Search results for 'temporal parts' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.score: 240.0
    Ignoring the temporal dimension, an object such as a railway tunnel or a human body is a three-dimensional whole composed of three-dimensional parts. The four-dimensionalist holds that a physical object exhibiting identity across time—Descartes, for example—is a four-dimensional whole composed of 'briefer' four-dimensional objects, its temporal parts. Peter van Inwagen (1990) has argued that four-dimensionalism cannot be sustained, or at best can be sustained only by a counterpart theorist. We argue that different schemes of individuation of (...)
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  2. Michael F. Patton (2002). Probabilities and Temporal Parts. Acta Analytica 17 (1):39-52.score: 240.0
    Adopting temporal parts theory is the most popular way of addressing a host of puzzles about diachronic identity. For example, it is not obvious how I am the same person as the baby who shared my name. With the theory, sameness of person, e.g., consists in being comprised by the same temporally extended, four-dimensional object. However, temporal parts theory has unacceptable consequences for notions of freedom and probability. I show that the only acceptable reading of four-dimensionalism (...)
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  3. Michael T. Traynor (2013). Actual Time and Possible Change: A Problem for Modal Arguments for Temporal Parts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):180-189.score: 240.0
    Sider (2001) and Hawley (2001) argue that, in order to account for the mere possibility of change, temporal parts must be as fine-grained as possible change, and hence as fine-grained as time. However, when dealing with metaphysical possibility, the fine-grainedness of actual time and the fine-grainedness of possible change can come apart. Once this is taken into account, we see that, on certain assumptions about the actual microstructure of time, the modal arguments of Sider and Hawley lead to (...)
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  4. Achille C. Varzi (2000). Foreword to ''Temporal Parts''. The Monist 83 (3):319-320.score: 240.0
    A brief introductory note to the Monist issue on "Temporal Parts", setting the background for the eight papers included in the rest of the issue (by Y. Balashov, B. Brogaard, K. Fine, M. Heller, R. LePoidevin, J. Parsons, P. M. Simons, and P. van Inwagen).
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  5. Mark Heller (1984). Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334.score: 180.0
    I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts.
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  6. Katherine Hawley, Temporal Parts.score: 180.0
    Temporal parts are analogous to spatial parts: just as the conference has one spatial part which occupies the seminar room, and another which occupies the lecture hall, it has one temporal part which ‘occupies’ Friday and another which ‘occupies’ Saturday. These temporal parts of the conference have half-hour coffee-breaks as temporal parts of their own; these coffee-breaks are also temporal parts of the whole conference.
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  7. Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738-752.score: 180.0
    What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts—four-dimensionalism—unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures (...)
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  8. Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.score: 180.0
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if (...)
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  9. Douglas Ehring (2001). Temporal Parts and Bundle Theory. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):163 - 168.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I try to make a bundle theory of objects consistentwith a temporal parts theory of object persistence. To that end,I propose that such bundles are made up of tropes includingthe co-instantiation relation.
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  10. Theodore Sider (2007). Temporal Parts. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub.. 241--262.score: 180.0
    An introduction to temporal parts theory. Most of us believe in spatial parts: hands are spatial parts of people, an electron is a spatial part of a hydrogen atom, the earth is a spatial part of the solar system. Why are these parts "spatial" parts? Because they are spatially smaller: the hand is spatially smaller than the person, the electron is spatially smaller than the atom, the earth is spatially smaller than the solar system. (...)
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  11. Thomas Sattig (2002). Temporal Parts and Complex Predicates. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):279–286.score: 180.0
    Those who believe that ordinary things have temporal as well as spatial parts must give an account of the truth conditions of temporally modified predications of the form ‘a is F at t ’ in terms of temporal parts. I will argue that the friend of temporal parts is committed to an account of temporal predication that is incompatible with the classical principle of predicate abstraction.
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  12. T. Sattig (2003). Temporal Predication with Temporal Parts and Temporal Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):355 – 368.score: 180.0
    If ordinary objects have temporal parts, then temporal predications have the following truth conditions: necessarily, ( a is F) at t iff a has a temporal part that is located at t and that is F. If ordinary objects have temporal counterparts, then, necessarily, ( a is F) at t iff a has a temporal counterpart that is located at t and that is F. The temporal-parts account allows temporal predication to (...)
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  13. Yuri Balashov (2003). Temporal Parts and Superluminal Motion. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):1-13.score: 180.0
    Hud Hudson has recently suggested a scenario intended to show that, assuming the doctrine of temporal parts and a sufficiently liberal view of composition, there are material objects that move faster than light. I accept Hudson's conditional but contend that his modus ponens is less plausible that the corresponding modus tollens. Reversed in this way, the argument stemming from the scenario raises the cost of mereological liberalism and advances the case for a principled restriction on diachronic composition.
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  14. Lawrence Brian Lombard (1994). The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and the "No-Change" Objection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):365-372.score: 180.0
    The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is (...)
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  15. J. W. Meiland (1966). Temporal Parts and Spatio-Temporal Analogies. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1):64 - 70.score: 180.0
    To what extent is time similar to space? in this paper it is shown that the claim, Made by richard taylor among others, That time and space are "radically alike" is unfounded. This claim can be supported only by employing the notion of temporal parts. It is shown that if objects are regarded as having temporal parts as well as spatial parts, Then serious disanalogies exist between time and space. Furthermore, If objects are said to (...)
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  16. David H. Sanford (1996). Temporal Parts. Temporal Portions, and Temporal Slices: An Exercise in Naive Mereology. Acta Analytica 15:21-33.score: 180.0
    Naive mereology studies ordinary conceptions of part and whole. Parts, unlike portions, have objective boundaries and many things, such as dances and sermons have temporal parts. In order to deal with Mark Heller's claim that temporal parts "are ontologically no more or less basic than the wholes that they compose," we retell the story of Laplace's Genius, here named "Swifty." Although Swifty processes lots of information very quickly, his conceptual repertoire need not extend beyond fundamental (...)
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  17. Nikk Effingham (2011). Temporal Parts and Time Travel. Erkenntnis 74 (2):225-240.score: 164.0
    This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a (...)
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  18. Cody S. Gilmore (2002). Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence, and Temporal Parts. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):241 - 263.score: 156.0
    Yuri Balashov has argued that endurantism is untenable in the context of Minkowski spacetime. Balashov's argument runs through two main theses concerning the relation of coexistence, or temporal co-location. (1) Coexistence must turn out to be an absolute or objective matter; and in Minkowski spacetime coexistence must be grounded in the relation of spacelike separation. (2) If endurantism is true, then (1) leads to absurd conclusions; but if perdurantism is true, then (1) is harmless. Iobject to both theses. Against (...)
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  19. Yuri Balashov (2005). Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts: A Reply to Gilmore. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):1 - 40.score: 152.0
    In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a: Philosophical Studies 99, 129–166; 2000b: Philosophy of Science 67 (Suppl), S549–S562), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002: Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263) has subjected my argument to an insightful three fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore’s first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who (...)
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  20. Hud Hudson (1999). Temporal Parts and Moral Personhood. Philosophical Studies 93 (3):299-316.score: 152.0
    Three Dimensionalists and Four Dimensionalists are engaged in a debate on the topics of persistence and mereology. In this paper, I explore implications of Four Dimensionalism for the formulation of the criterion of personhood and on the question of which individuals satisfy that criterion. In my discussion I argue that the Four Dimensionalist has reason to identify a human person with a proper part of a human organism, and that the Four Dimensionalist has reason to believe that if there is (...)
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  21. Jim Stone (2007). Persons Are Not Made of Temporal Parts. Analysis 67 (1):7–11.score: 150.0
  22. Dean W. Zimmerman (1998). Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):265 – 288.score: 150.0
  23. Philippe Chuard (2011). Temporal Experiences and Their Parts. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (11).score: 150.0
    The paper develops an objection to the extensional model of time consciousness—the view that temporally extended events or processes, and their temporal properties, can be directly perceived as such. Importantly, following James, advocates of the extensional model typically insist that whole experiences of temporal relations between non-simultaneous events are distinct from mere successions of their temporal parts. This means, presumably, that there ought to be some feature(s) differentiating the former from the latter. I try to show (...)
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  24. Lawrence Brian Lombard (1999). On the Alleged Incompatibility of Presentism and Temporal Parts. Philosophia 27 (1-2):253-260.score: 150.0
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  25. Michael C. Rea (1998). Temporal Parts Unmotivated. Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.score: 150.0
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  26. Kristie Miller (2009). Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.score: 150.0
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  27. Matthew McGrath (2007). Temporal Parts. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.score: 150.0
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  28. David S. Oderberg (2004). Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):686–708.score: 150.0
    Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Change occurs in many ways: it can be accidental or substantial; essential or non-essential; intrinsic or extrinsic; subjective (a change in the knower) or objective (a change in the known). Changes can be physical, spatial, quantitative, qualitative, natural, artefactual, conceptual, linguistic. Events are arguably best defined as changes in an object or objects. All change is from something and into something, and hence is at least a two-term relation, (...)
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  29. Montse Bordes (1997). Four-Dimensional Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts. Theoria (29):343-377.score: 150.0
  30. Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2004). Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts? In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oup Oxford.score: 150.0
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  31. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time. The Monist 83 (3):437-459.score: 150.0
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  32. L. Nathan Oaklander (1992). Temporal Passage and Temporal Parts. Noûs 26 (1):79-84.score: 150.0
  33. Achille C. Varzi (2005). Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument From Vagueness. Dialectica 59 (4):485–498.score: 150.0
    The so-called "argument from vagueness", the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is arguably the most powerful and innovative argument recently offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective--I submit--and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each "defect" corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So (...)
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  34. J. Butterfield (1985). Spatial and Temporal Parts. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):32-44.score: 150.0
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  35. Liliana Albertazzi (1994). Thepsychological Whole. I: The Temporal Parts of Presentation. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 5 (1):145-175.score: 150.0
  36. Peter Simons (2000). How to Exist at a Time When You Have No Temporal Parts. The Monist 83 (3):419-436.score: 150.0
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  37. Fabrice Correia (forthcoming). Comments on Achille Varzi's" Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument From Vagueness''. Dialectica.score: 150.0
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  38. Paul Helm (1979). Jonathan Edwards and the Doctrine of Temporal Parts. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1):37-51.score: 150.0
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  39. Harold W. Noonan (1987). Reply to Spinks on Temporal Parts. Analysis 47 (4):187 - 188.score: 150.0
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  40. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time. The Monist 83 (3):437 - 459.score: 150.0
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  41. H. W. Noonan (1985). A Note on Temporal Parts. Analysis 45 (3):151 - 152.score: 150.0
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  42. Graham Spinks (1986). Noonan on Temporal Parts. Analysis 46 (4):215 - 216.score: 150.0
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  43. Geoffrey Gorham (2010). Descartes on Persistence and Temporal Parts. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.score: 150.0
     
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  44. Darren Belousek Balashov, Michael Bergmann & J. B. Hud Hudson (1998). Temporal Parts Unmotivated Michael С Rea. Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.score: 150.0
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  45. Montserrat Bordes Solanas (1997). „Four-Dimensionalist Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts”. Theoria 12 (29):343-377.score: 150.0
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  46. S. Gilmore Cody (2002). Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence, and Temporal Parts. Philosophical Studies 109 (3).score: 150.0
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  47. Miu Er (2000). Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time, Peter Van Inwagen. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199).score: 150.0
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  48. Mariusz Grygianiec (2009). The Theory of Temporal Parts-Theorems and Arguments. Filozofia Nauki 17 (4):49.score: 150.0
     
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  49. Thomas Reid (2009). Identity and Temporal Parts. In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Arguing About Metaphysics. Routledge. 239.score: 150.0
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