Search results for 'truth-value gaps' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.score: 720.0
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language (...)
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  2. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1992). Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150.score: 720.0
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What (...)
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  3. Xinli Wang (2002). Taxonomy, Truth-Value Gaps and Incommensurability: A Reconstruction of Kuhn's Taxonomic Interpretation of Incommensurability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):465-485.score: 672.0
    Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its own context, lack truth values when (...)
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  4. Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156.score: 656.0
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
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  5. Patrick Greenough (2010). Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 540.0
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are all (...)
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  6. Richard Holton (2000). Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):135-165.score: 470.0
    The question is asked whether one can consistently both be a minimalist about truth, and hold that some meaningful assertoric sentences fail to be either true or false. It is shown that one can, but the issues are delicate, and the price is high: one must either refrain from saying that the sentences lack truth values, or else one must invoke a novel non-contraposing three-valued conditional. Finally it is shown that this does not help in reconciling minimalism with emotivism, where (...)
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  7. Fred Johnson (1999). Rejection and Truth-Value Gaps. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):574-577.score: 453.0
    A theorem due to Shoesmith and Smiley that axiomatizes two-valued multiple-conclusion logics is extended to partial logics.
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  8. Bas C. van Fraassen (1966). Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic. Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.score: 450.0
  9. Richmond H. Thomason (1970). Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps. Theoria 36 (3):264-281.score: 450.0
  10. Michael Glanzberg (2003). Against Truth-Value Gaps. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press. 151--94.score: 450.0
    ∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...)
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  11. Ian Rumfitt (1997). The Categoricity Problem and Truth-Value Gaps. Analysis 57 (4):223–236.score: 450.0
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  12. Fred Sommers (1965). Truth Value Gaps: A Reply to Mr. Odegard. Analysis 25 (3):66 - 68.score: 450.0
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  13. Roop Rekha Verma (1978). Denial, Contradiction and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophia 8 (2-3):383-388.score: 450.0
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  14. John McDowell (1982). Truth-Value Gaps. In L. J. Cohen (ed.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI: Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. North Holland Publishing Co.score: 450.0
     
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  15. Holton Richard (2000). Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Studies 97 (2).score: 450.0
  16. Joseph Margolis (1971). Proper Names, Truth-Value Gaps, and Paraphrastic Programs. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):197 - 200.score: 450.0
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  17. Mark Richard (2010). Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.score: 450.0
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  18. Peter W. Woodruff (1970). Logic and Truth Value Gaps. In. In Karel Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Problems in Logic. Dordrecht,Reidel. 121--142.score: 450.0
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  19. Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini (2014). Supervaluationism: Truth, Value and Degree Functionality. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):136-144.score: 399.0
    This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
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  20. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.score: 315.0
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  21. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1989). Are All Tautologies True? Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.score: 270.0
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  22. Douglas Odegard (1964). On Closing the Truth-Value Gap. Analysis 25 (1):10 - 12.score: 243.3
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  23. Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (2002). What Difference Does It Make: Three Truth-Values or Two Plus Gaps? [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 56 (1):83-98.score: 225.0
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  24. Anders J. Schoubye (2009). Descriptions, Truth Value Intuitions, and Questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (6):583-617.score: 224.0
    Since the famous debate between Russell (Mind 14: 479–493, 1905, Mind 66: 385–389, 1957) and Strawson (Mind 59: 320–344, 1950; Introduction to logical theory, 1952; Theoria, 30: 96–118, 1964) linguistic intuitions about truth values have been considered notoriously unreliable as a guide to the semantics of definite descriptions. As a result, most existing semantic analyses of definites leave a large number of intuitions unexplained. In this paper, I explore the nature of the relationship between truth value intuitions and non-referring definites. (...)
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  25. F. Parlamento (2014). Truth-Value Semantics and Functional Extensions for Classical Logic of Partial Terms Based on Equality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (3):383-395.score: 224.0
    We develop a bottom-up approach to truth-value semantics for classical logic of partial terms based on equality and apply it to prove the conservativity of the addition of partial description and selection functions, independently of any strictness assumption.
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  26. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 221.0
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate—a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is (...)
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  27. Roy T. Cook (2009). What is a Truth Value and How Many Are There? Studia Logica 92 (2):183 - 201.score: 209.3
    Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes (...)
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  28. Lynch Michael (2009). The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.score: 198.0
    There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
     
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  29. Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.score: 196.0
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  30. Raphael Woolf (2009). Truth as a Value in Plato's Republic. Phronesis 54 (1):9-39.score: 192.0
    To what extent is possession of truth considered a good thing in the Republic ? Certain passages of the dialogue appear to regard truth as a universal good, but others are more circumspect about its value, recommending that truth be withheld on occasion and falsehood disseminated. I seek to resolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of truths, which I label 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical'. Philosophical truths, I argue, are considered unqualifiedly good to possess, whereas non-philosophical truths are regarded as (...)
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  31. Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing (2006). Hyper-Contradictions, Generalized Truth Values and Logics of Truth and Falsehood. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):403-424.score: 190.0
    In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets (...)
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  32. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). A Fregean Principle. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.score: 180.0
    Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds.
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  33. Xinli Wang(王新力) (2002). 语义预设概念空泛无物吗?(Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty?). In Contemporary Inquiries Into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy. the Commercial Press, China.score: 180.0
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  34. Gottfried Gabriel (1984). Fregean Connection: Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):372-376.score: 168.0
    It is shown how frege's problematic connection between truth-Value and "bedeutung" (of a sentence) becomes more plausible when set against the background of german language and philosophy, Especially by comparing frege's position with the value-Theoretical school of neo-Kantianism (w windelband).
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  35. Ervin Laszlo (2005). Religion Versus Science: The Conflict in Reference to Truth Value, Not Cash Value. Zygon 40 (1):57-61.score: 168.0
    The rift between science and religion needs to be assessed not merely on pragmatic grounds, on the basis of the effect of scientific versus religious beliefs on people's behavior, as John Caiazza's essay does, but also and above all in regard to the cogency of the respective beliefs in reference to what we can reasonably assume is the true face of reality. About such truth value, the conflict is not irremediable; there are elements of belief regarding the nature of reality (...)
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  36. H. Hunt (2006). The Truth Value of Mystical Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):5-43.score: 168.0
    Can mystics intuit something of what modern physicists calculate? And if so, how? The question of the relation between the classical mysticisms and modern science is approached in Part I in terms of the multiple forms and definitions of 'truth value'. Intuition/epiphany, pragmatism, coherence, and correspondence are considered as forms of truth that have also been proposed for unitive mystical experience. Since 'correspondence' or 'representation' has been the definition at the core of modern science, it in particular is approached by (...)
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  37. Bernhard Weiss (1996). Anti-Realism, Truth-Value Links and Tensed Truth Predicates. Mind 105 (420):577-602.score: 168.0
    Antirealism about the past is apparently in conflict with our acceptance of a set of systematic linkages between the truth-values of differently tensed sentences made at different times. Arguments based on acceptance of these so-called truth-value links seem to show that fully accounting for our use of the past and future tenses will involve use of a notion of truth which is not epistemically constrained and is thus antirealistically unacceptable. I elaborate these difficulties through an examination of work by (...)
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  38. Gabriel Nuchelmans (1994). Can a Mental Proposition Change its Truth‐Value? Some 17th-Century Views. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):69-84.score: 168.0
    In the first half of the 17th century the Aristotelian view that the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change its truth-value.In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative answer and (...)
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  39. Marcia Eaton (1972). The Truth Value of Literary Statements. British Journal of Aesthetics 12 (2):163-174.score: 168.0
    After summarizing approaches taken previously to the problem of the determination of truth-Value of statements constituting literary works (ryle, Russell, Quine, Strawson, Davidson, Et. Al.) the author argues for a treatment of the problem based upon the linguistic status of such statements as translocutions and their relation to the context in which they occur.
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  40. Gautam Sengupta (1983). On Identifying Reference with Truth-Value. Analysis 43 (2):72 - 74.score: 168.0
    The purpose of the paper is to refute the fregean assumption that declarative sentences refer to truth-Values. A consequence of the assumption is that the truth-Value of a declarative sentence containing another as part remains unchanged when the part is replaced by another sentence having the same truth-Value, Provided that the part as part has only customary reference and expresses a complete thought. The refutation proceeds by demonstrating this consequence to be false.
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  41. Hugues Leblanc (1961). Probabilities as Truth-Value Estimates. Philosophy of Science 28 (4):414-417.score: 168.0
    The author recently claimed that Pr(P, Q), where Pr is a probability function and P and Q are two sentences of a formalized language L, qualifies as an estimate--made in the light of Q--of the truth-value of P in L. To substantiate his claim, the author establishes here that the two strategies lying at the opposite extremes of the spectrum of truth-value estimating strategies meet the first five of the six requirements (R1-R6) currently placed upon probability functions and (...)
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  42. Andrzej Pietruszczak (2006). On Applications of Truth-Value Connectives for Testing Arguments with Natural Connectives. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):143-156.score: 168.0
    In introductory logic courses the authors often limit their considerations to the truth-value operators. Then they write that conditionals and biconditionals of natural language ("if" and "if and only if") may be represented as material implications and equivalences ("⊃" and "≡"), respectively. Yet material implications are not suitable for conditionals. Lewis' strict implications are much better for this purpose. Similarly, strict equivalences are better for representing biconditionals (than material equivalences). In this paper we prove that the methods from standard (...)
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  43. Ioanna Patsioti-Tsacpounidis (2008). The Truth-Value of the Aristotelian 'Areti'. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 2:165-172.score: 168.0
    This paper examines the concept of ‘areti’ as encountered in the Aristotelian ethical system in order to establish its relationship to the modern concept of virtue as well as to that of moral truth, that is, to identify its truth-value. I intend to show that the Aristotelian ‘areti’ as a developed state of character and as an advanced stage of ethical understanding entails moral truth. ‘Areti’ as a good-in-itself possesses an intrinsic value which reflects moral truth, and as a (...)
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  44. Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridans Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.score: 153.0
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in rebus (...)
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  45. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1992). Redundant Truth. Ratio 5 (1):24-37.score: 153.0
    A strong and weak version of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. The weak version is defended against this argument. The strong version, however, is vitiated by truth-value gaps.
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  46. Daniele Mundici (1995). Averaging the Truth-Value in Łukasiewicz Logic. Studia Logica 55 (1):113 - 127.score: 152.0
    Chang's MV algebras are the algebras of the infinite-valued sentential calculus of ukasiewicz. We introduce finitely additive measures (called states) on MV algebras with the intent of capturing the notion of average degree of truth of a proposition. Since Boolean algebras coincide with idempotent MV algebras, states yield a generalization of finitely additive measures. Since MV algebras stand to Boolean algebras as AFC*-algebras stand to commutative AFC*-algebras, states are naturally related to noncommutativeC*-algebraic measures.
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  47. Berit Brogaard (2008). The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at three possible ways to refute it. (...)
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  48. David Wiggins (1998). Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford University Press.score: 148.0
    Needs, Values, Truth brings together of some of the most important and influential writings by a leading contemporary philosopher, drawn from twenty-five years of his work in the broad area of the philosophy of value. The author ranges between problems of ethics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of logic and language, looking at questions relating to meaning, truth and objectivity in judgements of value. For this third edition he has added a new essay on incommensurability, in addition to making (...)
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  49. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2009). Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.score: 146.0
    A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief: the kind arising from vagueness, and the familiar kind arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability? I argue that we cannot coherently countenance two different kinds of degree of belief. Instead, I present a framework in which there is a single notion of degree (...)
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