Search results for 'sub-personal' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.score: 90.0
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub-personal' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory (...)
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  2. Sebastian Gardner (2000). Psychoanalysis and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.score: 90.0
    This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself (...)
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  3. José Luis Bermúdez (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal; a Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63 – 82.score: 60.0
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands (...)
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  4. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.score: 54.0
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands (...)
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  5. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.score: 54.0
    The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three central ideas. The -rst is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. The ontological tenet is that mental representation is a two-place relation holding between a representing state and a represented entity (object, event, state of a.airs). The semantic tenet is that the relation in question is probably information-theoretic at heart, perhaps augmented teleologically, functionally, or teleo-functionally to cope with di/cult cases. The methodological tenet is that (...)
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  6. Guglielmo Tamburrini (2009). Brain to Computer Communication: Ethical Perspectives on Interaction Models. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 2 (3):137-149.score: 45.0
    Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) enable one to control peripheral ICT and robotic devices by processing brain activity on-line. The potential usefulness of BCI systems, initially demonstrated in rehabilitation medicine, is now being explored in education, entertainment, intensive workflow monitoring, security, and training. Ethical issues arising in connection with these investigations are triaged taking into account technological imminence and pervasiveness of BCI technologies. By focussing on imminent technological developments, ethical reflection is informatively grounded into realistic protocols of brain-to-computer communication. In particular, (...)
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  7. Matthew Elton (2000). The Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction: An Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):2 – 5.score: 45.0
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  8. Matthew Elton (2000). Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.score: 30.0
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better (...)
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  9. Denis Robinson (2004). Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree?: Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism. The Monist 87 (4):512-36.score: 27.0
    This paper explores a variety of kinds of apparent disagreement of which it may be held that they involve failure to disagree in that, at least in some broad sense, the disputants use the same words to express different meanings or concepts. It is argued that it is hard to rebut the claim that some apparent disagreements about personal identity fall into a particular sub-category of this broad type. I conclude both that a "constrained" relativism which I call "quasi-relativism" is (...)
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  10. Martin Davies (2000). Interaction Without Reduction: The Relationship Between Personal and Subpersonal Levels of Description. Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105.score: 26.0
    Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a (...)
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  11. David A. Jopling (1996). Sub-Phenomenology. Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind (...)
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  12. Anthony Chemero & William Cordeiro, Dynamical, Ecological Sub-Persons.score: 21.0
    Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Franklin and Marshall College Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA .
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  13. Francis Masiye & Robert Ssekubugu (2008). Routine Third Party Disclosure of Hiv Results to Identifiable Sexual Partners in Sub-Saharan Africa. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (5):341-348.score: 21.0
    The challenges of dealing with disclosure of HIV status cause frustration to health care providers and counselors. This frustration follows from the already known high risk to the third party on one hand and our ethical obligation to “respect persons” in terms of privacy and confidentiality on the other side. Given the stubbornly low rates of voluntary disclosure (partner notification) among couples, however, it is quite tempting to suggest a paradigm of routine third party disclosure to identifiable sexual partners by (...)
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  14. Martin Davies (2000). Persons and Their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.score: 20.0
    I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level, (...)
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  15. John Perry (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.score: 18.0
    Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and ...
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  16. James Giles (1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.score: 18.0
    The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of personal identity, and (...)
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  17. Derek Parfit (1982). Personal Identity and Rationality. Synthese 53 (2):227-241.score: 18.0
    There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.
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  18. Shelley Weinberg (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.score: 18.0
    Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own thinking. (...)
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  19. Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.score: 18.0
    What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject (...)
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  20. Shelley Weinberg (2012). The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.score: 18.0
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. But the former (...)
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  21. Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments dealing (...)
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  22. Marya Schechtman (2005). Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.score: 18.0
    Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather (...)
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  23. Eric T. Olson (2002). What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity? Noûs 36 (4):682-698.score: 18.0
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us (...)
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  24. David Shoemaker (2010). The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.score: 18.0
    It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each (...)
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  25. Marilea Bramer (2010). The Importance of Personal Relationships in Kantian Moral Theory: A Reply to Care Ethics. Hypatia 25 (1):121-139.score: 18.0
    Care ethicists have long insisted that Kantian moral theory fails to capture the partiality that ought to be present in our personal relationships. In her most recent book, Virginia Held claims that, unlike impartial moral theories, care ethics guides us in how we should act toward friends and family. Because these actions are performed out of care, they have moral value for a care ethicist. The same actions, Held claims, would not have moral worth for a Kantian because of the (...)
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  26. Robert S. Taylor (2005). Kantian Personal Autonomy. Political Theory 33 (5):602-628.score: 18.0
    Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre or Doctrine of Virtue--specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is important for at least three (...)
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  27. Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind 121 (483):677-702.score: 18.0
    Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...)
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  28. Amy Kind (2004). The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.score: 18.0
    Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this (...)
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  29. James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not (...)
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  30. Robert Schroer (2013). Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.score: 18.0
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  31. David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.score: 18.0
    Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that (...)
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  32. Lynne Rudder Baker (2011). First-Personal Aspects of Agency. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.score: 18.0
    Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person perspectives. (...)
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  33. David Fritzsche & E. Oz (2007). Personal Values' Influence on the Ethical Dimension of Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics 75 (4):335 - 343.score: 18.0
    Personal values have long been associated with individual decision behavior. The role played by personal values in decision making within an organization is less clear. Past research has found that managers tend to respond to ethical dilemmas situationally. This study examines the relationship between personal values and the ethical dimension of decision making using Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis. The study examines personal values as they relate to five types of ethical dilemmas. We found a significant positive contribution of altruistic (...)
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  34. Robert Francescotti (2005). Fetuses, Corpses and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81.score: 18.0
    Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.
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  35. David Hershenov (2005). Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity? Mind 114 (453):31 - 59.score: 18.0
    Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is (...)
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  36. Peter Nichols (2010). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.score: 18.0
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on the (...)
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  37. Theodore Sider (2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):189-209.score: 18.0
    It is easy to become battle-weary in metaphysics. In the face of seemingly unresolvable disputes and unanswerable questions, it is tempting to cast aside one’s sword, proclaiming: “there is no fact of the matter who is right!” Sometimes that is the right thing to do. As a case study, consider the search for the criterion of personal identity over time. I say there is no fact of the matter whether the correct criterion is bodily or psychological continuity.1 There exist two (...)
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  38. Daniel Kolak (2008). Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity. Synthese 162 (3):341 - 372.score: 18.0
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
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  39. Margaret Gilbert (2009). Shared Intention and Personal Intentions. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.score: 18.0
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
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  40. Basil Smith (2006). John Locke, Personal Identity and Memento. In Mark T. Conard (ed.), The Philosophy of Neo-Noir. University of Kentucky Press.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I compare John Locke’s “memory theory” of personal identity and Memento (directed by Christopher Nolan). I argue that the plot of Memento is ambiguous, in that the main character (Leonard Shelby, played by Guy Pearce) seems to have two histories. As such, Memento is but a series of puzzle cases that intend to illustrate that, although our memories may not be chronologically related to one another, and may even be fused with the memories of other persons, those (...)
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  41. John Wright (2006). Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel. Philosophia 34 (2):129-142.score: 18.0
    One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.
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  42. Mark T. Brown (2001). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.score: 18.0
    If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated (...)
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  43. Christine A. Hemingway & Patrick W. Maclagan (2004). Managers' Personal Values as Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 50 (1):33-44.score: 18.0
    In this theoretical paper, motives for CSR are considered. An underlying assumption is that the commercial imperative is not the sole driver of CSR decision-making in private sector companies, but that the formal adoption and implementation of CSR by corporations could be associated with the changing personal values of individual managers. These values may find expression through the opportunity to exercise discretion, which may arise in various ways. It is suggested that in so far as CSR initiatives represent individuals' values, (...)
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  44. Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.score: 18.0
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far (...)
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  45. Matti Eklund (2004). Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.score: 18.0
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
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  46. Steve Matthews (1998). Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.score: 18.0
    Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may be escaped (...)
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  47. Grant R. Gillett (1986). Brain Bisection and Personal Identity. Mind 95 (April):224-9.score: 18.0
    It has been argued that 'brain bisection' data leads us to abandon our traditional conception of personal identity. Nagel has remarked: The ultimate account of the unity of what we call a single mind consists of an enumeration of the types of functional integration that typify it. We know that these can be eroded in different ways and to different degrees. The belief that even in their complete version they can be explained by the presence of a numerically single subject (...)
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  48. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.score: 18.0
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  49. Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.score: 18.0
    Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity (...)
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  50. Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.score: 18.0
    Among theories of personal identity over time the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view (...)
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