept of a heap appears to lack sharp boundaries and, as a consequence of the subsequent indeterminacy surrounding the extension of the predicate ‘is a heap’, no one grain of wheat can be identified as making the difference between being (...)
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  9.  77
    Terry Horgan (2000). Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-111.
    The ancient sorites paradox has important implications for metaphysics, for logic, and for semantics. Metaphysically, the paradox can be harnessed to produce a powerful argument for the claim that there cannot be vague objects or vague properties. With respect to logic, the paradox forces a choice between the highly counterintuitive ‘epistemic’ account of vagueness and the rejection of classical two-valued logic. Regarding semantics, nonclassical approaches to the logic of vagueness lead naturally to the idea that truth, (...)
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  10.  44
    Graham Priest (1979). A Note on the Sorites Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):74 – 75.
    Informal accounts of the sorites paradox usually emphasize that the problem is one of vagueness. The paper uses the idea of fuzzy truth values to provide a formal semantics which shows precisely how sorites-Type arguments are formally invalid.
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  11.  25
    Richard DeWitt (1992). Remarks on the Current Status of the Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Research 17 (1):93.
    The past twenty or so years have seen the sorites paradox receive a good deal of philosophical air-time. Yet, in what is surely a sign of a good puzzle, no consensus has emerged. It is perhaps a good time to stop and take stock of the current status of the sorites paradox. My main contention is that the proposals offered to date as ways of blocking the paradox are seriously deficient, and hence there is, at (...)
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  12.  34
    Paul Franceschi, On the Circularity in the Sorites Paradox.
    I begin by highlighting the importance of the step size in the induction step of the sorites paradox. A careful analysis reveals that the step size can be characterised as a proper instance of the concept very small . After having accurately described the structure of sorites-susceptible predicates, I argue that the structure of the induction step in the Sorites Paradox is inherently circular. This circularity emerges in the structure of Wang's paradox and also (...)
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  13.  20
    Dale A. Thorpe (1984). The Sorites Paradox. Synthese 61 (3):391 - 421.
    A solution to the sorites paradox is obtained by distinguishing three formats of the sorites argument and appraising them in the light of four fundamental considerations: (i) the appropriate notion of truth for the application of vague predicates to their borderline cases, (ii) a certain construal of borderline cases, (iii) a certain freedom of use of vague terms not enjoyed by non-Vague terms and (iv) the revocation of that freedom by deductive contexts.
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  14.  14
    John L. King (1979). Bivalence and the Sorites Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1):17 - 25.
    Putative resolutions of the sorites paradox in which the major premise is declared false or illegitimate, Including max black's treatment in terms of the alleged illegitimacy of vague attributions to borderline cases, Are rejected on semantical grounds. The resort to a non-Bivalent logic of representational "accuracy" with a continuum of accuracy values is shown to resolve the paradox, And the identification of accuracy values as truth values is defended as compatible with the central insight of the correspondence (...)
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  15.  16
    Tamás Pólya & László Tarnay (1999). Sorites Paradox and Conscious Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):165-165.
    The theory of consciousness proposed by O'Brien & Opie is open to the Sorites paradox, for it defines a consciousness system internally in terms of computationally relevant units which add up to consciousness only if sufficient in number. The Sorites effect applies on the assumed level of features.
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  16.  1
    Snježana Prijić-Samaržija (2009). Bioethical Issues and Sorites Paradox. Synthesis Philosophica 23 (2):203-213.
    The main purpose of this article is an analysis of the Continuity Argument, one of the most influential arguments upon which the moral condemnation of scientific and medical practices such as embryo research and experimentation, assisted reproduction, abortion, therapeutic cloning, etc. are based. I have firstly given a very brief account of the approach that attributes the status of marker event to fertilization, identifying the Continuity Argument between other argumentation. Further, I have tried to distinguish the three possible interpretations of (...)
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  17.  45
    Terence Horgan (1994). Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  18.  34
    Crispin Wright (1987). Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):227-290.
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  19.  48
    Francesco Paoli (2003). A Really Fuzzy Approach to the Sorites Paradox. Synthese 134 (3):363 - 387.
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  20.  95
    James Cargile (1969). The Sorites Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):193-202.
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  21.  75
    Alex Voorhoeve & Ken Binmore (2006). Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-Based Decision-Making. Erkenntnis 64 (1):101-114.
    A persistent argument against the transitivity assumption of rational choice theory postulates a repeatable action that generates a significant benefit at the expense of a negligible cost. No matter how many times the action has been taken, it therefore seems reasonable for a decision-maker to take the action one more time. However, matters are so fixed that the costs of taking the action some large number of times outweigh the benefits. In taking the action some large number of times on (...)
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  22.  70
    Teresa Robertson (2000). On Soames's Solution to the Sorites Paradox. Analysis 60 (4):328–334.
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  23.  32
    Peter Mott (1998). Margins for Error and the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):494-504.
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  24.  40
    James Cargile (1993). Vagueness. An Investigation Into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Books 34 (1):22-24.
  25.  28
    Lee F. Kerckhove & Sara Waller (1998). Fetal Personhood and the Sorites Paradox. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2):175-189.
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  26.  8
    Dominic Hyde (2011). The Sorites Paradox. In Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide. Springer Verlag 1--17.
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  27.  33
    Mark Addis (1995). Surveyability and the Sorites Paradox. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):157-165.
    Some issues raised by the notion of surveyability and how it is represented mathematically are explored. Wright considers the sense in which the positive integers are surveyable and suggests that their structure will be a weakly finite, but weakly infinite, totality. One way to expose the incoherence of this account is by applying Wittgenstein's distinction between intensional and extensional to it. Criticism of the idea of a surveyable proof shows the notion's lack of clarity. It is suggested that this concept (...)
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  28.  23
    Timothy Williamson (1996). Putnam on the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Papers 25 (1):47-56.
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  29.  1
    Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (1986). Well-Ordering and the Sorites Paradox. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 23:59-119.
  30.  13
    Sean Foran (2003). The Sorites Paradox and the Ordinary Use of Vague Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):303 - 318.
  31.  1
    Roy A. Sorensen (1994). Vagueness: An Investigation Into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):483-486.
  32. M. Banerjee (1998). The Sorites Paradox: A Contextual Approach. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 25 (3):313-326.
     
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  33. Otavio Bueno & Ali Abasnezhad (eds.) (forthcoming). On the Sorites Paradox. Springer.
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  34. M. Cuonzo (2001). Why the Sorites Paradox Has a Restricted Solution At Best. Facta Philosophica 3:02-15.
     
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  35. Peter Mott (1994). On the Intuitionistic Solution of the Sorites Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75:133-150.
     
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  36. T. Robertson (2000). On Soames's Solution to the Sorites Paradox. Analysis 60 (4):328-334.
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  37. Marcelo Vasconez (2006). Fuzziness and the Sorites Paradox. Dissertation, Catholic University of Louvain
  38. Alex Voorhoeve & Ken Binmore (2006). Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-Based Decision-Making. Erkenntnis 64 (1):101-114.
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  39. E. N. Zalta (2005). Sorites Paradox. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First Published on Jan 17:1997.
     
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  40. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Why the Vagueness Paradox is Amazing. Think.
    One of the hardest problems in philosophy, one that has been around for over two thousand years without generating any significant consensus on its solution, involves the concept of vagueness: a word or concept that doesn’t have a perfectly precise meaning. There is an argument that seems to show that the word or concept simply must have a perfectly precise meaning, as violently counterintuitive as that is. Unfortunately, the argument is usually so compressed that it is difficult to see why (...)
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  41.  75
    Ofra Magidor (2012). Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):471-491.
    Call an argument a ‘happy sorites’ if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, (...)
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  42.  24
    Merrie Bergmann (2010). Conjunction-Based Sorites: A Misguided Objection to Degree-Theoretic (Fuzzy) Solutions to Sorites Paradoxes. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):1 - 4.
    In 1987, Crispin Wright argued that degree-theoretic (fuzzy) solutions to the Sorites paradox fail because the solutions do not work when the paradox is restated using a conjunctive major premise. I show that Wright is incorrect: degree-theoretic solutions also work when the paradox is stated with a conjunctive major premise.
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  43.  3
    Dominic Hyde (2013). Are the Sorites and Liar Paradox of a Kind? In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer 349--366.
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  44.  55
    Ian Rumfitt (forthcoming). Vagueness and Intuitionistic Logic. In Alexander Miller (ed.), Language, Logic,and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. OUP
    In his essay ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Crispin Wright proposes a solution to the Sorites Paradox (in particular, the form of it he calls the ‘Paradox of Sharp Boundaries’) that involves adopting intuitionistic logic when reasoning with vague predicates. He does not give a semantic theory which accounts for the validity of intuitionistic logic (and the invalidity of stronger logics) in that area. The present essay tentatively makes good the deficiency. By applying a theorem of Tarski, it (...)
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  45. Haim Gaifman (2010). Vagueness, Tolerance and Contextual Logic. Synthese 174 (1):5 - 46.
    The goal of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of basic reasoning patterns that are characteristic of vague predicates. The analysis leads to rigorous reconstructions of the phenomena within formal systems. Two basic features are dealt with. One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-increment of a walking distance is a walking distance). The other is the existence of borderline cases. The paper shows why these should be treated as different, though (...)
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  46. Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij (2010). Tolerant, Classical, Strict. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.
    In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...)
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  47.  4
    Daniel Lassiter & Noah D. Goodman (forthcoming). Adjectival Vagueness in a Bayesian Model of Interpretation. Synthese:1-36.
    We derive a probabilistic account of the vagueness and context-sensitivity of scalar adjectives from a Bayesian approach to communication and interpretation. We describe an iterated-reasoning architecture for pragmatic interpretation and illustrate it with a simple scalar implicature example. We then show how to enrich the apparatus to handle pragmatic reasoning about the values of free variables, explore its predictions about the interpretation of scalar adjectives, and show how this model implements Edgington’s Vagueness: a reader, 1997) account of the sorites (...)
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  48.  13
    Nicholas J. J. Smith (forthcoming). Consonance and Dissonance in Solutions to the Sorites. In Otavio Bueno & Ali Abasnezhad (eds.), On the Sorites Paradox. Springer
    A requirement on any theory of vagueness is that it solve the sorites paradox. It is generally agreed that there are two aspects to such a solution: one task is to locate the error in the sorites argument; the second task is to explain why the sorites reasoning is a paradox rather than a simple mistake. I argue for a further constraint on approaches to the second task: they should conform to the standard modus operandi (...)
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  49.  22
    David Spector (2013). Margin for Error Semantics and Signal Perception. Synthese 190 (15):3247-3263.
    A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics eliminates the margin for error principle and solves the epistemic sorites paradox. Two objective knowledge modalities can be defined in two-dimensional frames accounting for subjective perceptions: “necessary knowledge” (NK) and “possible knowledge” (PK), the latter being better suited to the interpretation of knowledge utterances. Two-dimensional semantics can in some cases be reduced to one-dimensional ones, by defining accessibility relations between objective worlds that reflect subjective perceptions: NK (...)
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  50.  46
    Eugene O. Mills (2002). Fallibility and the Phenomenal Sorites. Noûs 36 (3):384-407.
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