Search results for 'special sciences' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Todd Jones (2004). Special Sciences: Still a Flawed Argument After All These Years. Cognitive Science 28 (3):409-432.score: 212.0
  2. Carl Gillett (2006). Special Sciences. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference.score: 210.0
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  3. Jaegwon Kim (2005). Laws, Causation, and Explanation in the Special Sciences. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4):325 - 338.score: 186.0
    There is the general philosophical question concerning the relationship between physics, which is often taken to be our fundamental and all-encompassing science, on one hand and the special sciences, such as biology and psychology, each of which deals with phenomena in some specially restricted domain, on the other. This paper deals with a narrower question: Are there laws in the special sciences, laws like those we find, or expect to find, in basic physics? Three arguments that (...)
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  4. Michael Sollberger (2005). Commentary on Jaegwon Kim, "Laws, Causation, and Explanation in the Special Sciences". History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4):339 - 344.score: 186.0
    In the present commentary on Jaegwon Kim's Laws, Causation, and Explanation in the Special Sciences, I first give a short summary of the global problem. In a second step, I go on to sum up and comment on the three arguments which Kim gives to the disadvantage of 'strict' special-science laws. In so doing, I shall focus on the question whether ceteris paribus laws can still apply in special sciences.
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  5. Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright (2006). Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168.score: 184.0
    We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the (...)
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  6. Theo C. Meyering (2000). Physicalism and Downward Causation in Psychology and the Special Sciences. Inquiry 43 (2):181-202.score: 184.0
    Physicalism ? or roughly the view that the stuff that physics talks about is all the stuff there is ? has had a popular press in philosophical circles during the twentieth century. And yet, at the same time, it has become quite fashionable lately to believe that the mind matters in this world after all and that psychology is an autonomous science irreducible to physics. However, if (true, downward) mental causation implies non-reducibility and Physicalism implies the converse, it is hard (...)
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  7. James Woodward (2000). Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):197-254.score: 182.0
    This paper describes an alternative to the common view that explanation in the special sciences involves subsumption under laws. According to this alternative, whether or not a generalization can be used to explain has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant if it is stable or robust in the sense (...)
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  8. James Ladyman (2008). Structural Realism and the Relationship Between the Special Sciences and Physics. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):744-755.score: 182.0
    The primacy of physics generates a philosophical problem that the naturalist must solve in order to be entitled to an egalitarian acceptance of the ontological commitments he or she inherits from the special sciences and fundamental physics. The problem is the generalized causal exclusion argument. If there is no genuine causation in the domains of the special sciences but only in fundamental physics then there are grounds for doubting the existence of macroscopic objects and properties, or (...)
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  9. Mathias Frisch (2011). From Arbuthnot to Boltzmann: The Past Hypothesis, the Best System, and the Special Sciences. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1001-1011.score: 182.0
    In recent work on the foundations of statistical mechanics and the arrow of time, Barry Loewer and David Albert have developed a view that defends both a best system account of laws and a physicalist fundamentalism. I argue that there is a tension between their account of laws, which emphasizes the pragmatic element in assessing the relative strength of different deductive systems, and their reductivism or funda- mentalism. If we take the pragmatic dimension in their account seriously, then the laws (...)
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  10. Matthew C. Haug (2011). Abstraction and Explanatory Relevance; or, Why Do the Special Sciences Exist? Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1143-1155.score: 182.0
    Non-reductive physicalists have long held that the special sciences offer explanations of some phenomena that are objectively superior to physical explanations. This explanatory “autonomy” has largely been based on the multiple realizability argument. Recently, in the face of the local reduction and disjunctive property responses to multiple realizability, some defenders of non-reductive physicalism have suggested that autonomy can be grounded merely in human cognitive limitations. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. By distinguishing between two kinds (...)
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  11. Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender (2010). Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood. Erkenntnis 73 (3):427 - 447.score: 180.0
    An important obstacle to lawhood in the special sciences is the worry that such laws would require metaphysically extravagant conspiracies among fundamental particles. How, short of conspiracy, is this possible? In this paper we'll review a number of strategies that allow for the projectibility of special science generalizations without positing outlandish conspiracies: non-Humean pluralism, classical MRL theories of laws, and Albert and Loewer's theory. After arguing that none of the above fully succeed, we consider the conspiracy problem (...)
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  12. Amir Eshan Karbasizadeh (2008). Revising the Concept of Lawhood: Special Sciences and Natural Kinds. Synthese 162 (1):15 - 30.score: 180.0
    The Kripkean conception of natural kinds (kinds are defined by essences that are intrinsic to their members and that lie at the microphysical level) indirectly finds support in a certain conception of a law of nature, according to which generalizations must have unlimited scope and be exceptionless to count as laws of nature. On my view, the kinds that constitute the subject matter of special sciences such as biology may very well turn out to be natural despite the (...)
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  13. Peter Menzies & Christian List (2010). The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences. In Cynthia Mcdonald & Graham Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher-level properties have causal powers that are independent of those of their more basic physical properties. This view was espoused by the British emergentists, who claimed that systems achieving a certain level of organizational complexity have distinctive causal powers that emerge from their constituent elements but do not derive from them.2 More recently, non-reductive physicalists have espoused a similar view (...)
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  14. Huw Price, Causation in the Special Sciences: The Case for Pragmatism.score: 180.0
    One of the jobs of philosophers of the special sciences is to connect the local concerns of particular disciplines with those of philosophy in general. The two-way complexities of this task are well-illustrated by the case of causation. On the one hand—from the outside, as it were— philosophers interested in general issues about causation are prone to turn to the special sciences for real-life examples of the use of causal notions. On the other hand, from the (...)
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  15. Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.score: 180.0
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates (...)
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  16. Alex Rosenberg, Comments and Criticism on Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences.score: 180.0
    It is widely held that disciplines are autonomous when their taxonomies are “substrate neutral” and when the events, states and processes that realize their descriptive vocabulary are heterogeneous. This will be particularly true in the case of disciplines whose taxonomy consists largely in terms that individuate by function. Having concluded that the multiple realization of functional kinds is far less widespread than assumed or argued for, Shapiro cannot avail himself of the argument for the autonomy of the special (...) which relies on multiple realization. This makes urgent the question of whether we must “now give up the idea that functionalist taxonomies have any scientific value?” [p. 650]. He acknowledges that we must either deny that the special sciences are autonomous, because higher level kinds have only a single realization and can thus be reduced, or else we must deny that there are empirical laws in the special sciences. “In other words, either special sciences have no ontological independence from lower level sciences or, worse, they have no empirical laws, which is to say that they are not empirical sciences at all. [p. 650]” Shapiro’s reductionist/eliminativist dilemma for the special sciences is unreal. For he has not canvassed the most important source of multiple realization in nature, and this source obviates his dilemma for most of the special sciences. Moreover, the route he offers between the horns of his dilemma leads pretty directly to impalement on its eliminativist horn. Or so I shall try to show in this comment. (shrink)
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  17. Jaegwon Kim (2012). Against Laws in the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (Supplement):103-122.score: 180.0
    The traditional view of science holds that science is essentially nomothetic—that is, the defining characteristic of science is that it seeks to discover and formulate laws for the phenomena in its domain, and that laws are required for explanation and prediction. This paper advances the thesis that there are no laws in the special sciences, sciences other than fundamental physics, and that this does not impugn their status as sciences. Toward this end, two arguments are presented. (...)
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  18. Mark Colyvan, The Undeniable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Special Sciences.score: 180.0
    In many of the special sciences, mathematical models are used to provide information about specified target systems. For instance, population models are used in ecology to make predictions about the abundance of real populations of particular organisms. The status of mathematical models, though, is unclear and their use is hotly contested by some practitioners. A common objection levelled against the use of these models is that they ignore all the known, causally-relevant details of the often complex target systems. (...)
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  19. Jeffrey Dunn (2011). Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):71-98.score: 166.0
    David Lewis ([1986b]) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been subject to a counterexample from Adam Elga ([2000]). In this article, I formulate a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis’s similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the (...)
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  20. Matthew C. Haug (2011). Natural Properties and the Special Sciences. The Monist 94 (2):244-266.score: 164.0
    In this paper, I investigate how different views about the vertical and horizontal structure of reality affect the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalism. This debate is commonly assumed to hinge on whether there are high-level, special-science properties that are distinct from low-level physical properties and whether the alleged multiple realizability of high-level properties establishes this. I defend a metaphysical interpretation of nonreductive physicalismin the absence of both of these assumptions. Adopting an independently motivated, discipline-relative account of natural properties (...)
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  21. Sahotra Sarkar (ed.) (1996). Logical Empiricism and the Special Sciences: Reichenbach, Feigl, and Nagel. Garland Publ..score: 164.0
    A new direction in philosophy Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy (...)
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  22. Alex Rosenberg (2001). On Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):365-373.score: 162.0
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  23. Marion Godman (forthcoming). The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.score: 160.0
    I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’–such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable (...)
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  24. Brad Majors (2003). Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences. Philosophical Studies 113 (2):121 - 152.score: 156.0
    Discussion of moral explanation has reached animpasse, with proponents of contemporaryethical naturalism upholding the explanatoryintegrity of moral facts and properties, andopponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting thatsuch robustly explanatory pretensions as moraltheory has be explained away. I propose thatthe key to solving the problem lies in thequestion whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that,given the truth of contemporary ethicalnaturalism, moral properties are causallyefficacious if the properties of the specialsciences are. Certain objections are rebuttedinvolving (...)
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  25. Graham Macdonald (2004). Causation, Supervenience, and Special Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):631-631.score: 156.0
    Ross & Spurrett (R&S) argue that Kim's reductionism rests on a restricted account of supervenience and a misunderstanding about causality. I contend that broadening supervenience does nothing to avoid Kim's argument and that it is difficult to see how employing different notions of causality helps to avoid the problem. I end by sketching a different solution.
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  26. Carl Gillett (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.score: 154.0
  27. Panu Raatikainen (2010). Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 73 (3):349-363.score: 152.0
    The issue of downward causation (and mental causation in particular), and the exclusion problem is discussed by taking into account some recent advances in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. It is argued that from this viewpoint, a higher-level (e.g., mental) state can sometimes truly be causally relevant, and moreover, that the underlying physical state which realizes it may fail to be such.
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  28. Holger Lyre (2013). Must Structural Realism Cover the Special Sciences? In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. 383--390.score: 152.0
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  29. Antonella Corradini (2010). 15 How Special Are Special Sciences? In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. 6--289.score: 152.0
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  30. Jerry Fodor (1991). Special Sciences Jerry Fodor. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. Mit Press. 429.score: 152.0
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  31. Jerry A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences. Synthese 28 (2):97-115.score: 150.0
  32. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):149-63.score: 150.0
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  33. J. A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis). Synthese 28 (2):97-115.score: 150.0
  34. Michael Esfeld, Comment on David Papineau, Can Any Sciences Be Special?score: 150.0
    David Papineau, Jerry Fodor and many others wonder how the conjunction of the following three positions can be true: 1) Special science laws: There are lawlike generalizations in the special sciences. These sciences trade in kinds that are such that statements about salient, reliable correlations that are projectible and that support counterfactuals apply to the tokens coming under these kinds. 2) Non-reductionism: The laws of some of the special sciences cannot be reduced to physical (...)
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  35. Emma Tobin, What Makes the Special Sciences Special – Exploring Scientific Methodology in the Special Sciences.score: 150.0
    NOESIS, Cambridge Scholarly Press, 2005.
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  36. Richard N. Boyd (1999). Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realization: Comments on Millikan's "Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences&Quot;. Philosophical Studies 95 (1/2):67 - 98.score: 150.0
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  37. Alex Rosenberg (2001). On Multiple Realization: Comments and Criticism and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy XCVIII ( 7.score: 150.0
  38. Paco Calvo & John Symons, Radical Embodiment and Morphological Computation: Against the Autonomy of (Some) Special Sciences.score: 150.0
    An asymmetry between the demands at the computational and algorithmic levels of description furnishes the illusion that the abstract profile at the computational level can be multiply realized, and that something is actually being shared at the algorithmic one. A disembodied rendering of the situation lays the stress upon the different ways in which an algorithm can be implemented. However, from an embodied approach, things look rather different. The relevant pairing, I shall argue, is not between implementation and algorithm, but (...)
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  39. Mark Colyvan & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Reduction and the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 73:3 (special issue).score: 150.0
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  40. Paul Humphreys (1996). Understanding in the Not-So-Special Sciences. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):99-114.score: 150.0
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  41. Gail Belaief (1977). Philosophy and the Special Sciences. Journal of Critical Analysis 6 (4):101-109.score: 150.0
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  42. Lawrence A. Shapiro & Thomas W. Polger (2012). Identity, Variability, and Multiple Realization in the Special Sciences. In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 264.score: 150.0
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  43. Mark Colyvan & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Editorial to “Reduction and the Special Sciences”. Erkenntnis 73 (3):293-293.score: 150.0
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  44. Richard J. Blackwell (1979). "Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences," Ed. Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka. Modern Schoolman 56 (3):288-288.score: 150.0
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  45. Hinne Hettema (2013). Olga Pombo, Juan Manuel Torres, John Symons, and Shadid Rahman, Eds. , Special Sciences and the Unity of Science . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (4):315-317.score: 150.0
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  46. Jerry A. Fodor (1995). 2 Special Sciences. In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. 51.score: 150.0
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  47. H. Kincaid (1999). Individualism and the Unity of Science: Essays on Reduction, Explanation and the Special Sciences (Steve Clarke). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):518-518.score: 150.0
     
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  48. Zbigniew Kuderowicz & Maciej Łęcki (1975). The Problem of the Relation of Philosophy to Special Sciences as Discussed in Cracow in the Period 1944—1974. Dialectics and Humanism 2 (2):147-155.score: 150.0
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  49. M. Buhr (1979). Place and the Function of Philosophy and Special Sciences in Contemporary-World. Filosoficky Casopis 27 (1):1-6.score: 150.0
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