Search results for 'the ability to do otherwise' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.score: 1560.0
    In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
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  2. Gordon Pettit (2005). Moral Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:303-319.score: 1560.0
    Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs) cast doubt on the initially plausible claim that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. Following the lead of Peter van Inwagen and others, I argue that if we are careful in distinguishing events by causal origins, then we see that FSEs fail to show that one may be morally responsible for x, yet have no alternatives to x. I provide reasons for a fine-grained causal origins approach to events apart from the (...)
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  3. Hanna Pickard (2013). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 1560.0
    When philosophers want an example of a person who lacks the ability to do otherwise, they turn to psychopathology. Addicts, agoraphobics, kleptomaniacs, neurotics, obsessives, and even psychopathic serial murderers, are all purportedly subject to irresistible desires that compel the person to act: no alternative possibility is supposed to exist. I argue that this conception of psychopathology is false and offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency which preserves the ability to do otherwise. (...)
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  4. Peter Van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):341 - 350.score: 1560.0
    In his classic paper, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the "compatibilists" and the "incompatibilists" (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
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  5. Christopher Gilbert (2013). Descartes, Passion, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:275-298.score: 1560.0
    What does Descartes regard as necessary for human freedom? I approach this topic from a distinctive angle by focusing on the role of the passions in Descartes’s account of free will. My goal is to show that (1) Descartes takes us to have the ability to do otherwise when we judge or choose under the influence of the passions, and that (2) while such ability does not constitute freedom in the fullest Cartesian sense, it does ensure that (...)
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  6. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 1446.0
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined (...)
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  7. Rik Peels (2013). Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise? Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.score: 1434.0
    Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is (...)
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  8. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.score: 1285.0
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  9. Denis F. Sullivan (2007). Anscombe on Freedom, Animals, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:231-240.score: 1185.0
  10. Cecilia Wee (2006). Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):387-414.score: 1170.0
  11. Winston Nesbitt & Stewart Candlish (1978). Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Mind 87 (347):415-420.score: 1170.0
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  12. Hugh Rice (2006). Divine Omniscience, Timelessness, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Religious Studies 42 (2):123-139.score: 806.4
    There is a familiar argument based on the principle that the past is fixed that, if God foreknows what I will do, I do not have the power to act otherwise. So, there is a problem about reconciling divine omniscience with the power to do otherwise. However the problem posed by the argument does not provide a good reason for adopting the view that God is outside time. In particular, arguments for the fixity of the past, if successful, (...)
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  13. Randolph Clarke (2012). Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.score: 753.0
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack (...)
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  14. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). I Could Not Have Done Otherwise--So What? Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.score: 684.0
    Peter van Inwagen notes: "... almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act." Perhaps van Inwagen is right; perhaps most philosophers agree on this. If so, this shared assumption, which I will call CDO (for "could have done otherwise"), is a good candidate for denial, especially since there turns out to be so little to be said in support of (...)
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  15. Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.score: 645.0
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
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  16. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.score: 618.0
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do (...) is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) "manipulation arguments," involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist's favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise. (shrink)
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  17. Stan R. Tyvoll (1998). Free Will and the Ability to Will Otherwise. The Modern Schoolman 75 (3):171-181.score: 616.8
  18. Lilli Alanen (2002). Descartes on the Will and the Power to Do Otherwise. In. In Henrik Lagerlund & Mikko Yrjonsuri (eds.), Emotions and Choice From Boethius to Descartes. Kluwer. 279--298.score: 616.8
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  19. Penelope Mackie (2003). Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.score: 604.8
  20. Kadri Vihvelin (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.score: 604.8
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  21. Michael McKenna (2013). Source Compatibilism and That Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.score: 604.8
  22. Kadri Vihvelin (2009). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):343-371.score: 604.8
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  23. I. As (1997). Have Argued Elsewhere, God's Omnipotence is Not to Be Understood as the Ability to Do Absolutely Anything, Including That Which is Logically Impossible to Do–See My “The Absolutist Theory of Omnipotence,”. Sophia 36:55-78.score: 604.8
     
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  24. Richard R. La Croix (1984). Descartes on Gods Ability to Do the Logically Impossible. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):455 - 475.score: 597.6
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  25. Richard R. la Croix (1984). Descartes on God's Ability to Do the Logically Impossible. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):455-475.score: 597.6
  26. Christy Sylvest (forthcoming). CS2315-F08 December 7, 2008 Ethics and Therac-25 Some May Question Whether Software Engineering or Computer Programming Are Just Careers or If They Are Real Professions. But There is No Question That They Have the Ability to Affect the Public Either Through Good or Through Harm. Software Engineers Do Not Have to Have a License to Practice, but They Still Need to Abide by a Code of Ethics. Without This Code or a Set of Moral Rules to Guide Them They Cannot Be Expected to Feel Accountable for Their Actions. [REVIEW] Ethics.score: 597.6
     
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  27. Minna Cheves Wilkins (1928). The Effect of Changed Material on Ability to Do Formal Syllogistic Reasoning. New York.score: 597.6
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  28. Robert J. Hartman (2011). Involuntary Belief and the Command to Have Faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):181-192.score: 588.0
    Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence (...)
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  29. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.score: 580.0
    The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is false, (...)
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  30. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2008). The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.score: 570.0
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this (...)
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  31. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2010). The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.score: 570.0
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We (...)
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  32. Julia N. Karcher (1996). Auditors' Ability to Discern the Presence of Ethical Problems. Journal of Business Ethics 15 (10):1033 - 1050.score: 537.6
    Recently, society and the accounting profession have become increasingly concerned with ethics. Accounting researchers have responded by attempting to investigate and analyze the ethical behavior of accountants. While the current state of ethical behavior among practitioners is important, the ability of accountants to detect ethical problems that may not be obvious should also be studied and understood. This study addresses three questions: (1) are auditors alert to ethical issues; (2) if so, how important do they perceive them to be; (...)
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  33. Frederick H. Gautschi & Thomas M. Jones (1998). Enhancing the Ability of Business Students to Recognize Ethical Issues: An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of a Course in Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 17 (2):205 - 216.score: 535.2
    This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.
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  34. Robin Attfield (2001). To Do No Harm? The Precautionary Principle and Moral Values. Philosophy of Management 1 (3):11-20.score: 535.2
    From over 2000 years ago the ideal expressed in the Hippocratic Oath has encouraged doctors never knowingly to do harm: primum non nocere. Over 25 years ago the management writer Peter Drucker proposed it as the basis of a management ethic, ‘the right rule for the ethics managers need, the ethics of responsibility’. He argued then that the rule had wide scope encompassing for instance executive compensation, management rhetoric and the management of business impacts. In 2000 the United Nations Global (...)
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  35. Frederick H. Gautschi Iii & Thomas M. Jones (1998). Enhancing the Ability of Business Students to Recognize Ethical Issues: An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of a Course in Business Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (2):205-216.score: 535.2
    This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.
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  36. R. Zachary Manis (2011). Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):209-223.score: 523.2
    One important version of the problem of divine freedom is that, if God is essentially good, and if freedom logically requires being able to do otherwise, then God is not free with respect to willing the good, and thus He is not morally praiseworthy for His goodness. I develop and defend a broadly Molinist solution to this problem, which, I argue, provides the best way out of the difficulty for orthodox theists who are unwilling to relinquish the Principle of (...)
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  37. Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols (2013). Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 126–50.score: 507.0
    Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in which (...)
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  38. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.score: 462.0
    A crucial question for libertarians about free will and moral responsibility concerns how their accounts secure more control than compatibilism. This problem is particularly exasperating for event-causal libertarianism, as it seems that the only difference between these accounts and compatibilism is that the former require indeterminism. But how can indeterminism, a mere negative condition, enhance control? This worry has led many to conclude that the only viable form of libertarianism is agent-causal libertarianism. In this paper I show that this conclusion (...)
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  39. Garrett Pendergraft (2010). The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.score: 459.0
    Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet (...)
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  40. John Haugeland, Intelligence and the Ability to Take Responsibility.score: 458.4
    In an interview with Cogito (Greece), philosopher John Haugeland proposes that the defining feature of human intelligence is responsibility. On the ethical level, this means being able to decide between what one is told to do and what one ought to do; on the cognitive level, it involves abandoning a certain theory if it fails to comply with observation.
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  41. A. S. Iltis & M. J. Cherry (2008). First Do No Harm: Critical Analyses of the Roads to Health Care Reform. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (5):403-415.score: 451.2
    Health care reform poses numerous challenges. A core challenge is to make health care more efficient and effective without causing more harm than benefit. Additionally, those fashioning health-care policy must encourage patients to exercise caution and restraint when expending scarce resources; restrict the ability of politicians to advance their careers by promising alluring but costly entitlements, many of which they will not be able to deliver; face the demographic challenges of an aging population; and avoid regulations that create significant (...)
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  42. A. R. Singh (2008). Covert Treatment in Psychiatry: Do No Harm, True, But Also Dare to Care. Mens Sana Monographs 6 (1):81.score: 436.8
    _Covert treatment raises a number of ethical and practical issues in psychiatry. Viewpoints differ from the standpoint of psychiatrists, caregivers, ethicists, lawyers, neighbours, human rights activists and patients. There is little systematic research data on its use but it is quite certain that there is relatively widespread use. The veil of secrecy around the procedure is due to fear of professional censure. Whenever there is a veil of secrecy around anything, which is aided and abetted by vociferous opposition from some (...)
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  43. Seth Shabo (2011). Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.score: 435.0
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so (...)
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  44. Richard M. Glatz (2008). The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257 - 272.score: 435.0
    Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist (...)
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  45. Richard Holton (2010). Disentangling the Will. In Al Mele, Kathleen Vohs & Roy Baumeister (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? OUP. 82.score: 435.0
    It is argued that there are at least three things bundled up in the idea of free will: the capacity manifested by agents whenever they act freely; the property possessed by those actions for which an agent in morally responsible; and the ability to do otherwise. This paper attempts some disentangling.
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  46. Daniel James Speak (2007). The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.score: 435.0
    Discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities have largely ignored the limits of what Frankfurt-style counter-examples can show. Rather than challenging the coherence of the cases, I argue that even if they are taken to demonstrate the falsity of the principle, they cannot advance the compatibilist cause. For a forceful incompatibilist argument can be constructed from the Frankfurtian premise that agents in Frankfurtian circumstances would have done what they did even if they could have done something else. This 'counterfactual stability' (...)
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  47. Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.score: 435.0
    Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her (...) to perform the contrary action, must be dropped. In its stead, they propose the weaker requirement of guidance control, which only demands the agent’s causal control over the action for which she is to be held responsible. (shrink)
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  48. Fritz J. McDonald (2014). Review of Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 7 (2):251-252.score: 435.0
    The Self Beyond Itself is a defense of an incompatibilist, hard determinist view of free will. Free will is here defined in a very strong sense, as the existence of actions that do not result from any causes other than the agent herself. The question of how to define free will, especially whether it consists in the ability to do otherwise, and what the ability to do otherwise amounts to, is not given much consideration in this (...)
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  49. Galen Strawson (1986). On the Inevitability of Freedom (From the Compatibilist Point of View). American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400.score: 432.0
    This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
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  50. Andrew Eshleman (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.score: 429.0
    The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes free (...)
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