Search results for 'supervaluation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  38
    Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156.
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
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  2.  42
    Toby Meadows (2013). Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.
    In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...)
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  3.  34
    Philip Kremer & Michael Kremer (2003). Some Supervaluation-Based Consequence Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):225-244.
    In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties. For our main consequence relation, we show that natural versions of the following fail: upwards and downwards Lowenheim-Skolem, axiomatizability, and compactness. We also consider an alternate version for supervaluation semantics, and show both axiomatizability and compactness for the resulting consequence relation.
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  4.  51
    Philip Kremer (2008). Supervaluation Fixed-Point Logics of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):407 - 440.
    Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. (...)
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  5. Christopher Mole, Supervaluation for Papineau's Phenomenal Concepts.
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  6.  10
    Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148 - 156.
  7.  7
    Casper Storm Hansen (2015). Supervaluation on Trees for Kripke’s Theory of Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):46-74.
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  8.  38
    Joan Weiner (2007). Science and Semantics: The Case of Vagueness and Supervaluation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):355–374.
    It is widely assumed that the methods and results of science have no place among the data to which our semantics of vague predicates must answer. This despite the fact that it is well known that such prototypical vague predicates as ‘is bald’ play a central role in scientific research (e.g. the research that established Rogaine as a treatment for baldness). I argue here that the assumption is false and costly: in particular, I argue one cannot accept either supervaluationist semantics, (...)
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  9.  1
    Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Meinong Und Supervaluation. In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Ontos 105-130.
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  10. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2010). (2010) ‘Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluation- Ism’, in Eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, Its Nature, and Its Logic,. Oxford University Press.
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  11. Philip Kremer & Alasdair Urquhart (2008). Supervaluation Fixed-Point Logics of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):407-440.
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  12. Marta Ujvari (1999). Multi-Criteria Predicates and Supervaluation. Acta Analytica 14 (1).
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  13.  39
    Daniel J. McKaughan & John M. Drake (2012). Representing Vague Opinion. Principia 16 (2):341-344.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341 Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither (...)
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  14. Siu-Fan Lee (2009). Fregean Free Logics. Philosophical Researches (Dec):123-129.
    This paper asks which free logic a Fregean should adopt. It examines options within the tradition including Carnap’s (1956) chosen object theory, Lehmann’s (1994, 2002) strict Fregean free logic, Woodruff’s (1970) strong table about Boolean operators and Bencivenga’s (1986, 1991) supervaluational semantics. It argues for a neutral free logic in view of its proximity towards explaining natural languages. However, disagreeing with Lehmann, it claims a Fregean should adopt the strong table based on Frege’s discussion on generality. Supervaluation uses strong (...)
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  15. Trenton Merricks (2015). Propositions. OUP Oxford.
    Trenton Merricks presents an original argument for the existence of propositions, and defends an account of their nature. He draws a variety of controversial conclusions, for instance about supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts.
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  16.  78
    Jim Stone (2010). Harry Potter and the Spectre of Imprecision. Analysis 70 (4):638-644.
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  17.  30
    Greg Frost-Arnold (2008). Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):239 - 257.
    The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, (...)
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  18.  23
    Steven Rieber (2002). A Defense of Indeterminism. Acta Analytica 17 (1):75-82.
    My goal is to defend the indeterminist approach to vagueness, according to which a borderline vague utterance is neither true nor false. Indeterminism appears to contradict bivalence and the disquotational schema for truth. I agree that indeterminism compels us to modify each of these principles. Kit Fine has defended indeterminism by claiming that ordinary ambiguous sentences are neither true nor false when one disambiguation is true and the other is false. But even if Fine is right about sentences, his point (...)
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  19.  6
    Bas C. Van Fraassen (2011). Thomason's Paradox for Belief, and Two Consequence Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):15-32.
    Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain (...)
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  20.  48
    D. Hyde (1997). From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts. Mind 106 (424):641-660.
    One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps. Logics of vagueness including many valued logics, fuzzy logics, and supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view. The thought that an adequate response might require (...)
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  21.  33
    Eric Swanson (2014). Ordering Supervaluationism, Counterpart Theory, and Ersatz Fundamentality. Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):289-310.
    Many philosophical theories make comparisons between objects, events, states of affairs, worlds, or systems, and many such theories deliver plausible verdicts only if some of the elements they compare are ranked as ‘best.’ When the relevant ordering does not have such ‘best’ or ‘tied for best’ elements the theory wrongly falls silent or gives badly counterintuitive results. This paper develops ordering supervaluationism---a very general technique that allows any such theory to handle these problematic cases. Just as ordinary supervaluation helps (...)
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  22.  79
    Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas (2009). Supervaluations Debugged. Mind 118 (472):901-933.
    Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather (...)
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  23.  24
    P. D. Welch (2001). On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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  24.  23
    Andrea Cantini (1990). A Theory of Formal Truth Arithmetically Equivalent to ID. Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1):244 - 259.
    We present a theory VF of partial truth over Peano arithmetic and we prove that VF and ID 1 have the same arithmetical content. The semantics of VF is inspired by van Fraassen's notion of supervaluation.
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  25.  42
    Delia Graff Fara (2010). Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), (2010) ‘Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluation- ism’, in eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, Its Nature, and Its Logic,. Oxford University Press
  26.  79
    Achille C. Varzi (2000). Supervaluationism and Paraconsistency. In Diderik Batens, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest & Jean Paul Van Bendegem (eds.), Frontiers in Paraconsistent Logic. Research Studies Press 279–297.
    Since its first appearance in 1966, the notion of a supervaluation has been regarded by many as a powerful tool for dealing with semantic gaps. Only recently, however, applications to semantic gluts have also been considered. In previous work I proposed a general framework exploiting the intrinsic gap/glut duality. Here I also examine an alternative account where gaps and gluts are treated on a par: although they reflect opposite situations, the semantic upshot is the same in both cases--the value (...)
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  27.  19
    Ashley Piggins & Maurice Salles (2007). Instances of Indeterminacy. Analyse & Kritik 29 (2):311-328.
    This paper is a survey of how economists and philosophers approach the issue of comparisons. More precisely, it is about what formal representation is appropriate whenever our ability to compare things breaks down. We restrict our attention to failures that arise with ordinal comparisons. We consider a number of formal approaches to this problem including one based on the idea of parity. We also consider the claim that the failure to compare things is a consequence of vagueness. We contrast two (...)
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  28.  7
    Casper Storm Hansen (forthcoming). Unified Grounding. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper offers a unification and systematization of the grounding approaches to truth, denotation, classes and abstraction. Its main innovation is a method for “kleenifying” bivalent semantics so as to ensure that the trivalent semantics used for various linguistic elements are perfectly analogous to the semantics used by Kripke, rather than relying on intuition to achieve similarity. The focus is on generalizing strong Kleene semantics, but one section is devoted to supervaluation, and the unification method also extends to weak (...)
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  29.  23
    Reinhard Kahle (2001). Truth in Applicative Theories. Studia Logica 68 (1):103-128.
    We give a survey on truth theories for applicative theories. It comprises Frege structures, universes for Frege structures, and a theory of supervaluation. We present the proof-theoretic results for these theories and show their syntactical expressive power. In particular, we present as a novelty a syntactical interpretation of ID1 in a applicative truth theory based on supervaluation.
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  30.  80
    Nuel Belnap (2009). Truth Values, Neither-True-nor-False, and Supervaluations. Studia Logica 91 (3):305 - 334.
    The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds (...)
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  31.  20
    John Martin (1975). A Many-Valued Semantics for Category Mistakes. Synthese 31 (1):63 - 83.
    In this paper it is argued that herzberger's general theory of presupposition may be successfully applied to category mistakes. The study offers an alternative to thomason's supervaluation treatment of sortal presupposition and as an indirect measure of the relative merits of the two-Dimensional theory to supervaluations. Bivalent, Three-Valued matrix, And supervaluation accounts are compared to the two-Dimensional theory according to three criteria: (1) abstraction from linguistic behavior, (2) conformity of technical to preanalytic distinctions, And (3) ability to capture (...)
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  32.  47
    Delia Graff Fara (2011). Truth in a Region. In Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan
    In this paper I criticize a version of supervaluation semantics. This version is called "Region-Valuation" semantics. It's developed by Pablo Cobreros. I argue that all supervaluationists, regionalists in particular, and truth-value gap theorists of vagueness more generally, are commited to the validity of D-intro, the principle that every sentence entails its definitization (the truth of "Paul is tall" guarantees the truth of "Paul is definitely tall"). The principle embroils one in a paradox that's distinct from, but related to, the (...)
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  33.  49
    Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.
    I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.
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  34.  51
    Tomasz Bigaj (2001). Three-Valued Logic, Indeterminacy and Quantum Mechanics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (2):97-119.
    The paper consists of two parts. The first part begins with the problem of whether the original three-valued calculus, invented by J. Łukasiewicz, really conforms to his philosophical and semantic intuitions. I claim that one of the basic semantic assumptions underlying Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic should be that if under any possible circumstances a sentence of the form "X will be the case at time t" is true (resp. false) at time t, then this sentence must be already true (resp. false) (...)
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  35.  8
    Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2014). Heaps and Gluts: Paraconsistent Logic Applied to Vagueness. Logic and Logical Philosophy 7:179.
    This paper is an attempt to show that the subvaluation theory isnot a good theory of vagueness. It begins with a short review of supervaluation and subvaluation theories and procedes to evaluate the subvaluation theory. Subvaluationism shares all the main short-comings of supervaluationism.Moreover, the solution to the sorites paradox proposed by subvaluationists isnot satisfactory. There is another solution which subvaluationists could availthemselves of, but it destroys the whole motivation for using a paraconsistentlogic and is not different from the one (...)
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  36.  19
    Michael J. Almeida (2008). On Vague Eschatology. Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):359-375.
    Ted Sider’s Proportionality of Justice condition requires that any two moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same way. I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportionality of justice condition. It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral state, S' is beyond all redemption and S is not. It is consistent with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go determinately (...)
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  37. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, The Worry.
    This is a long paper with a long title, but its moral is succinct. There are supposed to be two, closely related, philosophical problems about sentences1 with truth value gaps: If a sentence can't be semantically evaluated, how can it mean anything at all? and How can classical logic be preserved for a language which contains such sentences? We are neutral on whether either of these supposed problems is real. But we claim that, if either is, supervaluation won't solve (...)
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  38. Tomasz Bigaj (1997). Uwagi o logice trójwartościowej. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    As it is well known, Jan Lukasiewicz invented his three-valued logic as a result of philosophical considerations concerning the problem of determinism and the status of future contingent sentences. In the article I critically analyse the thesis that the sentential calculus introduced by Lukasiewicz himself actually fulfills his philosophical assumptions. I point out that there are some counterintuitive features of Lukasiewicz three-valued logic. Firstly, there is no clear explanation for adopting specific truth-tables for logical connectives, such as conjunction, disjunction and (...)
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  39. Olafur Pall Jonsson (2001). Vague Objects. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Peter Unger's puzzle, the problem of the many, is an argument for the conclusion that we are grossly mistaken about what kinds of objects are in our immediate surroundings. But it is not clear what we should make of Unger's argument. There is an epistemic view which says that the argument shows that we don't know which objects are the referents of singular terms in our language. There is a linguistic view which says that Unger's puzzle shows that ordinary singular (...)
     
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  40. Alice I. Kyburg (1994). Belief, Assertability, and Truth: Pragmatic and Semantic Accounts of Vagueness. Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    This dissertation explores several accounts of the intuitions speakers have concerning the truth values of utterances of sentences containing vague nouns and adjectives. While some semanticists have attempted to account for these intuitions with multi-valued logics and supervaluation theories of truth, I focus on how utterances of vague sentences affect hearers' beliefs. ;Following a critique of the major semantical accounts of vagueness, I propose a formal theory of how beliefs are revised following utterances of sentences of the form X (...)
     
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  41. Nicholas Jeremy Josef Smith (2001). Vagueness. Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation is concerned with the problem of giving a correct account of the semantics of vague predicates such as '...is tall', '...is bald' and '...is near...'. ;In Chapter 1 I present a definition of vagueness that aims to capture, in a useful form, all our fundamental intuitions about the vagueness of predicates such as those mentioned above; such a definition is lacking in the literature. I also present an abstract characterisation of the Sorites paradox: one that is independent of (...)
     
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  42. Joanna Tędziagolska (1998). Zastosowanie metody superwaluacji do analizy paradoksów związanych z nieostrością. Filozofia Nauki 1.
    Supervaluation is a method which has been invented to deal with the reference failure. In his 1975 paper K. Fine suggested that it might be applied to the analysis of the phenomenon of vagueness as well. The paper tries to assess the pros and cons of the supervaluation theory of vagueness. Supervaluation provides us with the means for analysing vagueness without eliminating it from the language, and allows to solve the main paradox connected with vagueness; i.e. the (...)
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  43. Meinong und Supervaluation (2004). Arkad1usz chrudz1msk1'. In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Ontos 105.
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