Search results for 'the ability to do otherwise' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.
    In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
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  2.  86
    Hanna Pickard (2015). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.
    When philosophers want an example of a person who lacks the ability to do otherwise, they turn to psychopathology. Addicts, agoraphobics, kleptomaniacs, neurotics, obsessives, and even psychopathic serial murderers, are all purportedly subject to irresistible desires that compel the person to act: no alternative possibility is supposed to exist. I argue that this conception of psychopathology is false and offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency which preserves the ability to do otherwise. (...)
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  3.  19
    Denis F. Sullivan (2007). Anscombe on Freedom, Animals, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:231-240.
    It is commonly assumed that human beings are free because they have minds and, since they are the only creatures we have encountered that have minds, itis further assumed that they are the only creatures that are free. Elizabeth Anscombe, on the other hand, maintains that freedom, in the sense in which it is identified with the ability to do otherwise, is required for intentional action and, since even thoughtless beasts perform intentional actions, these beasts are also free. (...)
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  4.  83
    Gordon Pettit (2005). Moral Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:303-319.
    Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs) cast doubt on the initially plausible claim that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. Following the lead of Peter van Inwagen and others, I argue that if we are careful in distinguishing events by causal origins, then we see that FSEs fail to show that one may be morally responsible for x, yet have no alternatives to x. I provide reasons for a fine-grained causal origins approach to events apart from the (...)
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  5.  34
    Peter Van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):341 - 350.
    In his classic paper, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the "compatibilists" and the "incompatibilists" (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
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  6.  12
    Christopher Gilbert (2013). Descartes, Passion, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:275-298.
    What does Descartes regard as necessary for human freedom? I approach this topic from a distinctive angle by focusing on the role of the passions in Descartes’s account of free will. My goal is to show that (1) Descartes takes us to have the ability to do otherwise when we judge or choose under the influence of the passions, and that (2) while such ability does not constitute freedom in the fullest Cartesian sense, it does ensure that (...)
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  7. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  8.  40
    Rik Peels (2013). Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise? Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.
    Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is (...)
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  9.  82
    Cecilia Wee (2006). Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):387-414.
  10.  11
    Winston Nesbitt & Stewart Candlish (1978). Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Mind 87 (347):415-420.
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  11. Simon Kittle (2015). Free Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Dissertation, University of Sheffield
     
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  12.  40
    Simon Kittle (2015). Abilities to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
    In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is (...)
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  13.  70
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
    Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities (...)
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  14.  26
    Seth Shabo (2016). Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise. Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.
    Frankfurt’s famous counterexample strategy challenges the traditional association between moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. While this strategy remains controversial, it is now widely agreed that an adequate response to it must preserve an agent’s ability to do otherwise, and not the mere possibility, for only then is her alternative possibility sufficiently robust to ground her responsibility. Here, I defend a more stringent requirement for robustness. To have a robust alternative, I argue, the agent must have the right kind (...)
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  15. Kadri Vihvelin (1989). Ability and Being Able to Do Otherwise. Dissertation, Cornell University
    The free will debate is a modal one--if determinism is true, can agents ever do other than what they do? Compatibilists have tried to show that statements about what an agent could have done are deductible to statements about what she would have done if certain conditions had obtained. But recent developments in modal logic and the logic of counterfactuals provide arguments that no such analysis can succeed. There is in the literature no satisfactory reply to these arguments, and some (...)
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  16. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined (...)
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  17.  77
    Hugh Rice (2006). Divine Omniscience, Timelessness, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Religious Studies 42 (2):123-139.
    There is a familiar argument based on the principle that the past is fixed that, if God foreknows what I will do, I do not have the power to act otherwise. So, there is a problem about reconciling divine omniscience with the power to do otherwise. However the problem posed by the argument does not provide a good reason for adopting the view that God is outside time. In particular, arguments for the fixity of the past, if successful, (...)
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  18.  9
    Lilli Alanen (2002). Descartes on the Will and the Power to Do Otherwise. In Henrik Lagerlund & Mikko Yrjonsuri (eds.), Emotions and Choice From Boethius to Descartes. Kluwer 279--298.
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  19.  94
    Kadri Vihvelin (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.
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  20. Penelope Mackie (2003). Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.
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  21.  39
    Michael McKenna (2013). Source Compatibilism and That Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.
  22.  17
    Stan R. Tyvoll (1998). Free Will and the Ability to Will Otherwise. Modern Schoolman 75 (3):171-181.
  23.  9
    Kadri Vihvelin (2009). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):343-371.
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  24. I. As (1997). Have Argued Elsewhere, God's Omnipotence is Not to Be Understood as the Ability to Do Absolutely Anything, Including That Which is Logically Impossible to Do–See My “The Absolutist Theory of Omnipotence,”. Sophia 36:55-78.
     
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  25.  19
    Richard R. la Croix (1984). Descartes on God's Ability to Do the Logically Impossible. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):455-475.
  26. Minna Cheves Wilkins (1928). The Effect of Changed Material on Ability to Do Formal Syllogistic Reasoning. New York.
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  27.  13
    Richard R. La Croix (1984). Descartes on Gods Ability to Do the Logically Impossible. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):455 - 475.
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  28. Christy Sylvest (forthcoming). CS2315-F08 December 7, 2008 Ethics and Therac-25 Some May Question Whether Software Engineering or Computer Programming Are Just Careers or If They Are Real Professions. But There is No Question That They Have the Ability to Affect the Public Either Through Good or Through Harm. Software Engineers Do Not Have to Have a License to Practice, but They Still Need to Abide by a Code of Ethics. Without This Code or a Set of Moral Rules to Guide Them They Cannot Be Expected to Feel Accountable for Their Actions. [REVIEW] Ethics.
     
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  29.  1
    Johanna Gummerus, Veronica Liljander & Reija Sihlman (forthcoming). Do Ethical Social Media Communities Pay Off? An Exploratory Study of the Ability of Facebook Ethical Communities to Strengthen Consumers’ Ethical Consumption Behavior. Journal of Business Ethics.
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  30.  15
    Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller (2015). Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.
    The aim of this paper is to challenge libertarian accounts of free will. It is argued that there is an irreconcilable tension between the way in which philosophers motivate the incompatibilist ability to do otherwise and the way in which they formally express it. Potential incompatibilist responses in the face of this tension are canvassed, and it is argued that each response is problematic. It is not claimed that incompatibilist accounts in general are incoherent, but rather that (...)
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  31. Peter Goldie (2007). Seeing What is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality. Dialectica 61 (3):347-361.
    I argue that it is possible, in the right circumstances, to see what the kind thing is to do: in the right circumstances, we can, literally, see deontic facts, as well as facts about others’ emotional states, and evaluative facts. In arguing for this, I will deploy a notion of non‐inferential perceptual belief or judgement according to which the belief or judgement is arrived at non‐inferentially in the phenomenological sense and yet is inferential in the epistemic sense. The ability (...)
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  32.  16
    Frederick H. Gautschi & Thomas M. Jones (1998). Enhancing the Ability of Business Students to Recognize Ethical Issues: An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of a Course in Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 17 (2):205 - 216.
    This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.
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  33.  23
    Julia N. Karcher (1996). Auditors' Ability to Discern the Presence of Ethical Problems. Journal of Business Ethics 15 (10):1033 - 1050.
    Recently, society and the accounting profession have become increasingly concerned with ethics. Accounting researchers have responded by attempting to investigate and analyze the ethical behavior of accountants. While the current state of ethical behavior among practitioners is important, the ability of accountants to detect ethical problems that may not be obvious should also be studied and understood. This study addresses three questions: (1) are auditors alert to ethical issues; (2) if so, how important do they perceive them to be; (...)
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  34.  33
    Randolph Clarke (2012). Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack (...)
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  35. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do (...) is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) "manipulation arguments," involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist's favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise. (shrink)
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  36.  9
    Robin Attfield (2001). To Do No Harm? The Precautionary Principle and Moral Values. Philosophy of Management 1 (3):11-20.
    From over 2000 years ago the ideal expressed in the Hippocratic Oath has encouraged doctors never knowingly to do harm: primum non nocere. Over 25 years ago the management writer Peter Drucker proposed it as the basis of a management ethic, ‘the right rule for the ethics managers need, the ethics of responsibility’. He argued then that the rule had wide scope encompassing for instance executive compensation, management rhetoric and the management of business impacts. In 2000 the United Nations Global (...)
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  37.  3
    Frederick H. Gautschi Iii & Thomas M. Jones (1998). Enhancing the Ability of Business Students to Recognize Ethical Issues: An Empirical Assessment of the Effectiveness of a Course in Business Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 17 (2):205-216.
    This paper presents the results of a study of the effect of a business ethics course in enhancing the ability of students to recognize ethical issues. The findings show that compared to students who do not complete such a course, students enrolled in a business ethics course experience substantial improvement in that ability.
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  38.  24
    R. Zachary Manis (2011). Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):209-223.
    One important version of the problem of divine freedom is that, if God is essentially good, and if freedom logically requires being able to do otherwise, then God is not free with respect to willing the good, and thus He is not morally praiseworthy for His goodness. I develop and defend a broadly Molinist solution to this problem, which, I argue, provides the best way out of the difficulty for orthodox theists who are unwilling to relinquish the Principle of (...)
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  39. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). I Could Not Have Done Otherwise--So What? Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.
    Peter van Inwagen notes: "... almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act." Perhaps van Inwagen is right; perhaps most philosophers agree on this. If so, this shared assumption, which I will call CDO (for "could have done otherwise"), is a good candidate for denial, especially since there turns out to be so little to be said in support of (...)
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  40.  58
    Robert J. Hartman (2011). Involuntary Belief and the Command to Have Faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):181-192.
    Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the (...)
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  41.  9
    Greg Janzen (forthcoming). 'Brain-Malfunction' Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or (...)
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  42. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
    The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is false, but (...)
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  43.  84
    Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2010). The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. (...)
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  44. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2008). The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that (...)
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  45.  56
    John Haugeland, Intelligence and the Ability to Take Responsibility.
    In an interview with Cogito (Greece), philosopher John Haugeland proposes that the defining feature of human intelligence is responsibility. On the ethical level, this means being able to decide between what one is told to do and what one ought to do; on the cognitive level, it involves abandoning a certain theory if it fails to comply with observation.
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  46.  28
    Holly M. Smith (2014). Does Being Morally Responsible Depend on the Ability to Hold Morally Responsible? Philosophical Studies 171 (1):51-62.
    Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility is a genuine tour de force: a richly detailed, sustained argument for an innovative theory about the nature of moral responsibility, one that offers multiple layers of theoretical architectonic. Its depth repays equally deep examination, and I have learned a great deal from reading and thinking about it. Any philosopher seeking a rigorous yet generous introduction to the state of contemporary discussion on moral responsibility could hardly do better than to read this book. It is (...)
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  47.  2
    A. S. Iltis & M. J. Cherry (2008). First Do No Harm: Critical Analyses of the Roads to Health Care Reform. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (5):403-415.
    Health care reform poses numerous challenges. A core challenge is to make health care more efficient and effective without causing more harm than benefit. Additionally, those fashioning health-care policy must encourage patients to exercise caution and restraint when expending scarce resources; restrict the ability of politicians to advance their careers by promising alluring but costly entitlements, many of which they will not be able to deliver; face the demographic challenges of an aging population; and avoid regulations that create significant (...)
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  48.  17
    Alexander Barzel (1998). The Perplexing Conclusion: The Essential Difference Between Natural and Artificial Intelligence is Human Beings' Ability to Deceive. Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):165–178.
    As opposed to the computer, the human being can intentionally mislead in many different ways, can behave chaotically, and whenever he has the motivation can choose also by improvisation, non‐consequent misleading, and spontaneous manners of reasoning and articulation. Human perception and the elaboration of the experience are existentially interest‐related, and distorted if found necessary. The arbitrariness is unlimited; human beings can initiate and produce absurd combinations, contextual failures and deceptive expressions, and do so also by intonation and body‐language. These are (...)
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  49. Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
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  50.  68
    Christian List, What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: In Defence of Compatibilist Libertarianism.
    The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. In this paper, I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Both proponents and critics of the argument typically accept the way it is framed and only disagree on whether the argument’s premises and the rules of inference on which it relies are true. I suggest that the argument involves a category mistake: (...)
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