Search results for 'sympathy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eric Barnes, Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain, Matti Eklund, Deep Inconsistency, Barbara Montero, Harold Langsam, Self-Knowledge Externalism, Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration, Moral Sympathy & Josh Parsons (2002). INDEX for Volume 80, 2002. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.score: 30.0
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  2. Peter Carruthers (1999). Sympathy and Subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82.score: 18.0
    This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological.
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  3. Bence Nanay (2010). Adam Smith’s Concept of Sympathy and its Contemporary Interpretations. Adam Smith Review.score: 18.0
    Adam Smith’s account of sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ has recently become exceedingly popular. It has been used as an antecedent of the concept of simulation: understanding, or attributing mental states to, other people by means of simulating them. It has also been singled out as the first correct account of empathy. Finally, to make things even more complicated, some of Smith’s examples for sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ have been used as the earliest expression of emotional contagion. The aim (...)
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  4. C. Taylor (1999). Sympathy. Journal of Ethics 3 (1):73-87.score: 18.0
    In this article I examine an example of sympathy -- the actions of one woman who rescued Jews during their persecution in Nazi Europe. I argue that this woman''s account of her actions here suggests that sympathy is a primitive response to the suffering of another. By primitive here I mean: first, that these responses are immediate and unthinking; and second, that these responses are explanatorily basic, that they cannot be explained in terms of some more fundamental feature (...)
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  5. John W. McHugh (2011). Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith's Account of Sympathy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):189-204.score: 18.0
    This paper attempts to relax the tension between Adam Smith's claim that sympathy involves an evaluative act of imaginative projection and his claim that sympathy involves a non-evaluative act of imaginative identification. The first section locates the tension specifically in the two different ways Smith depicts the stance adopted by the sympathizer. The second section argues that we can relax this tension by finding an important role for a non-evaluative stance in Smith's normative account of moral evaluation. This (...)
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  6. Jennifer A. Herdt (2001). The Rise of Sympathy and the Question of Divine Suffering. Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (3):367 - 399.score: 18.0
    Seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, writing just at the time when the concept of sympathy was moving from the realm of magic to that of ethics, argued that God must be understood as having a vital sympathy with suffering human beings. Yet while Cudworth invoked sympathy in an attempt to capture God's intimate relation with creation, in fact, it served as a principle of mediation that tended either to collapse God into the world or to distance God (...)
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  7. Aleksandar Fatic (2013). Towards an Ethics of Sympathy: A Legacy of Max Scheler. In Gary Peters & Fiona Peters (eds.), Thoughts of Love. Cambridge Scholars Press.score: 18.0
    The paper examines the potential of sympathy as defined by Max Scheler to found a normative ethics. Scheler perceives sympathy in predominantly instinctivist terms, and insists that, while it accounts for a comprehensive range of human interactions, it cannot be a basis for ethics. However, Scheler does not convincingly argue against an ethics of sympathy. A closer examination of his account of sympathy reveals that this account in fact suggests a strong possibility of an ethics of (...)
     
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  8. Rebecca Garden (2010). Sympathy, Disability, and the Nurse: Female Power in Edith Wharton's The Fruit of the Tree. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 31 (3):223-242.score: 18.0
    The nursing profession’s emphasis on empathy as essential to nursing care may undermine nurses’ power as a collective and detract from perceptions of nurses’ analytical skills and expertise. The practice of empathy may also obscure and even compound patients’ suffering when it does not fully account for their subjectivity. This essay examines the relation of empathy to women’s agency and explores the role empathy plays in obscuring rather than empowering the suffering other, particularly people who are disabled, through a close (...)
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  9. Craig Taylor (2002). Sympathy: A Philosophical Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
    It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends.
     
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  10. Rico Vitz (forthcoming). The Nature and Functions of Sympathy in Hume's Philosophy. In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    My aim, in this chapter, is to outline the key details of this particularly interesting aspect of Hume's philosophical system. My presentation will be threefold. In the first section of the paper, I will elucidate the nature of sympathy, drawing upon some of the more recent ways in which Hume's commentators have attempted to resolve the interpretive puzzles Hume's works present. In the second section, I will explicate some of the functions sympathy has in Hume's philosophy, including not (...)
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  11. Robert M. Gordon (1996). Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press. 727-742.score: 15.0
  12. Thomas Natsoulas (1988). Sympathy, Empathy, and the Stream of Consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (June):169-195.score: 15.0
  13. Sherman A. Lee & Linsey Quarles (2012). Who Feels Sympathy for Roosters Used in Cockfighting? Examining the Influence of Feelings, Belief in Animal Mind, Personality, and Empathy-Related Traits. Society and Animals 20 (4):327-341.score: 15.0
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  14. Alice MacLachlan (2010). Seeing Sympathy: Remarks on Sympathizing with the Enemy. Review of International Affairs 61 (1138-39):178-189.score: 15.0
    This article responds to Nir Eisikovits’ recent book Sympathizing with the Enemy: Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, Negotiation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010).
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  15. Philip Mercer (1972). Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume's Treatise. Oxford,Clarendon Press.score: 15.0
  16. Ari Kohen (2010). A Case of Moral Heroism: Sympathy, Personal Identification, and Mortality in Rwanda. [REVIEW] Human Rights Review 11 (1):65-82.score: 15.0
    What sort of person chooses to remain in a place like Rwanda when an easy exit is offered, when leaving seems the only safe or sane option, and when one is not directly connected to the would-be victims? And how does this person come to develop a circle of care that is expansive enough to include those who are radically Other? In what follows, I consider these questions through a detailed examination of the recent example of Paul Rusesabagina, the Hutu (...)
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  17. Linsey Quarles & Sherman A. Lee (2012). Who Feels Sympathy for Roosters Used in Cockfighting? Examining the Influence of Feelings, Belief in Animal Mind, Personality, and Empathy-Related Traits. Society and Animals 20 (4):327-341.score: 15.0
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  18. Stephen Darwall (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):261–282.score: 12.0
    In what follows, I wish to discuss empathy and sympathy’s relevance to ethics, taking recent findings into account. In particular, I want to consider sympathy’s relation to the idea of a person’s good or well-being. It is obvious and uncontroversial that sympathetic concern for a person involves some concern for her good and some desire to promote it. What I want to suggest is that the concept of a person’s good or well-being is one we have because we (...)
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  19. Robert Sugden (2002). Beyond Sympathy and Empathy: Adam Smith's Concept of Fellow-Feeling. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):63-87.score: 12.0
    When modern economists use the notions of sympathy or empathy, they often claim that their ideas have their roots in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1976), while sometimes complaining that Smith fails to distinguish clearly enough between the two concepts. Recently, Philippe Fontaine (1997) has described various forms of sympathy and empathy, and has explored their respective roles in Smith's work. My objective in this paper is to argue that Smith's analysis of how people's sentiments impinge on (...)
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  20. Patrick R. Frierson (2006). Adam Smith and the Possibility of Sympathy with Nature. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):442–480.score: 12.0
    As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith's moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith's "all important emotion of sympathy" (Callicott, 2001, p. 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in "History of Astronomy and Physics," I show that sympathy with (...)
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  21. Cor van der Weele (2011). Empathy's Purity, Sympathy's Complexities; De Waal, Darwin and Adam Smith. Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):583-593.score: 12.0
    Frans de Waal’s view that empathy is at the basis of morality directly seems to build on Darwin, who considered sympathy as the crucial instinct. Yet when we look closer, their understanding of the central social instinct differs considerably. De Waal sees our deeply ingrained tendency to sympathize (or rather: empathize) with others as the good side of our morally dualistic nature. For Darwin, sympathizing was not the whole story of the workings of sympathy ; the (selfish) need (...)
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  22. Heidi Maibom, Feeling for Others: Empathy and Sympathy as Sources of Moral Motivation.score: 12.0
    According to the Humean theory of motivation, we only have a reason to act if we have both a belief and a pro-attitude. When it comes to moral reasons, it matters a great deal what that pro-attitude is; pure self-interest cannot combine with a belief to form a moral reason. A long tradition regards empathy and sympathy as moral motivators, and recent psychological evidence supports this view. I examine what I take to be the most plausible version of this (...)
     
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  23. Kerri Woods (2009). Suffering, Sympathy, and (Environmental) Security: Reassessing Rorty's Contribution to Human Rights Theory. Res Publica 15 (1):53-66.score: 12.0
    This article reassess Rorty’s contribution to human rights theory. It addresses two key questions: (1) Does Rorty sustain his claim that there are no morally relevant transcultural facts? (2) Does Rorty’s proposed sentimental education offer an adequate response to contemporary human rights challenges? Although both questions are answered in the negative, it is argued here that Rorty’s focus on suffering, sympathy, and security, offer valuable resources to human rights theorists. The article concludes by considering the idea of a dual (...)
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  24. Patrick Frierson, Adam Smith and the Possibility of Sympathy with Nature Patrick R. Frierson.score: 12.0
    As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith’s moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith’s “all important emotion of sympathy” (Callicott 2001: 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments , as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in “History of Astronomy and Physics,” I show that sympathy with (...)
     
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  25. Robert J. Lipkin (1987). Altruism and Sympathy in Hume's Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):18 – 32.score: 12.0
    The standard interpretation of hume's ethical theory maintains that sympathy is merely an empirical feature of motivation and ethics. This article argues for an alternative interpretation according to which sympathy is a necessary feature of practical reasoning. Hence, It is impossible to deny that we have altruistic reasons, Because such a denial requires adopting a particular perspective which reveals inexorably the existence of such reasons. What this entails is that hume's ethical theory includes an argument rendering skepticism about (...)
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  26. Henrik Bohlin (2009). Sympathy, Understanding, and Hermeneutics in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 35 (1-2):135-170.score: 12.0
    With his theory of sympathy in the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume has been interpreted as anticipating later hermeneutic theories of understanding. It is argued in the present article that Hume has good reasons to consider a hermeneutic theory of empathetic understanding, that such a theory avoids a serious difficulty in Hume’s “official,” positivist theory of sympathy, that it is compatible with the complex and subtle form of positivism, or naturalism, developed in Book 1 of the Treatise, and (...)
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  27. Rico Vitz (2004). Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.score: 12.0
    In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original (...)
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  28. Julia Driver (2011). The Secret Chain: A Limited Defense of Sympathy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):234-238.score: 12.0
    This paper responds to criticisms of sympathy-based approaches to ethics made by Jesse Prinz, focusing on the criticism that emotions are too variable to form a basis for ethics. I draw on the idea, articulated by early sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume, that proper reliance on sympathy is subject to a corrective procedure in order, in part, to avoid the variability problem.
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  29. George Ainslie (2006). Cruelty May Be a Self-Control Device Against Sympathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):224-225.score: 12.0
    Dispassionate cruelty and the euphoria of hunting or battle should be distinguished from the emotional savoring of victims' suffering. Such savoring, best called negative empathy, is what puzzles motivational theory. Hyperbolic discounting theory suggests that sympathy with people who have unwanted but seductive traits creates a threat to self-control. Cruelty to those people may often be the least effortful way of countering this threat.
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  30. Edith Wyschogrod (1981). Empathy and Sympathy as Tactile Encounter. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (1):25-44.score: 12.0
    Empathy and sympathy are feeling-acts which bring the self into direct encounter with other persons. In empathy a self grasps the affective act of another self; in sympathy x n persons apprehend a common object while immersed in similar feeling acts. Since touch is the paradigmatic sense for bringing what is felt into proximity with feeling, structural affinities between touch and these feeling acts can be shown. This relationship has been obscured by classical theories of touch in which (...)
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  31. Zachary Davis (2005). Husserl on the Ethical Renewal of Sympathy and the One World of Solidarity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):561-581.score: 12.0
    Edmund Husserl’s Kaizo articles mark one of his first attempts at notions of cultural renewal and critique. (1) Central to both of these notions for Husserl is the idea of a best possible humanity. At the conclusion of the Kaizo articles, Husserl entertains some quite troubling and potentially dangerous descriptions of the best possible in terms of an Übernation or Weltvolk. Although merely provisional, these descriptions call for a cultural and ethical renewal through the reorientation of humanity in accord with (...)
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  32. Neil Saccamano (2011). Aesthetically Non-Dwelling: Sympathy, Property, and the House of Beauty in Hume's Treatise. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (1):37-58.score: 12.0
    One of the distinctive features of Hume's presentation of disinterested aesthetic pleasure in the Treatise is its basis in sympathy as the communication of sentiment between a spectator and specifically an owner of a beautiful object. By tracking the recurring example of the beautiful house, which properly provides pleasure only to the owner who dwells in it, I reconsider the operation of sympathy in relation to property. My central argument is that sympathy underwrites the disinterested sociality of (...)
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  33. Justin Tiwald (2011). Sympathy and Perspective-Taking in Confucian Ethics. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):663-674.score: 12.0
    This article spells out a forgotten debate in Confucian ethics that concerns the finer points of empathy, sympathy, and perspective-taking (sometimes called ‘role-taking’). The debate’s central question is whether sympathy is more virtuous when it is automatic and other-focused – that is, when we engage in perspective-taking without conscious effort and sympathize without significant reference to our selves or our own feelings.
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  34. Andy Lamey (2010). Sympathy and Scapegoating in J.M. Coetzee. In Anton Leist & Peter Singer (eds.), J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature.score: 12.0
    J.M. Coetzee’s book, 'Elizabeth Costello' is one of the stranger works to appear in recent years. Yet if we focus our attention on the book’s two chapters dealing with animals, two preoccupations emerge. The first sees Coetzee use animals to evoke a particular conception of ethics, one similar to that of the philosopher Mary Midgley. Coetzee’s second theme connects animals to the phenomena of scapegoating, as it has been characterized by the philosophical anthropologist René Girard. While both themes involve human (...)
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  35. Garrett Cullity (2004). Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):37–62.score: 12.0
    According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally non-arbitrary one--involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. This paper (...)
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  36. Kristja´N. Kristja´Nsson * (2004). Empathy, Sympathy, Justice and the Child. Journal of Moral Education 33 (3):291-305.score: 12.0
    This essay explains and puts into theoretical perspective the rising interest in justice as an emotional virtue. Martin Hoffman's empathy theory is germane to this debate since it gives an essentially emotion?oriented account of moral development in general, as well as an explanation of the gradual bonding of empathy/sympathy with justice. While Hoffman's theory provides valuable insights into the ways in which all moral concerns, including justice, rely on and relate to the child's original capacity for empathy, it seems (...)
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  37. John A. Fischer (1987). Taking Sympathy Seriously: A Defense of Our Moral Psychology Toward Animals. Environmental Ethics 9 (3):197-215.score: 12.0
    Sympathy for animals is regarded by many thinkers as theoretically disreputable. Against this I argue that sympathy appropriately underlies moral concern for animals. I offer an account of sympathy that distinguishes sympathy with from sympathy for fellow creatures, and I argue that both can be placed on an objective basis, if we differentiate enlightened from folk sympathy. Moreover, I suggest that sympathy for animals is not, as some have claimed, incompatible with environmentalism; on (...)
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  38. Fonna Forman-Barzilai (2005). Sympathy in Space(S): Adam Smith on Proximity. Political Theory 33 (2):189 - 217.score: 12.0
    In this essay the author explores the relation between sympathy and proximity in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. The essay proceeds in two parts. First, the author demonstrates that Smith's description of our various attachments and affections, and the inevitable conflicts among them, draws us into the rich spatial texture of sympathetic response and stimulates further inquiry into a variety of spaces in which sympathetic activity takes place. In the second part, the author explores three such spaces-the physical, (...)
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  39. Ian Hacking (2001). On Sympathy: With Other Creatures. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (4):685 - 717.score: 12.0
    Animal liberationists have increased our moral concern for animals, to the extent that many now think that animals have rights. I am very cautious about the arguments of these philosophers, although I agree with many of their precepts. In this respect, I am aligned with the powerful essays of Cora Diamond. I argue that something like what Hume calls sympathy is essential for expanding circles of moral concern, and develop some Humeian ideas. Sympathy with, and not simply (...) for. Suffering is too narrow a range of concern. It is not as if the pain and pleasure of the utilitarians were the only ways in which we could be concerned with others. As Hume argued, animals share most human emotions, and it is through sympathy with the entire range that our worlds join. It is increasingly difficult for most of us to realize this, because human relationships with animals have changed since Hume's day. The multi-species barnyard has all but disappeared. We now live in a world of televised wilderness. To exaggerate, our species lives alone for the first time. Animal liberationists have the effect of enlarging our moral world, but should do so not just by attending to suffering or to rights of an animal, but to the whole creature, a being with which we can resonate. (shrink)
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  40. Douglas Chismar (1988). Hume's Confusion About Sympathy. Philosophy Research Archives 14:237-246.score: 12.0
    David Hume argues that the prevalence of human sympathizing justifies our attributing to humans a certain degree of benevolence. This move from sympathy to having a concern for others has been challenged by recent critics. A more fine-grained look at Hume’s concept of sympathy may reveal the reasons why he thought that experiencing sympathy implied having a benevolent attitude. Two arguments from the Treatise are analyzed and found wanting. It is suggested that Hume’s confusion may derive from (...)
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  41. Deborah Mower (2009). Teaching Ethics Via Sympathy. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):51-60.score: 12.0
    Given the specific educational, psychological, and sociological factors of juvenile inmates, I developed a course to teach such students moral concepts and reasoning without high level theorizing. I combined Hume’s account of sympathy with current philosophical and psychological research to develop the students’ natural sympathy as an aid in developing emotional, contextual, and moral literacy. In this paper, I explain (1) how the course developed the students’ natural sympathy, (2) how sympathy can provide a simple and (...)
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  42. Robert C. Solomon (2004). Sympathy as a “Natural”. The Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics 2004:53-58.score: 12.0
    In this essay, I want to reconsider sympathy as a “natural” emotion or sentiment. Adam Smith famously defended it as such (as did his friend David Hume) but both used the term ambiguously and in a different sense than we use it today. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Smith got it quite right, that the basis of morality and justice is to be found in the realm of affect rather than in theory and principles alone, and that (...) is a “natural” or should we say a “basic” emotion. But that means that morality may not be an exclusively human characteristic, as many philosophers (including Smith and Hume) have assumed. But some contemporary thinking in psychology and philosophy makes that extension plausible. (shrink)
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  43. Anik Waldow (2013). Mirroring Minds: Hume on Sympathy. The European Legacy 18 (5):540-551.score: 12.0
    Hume?s account of sympathy has often been taken to describe what the discovery of so-called mirror neurons has suggested, namely, that we are able to understand one another?s emotions and beliefs through experiences that require no mediating thoughts and exactly resemble the experiences of the observed person. I will oppose this interpretation by arguing that, on Hume?s standard account, sympathy is a mechanism that produces ideas and beliefs prior to the emergence of shared feelings. To stress this aspect (...)
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  44. Jason Frank (2009). Sympathy and Separation: Benjamin Rush and the Contagious Public. Modern Intellectual History 6 (1):27-57.score: 12.0
    This essay considers Benjamin Rush's concern with the political organization of sympathy in post-Revolutionary America and how this concern shaped his response to the threat of post-Revolutionary Like many of his contemporaries, Rush worried about the contagious volatility of large public assemblies engendered by the Revolution. For Rush, regular gatherings of the people out of doors threatened to corrupt visions both of an orderly and emancipatory public sphere and of the virtuous and independent citizens required by republican government. Rush (...)
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  45. Filimon Peonidis (2005). Autonomy and Sympathy. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:371-382.score: 12.0
    Kantian moral humanism refers to Kant’s ingenious effort to conceive human beings as bearers of an intrinsic and non-negotiable value that is grounded on the fact that they are autonomous lawgivers in a kingdom of ends. However, the highly idealised character of his project and its metaphysical underpinnings render the association between man’s inner worth and autonomy problematic for the modern reader. In this essay we argue for a more down to earth moral humanism that still supports the above association (...)
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  46. Steven G. Smith (1993). Sympathy, Scruple, and Piety: The Moral and Religious Valuation of Nonhumans. Journal of Religious Ethics 21 (2):319 - 342.score: 12.0
    Our moral valuation of nonhuman and human beings alike may arise in sympathy, the realization in feeling of a significant commonality between self and others; in scrupulous observance of policy, the affirmation in practical consistency of a system of relations with others; and in piety, the attitude of boundless appreciation and absolute scruple with respect to objects as sacred - that is, as valued for the sake of adequate valuation of the holy. Differences between the moral status of humans (...)
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  47. Nancy E. Snow (2013). Sympathy. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 12.0
    The term “sympathy” has two meanings in philosophical literature. According to one conception, “sympathy” commonly means having care and concern for another whose well-being is under threat or is encountering some obstacle (Darwall 1998: 261). When I feel sympathy, I feel for the other (Darwall 1998: 261). The Confucian philosopher Mengzi (also known as Mencius), for example, writes that a person seeing a small child on the verge of falling into a well would be moved by alarm (...)
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  48. Anik Waldow (2014). Sympathy and the Mechanics of Character Change. Hume Studies 38 (2):221-242.score: 12.0
    Hume holds that sympathy is both crucial for making moral judgments and a distorting influence that prevents us from assessing the virtue of characters impartially. He writes, When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleas’d with it, and approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and is itself a kind of pleasure. But as this sympathy is very variable, it (...)
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