Search results for 'the ability to do otherwise' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.score: 312.0
    In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gordon Pettit (2005). Moral Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:303-319.score: 312.0
    Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs) cast doubt on the initially plausible claim that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. Following the lead of Peter van Inwagen and others, I argue that if we are careful in distinguishing events by causal origins, then we see that FSEs fail to show that one may be morally responsible for x, yet have no alternatives to x. I provide reasons for a fine-grained causal origins approach to events apart from the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Hanna Pickard (2013). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 312.0
    When philosophers want an example of a person who lacks the ability to do otherwise, they turn to psychopathology. Addicts, agoraphobics, kleptomaniacs, neurotics, obsessives, and even psychopathic serial murderers, are all purportedly subject to irresistible desires that compel the person to act: no alternative possibility is supposed to exist. I argue that this conception of psychopathology is false and offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency which preserves the ability to do otherwise. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):341 - 350.score: 312.0
    In his classic paper, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the "compatibilists" and the "incompatibilists" (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Christopher Gilbert (2013). Descartes, Passion, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:275-298.score: 312.0
    What does Descartes regard as necessary for human freedom? I approach this topic from a distinctive angle by focusing on the role of the passions in Descartes’s account of free will. My goal is to show that (1) Descartes takes us to have the ability to do otherwise when we judge or choose under the influence of the passions, and that (2) while such ability does not constitute freedom in the fullest Cartesian sense, it does ensure that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 289.2
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Rik Peels (2013). Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise? Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.score: 286.8
    Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.score: 257.0
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Denis F. Sullivan (2007). Anscombe on Freedom, Animals, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:231-240.score: 237.0
  10. Cecilia Wee (2006). Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):387-414.score: 234.0
  11. Winston Nesbitt & Stewart Candlish (1978). Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Mind 87 (347):415-420.score: 234.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Hugh Rice (2006). Divine Omniscience, Timelessness, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Religious Studies 42 (2):123-139.score: 201.6
    There is a familiar argument based on the principle that the past is fixed that, if God foreknows what I will do, I do not have the power to act otherwise. So, there is a problem about reconciling divine omniscience with the power to do otherwise. However the problem posed by the argument does not provide a good reason for adopting the view that God is outside time. In particular, arguments for the fixity of the past, if successful, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Stan R. Tyvoll (1998). Free Will and the Ability to Will Otherwise. The Modern Schoolman 75 (3):171-181.score: 154.2
  14. Lilli Alanen (2002). Descartes on the Will and the Power to Do Otherwise. In. In Henrik Lagerlund & Mikko Yrjonsuri (eds.), Emotions and Choice From Boethius to Descartes. Kluwer. 279--298.score: 154.2
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Penelope Mackie (2003). Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.score: 151.2
  16. Kadri Vihvelin (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.score: 151.2
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Michael McKenna (2013). Source Compatibilism and That Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.score: 151.2
  18. Kadri Vihvelin (2009). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):343-371.score: 151.2
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. I. As (1997). Have Argued Elsewhere, God's Omnipotence is Not to Be Understood as the Ability to Do Absolutely Anything, Including That Which is Logically Impossible to Do–See My “The Absolutist Theory of Omnipotence,”. Sophia 36:55-78.score: 151.2
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Randolph Clarke (2012). Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.score: 150.6
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Richard R. la Croix (1984). Descartes on God's Ability to Do the Logically Impossible. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):455-475.score: 149.4
  22. Richard R. La Croix (1984). Descartes on Gods Ability to Do the Logically Impossible. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):455 - 475.score: 149.4
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Christy Sylvest (forthcoming). CS2315-F08 December 7, 2008 Ethics and Therac-25 Some May Question Whether Software Engineering or Computer Programming Are Just Careers or If They Are Real Professions. But There is No Question That They Have the Ability to Affect the Public Either Through Good or Through Harm. Software Engineers Do Not Have to Have a License to Practice, but They Still Need to Abide by a Code of Ethics. Without This Code or a Set of Moral Rules to Guide Them They Cannot Be Expected to Feel Accountable for Their Actions. [REVIEW] Ethics.score: 149.4
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Minna Cheves Wilkins (1928). The Effect of Changed Material on Ability to Do Formal Syllogistic Reasoning. New York.score: 149.4
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Susan M. Shell (2002). Rousseau and Kant) That Have Informed Liberal Politics, and the Other, If Not Greater, Darkness, in the Form of Religiously Inspired Violence, Against Which Liberalism has Also Historically Struggled. In Slighting That Nobler, If Partly Mistaken, Motive, Tuck's Otherwise Incisive Study Fails to Do Liberalism Full Justice. Kantian Review 6:137.score: 147.6
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Ori J. Herstein (2012). Defending the Right To Do Wrong. Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.score: 141.0
    Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jukka Varelius (2013). Voluntary Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and the Right to Do Wrong. HEC Forum 25 (3):1-15.score: 141.0
    It has been argued that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are morally wrong. Yet, a gravely suffering patient might insist that he has a moral right to the procedures even if they were morally wrong. There are also philosophers who maintain that an agent can have a moral right to do something that is morally wrong. In this article, I assess the view that a suffering patient can have a moral right to VE and PAS despite the moral (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Philip McShane (2013). 'What-To-Do?': The Heart of Lonergan's Ethics. Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 7.score: 139.2
    Philip McShane explores the implications of Bernard Lonergan’s compacted account of ‘what questions’ and ‘what-to-do questions’ for understanding deliberation. The essay provides a fascinating and instructive glimpse into McShane’s own long-continued struggle and dialogue with Lonergan’s achievement.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). I Could Not Have Done Otherwise--So What? Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.score: 136.8
    Peter van Inwagen notes: "... almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act." Perhaps van Inwagen is right; perhaps most philosophers agree on this. If so, this shared assumption, which I will call CDO (for "could have done otherwise"), is a good candidate for denial, especially since there turns out to be so little to be said in support of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Julia N. Karcher (1996). Auditors' Ability to Discern the Presence of Ethical Problems. Journal of Business Ethics 15 (10):1033 - 1050.score: 134.4
    Recently, society and the accounting profession have become increasingly concerned with ethics. Accounting researchers have responded by attempting to investigate and analyze the ethical behavior of accountants. While the current state of ethical behavior among practitioners is important, the ability of accountants to detect ethical problems that may not be obvious should also be studied and understood. This study addresses three questions: (1) are auditors alert to ethical issues; (2) if so, how important do they perceive them to be; (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Frederick H. Gautschi & Thomas M. Jones (1998). Enhancing the Ability of Business Students to Recognize Ethical Issues: An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of a Course in Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 17 (2):205 - 216.score: 133.8
    This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robin Attfield (2001). To Do No Harm? The Precautionary Principle and Moral Values. Philosophy of Management 1 (3):11-20.score: 133.8
    From over 2000 years ago the ideal expressed in the Hippocratic Oath has encouraged doctors never knowingly to do harm: primum non nocere. Over 25 years ago the management writer Peter Drucker proposed it as the basis of a management ethic, ‘the right rule for the ethics managers need, the ethics of responsibility’. He argued then that the rule had wide scope encompassing for instance executive compensation, management rhetoric and the management of business impacts. In 2000 the United Nations Global (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Frederick H. Gautschi Iii & Thomas M. Jones (1998). Enhancing the Ability of Business Students to Recognize Ethical Issues: An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of a Course in Business Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (2):205-216.score: 133.8
    This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. R. Zachary Manis (2011). Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):209-223.score: 130.8
    One important version of the problem of divine freedom is that, if God is essentially good, and if freedom logically requires being able to do otherwise, then God is not free with respect to willing the good, and thus He is not morally praiseworthy for His goodness. I develop and defend a broadly Molinist solution to this problem, which, I argue, provides the best way out of the difficulty for orthodox theists who are unwilling to relinquish the Principle of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.score: 129.0
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.score: 123.6
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do (...) is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) "manipulation arguments," involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist's favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise. (shrink)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Beatrice Gelder (1988). Above Suspicion: Cognitive and Intentional Aspects of the Ability to Lie. [REVIEW] Argumentation 2 (1):77-87.score: 121.2
    This paper looks at the attribution of the ability to lie and not at lying or lies. It also departs from more familiar approaches by focussing on the appraisal of an ability and not on the ability in itself. We believe that this attribution perspective is required to bring out the cognitive and intentional basis of the ability to lie.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Roxana Havrici (2010). Gerrie ter Haar Oi James J. Busuttil (Eds.), The Freedom to Do God's Will. Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 4 (10):244-245.score: 118.2
    Gerrie ter Haar oi James J. Busuttil (eds.), The Freedom to Do God’s Will. Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change Routledge, London and New York, 2003.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Robert J. Hartman (2011). Involuntary Belief and the Command to Have Faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):181-192.score: 117.6
    Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.score: 116.0
    The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is false, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Marie T. Farrell (2014). The First Thing to Do is Live: Essays Sacred and Secular [Book Review]. Australasian Catholic Record, The 91 (1):123.score: 115.8
    Farrell, Marie T Review(s) of: The first thing to do is live: Essays sacred and secular, by Adrian Lyons SJ (Melbourne: David Lovell Publishing, 2013), pp. 136, pb $27.95.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Dorin Ştefănescu (2010). Nothing to Do or the Invisible Ethics. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 9 (26):75-93.score: 115.8
    According to Fondane, rationalist philosophy implies arguments that aim at a separation of the intelligible and the sensible which, in the Platonic tradition represents a degradation of the de-signified individual. Supporting itself on Lévinas’ thematization of the ethical as a prime philosophy, the interpretation regards the nucleus of the strong relation between morality and religion. Following the Christic example, the moment man is emptied of himself, he may free himself from his fake central placing. A radical passivity of a de-moralized (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Nicholas Southwood (2013). “The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”. Noûs 47 (3).score: 115.2
    A familiar complaint against the principle that “ought” implies “can” is that it seems that agents can intentionally make it the case that they cannot perform acts that they nonetheless ought to perform. I propose a related principle that I call the principle that “the thing to do” implies “can.” I argue that the principle that “the thing to do” implies “can” is implied by important but underappreciated truths about practical reason, and that it is not vulnerable to the familiar (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Peter Homans (1989). The Ability to Mourn: Disillusionment and the Social Origins of Psychoanalysis. University of Chicago Press.score: 115.2
    Peter Homans offers a new understanding of the origins of psychoanalysis and relates the psychoanalytic project as a whole to the sweep of Western culture, past and present. He argues that Freud's fundamental goal was the interpretation of culture and that, therefore, psychoanalysis is fundamentally a humanistic social science. To establish this claim, Homans looks back at Freud's self-analysis in light of the crucial years from 1906 to 1914 when the psychoanalytic movement was formed and shows how these experiences culminated (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Mascha Van 'T. Wout, Sara Faught & David Menino (2013). Does Interoceptive Awareness Affect the Ability to Regulate Unfair Treatment by Others? Frontiers in Psychology 4:880.score: 115.2
    In this study we aimed to investigate how awareness of bodily responses, referred to as interoceptive awareness, influences decision-making in a social interactive context. Interoceptive awareness is thought to be crucial for adequate regulation of one’s emotions. However, there is a dearth of studies that examine the association between interoceptive awareness and the ability to regulate emotions during interpersonal decision-making. Here, we quantified interoceptive awareness with a heartbeat detection task in which we measured the difference between subjective self-reports and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Adam D. Bailey (2011). The Intend/Foresee Distinction, Moral Absolutes, and the Side Effects of the Choice to Do Nothing. American Journal of Jurisprudence 56 (1):151-168.score: 115.2
    What grounds the moral significance of the intend/foresee distinction? To put the question another way, what reason do we have for believing that moral absolutes apply with respect to intended effects, but not foreseeable but unintended (bad) effects? Joseph Boyle has provided an answer that relies on the idea that persons can find themselves in situations of “moral impossibility”—situations in which every available option foreseeably will give rise to bad effects. However, Robert Anderson has put Boyle’s answer into question by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Rayna H. Friendly, Drew Rendall & Laurel J. Trainor (2013). Plasticity After Perceptual Narrowing for Voice Perception: Reinstating the Ability to Discriminate Monkeys by Their Voices at 12 Months of Age. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 115.2
    Differentiating individuals by their voice is an important social skill for infants to acquire. In a previous study, we demonstrated that the ability to discriminate individuals by voice follows a pattern of perceptual narrowing (Friendly, et al., in press). Specifically, we found that the ability to discriminate between two foreign-species (rhesus monkey) voices decreased significantly between 6 and 12 months of age. Also during this period, there was a trend for the ability to discriminate human voices to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. John Haugeland, Intelligence and the Ability to Take Responsibility.score: 114.6
    In an interview with Cogito (Greece), philosopher John Haugeland proposes that the defining feature of human intelligence is responsibility. On the ethical level, this means being able to decide between what one is told to do and what one ought to do; on the cognitive level, it involves abandoning a certain theory if it fails to comply with observation.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Marilyn Fischer (2011). Keywords: What's an Advocate to Do with the Words She's Given? The Pluralist 5 (3):32-40.score: 114.6
    I was ecstatic when i read Donna Gabaccia's discussion of "keywords." There is a name for this? People really write books about it? I was thrilled to learn that people do systematically what I, in a bumbling sort of way, dabble with. For the past few years, I have kept a "phrase file," entering what Gabaccia calls "central and evocative terms," along with instances of their use that I happen upon while doing other things (Gabaccia, "Nations of Immigrants" 6). Every (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2008). The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.score: 114.0
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000