Search results for 'subjective character' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.score: 168.0
    Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective (...), of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth. (shrink)
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  2. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1962). The Subjective and Irreproducible Character of Direct Experience. Studia Logica 13 (1):212-212.score: 96.0
    The author discusses the subjective and irreproducible character of the method of direct experience, which is the ground of the acceptance of observation statements. It is also shown how this method forms a part of the method of arriving at universal statements on the basis of experience without depriving the latter of its intersubjective and reproducible character.
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  3. Paul G. Muscari (1985). The Subjective Character of Experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (4):577-97.score: 94.0
     
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  4. Janet Levin (1986). Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):245-61.score: 90.0
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  5. Sebastian Watzl (2010). The Significance of Attention. Dissertation, Columbia Universityscore: 90.0
    This dissertation investigates the nature, the phenomenal character and the philosophical significance of attention. According to its central thesis, attention is the ongoing mental activity of structuring the stream of consciousness or phenomenal field. The dissertation connects the scientific study of attention in psychology and the neurosciences with central discussions in the philosophy of mind. Once we get clear on the nature and the phenomenal character of attention, we can make progress toward understanding foundational issues concerning the nature (...)
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  6. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.score: 90.0
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  7. Kim Atkins (2000). Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience. Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):71–79.score: 90.0
  8. Alexandre Billon (2014). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).score: 90.0
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  9. Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Subjective Character of Experience in Medical Ethics: A Reply to Atkins. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):219–223.score: 90.0
    Kim Atkins argues that Thomas Nagel’s argument regarding a bat’s phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this paper I demonstrate that Atkins’s argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel’s argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.
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  10. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Review: Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191 - 198.score: 90.0
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  11. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Précis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):443-445.score: 84.0
    This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
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  12. S. Orestis Palermos (2013). Knowledge and Cognitive Integration. Synthese (8):1-21.score: 72.0
    Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of (...)
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  13. Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.score: 60.0
    To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no (...)
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  14. Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.score: 60.0
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  15. Miguel Angel Sebastian (forthcoming). Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer It to Me? Philosophical Topics.score: 60.0
    In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. -/- Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access (...)
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  16. Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 60.0
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  17. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2013). Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.score: 54.0
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs (...)
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  18. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.score: 54.0
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the (...)
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  19. B. R. Tilghman (1991). What is It Like to Be an Aardvark? Philosophy 66 (July):325-38.score: 48.0
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  20. David John Chalmers (2009). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, Usa.score: 48.0
    What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? In this sequel to his groundbreaking and controversial The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others. Starting with a statement of the "hard problem" of consciousness, Chalmers builds a positive framework for the science of consciousness and a nonreductive vision of the metaphysics of consciousness. He replies to (...)
     
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  21. Siegen K. Chou (1931). "Reading and Legibility of Chinese Characters: II. Reading Half-Characters" [and] "Reading and Legibility of Chinese Characters: III. Judging the Positions of Chinese Characters by American Subjects": Correction. [REVIEW] Journal of Experimental Psychology 14 (2):186-186.score: 44.0
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  22. Guy Axtell (forthcoming). Possibility and Permission? Intellectual Character, Inquiry, and the Ethics of Belief. In Pihlstrom S. & Rydenfelt H. (eds.), William James on Religion. (Palgrave McMillan “Philosophers in Depth” Series.score: 42.0
    This chapter examines the modifications William James made to his account of the ethics of belief from his early ‘subjective method’ to his later heightened concerns with personal doxastic responsibility and with an empirically-driven comparative research program he termed a ‘science of religions’. There are clearly tensions in James’ writings on the ethics of belief both across his career and even within Varieties itself, tensions which some critics think spoil his defense of what he calls religious ‘faith ventures’ or (...)
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  23. Damion Buterin (2009). Knowledge, Freedom and Willing: Hegel on Subjective Spirit. Inquiry 52 (1):26 – 52.score: 42.0
    This paper argues that Hegel's depiction of knowledge, as presented in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective Spirit, is founded on what he deems to be the practical interests of self-consciousness. More specifically, it highlights the significance of the will in Hegel's understanding of the cognitive process. I begin with a survey of the relation between category-formation and the notion of self-determining freedom in the Logic , and therewith draw attention to the unity of thinking and willing in the Concept. (...)
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  24. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Color, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 55-66.score: 42.0
    Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color (...)
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  25. Patrick R. Frierson (2006). Character and Evil in Kant's Moral Anthropology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (4):623-634.score: 42.0
    In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains that moral anthropology studies the “subjective conditions in human nature that help or hinder [people] in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals” and insists that such anthropology “cannot be dispensed with” (6:217).1 But it is often difficult to find clear evidence of this sort of anthropology in Kant’s own works. in this paper, i discuss Kant’s account of character as an example of Kantian moral anthropology.
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  26. Beata Stawarska (2001). Pictorial Representation or Subjective Scenario? Sartre on Imagination. Sartre Studies International 7 (2):87-111.score: 42.0
    The major thesis developed in Sartre's L'imaginaire is that all imaginary acts can be subsumed under the heading of one "image family" and, therefore, that imagination as a whole can be theorized in terms of pictorial representation. Yet this theory fails to meet the objective of Sartre's study, to demonstrate that imaginary activity is not a derivative of perception but an attitude with a character and dignity of its own. The subsidiary account of imagination in terms of neutralization of (...)
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  27. Emily Brady (2002). Aesthetic Character and Aesthetic Integrity in Environmental Conservation. Environmental Ethics 24 (1):75-91.score: 42.0
    Aesthetics plays an important role in environmental conservation. In this paper, I pin down two key concepts for understanding this role, aesthetic character and aesthetic integrity. Aesthetic character describes the particularity of an environment based on its aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities. In the first part, I give an account of aesthetic character through a discussion of its subjective and objective bases, and I argue for an awareness of the dynamic nature of this character. In the (...)
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  28. Matthew Ratcliffe (2002). Husserl and Nagel on Subjectivity and the Limits of Physical Objectivity. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (4):353-377.score: 40.0
    Thomas Nagel argues that the subjective character of mind inevitably eludes philosophical efforts to incorporate the mental into a single, complete, physically objective view of the world. Nagel sees contemporary philosophy as caught on the horns of a dilemma.
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  29. P. Sven Arvidson (2008). Attentional Capture and Attentional Character. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):539-562.score: 36.0
    Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located (...)
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  30. David Forman (2012). Principled and Unprincipled Maxims. Kant-Studien 103 (3):318-336.score: 36.0
    Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of (...)
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  31. Michelle Ciurria (2013). Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame. Philosophia 41 (1):179-193.score: 36.0
    In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we (...)
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  32. James Scott Johnston (2006). The Education of the Categorical Imperative. Studies in Philosophy and Education 25 (5-6):385-402.score: 36.0
    In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate (...)
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  33. John Paley & Gail Eva (2005). Narrative Vigilance: The Analysis of Stories in Health Care. Nursing Philosophy 6 (2):83-97.score: 36.0
    The idea of narrative has been widely discussed in the recent health care literature, including nursing, and has been portrayed as a resource for both clinical work and research studies. However, the use of the term 'narrative' is inconsistent, and various assumptions are made about the nature (and functions) of narrative: narrative as a naive account of events; narrative as the source of 'subjective truth'; narrative as intrinsically fictional; and narrative as a mode of explanation. All these assumptions have (...)
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  34. Sebastian Luft (2007). The Subjectivity of Effective History and the Suppressed Husserlian Elements in Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics. Idealistic Studies 37 (3):219-254.score: 36.0
    This essay makes two claims. The first, exegetical, point shows that there are Husserlian elements in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that are usually overlooked.The second, systematic, claim takes issue with the fact that Gadamer saw himself in alliance with the project of the later Heidegger. It would have been more fruitful had Gadamer aligned himself with Husserl and the Enlightenment tradition. Following Heidegger in his concept of “effective history,” Gadamer risks betraying the main tenets of the Enlightenment by shifting the weight from (...)
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  35. Pirooz Fatoorchi (2008). Avicenna on the Human Self‐Consciousness. In Mehmet Mazak & Nevzat Ozkaya (eds.), International Ibn Sina Symposium Papers (vol.2). FSF Printing House.score: 34.0
    In recent years, philosophers have shown a rapidly increasing interest in the problem of consciousness and it is arguably the central issue in current interdisciplinary discussions about the mind. Any convincing theory of consciousness has to account for the perplexing aspects of human self-consciousness. This paper deals with Ibn Sina’s view on the human self-consciousness with special reference to his well-known “Flying Man” thought experiment. In a brief comparative discussion, we will consider some of the parallels between Ibn Sina’s account (...)
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  36. Bill Brewer (2008). How to Account for Illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 168-180.score: 30.0
    The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms (...)
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  37. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.score: 30.0
    <b>Key Terms:</b> Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight.
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  38. Corbin Collins (1997). Searle on Consciousness and Dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.score: 30.0
    In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is (...)
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  39. Erik J. Wielenberg (2006). Saving Character. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):461 - 491.score: 30.0
    In his recent book Lack of Character, John Doris argues that people typically lack character (understood in a particular way). Such a claim, if correct, would have devastating implications for moral philosophy and for various human moral projects (e.g. character development). I seek to defend character against Doris's challenging attack. To accomplish this, I draw on Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant to identify some of the central components of virtuous character. Next, I examine in detail some (...)
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  40. Paul Coates (2000). Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-Causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.score: 30.0
    The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call.
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  41. Michael Tye, Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 30.0
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the (...)
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  42. Glenn Braddock (2002). Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.score: 30.0
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. (...)
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  43. Michael Tye, “Qualia,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Revised 31 July 2007).score: 30.0
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the (...)
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  44. Matthew Nudds, Kinds of Experience and the Five Senses.score: 30.0
    In this paper I am going to argue that two commonly held views about perceptual experience are incompatible and that one must be given up. The first is the view that the five senses are to be distinguished by appeal to the kind of experiences involved in perception; the second is the view – called Representationalism – that the subjective character of perceptual experience is solely determined by what the experience represents. We could take their incompatibility as a (...)
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  45. Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Unity of Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.score: 30.0
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
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  46. Anil Gupta (2011). Replies to Selim Berker and Karl Schafer. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):41 - 53.score: 30.0
    I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliability (...)
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  47. Bosuk Yoon (2008). What is the Subjectivity of Perceptual Experience? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:215-222.score: 30.0
    For the purpose of this paper, I take it for granted that subjectivity is an essential character of perceptual experience. What I take issue with is the further claim that subjectivity of experience tends to support the view that phenomenal characters are intrinsic properties of experience. A criticism of the claim can be presented from the perspective of representationalism according to which phenomenal character is a kind of representational character. But representationalism fails to do justice to the (...)
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  48. Wonbin Park (2008). Subject From Ethic? Or Subject From Philosophy? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45:265-269.score: 30.0
    Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a French Philosopher and a Jew, became known first for his role in the introduction of Husserl’s phenomenology to France, and later for his criticisms of Husserl and Heidegger. As the Holocaust gave a significant impact on many theologians and philosophers to establish their theoretical systems, Levinas realized how ethic of responsibility was important through his personal tragic experience. What most peculiar character of his experience is that it leads him to cast a doubt a subject-oriented (...)
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  49. Mikhail Kissine (2012). Pragmatics, Cognitive Flexibility and Autism Spectrum Disorders. Mind and Language 27 (1):1-28.score: 30.0
    Pragmatic deficits of persons with autism spectrum disorders [ASDs] are often traced back to a dysfunction in Theory of Mind. However, the exact nature of the link between pragmatics and mindreading in autism is unclear. Pragmatic deficits in ASDs are not homogenous: in particular, while inter-subjective dimensions are affected, some other pragmatic capacities seem to be relatively preserved. Moreover, failure on classical false-belief tasks stems from executive problems that go beyond belief attribution; false-belief tasks require taking an alternative perspective (...)
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  50. Marina Bykova (2007). The Philosophy of Subjectivity From Descartes to Hegel. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:147-153.score: 30.0
    In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. (...)
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