Search results for 'theoretical entities, scientific realism, entity realism, Hacking, Cartwright, Giere, Harre' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  92
    Mohamed Elsamahi (1994). Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism? In David & Richard Hull & Burian (ed.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. 173 - 180.
    Hacking and other entity realists suggest a strategy to build scientific realism on a stronger foundation than inference to the best explanation. They argue that if beliefs in the existence of theoretical entities are derived from experimentation rather than theories, they can escape the antirealist's criticism and provide a stronger ground for realism. In this paper, an outline and a critique of entity realism are presented. It will be argued that entity realism cannot stand as (...)
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  2. Jerrold L. Aronson, Rom Harré & Eileen Cornell Way (1994). Realism Rescued How Scientific Progress is Possible.
     
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  3.  32
    Rom Harré (1988). Scientific Method: Realism, Reference and Theory. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 24:53-68.
  4. Jerrold L. Aronson, Rom Harre, Eileen Cornell Way, Robin Findlay Hendry & David J. Mossley (1999). Reviews-Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):175-180.
     
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  5. Howard Sankey (2012). Reference, Success and Entity Realism. Kairos 5:31-42.
    The paper discusses the version of entity realism presented by Ian Hacking in his book, Representing and Intervening. Hacking holds that an ontological form of scientific realism, entity realism, may be defended on the basis of experimental practices which involve the manipulation of unobservable entities. There is much to be said in favour of the entity realist position that Hacking defends, especially the pragmatist orientation of his approach to realism. But there are problems with the position. (...)
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  6. Rom Harré (1994). Three Varieties of Realism. In A. A. Derksen (ed.), The Scientific Realism of Rom Harré. Tilburg University Press
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  7. Boaz Miller (2016). What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese 193 (3):991-1006.
    According to Ian Hacking’s Entity Realism, unobservable entities that scientists carefully manipulate to study other phenomena are real. Although Hacking presents his case in an intuitive, attractive, and persuasive way, his argument remains elusive. I present five possible readings of Hacking’s argument: a no-miracle argument, an indispensability argument, a transcendental argument, a Vichian argument, and a non-argument. I elucidate Hacking’s argument according to each reading, and review their strengths, their weaknesses, and their compatibility with each other.
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  8.  28
    Rom Harré (2009). The Siren Song of Substantivalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (4):466-473.
    The defence of a process philosophy as the metaphysics for the foundation of social psychology is part of a general defence of scientific realism. Realists, be they classical or neo critical realists hope to construct a dual level science—a phenomenal level resting on a transcendent level required to account for the order and stability to be found in the unfolding of the phenomena. Also required is a driving force or agency. Discursive psychologists argue for a social ontology in which (...)
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  9.  77
    Rom Harre (2013). Approaches to Realism. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):23-35.
    Scientific realism asserts that the methods of science, combined with the intellectual powers of human beings can give us reliable knowledge of states of the world beyond the limits of perception. Among the varieties of realism, policy realism is based on the principle that taking plausible theories to be putative descriptions of actual states of affairs is the best way to design experiments and to advance our knowledge. We carve out the umwelt from the welt by the use of (...)
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  10. Paweł Zeidler & Danuta Sobczyńska (1995). The Idea of Realism in the New Experimentalism and the Problem of the Existence of Theoretical Entities in Chemistry. Foundations of Science 1 (4):517-535.
    The paper is focused on some aspects of experimental realism of Ian Hacking, and especially on his manipulability criterion of existence. The problem is here related to chemical molecules, the objects of interest in chemical research. The authors consider whether and to what extent this criterion has been applied in experimental practice of chemistry. They argue that experimentation on is a fundamental criterion of existence of entities in chemistry rather than experimentation with. Some examples regarding studies of structures of complex (...)
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  11.  27
    Rinat Nugayev (2011). Internal Realism and the Objectivity of Scientific Knowledge. Analytica 5:1-35.
    Arguments pro and contra convergent realism – underdetermination of theory by observational evidence and pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity – are considered. It is argued that, to meet the counter-arguments challenge, convergent realism should be considerably changed with a help of modification of the propositions from this meta-programme “hard core” or “protecting belt”. Two well-known convergent realism rivals – “entity realism” of Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking and John Worrall’s “structural realism” – are considered. Entity realism’s main drawback (...)
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  12. Galileo Mauro Dorato (1988). The World of the Worms and the Quest for Reality. Dialectica 42 (3):171-182.
    SummaryPhilosophical debates concerning the existence of entities postulated in scientific explanations have always characterized the most significant revolutions in the history of physics.Scientific realism — meant here as the doctrine according to which theoretical entities in a mature science typically refer and the laws of a theory in a mature science are approximately true — can be given a clearer, pragmatic interpretation by suggesting sufficient conditions for both and . Following I. Hacking, manipulability and measurability of a (...)
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  13. Rom Harré (1996). From Observability to Manipulability: Extending the Inductive Arguments for Realism. Synthese 108 (2):137 - 155.
    In recent years there have been several attempts to construct inductive arguments for some version of scientific realism. Neither the characteristics of what would count as inductive evidence nor the conclusion to be inferred have been specified in ways that escape sceptical criticism. By introducing the pragmatic criterion of manipulative efficacy for a good theory and by sharpening the specification of the necessary inductive principle, the viability of a mutually supporting pair of argument forms are defended. It is shown (...)
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  14.  3
    Rom Harré (2009). Saving Critical Realism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (2):129-143.
    Critical Realism aims to be both philosophically sophisticated and morally forward looking. Unfortunately the accepted form that this point of view has taken is flawed in both these aims. However, close attention to realist formats in science and the constraints that are required to give a social psychological application of them makes possible a revision of the Critical Realist scheme strengthening its scientific claim and removing certain moral ambiguities in its applications. What follows is a schematic outline for an (...)
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  15.  18
    Rom Harré (2004). Modeling: Gateway to the Unknown: A Work. Elsevier.
    Edited by Daniel Rothbart of George Mason University in Virginia, this book is a collection of Rom Harré's work on modeling in science (particularly physics and psychology). In over 28 authored books and 240 articles and book chapters, Rom Harré of Georgetown University in Washington, DC is a towering figure in philosophy, linguistics, and social psychology. He has inspired a generation of scholars, both for the ways in which his research is carried out and his profound insights. For Harré, the (...)
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  16.  26
    Rom Harré (1996). Rhetoric and Realism. Theoria 11 (1):41-47.
    Does the deconstruction of scientific discourse and experimental procedures undercut realism? In this paper I want to argue that the revelation of the rhetorical character of science serves rather to support realism, since it is in the interests of the presentation of scientific writing as factual and of scientific experiments as disclosing or revealing reality that the various rhetorical devices are employed.
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  17. Robert Pierson & Richard Reiner (2008). Explanatory Warrant for Scientific Realism. Synthese 161 (2):271 - 282.
    Nancy Cartwright relies upon an inference pattern known as inference to the best causal explanation (IBCE) to support a limited form of entity realism, according to which we are warranted in believing in entities that purportively cause observable effects. IBCE, as usually understood, is valid, even though all other forms of inference to the best explanation (IBE) are usually understood to be invalid. We argue that IBCE and IBE are in the same boat with respect to their ability to (...)
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  18. Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
    It is often thought that questions of reference are crucial in assessing scientific realism, construed as the view that successful theories are at least approximately true descriptions of the unobservable; realism is justified only if terms in empirically successful theories generally refer to genuinely existing entities or properties. In this paper this view is questioned. First, it is argued that there are good reasons to think that questions of realism are largely decided by convention and carry no epistemic significance. (...)
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  19.  21
    David Mitsuo Nixon (2010). What Would It Mean to Directly Observe Electrons? Principia 8 (1):1-18.
    In this paper it is argued that a proper understanding of the justification of perceptual beliefs leaves open the possibility that normal humans, unaided by microscopes, could genuinely know, by direct observation, of the existence of a theoretical entity like an electron. A particular theory of justification called perceptual responsibilism is presented. If successful, this kind of view would undercut one line of argument that has been given (for example, by Bas van Fraassen) in support of scientific (...)
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  20. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1992). Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 37 (2):151 - 178.
    It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it is (...)
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  21. Jacob Busch (2006). Entity Realism Meets the Pessimistic Meta-Induction – The World is Not Enough. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (106):26.
    In the following I briefly set out Devitt's (1997) definition of entity realism and compare it to Hacking's (1983) definition. I then set out the pessimistic induction argument as suggested by Putnam (1978). I present an argument developed by Bertolet (1988) to the effect that Devitt's abductive defence of realism fails. In the light of its failure, Devitt offers the ability of his definition of scientific realism to solve the pessimistic induction argument as a tactical advantage for his (...)
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  22.  3
    Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Entity Realism and Singularist Semirealism. Synthese:1-19.
    Entity realism is the view that ‘a good many theoretical entities do really exist’. The main novelty of entity realism was that it provided an account of scientific realism that did not have to endorse realism about theories—the general proposal was that entity realism is noncommittal about whether we should be realist about scientific theories. I argue that the only way entity realists can resist the pull of straight scientific realism about theories (...)
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  23. Theodore Arabatzis (2001). Can a Historian of Science Be a Scientific Realist? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S531-.
    In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces (...)
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  24. Uskali Mäki (2005). Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or (How) Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism Be Informed About the Sciences? Erkenntnis 63 (2):231 - 251.
    In order to examine the fit between realism and science, one needs to address two issues: the unit of science question (realism about which parts of science?) and the contents of realism question (which realism about science?). Answering these questions is a matter of conceptual and empirical inquiry by way local case studies. Instead of the more ordinary abstract and global scientific realism, what we get is a doubly local scientific realism based on a bottom-up strategy. Representative formulations (...)
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  25.  84
    Silvio Seno Chibeni (2005). Discussions Quinton's Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):393-400.
    This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity (...)
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  26. Ian Hacking (1995). Scientific Realism About Some Chemical Entities. Foundations of Science 1 (4):537-542.
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  27.  16
    Johanna Wolff (forthcoming). Naturalistic Quietism or Scientific Realism? Synthese:1-14.
    Realists about science tend to hold that our scientific theories aim for the truth, that our successful theories are at least partly true, and that the entities referred to by the theoretical terms of these theories exist. Antirealists about science deny one or more of these claims. A sizable minority of philosophers of science prefers not to take sides: they believe the realism debate to be fundamentally mistaken and seek to abstain from it altogether. In analogy with other (...)
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  28. Valeriano Iranzo (2000). Manipulabilidad Y Entidades Inobservables (Manipulability and Unobservable Entities). Theoria 15 (1):131-153.
    Una estrategia recientemente utilizada por los defensores deI realismo científico ha sido derivar implicaciones ontológicas deI contexto manipulativo-experimental. EI artículo pretende comparar y valorar dos enfoques diferentes deI argumento de la manipulabilidad -I. Hacking y R. Harré-, cuya idea basíca es que, de cara a establecer la existencia de una entidad, manipularla puede ser tan importante corno observarla. Por último, a fin de evitar los aspectos más cuestionables de ambos enfoques, propongo entender la eficacia manipulativa corno obtención de informacion fiable. (...)
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  29. Theodore Arabatzis (1995). The Electron: A Biographical Sketch of a Theoretical Entity. Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation reconstructs some aspects of the historical development of the concept of the electron from 1891, when the term "electron" was introduced, to 1925, when the notion of spin was put forward, in the light of the relevant historiographical and philosophical problems. The central historiographical tool employed is Karl Popper's notion of a problem situation. Furthermore, some of the historical episodes are reconstructed in terms of a "biographical" approach to theoretical entities that portrays them as active agents that (...)
     
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  30. Wilfrid Sellars (1965). Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism: A Critique of Nagel and Feyerabend on Theoretical Explanation. In Robert Cohen Max Wartofsky (ed.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II,.
    Sellars argues against Nagelian instrumentalism for his version (not Feyerabend's) of scientific realism.
     
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  31. Anthony A. Derksen (1994). Harré and His Version of Scientific Realism. In A. A. Derksen (ed.), The Scientific Realism of Rom Harré. Tilburg University Press
     
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  32. Stathis Psillos, Cartwright's Realist Toil: From Entities to Capacities.
    In this paper I develop five worries concerning Cartwright’s realism about entities and capacities. The first is that while she was right to insist on the ontic commitment that flows from causal explanation, she was wrong to tie these commitments solely to the entities that do the causal explaining. This move obscured the nature of causal explanation and its connection to laws. The second worry is that when she turned her attention to causal inference, by insisting on the motto of (...)
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  33.  7
    Ann-Sophie Barwich (2014). Fiction in Science? Exploring the Reality of Theoretical Entities. In Javier Cumpa, Greg Jesson & Guido Bonino (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. De Gruyter 291-310.
    This paper revisits the concept of fiction employed in recent debates about the reality of theoretical entities in the philosophy of science. From an anti-realist perspective the dependence of evidence for some scientific entities on mediated forms of observation and modelling strategies reflects a degree of construction that is argued to closely resemble fiction. As a realist’s response to this debate, this paper provides an analysis of fictional entities in comparison to real ones. I argue that the distinction (...)
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  34. Piotr Giza (2002). Automated Discovery Systems and Scientific Realism. Minds and Machines 12 (1):105-117.
    In the paper I explore the relations between a relatively new and quickly expanding branch of artificial intelligence –- the automated discovery systems –- and some new views advanced in the old debate over scientific realism. I focus my attention on one such system, GELL-MANN, designed in 1990 at Wichita State University. The program's task was to analyze elementary particle data available in 1964 and formulate an hypothesis (or hypotheses) about a `hidden', more simple structure of matter, or to (...)
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  35. Mark Colyvan, Scientific Realism and Mathematical Nominalism: A Marriage Made in Hell.
    The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument is the argument for treating mathematical entities on a par with other theoretical entities of our best scientific theories. This argument is usually taken to be an argument for mathematical realism. In this chapter I will argue that the proper way to understand this argument is as putting pressure on the viability of the marriage of scientific realism and mathematical nominalism. Although such a marriage is a popular option amongst philosophers of science and (...)
     
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  36. Steve Clarke (2001). Defensible Territory for Entity Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):701-722.
    In the face of argument to the contrary, it is shown that there is defensible middle ground available for entity realism, between the extremes of scientific realism and empiricist antirealism. Cartwright's ([1983]) earlier argument for defensible middle ground between these extremes, which depended crucially on the viability of an underdeveloped distinction between inference to the best explanation (IBE) and inference to the most probable cause (IPC), is examined and its defects are identified. The relationship between IBE and IPC (...)
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  37. William J. Mckinney (1991). Experimenting on and Experimenting With: Polywater and Experimental Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):295-307.
    With the careful use of the polywater episode in the history of chemistry as a case study, I will show that the distinction recently made in the philosophy of science between experimenting on an entity and manipulating that entity is best seen as a distinction between experimenting on, and experimenting with, that entity. The polywater case also reveals that Ian Hacking's 1983 manipulability criterion is not a necessary condition for realism, and that scientists can, and do, justifiably (...)
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  38. Mark Sprevak (forthcoming). Realism and Instrumentalism. In H. Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications
    The choice between realism and instrumentalism is at the core of concerns about how our scientific models relate to reality: Do our models aim to be literally true descriptions of reality, or is their role only as useful instruments for generating predictions? Realism about X, roughly speaking, is the claim that X exists and has its nature independent of our interests, attitudes, and beliefs. An instrumentalist about X denies this. She claims that talk of X should be understood as (...)
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  39. Jutta Rockmann (1998). Gravitational Lensing and Hacking's Extragalactic Irreality. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (2):151 – 164.
    In Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing Hacking resumes the discussion of scientific realism from the last chapter of Representing and Intervening. Since the criterion of manipulability cannot be applied to astronomical objects, experimental entity realism seems to be restricted to terrestrial entities. In fact, Hacking explicitly argues against astronomical realism. The case at issue is the existence of gravitational lenses. In this paper, I question Hacking 's chief witness for astronomical antirealism: the gravitational lens system “0957+ (...)
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  40. Stathis Psillos (2005). Scientific Realism and Metaphysics. Ratio 18 (4):385–404.
    When we think of scientific realism, there seem to be to ways to conceive of what it is about. The first is to see it as a view about scientific theories; the second is to see it as a view about the world. Some philosophers, most typically from Australia, think that the second way is the correct way. Scientific realism, they argue, is a metaphysical thesis: it asserts the reality of some types of entity, most typically, (...)
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  41. Edward MacKinnon (1979). Scientific Realism: The New Debates. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):501-532.
    In place of earlier instrumentalist and phenomenalist interpretations of science both Quine and Sellars have developed highly influential realist positions centering around the doctrine that accepting a theory as explanatory and irreducible rationally entails accepting the entities posited by the theory. A growing reaction against this realism is partially based on perceived inadequacies in the doctrines of Quine and Sellars, but even more on reconstructions of scientific explanations which do not involve such ontic commitments. Three types of anti-realistic positions (...)
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  42.  27
    William W. Rozeboom (1960). Studies in the Empiricist Theory of Scientific Meaning. Philosophy of Science 27 (4):359-373.
    Part I is concerned with the tenet of modern Emperical Realism that while the theoretical concepts employed in science obtain their meanings entirely from the connections their usage establishes with the data language, the referents of such terms may be "unobservables," that is, entities which cannot be discussed within the data language alone. Such a view avoids both the restrictive excesses of logical positivism and the epistemic laxity of transcendentalism; however, it also necessitates a break with classical semantics, for (...)
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  43.  11
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (2002). Kotarbiński as a Scientific Realist. Erkenntnis 56 (1):63-82.
    Tadeusz Kotarbiski is widely recognized as a major philosopher of theLvov–Warsaw school. His reism, which is a contribution to semantics andontology, is still discussed and debated, and his most original creation, praxiology,has grown into an entire research field. However, Kotarbiski's philosophy ofscience has not received much attention by later commentators. This paper attemptsto correct this situation by considering the hypothesis that Kotarbiski succeededalready in 1929 in formulating a position that can be regarded as an early version ofscientific realism. Unlike most (...)
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  44.  1
    Matthias Neuber (2014). Is Logical Empiricism Compatible with Scientific Realism? In Maria Carla Galavotti, Elisabeth Nemeth & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Springer 249-262.
    Scientific realism is the view that the theoretical entities of science exist. Atoms, forces, electromagnetic fields, and so on, are not merely instruments for organizing observational data but are real and causally effective. This view seems to be hardly compatible with the logical empiricist agenda: As common wisdom has it, logical empiricism is mainly characterized by a strong verification criterion of meaning, i.e., by the project of defining the meaning of theoretical terms by virtue of the meaning (...)
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  45.  10
    Kathleen L. Slaney (2001). On Empirical Realism and the Defining of Theoretical Terms. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):132-152.
    The so-called "problem of theoretical terms" rests on the notion that the signifiers of theoretical concepts cannot be completely defined for the reason that their referents are beyond the boundaries of human perception and/or cognition. Empirical realism is a scientific tradition that was born, in part, out of a dissatisfaction with the positivist treatment of theoretical terms. Empirical realists generally conceive of theoretical terms as playing an essential role in scientific activity, giving it its (...)
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  46. Richard Reiner & Robert Pierson (1995). Hacking's Experimental Realism: An Untenable Middle Ground. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):60-69.
    As Laudan and Fine show, and Boyd concedes, the attempt to infer the truth of scientific realism from the fact that it putatively provides the best explanation of the instrumental success of science is circular, since what is to be shown is precisely the legitimacy of such abductive inferences. Hacking's "experimental argument for scientific realism about entities" is one of the few arguments for scientific realism that purports to avoid this circularity. We argue that Hacking's argument is (...)
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  47.  75
    Alan G. Gross (1990). Reinventing Certainty: The Significance of Ian Hacking's Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:421 - 431.
    This paper examines Ian Hacking's arguments in favor of entity realism. It shows that his examples from science do not support his realism. Furthermore, his proposed criterion of experimental use is neither sufficient nor necessary for conferring a privileged status on his preferred unobservables. Nonetheless his insight is genuine; it may be most profitably seen as part of a more general effort to create a space for a new form of scientific and philosophical certainty, one that does not (...)
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  48. A. A. Derksen (ed.) (1994). The Scientific Realism of Rom Harré. Tilburg University Press.
  49. Anthony A. Derksen & C. A. Hooker (1996). The Scientific Realism of Rom Harre. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):647-653.
     
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  50.  33
    Howard Sankey (1997). The Semantic Stance of Scientific Entity Realism. Philosophia 25 (1 - 4):481-482.
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