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Bibliography: Stuff in Metaphysics
  1.  6
    Hot Stuff (2000). Paul Needham. In J. Faye, U. Scheffler & M. Urchs (eds.), Things, Facts and Events. Rhodopi 76--421.
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  2. Ned Markosian (2015). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):665-687.
    This paper argues for including stuff in one's ontology. The distinction between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different ontologies of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure stuff ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. Eleven different reasons for including stuff in one's ontology are given. Then five objections to positing stuff are considered and rejected.
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  3.  81
    Lucía Lewowicz & Olimpia Lombardi (2013). Stuff Versus Individuals. Foundations of Chemistry 15 (1):65-77.
    The general question to be considered in this paper points to the nature of the world described by chemistry: what is macro-chemical ontology like? In particular, we want to identify the ontological categories that underlie chemical discourse and chemical practice. This is not an easy task, because modern Western metaphysics was strongly modeled by theoretical physics. For this reason, we attempt to answer our question by contrasting macro-chemical ontology with the mainstream ontology of physics and of traditional metaphysics. In particular, (...)
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  4. Shieva Kleinschmidt (2007). Some Things About Stuff. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):407-423.
    I examine the implications of positing stuff as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it’s intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations. I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.
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  5.  81
    Kristie Miller (2008). Essential Stuff. Ratio 21 (1):55–63.
    Here is a common view. There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, ‘thing’ is a count noun, and ‘stuff’ is a mass noun. Syntactically, ‘thing’ functions as a singular referring term that takes ‘a’ and ‘every’ and is subject to pluralisation, while ‘stuff’ functions as a plural referring term that takes ‘some’ and is not subject to pluralisation. Hence there exists a thing, and some stuff. Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles (...)
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  6.  68
    Michael B. Burke (1980). Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence. Mind 89 (355):391-405.
    I will try to establish that there are cases in which an ordinary material object exists intermittently. Afterwards there will be a few words about the consequences of acknowledging such cases, but what is of more interest, perhaps, is the route by which the conclusion is reached. When deciding among competing descriptions of the cases considered, I have tried to reduce to a minimum the role of intuitive judgement, and I have based several arguments on 'metaphysical principles'. These principles are (...)
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  7.  53
    Mark Steen (2011). More Problems for MaxCon: Contingent Particularity and Stuff-Thing Coincidence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (2):135-154.
    Ned Markosian argues (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:213-228, 1998a; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a, The Monist 87:405-428, 2004b) that simples are ‘maximally continuous’ entities. This leads him to conclude that there could be non-particular ‘stuff’ in addition to things. I first show how an ensuing debate on this issue McDaniel (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2):265-275, 2003); Markosian (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a) ended in deadlock. I attempt to break the deadlock. Markosian’s view entails stuff-thing coincidence, which (...)
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  8. Ned Markosian (2004). Simples, Stuff, and Simple People. The Monist 87 (3):405-428.
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  9.  36
    Maureen Donnelly & Thomas Bittner (2009). Summation Relations and Portions of Stuff. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):167 - 185.
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  10.  13
    M. Esfeld, D. Lazarovici, V. Lam & M. Hubert (forthcoming). The Physics and Metaphysics of Primitive Stuff. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv026.
    The article sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive stuff—that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all—but that is not a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the picture exclusively through the role that they play for the dynamics of (...)
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  11.  37
    Thomas J. McKay (2015). Stuff and Coincidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3081-3100.
    Anyone who admits the existence of composite objects allows a certain kind of coincidence, coincidence of a thing with its parts. I argue here that a similar sort of coincidence, coincidence of a thing with the stuff that constitutes it, should be equally acceptable. Acknowledgement of this is enough to solve the traditional problem of the coincidence of a statue and the clay or bronze it is made of. In support of this, I offer some principles for the persistence (...)
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  12. Frank Arntzenius (ed.) (2012). Space, Time, & Stuff. Oxford Univ. Press.
    Frank Arntzenius presents a series of radical new ideas about the structure of space and time. Space, Time, and Stuff is an attempt to show that physics is geometry: that the fundamental structure of the physical world is purely geometrical structure. Along the way, he examines some non-standard views about the structure of spacetime and its inhabitants, including the idea that space and time are pointless, the idea that quantum mechanics is a completely local theory, the idea that antiparticles (...)
     
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  13.  23
    Kristie Miller (2009). Stuff. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):1 - 18.
    Linguistically, we distinguish between thing terms and stuff terms, where, roughly, "thing" is a count noun, and "stuff" is a mass noun. Syntactically, "thing" functions as a singular referring term, that is, a term that refers to a single "entity" and hence takes "a" and "every" and is subject to pluralization, while "stuff" functions as a plural referring term, that is, it refers to a plurality of "entities" and hence takes "some" and is not subject to pluralization. (...)
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  14.  9
    S. Llewellyn (2013). Such Stuff as Dreams Are Made On? Elaborative Encoding, the Ancient Art of Memory, and the Hippocampus. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):589-607.
    This article argues that rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming is elaborative encoding for episodic memories. Elaborative encoding in REM can, at least partially, be understood through ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles: visualization, bizarre association, organization, narration, embodiment, and location. These principles render recent memories more distinctive through novel and meaningful association with emotionally salient, remote memories. The AAOM optimizes memory performance, suggesting that its principles may predict aspects of how episodic memory is configured in the brain. Integration and segregation (...)
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  15.  72
    David Barnett (2004). Some Stuffs Are Not Sums of Stuff. Philosophical Review 113 (1):89-100.
    Milk, sand, plastic, uranium, wood, carbon, and oil are kinds of stuff. The sand in Hawaii, the uranium in North Korea, and the oil in Iraq are portions of stuff. Not everyone believes in portions of stuff.1 Those who do are likely to agree that, whatever their more specific natures, portions of stuff can at least be identified with mereological sums of their subportions.2 It seems after all trivial that a given portion of stuff just (...)
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  16.  55
    Crawford L. Elder (2003). Destruction, Alteration, Simples and World Stuff. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):24–38.
    When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unravelled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be reduced to mere alteration of something else, (...)
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  17. David Nicolas (2009). Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller. Erkenntnis 71 (3):425 - 429.
    In ‘Essential stuff' (2008) and ‘Stuff' (2009), Kristie Miller argues that two generally accepted theses, often formulated as follows, are incompatible: - (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis that any portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists. - Stuff composition, the thesis that for any two portions of stuff, there exists a portion of stuff that is their mereological sum (or fusion). She does this by (...)
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  18.  46
    Steven Weinstein, Review of "Space, Time, and Stuff", Frank Arntzenius, OUP 2012. [REVIEW]
    Review of "Space, Time, and Stuff" by Frank Arntzenius.
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  19.  16
    Jamie Horder (2008). Strange Stuff Indeed. Think 6 (17-18):205-209.
    Jamie Horder reviews The Stuff of Thought (London: Allen Lane, 2007) by Steven Pinker.
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  20.  42
    Martín Labarca & Olimpia Lombardi (2009). Klaus Ruthenberg and Jaap Van Brakel (Eds): Stuff. The Nature of Chemical Substances. [REVIEW] Foundations of Chemistry 11 (3):183-186.
    Klaus Ruthenberg and Jaap van Brakel (eds): Stuff. The nature of chemical substances Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 183-186 DOI 10.1007/s10698-009-9077-6 Authors Martín Labarca, CONICET, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes Buenos Aires Argentina Olimpia Lombardi, CONICET, Universidad de Buenos Aires Buenos Aires Argentina Journal Foundations of Chemistry Online ISSN 1572-8463 Print ISSN 1386-4238 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 3.
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  21.  4
    Ron Broglio (2011). Thinking About Stuff: Posthumanist Phenomenology and Cognition. [REVIEW] AI and Society 26 (2):187-192.
    Emerging digital technologies, such as sensors and pervasive computing, provide a robust interplay between digital and physical space. Architecture as a disciplinary endeavor has subsumed the capacities of these technologies without allowing the difference these technologies afford to challenge fundamental notions of architecture, such as cognition, visibility, and presence. This essay explores the inverse of the architectural ground by exploring the cognitive capacity for non-animate entities. The implication of this posthuman phenomenology is that entities themselves pose questions and that “ (...)” thinks. Given an expanded definition of thinking, the environment is an active agent of entities that respond to human building with forces, tensions, marks, and crossings—physical elements that yield symbolic significance in our world. (shrink)
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  22.  3
    Linda Steet (2010). Girl Stuff: Same-Sex Relations in Girls' Public Reform Schools and the Institutional Response. Educational Studies 29 (4):341-358.
    (1998). Girl Stuff: Same-Sex Relations in Girls' Public Reform Schools and the Institutional Response. Educational Studies: Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 341-358.
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  23. Francis Jeffry Pelletier (ed.) (2009). Kinds, Things and Stuff: Mass Terms and Generics. Oxford University Press Usa.
    A generic statement is a type of generalization that is made by asserting that a "kind" has a certain property. For example we might hear that marshmallows are sweet. Here, we are talking about the "kind" marshmallow and assert that individual instances of this kind have the property of being sweet. Almost all of our common sense knowledge about the everyday world is put in terms of generic statements. What can make these generic sentences be true even when there are (...)
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  24. Kurt A. Richardson, Paul Cilliers & Michael Lissack (2001). Complexity Science: A "Gray" Science for the "Stuff in Between". Emergence: Complexity and Organization 3 (2):6-18.
  25.  12
    Gavin Huntley-Fenner, Susan Carey & Andrea Solimando (2002). Objects Are Individuals but Stuff Doesn't Count: Perceived Rigidity and Cohesiveness Influence Infants' Representations of Small Groups of Discrete Entities. Cognition 85 (3):203-221.
  26. Dean W. Zimmerman (1997). Coincident Objects: Could a ‘Stuff Ontology’ Help? Analysis 57 (1):19–27.
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  27.  5
    Sandeep Prasada, Krag Ferenz & Todd Haskell (2002). Conceiving of Entities as Objects and as Stuff. Cognition 83 (2):141-165.
  28.  75
    Thomas Bittner & M. Donnelly, A Temporal Mereology for Distinguishing Between Integral Objects and Portions of Stuff.
    In R. Holte and A. Howe (eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-07).
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  29.  52
    J. Christopher Maloney (1987). The Right Stuff. Synthese 70 (March):349-72.
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  30.  6
    Sue Llewellyn (2013). Such Stuff as REM and NREM Dreams Are Made On? An Elaboration. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):634-659.
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  31.  79
    Itay Shani (2010). Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does Not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (4):413-434.
    There is a famous passage in chapter six of James’ Principles of Psychology whose import, many believe, deals a devastating blow to the explanatory aspirations of panpsychism. In the present paper I take a close look at James’ argument, as well as at the claim that it underlies a powerful critique of panpsychism. Apart from the fact that the argument was never aimed at panpsychism as such, I show that it rests on highly problematic assumptions which, if followed to their (...)
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  32.  78
    Wayne Wright (2006). Visual Stuff and Active Vision. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
    This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a (...)
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  33.  12
    Karinne Ludlow (2008). Nanoregulation—Filtering Out the Small Stuff. NanoEthics 2 (2):183-191.
    Whilst there are not yet laws specifically relating to nanotechnology and its products in any country, the technology and its products are not unregulated. Regulatory frameworks created for conventional technologies and products will be expected to apply to nanotechnology and its products. For example, new medicines are regulated in Australia by the Therapeutic Goods Administration. If a new medicine incorporates nanotechnology, then it should still be regulated as a medicine. However, whether the expectation that pre-existing regulatory frameworks will apply is (...)
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  34.  19
    David Nicolas (2011). Review of J.Pelletier (Ed.), Kinds, Things, and Stuff, 2010. [REVIEW] Language 87.
  35.  10
    Francis Jeffry Pelletier (2011). Descriptive Metaphysics, Natural Language Metaphysics, Sapir-Whorf, and All That Stuff: Evidence From the Mass-Count Distinction. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 6 (1):7.
    Strawson described ‘descriptive metaphysics’, Bach described ‘natural language metaphysics’, Sapir and Whorf describe, well, Sapir-Whorfianism. And there are other views concerning the relation between correct semantic analysis of linguistic phenomena and the “reality” that is supposed to be thereby described. I think some considerations from the analyses of the mass-count distinction can shed some light on that very dark topic.
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  36.  8
    Clark Glymour (1987). ESP and the Big Stuff. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):590.
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  37.  44
    Vivian Mizrahi (2014). Sniff, Smell, and Stuff. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):233-250.
    Most philosophers consider olfactory experiences to be very poor in comparison to other sense modalities. And because olfactory experiences seem to lack the spatial content necessary to object perception, philosophers tend to maintain that smell is purely sensational or abstract. I argue in this paper that the apparent poverty and spatial indeterminateness of odor experiences does not reflect the “subjective” or “abstract” nature of smell, but only that smell is not directed to particular things. According to the view defended in (...)
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  38. Paul Needham (2010). Transient Things and Permanent Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):147 – 166.
    A view of individuals as constituted of quantities of matter, both understood as continuants enduring over time, is elaborated in some detail. Constitution is a three-place relation which can't be collapsed to identity because of the place-holder for a time and because individuals and quantities of matter have such a radically different character. Individuals are transient entities with limited lifetimes, whereas quantities are permanent existents undergoing change in physical and chemical properties from time to time. Coincidence, considered as a matter (...)
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  39.  17
    Francis Jeffry Pelletier (ed.) (2009). Kinds, Things, and Stuff: Mass Terms and Generics. OUP Usa.
    This volume showcases an interplay between leading philosophical and linguistic semanticists on the one side, and leading cognitive and developmental psychologists on the other side. The topic is a class of outstanding questions in the semanticists on the one side, and leading cognitive and developmental psychologists on the other side. The topic is a class of outstanding questions in the semantic and logical theories of generic statements and statements that employ mass terms by looking to the cognitive abilities of speakers (...)
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  40.  9
    Amy Olberding (2015). Looking Philosophical: Stuff, Stereotypes, and Self‐Presentation. Hypatia 30 (4):692-707.
    Self-presentation is a complex phenomenon through which individuals present themselves in performance of social roles. The success of such performances rests not just on how well a performer fulfills expectations regarding the role she would play, but on whether observers find her convincing. I focus on how self-presentation entails making use of material environment and objects: One may “dress for the part” and employ props that suit a desired role. However, regardless of dress or props, one can nonetheless fail to (...)
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  41.  6
    Brian Medlin & Christine Vick, Mysticism and Stuff Like That: Introduction by Christine Vick.
    Essay on mysticism in poetry, the Australian bush, and a photo essay on the Coorong by Brian Medlin, with an introduction by his wife, Christine Vick.
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  42.  17
    Timothy F. Murphy & Gladys B. White (2005). Dead Sperm Donors or World Hunger: Are Bioethicists Studying the Right Stuff? Hastings Center Report 35 (2):c3-c3.
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  43.  98
    F. W. Frankland (1882). Prof. Royce on "Mind-Stuff" and Reality. Mind 7 (25):110-114.
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  44.  6
    David John Baker (2014). Frank Arntzenius,Space, Time, and Stuff. Oxford: Oxford University Press , 320 Pp., $49.50. Philosophy of Science 81 (1):171-174.
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  45.  27
    Review by: David John Baker (2014). Review: Frank Arntzenius: Space, Time, and Stuff. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 81 (1):171-174,.
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  46.  24
    V. C. Chappell (1970). Stuff and Things. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:61 - 76.
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  47.  42
    Richard E. Grandy (1975). Stuff and Things. Synthese 31 (3-4):479 - 485.
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  48.  2
    James DuBois (2009). What Counts as Empirical Research in Bioethics and Where Do We Find the Stuff? American Journal of Bioethics 9 (6):70-72.
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  49.  4
    D. W. Zimmerman (1997). Coincident Objects: Could a 'Stuff Ontology' Help? Analysis 57 (1):19-27.
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  50.  73
    Thomas A. Blackson (1992). The Stuff of Conventionalism. Philosophical Studies 68 (1):65 - 81.
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