Search results for 'triviality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.score: 24.0
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...)
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  2. Attila Tanyi (2006). Naturalism and Triviality. Philosophical Writings 32 (Summer):12-31.score: 24.0
    The paper examines Derek Parfit’s claim that naturalism trivializes the agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. In the first section, I present Parfit’s charge in detail. After this I discuss three possible responses to the objection. I show that the first two responses either fail or are inconclusive. Trying to avoid Parfit’s charge by endorsing irreductionist naturalism is not a solution because this form of naturalism is metaphysically untenable. Non- descriptive naturalism, on the other hand, (...)
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  3. Alan Hájek (2011). Triviality Pursuit. Topoi 30 (1):3-15.score: 24.0
    The thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities has putatively been refuted many times by so-called ‘triviality results’, although it has also enjoyed a number of resurrections. In this paper I assault it yet again with a new such result. I begin by motivating the thesis and discussing some of the philosophical ramifications of its fluctuating fortunes. I will canvas various reasons, old and new, why the thesis seems plausible, and why we should care about its fate. I (...)
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  4. Graham Priest (1999). Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):549--558.score: 22.0
    It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the nontriviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator.
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  5. Justin Khoo (2013). Conditionals, Indeterminacy, and Triviality. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):260-287.score: 21.0
  6. Jerzy Gołosz (2013). Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem. Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (1):45-61.score: 21.0
    It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the (...)
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  7. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009). Triviality Arguments Against Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.score: 18.0
    Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
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  8. Hannes Leitgeb (2010). On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.score: 18.0
    We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and which are subject (...)
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  9. Charles Pigden (2010). On the Triviality of Hume's Law: A Reply to Gerhard Schurz. In , Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan. 217-238.score: 18.0
    I argue that No-Ought-From-Is (in the sense that I believe it) is a relatively trivial affair. Of course, when people try to derive substantive or non-vacuous moral conclusions from non-moral premises, they are making a mistake. But No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is is meta-ethically inert. It tells us nothing about the nature of the moral concepts. It neither refutes naturalism nor supports non-cognitivism. And this is not very surprising since it is merely an instance of an updated version of the conservativeness of logic (in (...)
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  10. Charles G. Morgan (1999). Conditionals, Comparative Probability, and Triviality: The Conditional of Conditional Probability Cannot Be Represented in the Object Language. Topoi 18 (2):97-116.score: 18.0
    In this paper we examine the thesis that the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability. Previous work by a number of authors has shown that in standard numerical probability theories, the addition of the thesis leads to triviality. We introduce very weak, comparative conditional probability structures and discuss some extremely simple constraints. We show that even in such a minimal context, if one adds the thesis that the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability, then one (...)
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  11. Peter Gärdenfors (1987). Variations on the Ramsey Test: More Triviality Results. Studia Logica 46 (4):319-325.score: 18.0
    The purpose of this note is to formulate some weaker versions of the so called Ramsey test that do not entail the following unacceptable consequenceIf A and C are already accepted in K, then if A, then C is also accepted in K. and to show that these versions still lead to the same triviality result when combined with a preservation criterion.
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  12. Johanna N. Y. Franklin (2008). Hyperimmune-Free Degrees and Schnorr Triviality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 73 (3):999-1008.score: 18.0
    We investigate the relationship between lowness for Schnorr randomness and Schnorr triviality. We show that a real is low for Schnorr randomness if and only if it is Schnorr trivial and hyperimmune free.
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  13. Stefano Franchi, Palomar, the Triviality of Modernity and the Doctrine of the Void.score: 18.0
    This is a preprint version, please do not quote without authorization. The final version has appeared as Stefano Franchi, "Palomar, the Triviality of Modernity, and the Doctrine of the Void,“ New Literary History, 28 (1997), 4, 757-778. See: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_literary_history/toc/nlh28.4.html..
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  14. Johanna N. Y. Franklin (2010). Schnorr Triviality and Genericity. Journal of Symbolic Logic 75 (1):191-207.score: 18.0
    We study the connection between Schnorr triviality and genericity. We show that while no 2-generic is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial and no 1-generic is tt-equivalent to a Schnorr trivial, there is a 1-generic that is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial. However, every such 1-generic must be high. As a corollary, we prove that not all K-trivials are Schnorr trivial. We also use these techniques to extend a previous result and show that the bases of cones of (...)
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  15. Arief Daynes (2000). A Strictly Finitary Non-Triviality Proof for a Paraconsistent System of Set Theory Deductively Equivalent to Classical ZFC Minus Foundation. Archive for Mathematical Logic 39 (8):581-598.score: 18.0
    The paraconsistent system CPQ-ZFC/F is defined. It is shown using strong non-finitary methods that the theorems of CPQ-ZFC/F are exactly the theorems of classical ZFC minus foundation. The proof presented in the paper uses the assumption that a strongly inaccessible cardinal exists. It is then shown using strictly finitary methods that CPQ-ZFC/F is non-trivial. CPQ-ZFC/F thus provides a formulation of set theory that has the same deductive power as the corresponding classical system but is more reliable in that non-triviality (...)
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  16. Frank O. Wagner (1998). CM-Triviality and Stable Groups. Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (4):1473-1495.score: 18.0
    We define a generalized version of CM-triviality, and show that in the presence of enough regular types, or solubility, a stable CM-trivial group is nilpotent-by-finite. A torsion-free small CM-trivial stable group is abelian and connected. The first result makes use of a generalized version of the analysis of bad groups.
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  17. Ross P. Cameron (2010). Necessity and Triviality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.score: 16.0
    In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially (...)
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  18. Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares (1995). Conditionals, Probability, and Non-Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.score: 16.0
    We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to (...)
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  19. Ikuo Yoneda (2003). CM-Triviality and Generic Structures. Archive for Mathematical Logic 42 (5):423-433.score: 16.0
    We show that any relational generic structure whose theory has finite closure and amalgamation over closed sets is stable CM-trivial with weak elimination of imaginaries.
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  20. Jerome Stolnitz (1992). On the Cognitive Triviality of Art. British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (3):191-200.score: 15.0
  21. John Gibson (2003). Between Truth and Triviality. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3):224-237.score: 15.0
    A viable theory of literary humanism must do justice to the idea that literature offers cognitive rewards to the careful reader. There are, however, powerful arguments to the effect that literature is at best only capable of offering idle visions of a world already well known. In this essay I argue that there is a form of cognitive awareness left unmentioned in the traditional vocabulary of knowledge acquisition, a form of awareness literature is particularly capable of offering. Thus even if (...)
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  22. Robert Jubb (2009). Logical and Epistemic Foundationalism About Grounding: The Triviality of Facts and Principles. Res Publica 15 (4):337-353.score: 15.0
    In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. <span class='Hi'>Cohen</span>’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that <span class='Hi'>Cohen</span> has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue that (...)
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  23. J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.score: 15.0
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
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  24. Peter Singer (1973). The Triviality of the Debate Over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral". American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):51 - 56.score: 15.0
    "THE central problem in moral philosophy is commonly known as the is-ought problem." So runs the opening sentence of the introduction to a recent volume of readings on this issue. [1] Taken as a statement about the preoccupations of moral philosophers of the present century, we can accept this assertion. The problem of how statements of fact are related to moral judgments has dominated recent moral philosophy. Associated with this problem is another, which has also been given considerable attention - (...)
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  25. Jerome Stolnitz (1991). On the Historical Triviality of Art. British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (3):195-202.score: 15.0
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  26. Marie Duží (2010). The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.score: 15.0
    The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel's paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, (...)
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  27. J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.score: 15.0
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
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  28. Anthony Appiah (1986). The Importance of Triviality. Philosophical Review 95 (2):209-231.score: 15.0
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  29. Peter Ludlow (2004). Presentism, Triviality, and the Varieties of Tensism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:21-36.score: 15.0
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  30. Peter Milne (2003). The Simplest Lewis-Style Triviality Proof Yet? Analysis 63 (4):300–303.score: 15.0
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  31. Richard Bradley (1999). More Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.score: 15.0
    This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.
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  32. Thomas Crisp (2004). On Presentism and Triviality. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.score: 15.0
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  33. Peter Milne (1997). Quick Triviality Proofs for Probabilities of Conditionals. Analysis 57 (1):75–80.score: 15.0
  34. Sophia Vasalou (2007). Subject and Body in Baran Mu'tazilism, Or: Mu'tazilite Kalām and the Fear of Triviality. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 17 (2):267-298.score: 15.0
    In this paper, my aim is to offer some comments on the study of Mum, framed around the study of a particular episode in the Mumn a question with a deceptively Aristotelian cadence that is not too difficult to dispel. Within this episode, my focus is on one of the major arguments used by the late Ba Hs ontological innovations), and on the relationship between the mental and the physical (or the subjective and objective) which emerges from it. The most (...)
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  35. Susan Rogerson & Greg Restall (2004). Routes to Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):421-436.score: 15.0
    It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension - the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.
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  36. Lionel Kenner (1965). The Triviality of the Red-Green Problem. Analysis 25 (March):147-153.score: 15.0
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  37. J. Robert & G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.score: 15.0
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
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  38. Patricia Hanna (1984). Translation, Indeterminacy and Triviality. Philosophia 14 (3-4):341-348.score: 15.0
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  39. Willie van Peer (1995). The Historical Non-Triviality of Art: A Rejoinder to Jerome Stolnitz. British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (2):168-172.score: 15.0
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  40. No Problem far Actualism (1986). A State of Belief K If and Only If the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A Also Requires Accepting C. The Preservation Criterion Says That If a Prop-Osition B is Accepted in a Given State of Belief K and A is Consistent with the Beliefs in K, Then B is Still Accepted in the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A. It is Proved That, on Pain of Triviality, the Ramsey Test And. Philosophy 61 (235).score: 15.0
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  41. Anand Pillay (2000). A Note on CM-Triviality and the Geometry of Forking. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):474-480.score: 15.0
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  42. Richard Bosley & John Malcolm (1965). Some Comments on a Study in Triviality. Dialogue 4 (01):88-91.score: 15.0
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  43. Johanna N. Y. Franklin (forthcoming). Hyperimmune-Free Degrees and Schnorr Triviality. Journal of Symbolic Logic.score: 15.0
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  44. Tetsuji Iseda (2005). Near Triviality of Conclusive Reasons. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-20.score: 15.0
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  45. Sophie Allen (2009). The Definition of Consciousness: Is Triviality or Falsehood Inevitable? Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):127-138.score: 15.0
  46. Julia Annas (1982). Plato on the Triviality of Literature. In J. M. E. Moravcsik & Philip Temko (eds.), Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts. Rowman and Littlefield.score: 15.0
     
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  47. Andreas Baudisch (2002). Mekler's Construction Preserves -Triviality. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 115 (1-3):115-173.score: 15.0
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  48. Peter Binns (1974). The Triviality of Althusser'. Radical Philosophy 7:30-3.score: 15.0
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  49. Ross T. Brady (1989). The Non-Triviality of Dialectical Set Theory. In G. Priest, R. Routley & J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag. 437--470.score: 15.0
     
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  50. B. Hart, A. Pillay & S. Starchenko (1993). Triviality, NDOP and Stable Varieties. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 62 (2):119-146.score: 15.0
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