Search results for 'sub-personal' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.score: 240.0
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub-personal' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory (...)
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  2. Sebastian Gardner (2000). Psychoanalysis and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.score: 240.0
    This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself (...)
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  3. José Luis Bermúdez (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal; a Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63 – 82.score: 180.0
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands (...)
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  4. Matthew Elton (2000). The Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction: An Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):2 – 5.score: 150.0
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  5. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.score: 120.0
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands (...)
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  6. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.score: 120.0
    The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three central ideas. The -rst is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. The ontological tenet is that mental representation is a two-place relation holding between a representing state and a represented entity (object, event, state of a.airs). The semantic tenet is that the relation in question is probably information-theoretic at heart, perhaps augmented teleologically, functionally, or teleo-functionally to cope with di/cult cases. The methodological tenet is that (...)
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  7. Guglielmo Tamburrini (2009). Brain to Computer Communication: Ethical Perspectives on Interaction Models. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 2 (3):137-149.score: 90.0
    Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) enable one to control peripheral ICT and robotic devices by processing brain activity on-line. The potential usefulness of BCI systems, initially demonstrated in rehabilitation medicine, is now being explored in education, entertainment, intensive workflow monitoring, security, and training. Ethical issues arising in connection with these investigations are triaged taking into account technological imminence and pervasiveness of BCI technologies. By focussing on imminent technological developments, ethical reflection is informatively grounded into realistic protocols of brain-to-computer communication. In particular, (...)
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  8. Matthew Elton (2000). Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.score: 72.0
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better (...)
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  9. Denis Robinson (2004). Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree?: Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism. The Monist 87 (4):512-36.score: 66.0
    This paper explores a variety of kinds of apparent disagreement of which it may be held that they involve failure to disagree in that, at least in some broad sense, the disputants use the same words to express different meanings or concepts. It is argued that it is hard to rebut the claim that some apparent disagreements about personal identity fall into a particular sub-category of this broad type. I conclude both that a "constrained" relativism which I call "quasi-relativism" is (...)
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  10. Martin Davies (2000). Interaction Without Reduction: The Relationship Between Personal and Subpersonal Levels of Description. Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105.score: 64.0
    Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a (...)
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  11. Anthony Chemero & William Cordeiro, Dynamical, Ecological Sub-Persons.score: 60.0
    Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Franklin and Marshall College Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA .
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  12. David A. Jopling (1996). Sub-Phenomenology. Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.score: 60.0
    This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind (...)
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  13. Anthony Chemero & William Cordeiro, "Dynamical, Ecological Sub-Persons" Commentary on Susan HurleyÂ's Consciousness in Action.score: 50.0
    In a way that is rarely even attempted, and even more rarely actually pulled off, Susan Hurley, in her book Consciousness in Action, brings scientific ideas into contact with mainstream philosophy. It is not at all unusual for empirical results from cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience to be raised in discussion of issues in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind--Dennett and the Churchlands, for example, have been doing so for years. But Hurley attempts to draw empirical results even closer (...)
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  14. Martin Davies (2000). Persons and Their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.score: 44.0
    I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level, (...)
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  15. Francis Masiye & Robert Ssekubugu (2008). Routine Third Party Disclosure of Hiv Results to Identifiable Sexual Partners in Sub-Saharan Africa. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (5):341-348.score: 38.0
    The challenges of dealing with disclosure of HIV status cause frustration to health care providers and counselors. This frustration follows from the already known high risk to the third party on one hand and our ethical obligation to “respect persons” in terms of privacy and confidentiality on the other side. Given the stubbornly low rates of voluntary disclosure (partner notification) among couples, however, it is quite tempting to suggest a paradigm of routine third party disclosure to identifiable sexual partners by (...)
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  16. Augustina Akoto (2013). “Why Don't They Change?” Law Reform, Tradition and Widows' Rights in Ghana. Feminist Legal Studies 21 (3):263-279.score: 36.0
    Widows form a sub-set of an already beleaguered gendered minority in societies where law is but one of a competing number of social orders. This can render widows vulnerable and often outside the protection of State law and at the behest of (discriminatory) customary laws. Ghana enacted the Intestate Succession Law 1985 (P.N.D.C.L.111) to grant widows the right to inherit from the estate of the deceased. However, the law has had little impact. Personal narrative analysis was used to ascertain the (...)
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  17. Katalin Balog (2009). Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content. Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.score: 30.0
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...)
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  18. Sebastian Watzl (2011). The Nature of Attention. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):842-853.score: 30.0
    What is attention? Attention is often seen as a subject matter for the hard sciences of cognitive and brain processes, and is understood in terms of sub-personal mechanisms and processes. Correspondingly, there still is a stark contrast between the central role attention plays for the empirical investigation of the mind in psychology and the neurosciences, and its relative neglect in philosophy. Yet, over the past years, several philosophers have challenged the standard conception. A number of interesting philosophical questions concerning (...)
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  19. Daniel D. Hutto (1995). Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett. The Monist 78 (4):464-79.score: 30.0
    Professor Dennett has recently embarked on what he considers a "demystifying philosophical investigation" with respect to the phenomena of consciousness. In essence the strategy he has employed is one of getting us to 'trade in' our ordinary intuitions so as to soften us up for the first phases of a full-fledged 'scientific' explanation of consciousness in terms of sub-personal systems and their ontogenetic origins. His hope is that, once we are freed from certain misleading metaphors about the mind we (...)
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  20. Mohan Matthen (2010). On the Diversity of Auditory Objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.score: 30.0
    This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (whereas (...)
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  21. Dan Ryder (2009). Problems of Representation I: Nature and Role. In John Symons Paco Calvo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 233.score: 30.0
    Introduction There are some exceptions, which we shall see below, but virtually all theories in psychology and cognitive science make use of the notion of representation. Arguably, folk psychology also traffics in representations, or is at least strongly suggestive of their existence. There are many different types of things discussed in the psychological and philosophical literature that are candidates for representation-hood. First, there are the propositional attitudes – beliefs, judgments, desires, hopes etc. (see Chapters 9 and 17 of this volume). (...)
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  22. Michael K. Shim (2005). The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.score: 30.0
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
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  23. Ronald P. Endicott (1996). Searle, Syntax, and Observer-Relativity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.score: 30.0
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...)
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  24. Napoleon Katsos (2008). The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface From an Experimental Perspective: The Case of Scalar Implicature. Synthese 165 (3):385 - 401.score: 30.0
    In this paper I discuss some of the criteria that are widely used in the linguistic and philosophical literature to classify an aspect of meaning as either semantic or pragmatic. With regards to the case of scalar implicature (e.g. some Fs are G implying that not all Fs are G), these criteria are not ultimately conclusive, either in the results of their application, or in the interpretation of the results with regards to the semantics/pragmatics distinction (or in both). I propose (...)
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  25. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.score: 30.0
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific (...)
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  26. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Masters of Our Meanings. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.score: 30.0
    The two-dimensional framework in semantics has the most power and plausibility when combined with a kind of global semantic neo-descriptivism. If neo-descriptivism can be defended on the toughest terrain - the semantics of ordinary proper names - then the other skirmishes should be easier. This paper defends neo-descriptivism against two important objections: that the descriptions may be inaccessibly locked up in sub-personal modules, and thus not accessible a priori, and that in any case all such modules bottom out in (...)
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  27. David Pitt, Unconscious Intentionality.score: 30.0
    Some contemporary philosophers – most notably John Searle and Galen Strawson – have persisted in the Cartesian intuition that consciousness and intentionality are somehow essentially connected. Descartes himself held that the relation between consciousness and intentionality is especially intimate: there can be no unconscious mental states of any kind; and no creature incapable of consciousness is capable of mentality. Descartes’s view is widely acknowledged to have been discredited by Freud, and by contemporary cognitive science. Freud argued that the (...)
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  28. Austen Clark (2006). Attention & Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA Meeting, Pasadena, California, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.score: 30.0
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
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  29. Mitchell Herschbach (2008). Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.score: 30.0
    Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. (...)
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  30. Anna Edmonds, Abandoning the Truth Aim a Reevaluation of the Aim of Belief and the Goal of Cognition.score: 30.0
    Part 2 Truth and the Aim of the Cognitive System: The Sub-personal Level 36 2.1 Truth and Justification: Externalist Truth-Conducive Accounts 40 2.2 Are cognizers better off having true beliefs?
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  31. Gregory Currie (2008). Some Ways to Understand People. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):211 – 218.score: 30.0
    Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto claim that those once bitter rivals, simulation theory and theory-theory, are now to be treated as partners in crime. It's true that the debate has become more nuanced, with detailed suggestions abroad as to how these two approaches might peaceably divide the field. And there is common ground between them, at least to the extent that they agree on what needs to be explained. But I see no fatal flaw in what they share. In particular, (...)
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  32. Daniel C. Dennett & Christopher D. Viger (1999). Sort-of Symbols? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):613-613.score: 30.0
    Barsalou's elision of the personal and sub-personal levels tends to conceal the fact that he is, at best, providing the “specs” but not yet a model for his hypothesized perceptual symbols.
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  33. Leslie F. Stevenson (2000). Synthetic Unities of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.score: 30.0
    Inspired by Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Sellars, I illustrate and identify certain kinds of unity which are typical (if not universal) features of our conscious experience, and argue that Kant was right to claim that such unities are produced by unconscious processes of synthesis: A perceptual experience of succession is not reducible to a succession of perceptual experiences. The experience of perceiving one object as having several features is not reducible to a conjunction of perceptual experiences of those features. A cross-modal (...)
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  34. Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.score: 30.0
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  35. Robyn Carston & Gower Street, The Relationship Between Generative Grammar and (Relevance-Theoretic) Pragmatics.score: 30.0
    The generative grammar approach to language seeks a fully explicit account of the modular systems of knowledge (competence) that underlies the human language capacity. Similarly, the relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics attempts an explicit characterisation of the sub-personal systems involved in utterance interpretation. As an on-line performance system, however, it is subject to certain additional constraints; this is demonstrated by the way in which matters of computational (processing effort) economy are currently employed in the two types of theory. A sub-module (...)
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  36. Michael Madary (2013). Anticipation and Variation in Visual Content. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):335-347.score: 30.0
    This article is composed of three parts. In the first part of the article I take up a question raised by Susanna Siegel (Philosophical Review 115: 355–388, 2006a). Siegel has argued that subjects have the following anticipation: (PC) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will change as a result of this change. She has left it an open question as to whether subjects anticipate a specific kind of change. I take up this question and answer (...)
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  37. Joseph Margolis (1980). The Trouble with Homunculus Theories. Philosophy of Science 47 (June):244-259.score: 30.0
    The so-called post-Wittgensteinian Oxford philosophers are often criticized not only for failing to provide for the causal explanation of human behavior and psychological states, but also for failing to recognize that psychological explanations require appeal to sub-personal or molecular processes. Three strategies accommodating this criticism appear in so-called homunculus theories and include: (1) that the sub-systems be assigned intentional or informational content purely heuristically; (2) that the intentional or informational content of molar states be analyzed without remainder in terms (...)
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  38. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Interacting? Yes. But, of What Kind and on What Basis? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):543-546.score: 30.0
    De Jaegher’s (2009) paper argues that Gallagher, who aims to replace traditional theory-of-mind accounts of social understanding with accounts based on direct perception (hereafter DP), has missed an important opportunity. Despite a desire to break faith with tradition, there is a danger that proponents of DP accounts will remain (at least tacitly) committed to an unchallenged, and perhaps unnoticed, sort of individualism inherent in traditional theories (i.e. those that regard our engagement with others as a ‘problem’ to be solved: a (...)
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  39. Marc Slors (2012). The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory. Inquiry 55 (5):521-542.score: 30.0
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible (...)
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  40. Peter King (2008). The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism. Vivarium 46 (3):253-274.score: 30.0
    Contemporary philosophy of mind is much concerned with issues pertaining to ‘mental architecture’ — describing how mental processes are organized, typically by identifying sub-personal functional mechanisms which causally interact, often through the intermediary of a mental representation, thereby giving rise to psychological phenomena. Such internal mental mechanisms can be quite low-level and operate with a degree of relative independence; if so, they may be considered ‘modules’ or minimal centres of mental activity. A module or a set of modules may (...)
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  41. Mohan Matthen, Auditory Objects.score: 30.0
    What do we directly hear? In section I, I define direct perception, and outline the logical atomist way of attacking the question. I argue in section II that atomism fails. Then, in sections III-V, I propose that a better alternative to atomism is to revive and modernize another traditional empiricist doctrine: that we directly sense what the senses deliver to automatic (i.e., sub-personal) processes of learning.
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  42. Manuela Ungureanu (2013). Experiences of Word Meaning. Dialogue and Universalism 23 (1):15-26.score: 30.0
    I focus on Barry C. Smith’s investigations in the phenomenology of speech, and on his ambitious, unified theory of both sub-personal and first-personal linguistic knowledge (2008, 2009). I argue that empirical hypotheses about our awareness of word meaning challenge the starting points of his phenomenology of speech, as they require both (1) modifications of his proposed theory of speakers experiences of word meaning, and (2) clarifications of what the phenomenology of speech teaches us and why.
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  43. Jona Vance (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.score: 30.0
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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  44. Austen Clark & Manchester Hall, March 2004.score: 30.0
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
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  45. Mark Glouberman (2007). Israelite Idol. Philosophy and Theology 19 (1/2):57-78.score: 26.0
    The Bible ridicules idolaters for bowing down to sticks and stones. Since idolaters worship what the sticks and stones stand for, not the sticks and stones themselves, isn’t the biblical position confused? At the basis of the Bible’s consistent refusal to observe the preceding distinction are found the conceptual underpinnings of its critique of idolatry. Men and women alone among creatures are inspired with God’s breath. Men and women alone among creatures, that is, are like God. They alone among creatures (...)
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  46. Shelley Weinberg (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.score: 24.0
    Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own thinking. (...)
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  47. James Giles (1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.score: 24.0
    The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of personal identity, and (...)
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  48. Robert S. Taylor (2005). Kantian Personal Autonomy. Political Theory 33 (5):602-628.score: 24.0
    Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre or Doctrine of Virtue--specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is important for at least three (...)
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