Search results for 'supervaluation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Toby Meadows (2013). Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.score: 18.0
    In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...)
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  2. Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156.score: 18.0
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
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  3. Philip Kremer & Michael Kremer (2003). Some Supervaluation-Based Consequence Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):225-244.score: 14.0
    In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties. For our main consequence relation, we show that natural versions of the following fail: upwards and downwards Lowenheim-Skolem, axiomatizability, and compactness. We also consider an alternate version for supervaluation semantics, and show both axiomatizability and compactness for the resulting consequence relation.
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  4. Philip Kremer (2008). Supervaluation Fixed-Point Logics of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):407 - 440.score: 12.0
    Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. (...)
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  5. Christopher Mole, Supervaluation for Papineau's Phenomenal Concepts.score: 9.0
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  6. Daniel J. Mckaughan & John M. Drake (2012). Representing Vague Opinion. Principia 16 (2):341-344.score: 9.0
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341 Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither (...)
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  7. Joan Weiner (2007). Science and Semantics: The Case of Vagueness and Supervaluation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):355–374.score: 9.0
    It is widely assumed that the methods and results of science have no place among the data to which our semantics of vague predicates must answer. This despite the fact that it is well known that such prototypical vague predicates as ‘is bald’ play a central role in scientific research (e.g. the research that established Rogaine as a treatment for baldness). I argue here that the assumption is false and costly: in particular, I argue one cannot accept either supervaluationist semantics, (...)
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  8. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Meinong Und Supervaluation. In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Ontos.score: 9.0
     
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  9. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2010). (2010) ‘Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluation- Ism’, in Eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, Its Nature, and Its Logic,. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
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  10. Siu-Fan Lee (2009). Fregean Free Logics. Philosophical Researches (Dec):123-129.score: 9.0
    This paper asks which free logic a Fregean should adopt. It examines options within the tradition including Carnap’s (1956) chosen object theory, Lehmann’s (1994, 2002) strict Fregean free logic, Woodruff’s (1970) strong table about Boolean operators and Bencivenga’s (1986, 1991) supervaluational semantics. It argues for a neutral free logic in view of its proximity towards explaining natural languages. However, disagreeing with Lehmann, it claims a Fregean should adopt the strong table based on Frege’s discussion on generality. Supervaluation uses strong (...)
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  11. Marta Ujvari (1999). Multi-Criteria Predicates and Supervaluation. Acta Analytica 14 (1).score: 9.0
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  12. Greg Frost-Arnold (2008). Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):239 - 257.score: 7.0
    The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, (...)
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  13. Nuel Belnap (2009). Truth Values, Neither-True-nor-False, and Supervaluations. Studia Logica 91 (3):305 - 334.score: 6.0
    The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds (...)
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  14. Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas (2009). Supervaluations Debugged. Mind 118 (472):901-933.score: 6.0
    Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather (...)
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  15. Jim Stone (2010). Harry Potter and the Spectre of Imprecision. Analysis 70 (4):638-644.score: 6.0
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  16. Steven Rieber (2002). A Defense of Indeterminism. Acta Analytica 17 (1):75-82.score: 6.0
    My goal is to defend the indeterminist approach to vagueness, according to which a borderline vague utterance is neither true nor false. Indeterminism appears to contradict bivalence and the disquotational schema for truth. I agree that indeterminism compels us to modify each of these principles. Kit Fine has defended indeterminism by claiming that ordinary ambiguous sentences are neither true nor false when one disambiguation is true and the other is false. But even if Fine is right about sentences, his point (...)
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  17. N. Angel Pinillos (forthcoming). Attitudes, Supervaluations and Vagueness in the World. In K. Akiba (ed.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity. Verlag.score: 6.0
    I consider two possible sources of vagueness. The first is indeterminacy about which intension is expressed by a word. The second is indeterminacy about which referent (extension) is determined by an intension. Focusing on a Fregean account of intensions, I argue that whichever account is right will matter to whether vagueness turns out to be a representational phenomenon (as opposed to being “in the world”). In addition, it will also matter to whether supervaluationism is a viable semantic framework. Based on (...)
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  18. Bas C. Van Fraassen (2011). Thomason's Paradox for Belief, and Two Consequence Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):15-32.score: 6.0
    Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain (...)
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  19. Robert Williams (forthcoming). Degree Supervaluational Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic.score: 4.0
    Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the barebones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. In a recent paper, Achille Varzi writes: it is pretty clear that there is not just one supervaluational semantics out there–there are lots of such semantics; and although it is true that they all exploit the same insight, their relative differences are by no means immaterial . . . a (...)
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  20. Neil McKinnon (2002). Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):320-339.score: 4.0
    Supervaluational treatments of vagueness are currently quite popular among those who regard vagueness as a thoroughly semantic phenomenon. Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' may be regarded as arising from the vagueness of our ordinary physical-object terms, so it is not surprising that supervaluational solutions to Unger's problem have been offered. I argue that supervaluations do not afford an adequate solution to the problem of the many. Moreover, the considerations I raise against the supervaluational solution tell also against the solution (...)
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  21. Newton C. A. da Costa & Otavio Bueno (1999). Quasi-Truth, Supervaluations and Free Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):215-226.score: 4.0
    The partial structures approach has two major components: a broad notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak notion of truth (quasi-truth). In this paper, we discuss the relationship between this approach and free logic. We also compare the model-theoretic analysis supplied by partial structures with the method of supervaluations, which was initially introduced as a technique to provide a semantic analysis of free logic. We then combine the three formal frameworks (partial structures, free logic and supervaluations), and apply the (...)
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  22. J. A. Burgess (1997). Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.score: 4.0
    For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that (...)
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  23. Ermanno Bencivenga (1984). Supervaluations and Theories. Grazer Philosophische Studien 21:89-98.score: 4.0
    When applying supervaluations to the analysis of a theory, one may encounter the following problem: in supervaluational semantics, contingent statements often have existential presuppositions, and these presuppositions may either contradict the theory or make the application of supervaluations pointless. The most natural way of handling this problem consists in revising the semantics each time a specific theory is considered, and in making the status of the axioms of the theory technically indistinguishable from that of logical truths. Philosophically, this position has (...)
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  24. Gennaro Chierchia (2010). Mass Nouns, Vagueness and Semantic Variation. Synthese 174 (1):99 - 149.score: 3.0
    The mass/count distinction attracts a lot of attention among cognitive scientists, possibly because it involves in fundamental ways the relation between language (i.e. grammar), thought (i.e. extralinguistic conceptual systems) and reality (i.e. the physical world). In the present paper, I explore the view that the mass/count distinction is a matter of vagueness. While every noun/concept may in a sense be vague, mass nouns/concepts are vague in a way that systematically impairs their use in counting. This idea has never been systematically (...)
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  25. Delia Graff Fara (2011). Truth in a Region. In Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 3.0
    In this paper I criticize a version of supervaluation semantics. This version is called "Region-Valuation" semantics. It's developed by Pablo Cobreros. I argue that all supervaluationists, regionalists in particular, and truth-value gap theorists of vagueness more generally, are commited to the validity of D-intro, the principle that every sentence entails its definitization (the truth of "Paul is tall" guarantees the truth of "Paul is definitely tall"). The principle embroils one in a paradox that's distinct from, but related to, the (...)
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  26. Achille Varzi, Supervaluationism and Paraconsistency.score: 3.0
    Since its first appearance in 1966, the notion of a supervaluation has been regarded by many as a powerful tool for dealing with semantic gaps. Only recently, however, applications to semantic gluts have also been considered. In previous work I proposed a general framework exploiting the intrinsic gap/glut duality. Here I also examine an alternative account where gaps and gluts are treated on a par: although they reflect opposite situations, the semantic upshot is the same in both cases--the value (...)
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  27. Tomasz Bigaj (2001). Three-Valued Logic, Indeterminacy and Quantum Mechanics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (2):97-119.score: 3.0
    The paper consists of two parts. The first part begins with the problem of whether the original three-valued calculus, invented by J. Łukasiewicz, really conforms to his philosophical and semantic intuitions. I claim that one of the basic semantic assumptions underlying Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic should be that if under any possible circumstances a sentence of the form "X will be the case at time t" is true (resp. false) at time t, then this sentence must be already true (resp. false) (...)
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  28. Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.score: 3.0
    I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.
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  29. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1996). What Cannot Be Evaluated Cannot Be Evaluated and It Cannot Be Supervalued Either. Journal of Philosophy 93 (10):516-535.score: 3.0
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  30. Delia Graff Fara (2010). Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), (2010) ‘Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluation- ism’, in eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, Its Nature, and Its Logic,. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
  31. D. Hyde (1997). From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts. Mind 106 (424):641-660.score: 3.0
    One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps. Logics of vagueness including many valued logics, fuzzy logics, and supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view. The thought that an adequate response might require (...)
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  32. Theodore J. Everett (2000). A Simple Logic for Comparisons and Vagueness. Synthese 123 (2):263-278.score: 3.0
    I provide an intuitive, semantic account of a new logic forcomparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both aclassical truth-value and a ``how much'''' value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determinedby the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value ofeach atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separatestandard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari''s comparative logics, in that it does not allow for (...)
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  33. Nicholas Jones, On Supervaluations, Meaning and Consequence.score: 3.0
    University of London Jacobsen Prize Essay 2008.
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  34. Andrea Cantini (1990). A Theory of Formal Truth Arithmetically Equivalent to ID. Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1):244 - 259.score: 3.0
    We present a theory VF of partial truth over Peano arithmetic and we prove that VF and ID 1 have the same arithmetical content. The semantics of VF is inspired by van Fraassen's notion of supervaluation.
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  35. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, The Worry.score: 3.0
    This is a long paper with a long title, but its moral is succinct. There are supposed to be two, closely related, philosophical problems about sentences1 with truth value gaps: If a sentence can't be semantically evaluated, how can it mean anything at all? and How can classical logic be preserved for a language which contains such sentences? We are neutral on whether either of these supposed problems is real. But we claim that, if either is, supervaluation won't solve (...)
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  36. Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (1990). Supervaluational Anti-Realism and Logic. Synthese 84 (1):97 - 138.score: 3.0
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  37. P. D. Welch (2001). On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.score: 3.0
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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  38. Brian Skyrms (1968). Supervaluations: Identity, Existence, and Individual Concepts. Journal of Philosophy 65 (16):477-482.score: 3.0
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  39. Hans G. Herzberger (1982). The Algebra of Supervaluations. Topoi 1 (1-2):74-81.score: 3.0
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  40. Peter W. Woodruff (1984). On Supervaluations in Free Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (3):943-950.score: 3.0
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  41. Michael J. Almeida (2008). On Vague Eschatology. Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):359-375.score: 3.0
    Ted Sider’s Proportionality of Justice condition requires that any two moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same way. I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportionality of justice condition. It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral state, S' is beyond all redemption and S is not. It is consistent with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go determinately (...)
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  42. J. Robert G. Williams (2011). Degree Supervaluational Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):130-149.score: 3.0
    Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. Thereall classical valid sequents are degree logic valid. Strikingly, metarules such as cut and conjunction introduction fail.
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  43. Nicholas Griffin (1978). Supervaluations and Tarski. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (2):297-298.score: 3.0
  44. Alex Malpass (2013). Fara's Formula and the Supervaluational Thin Red Line. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (77):267-282.score: 3.0
    Este artículo se centra en un argumento presentado por Fara (2010) en contra del supervaluacionismo en el contexto de la vaguedad. Muestro cómo dicho argumento es igualmente aplicable al supervaluacionismo de tiempo ramificado (presentado por primera vez por Thomason 1970), pero no a la semántica 'STRL' de Malpass y Wawer (2012), que está estrechamente relacionada.
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  45. John Martin (1975). A Many-Valued Semantics for Category Mistakes. Synthese 31 (1):63 - 83.score: 3.0
    In this paper it is argued that herzberger's general theory of presupposition may be successfully applied to category mistakes. The study offers an alternative to thomason's supervaluation treatment of sortal presupposition and as an indirect measure of the relative merits of the two-Dimensional theory to supervaluations. Bivalent, Three-Valued matrix, And supervaluation accounts are compared to the two-Dimensional theory according to three criteria: (1) abstraction from linguistic behavior, (2) conformity of technical to preanalytic distinctions, And (3) ability to capture (...)
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  46. E. Bencivenga (1983). Compactness of a Supervaluational Language. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):384-386.score: 3.0
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  47. Reinhard Kahle (2001). Truth in Applicative Theories. Studia Logica 68 (1):103-128.score: 3.0
    We give a survey on truth theories for applicative theories. It comprises Frege structures, universes for Frege structures, and a theory of supervaluation. We present the proof-theoretic results for these theories and show their syntactical expressive power. In particular, we present as a novelty a syntactical interpretation of ID1 in a applicative truth theory based on supervaluation.
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  48. Greg Restall (2005). Lukasiewicz, Supervaluations and the Future. Logic and Philosophy of Science 3:1-10.score: 3.0
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