Search results for 'subjective character' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  44
    Marie Guillot (2016). I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I (...)
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  2. Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
    . When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": the bluish aspect and the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character . What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character , of conscious (...)
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  3.  33
    Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson (forthcoming). Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to (...)
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  4. Janet Levin (1986). Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):245-61.
  5.  35
    Kim Atkins (2000). Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience. Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):71–79.
  6. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  7.  26
    Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Subjective Character of Experience in Medical Ethics: A Reply to Atkins. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):219–223.
    Kim Atkins argues that Thomas Nagel’s argument regarding a bat’s phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this paper I demonstrate that Atkins’s argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel’s argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.
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  8. Paul G. Muscari (1985). The Subjective Character of Experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (4):577-97.
     
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  9.  10
    David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191 - 198.
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  10.  30
    Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1962). The Subjective and Irreproducible Character of Direct Experience. Studia Logica 13 (1):212-212.
    The author discusses the subjective and irreproducible character of the method of direct experience, which is the ground of the acceptance of observation statements. It is also shown how this method forms a part of the method of arriving at universal statements on the basis of experience without depriving the latter of its intersubjective and reproducible character.
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  11. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Précis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):443-445.
    This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
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  12. Alexandre Billon (2015). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  13. Sebastian Watzl (2010). The Significance of Attention. Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation investigates the nature, the phenomenal character and the philosophical significance of attention. According to its central thesis, attention is the ongoing mental activity of structuring the stream of consciousness or phenomenal field. The dissertation connects the scientific study of attention in psychology and the neurosciences with central discussions in the philosophy of mind. Once we get clear on the nature and the phenomenal character of attention, we can make progress toward understanding foundational issues concerning the nature (...)
     
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  14. David John Chalmers (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? In this sequel to his groundbreaking and controversial The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others. Starting with a statement of the "hard problem" of consciousness, Chalmers builds a positive framework for the science of consciousness and a nonreductive vision of the metaphysics of consciousness. He replies to (...)
     
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  15. S. Orestis Palermos (2013). Knowledge and Cognitive Integration. Synthese (8):1-21.
    Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of (...)
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  16. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2013). Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs (...)
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  17.  69
    Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the (...)
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  18. Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
    To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no (...)
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  19. Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2012). Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer "It" to "Me" ? Philosophical Topics 40 (2):155-177.
    In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order theorists need to offer an account of such access to become a (...)
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  20. Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  21. Jason Costanzo (2014). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  22. David J. Chalmers (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press Usa.
    What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? In this sequel to his groundbreaking and controversial The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others. Starting with a statement of the "hard problem" of consciousness, Chalmers builds a positive framework for the science of consciousness and a nonreductive vision of the metaphysics of consciousness. He replies to (...)
     
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  23. Guy Axtell (2014). Possibility and Permission? Intellectual Character, Inquiry, and the Ethics of Belief. In Pihlstrom S. & Rydenfelt H. (eds.), William James on Religion. (Palgrave McMillan “Philosophers in Depth” Series
    This chapter examines the modifications William James made to his account of the ethics of belief from his early ‘subjective method’ to his later heightened concerns with personal doxastic responsibility and with an empirically-driven comparative research program he termed a ‘science of religions’. There are clearly tensions in James’ writings on the ethics of belief both across his career and even within Varieties itself, tensions which some critics think spoil his defense of what he calls religious ‘faith ventures’ or (...)
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  24.  55
    Beata Stawarska (2001). Pictorial Representation or Subjective Scenario? Sartre on Imagination. Sartre Studies International 7 (2):87-111.
    The major thesis developed in Sartre's L'imaginaire is that all imaginary acts can be subsumed under the heading of one "image family" and, therefore, that imagination as a whole can be theorized in terms of pictorial representation. Yet this theory fails to meet the objective of Sartre's study, to demonstrate that imaginary activity is not a derivative of perception but an attitude with a character and dignity of its own. The subsidiary account of imagination in terms of neutralization of (...)
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  25.  74
    Patrick Frierson (2006). Character and Evil in Kant's Moral Anthropology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (4):623-634.
    In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains that moral anthropology studies the “subjective conditions in human nature that help or hinder [people] in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals” and insists that such anthropology “cannot be dispensed with” (6:217).1 But it is often difficult to find clear evidence of this sort of anthropology in Kant’s own works. in this paper, i discuss Kant’s account of character as an example of Kantian moral anthropology.
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  26.  30
    Emily Brady (2002). Aesthetic Character and Aesthetic Integrity in Environmental Conservation. Environmental Ethics 24 (1):75-91.
    Aesthetics plays an important role in environmental conservation. In this paper, I pin down two key concepts for understanding this role, aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity. Aesthetic character describes the particularity of an environment based on its aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities. In the first part, I give an account of aesthetic character through a discussion of its subjective and objective bases, and I argue for an awareness of the dynamic nature of this character. In the (...)
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  27. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Color, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview 55-66.
    Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color (...)
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  28.  13
    Mark A. Wrathall (2015). Trivial Tasks That Consume a Lifetime: Kierkegaard on Immortality and Becoming Subjective. Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):419-441.
    S. Kierkegaard argued that our highest task as humans is to realize an “intensified” or “developed” form of subjectivity—his name for self-responsible agency. A self-responsible agent is not only responsible for her actions. She also bears responsibility for the individual that she is. In this paper, I review Kierkegaard’s account of the role that our capacity for reflective self-evaluation plays in making us responsible for ourselves. It is in the exercise of this capacity that we can go from being (...) in a degraded sense—merely being an idiosyncratic jumble of accidental and arbitrary attitudes and affects—to being a subject in the ideal or eminent sense. The latter requires the exercise of my capacity for reflective self-evaluation, since it involves recognizing, identifying with, and reinforcing those aspects of my overall make-up that allow me to express successfully a coherent way of being in the world. Kierkegaard argues that taking immortality seriously is one way to achieve the right kind of reflective stance on one’s own character or personality. Thus, Kierkegaard argues that immortality as a theoretical posit can contribute to one’s effort to own or assume responsibility for being the person one is. (shrink)
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  29.  95
    Damion Buterin (2009). Knowledge, Freedom and Willing: Hegel on Subjective Spirit. Inquiry 52 (1):26 – 52.
    This paper argues that Hegel's depiction of knowledge, as presented in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective Spirit, is founded on what he deems to be the practical interests of self-consciousness. More specifically, it highlights the significance of the will in Hegel's understanding of the cognitive process. I begin with a survey of the relation between category-formation and the notion of self-determining freedom in the Logic , and therewith draw attention to the unity of thinking and willing in the Concept. (...)
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  30. James A. Diefenbeck (1984). A Celebration of Subjective Thought. Southern Illinois University Press.
    Seeing objective thought as passive, Diefenbeck seeks to develop a theory of thought or of reason “appropriate to the subject as an active agent or first cause.” His system would illuminate and render more effective the creation of values that guide lives. George Kimball Plochmann in his foreword describes the book as “a sus­tained inquiry into the character of knowledge, one seeking to prove that our exclusive cognitive allegiance to the so-called objective sciences is misplaced, not so much because (...)
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  31. Abraham Witonsky (1997). The Problem of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, Temple University
    I defend the view that the felt quality of experience is both an essential feature of certain inner mental states as well as a feature of the brain, but that at present we have no idea of how it is a feature of the brain because it is irreducibly subjective. I call this situation the "problem of phenomenal character". I argue that we cannot solve this problem with our present conceptual apparatus, but I explain why it is premature (...)
     
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  32.  5
    Keith E. Turausky (2014). Wherever You Go, There You Are: On Individuative Subjective Phenomenology. Essays in Philosophy 15 (2):249-265.
    That experience requires a subject is all but uncontroversial. It is surprising, then, that contemporary philosophers of mind generally focus on experiences at the expense of subjects. Herein, I argue that beyond the qualitative character of phenomenology, there is a discrete further fact—the subjective character of phenomenology—that calls out for explanation. Similar views have recently been endorsed by both Zahavi and Kriegel, but a comparison of the ways they have framed the issue suggests there are two discrete (...)
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  33.  74
    B. R. Tilghman (1991). What is It Like to Be an Aardvark? Philosophy 66 (July):325-38.
    The Alligator's Child was full of 'satiable curtiosity. One day while rummaging in a trunk in the lumber room he came across a photograph of his father wearing an aardvark uniform and standing by a large ant hill. All excitement, he rushed to his father and breathlessly said, ‘Father, I didn't know that you had been an aardvark! What is it like to be an aardvark?’.
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  34.  16
    Anne C. Ozar (2010). The Value of a Phenomenology of the Emotions for Cultivating One's Own Character. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10:303-317.
    This article demonstrates the unique value of a Husserlian phenomenological account of the affective (or “feeling”) dimension of emotional experience for realizing Aristotle’s vision of the cultivation of virtue. Through an analysis of envy, the author defends the claim that the affective dimension of self-assessment is central to the process of conceptualization by which we learn to apprehend our own emotional responses. Analytic conceptual analyses that dismiss the subjective, affective correlate of emotional experiences, therefore, fail to take seriously what (...)
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  35.  56
    Tom McClelland (2016). Can Self-Representationalism Explain Away the Apparent Irreducibility of Consciousness? Synthese (6):1-22.
    Kriegel’s self-representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physical i.e. to ‘demystify’ consciousness. This paper seeks to determine whether SR succeeds on the second project. Kriegel trades on a distinction between the subjective character and qualitative character of conscious states. Subjective character is the (...)
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  36. David Forman (2012). Principled and Unprincipled Maxims. Kant-Studien 103 (3):318-336.
    Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of (...)
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  37.  67
    Michelle Ciurria (2013). Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame. Philosophia 41 (1):179-193.
    In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we (...)
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  38.  30
    Douglas C. Long (1992). The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external (...)
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  39.  13
    Alan Brudner (2008). Subjective Fault for Crime: A Reinterpretation. Legal Theory 14 (1):1-38.
    This essay develops a liberal account of the mens rea requirement of criminal liability and identifies the fault level required by that account. By “a liberal account” is meant one that interprets the meaning of mens rea in a way that reconciles liability to coercion with the individual's inviolability. The article argues that the wrongdoer's choice to interfere or to risk interfering with another agent's capacity to act on his own ends is the level of fault required to make punishment (...)
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  40.  27
    Mezentsev Gennady (2008). The Character of Crisis Events in the Bases of Modern Philosophy And the Ways of Solving These Problems. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:49-55.
    This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. The (...)
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  41.  35
    James Scott Johnston (2006). The Education of the Categorical Imperative. Studies in Philosophy and Education 25 (5-6):385-402.
    In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate (...)
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  42.  25
    John Paley & Gail Eva (2005). Narrative Vigilance: The Analysis of Stories in Health Care. Nursing Philosophy 6 (2):83-97.
    The idea of narrative has been widely discussed in the recent health care literature, including nursing, and has been portrayed as a resource for both clinical work and research studies. However, the use of the term 'narrative' is inconsistent, and various assumptions are made about the nature (and functions) of narrative: narrative as a naive account of events; narrative as the source of 'subjective truth'; narrative as intrinsically fictional; and narrative as a mode of explanation. All these assumptions have (...)
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  43.  5
    Irene J. F. De Jong (1992). The Subjective Style in Odysseus' Wanderings. Classical Quarterly 42 (01):1-.
    In his celebrated article on the narrative technique of Odysseus' Wanderings W. Suerbaum concludes that this character's narration is not essentially different from that of the primary narrator of the Odyssey . Even though Odysseus is a first-person narrator and hence is subject to certain restrictions, these are almost completely counterbalanced by his ex eventu knowledge. For example, he can even report a conversation which took place on Olympus , because it was afterwards reported to him by Calypso, who (...)
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  44. John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character that date back to Aristotle. John Doris draws on behavioral science, especially social psychology, to argue that we misattribute the causes of behavior to personality traits and other fixed aspects of character rather than to the situational context. More often than not it is the situation not the nature of the personality that really counts. The author elaborates the philosophical consequences of this research (...)
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  45. Bill Brewer (2008). How to Account for Illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 168-180.
    The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms (...)
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  46. Jiri Benovsky (2015). Dual‐Aspect Monism. Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
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  47. Alexandre Billon (2016). Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights From the Study of Depersonalisation. Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
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  48. Michael Tye (2002). Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press
    Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties (...)
     
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  49.  73
    Axel Cleeremans (2014). Connecting Conscious and Unconscious Processing. Cognitive Science 38 (6):1286-1315.
    Consciousness remains a mystery—“a phenomenon that people do not know how to think about—yet” (Dennett, , p. 21). Here, I consider how the connectionist perspective on information processing may help us progress toward the goal of understanding the computational principles through which conscious and unconscious processing differ. I begin by delineating the conceptual challenges associated with classical approaches to cognition insofar as understanding unconscious information processing is concerned, and to highlight several contrasting computational principles that are constitutive of the connectionist (...)
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  50. Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Psyche 10.
    John Perry’s Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is based on the Jean Nicod Lectures, which he gave in Paris in 1999. The main goal of this book is to defend what he calls ‘antecedent physicalism’ from various common objections to physicalism. The book is organised as follows. In Chapter 1 Perry reviews a number of antiphysicalist arguments, which have been intensively discussed in the last few years among philosophers of mind. In Chapters 2 and 3 he formulates antecedent physicalism. Unlike eliminativism, (...)
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