Search results for 'truth-value gaps' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  6
    Manuel Križ & Emmanuel Chemla (2015). Two Methods to Find Truth-Value Gaps and Their Application to the Projection Problem of Homogeneity. Natural Language Semantics 23 (3):205-248.
    Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest (...)
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  2.  84
    Ian Rumfitt (1997). The Categoricity Problem and Truth-Value Gaps. Analysis 57 (4):223–236.
    In his article 'Rejection' (1996), Timothy Smiley had shown how a logical system allowing rules of rejection could provide a categorical axiomatization of the classical propositional calculus. This paper shows how rules of rejection, when placed in a multiple conclusion setting, can also provide categorical axiomatizations of a range of non-classical calculi which permit truth-value gaps, among them the calculus in Smiley's own 'Sense without denotation' (1960).
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  3.  71
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language (...)
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  4.  22
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1992). Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150.
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What (...)
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  5. Xinli Wang (2002). Taxonomy, Truth-Value Gaps and Incommensurability: A Reconstruction of Kuhn's Taxonomic Interpretation of Incommensurability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):465-485.
    Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its own context, lack truth values when (...)
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  6.  38
    Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156.
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
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  7.  33
    Xinli Wang (1998). Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation). Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  8. Patrick Greenough (2010). Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave Macmillan
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are all (...)
     
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  9.  17
    Teresa Marques (2004). Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps. Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot (...)
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  10.  35
    James R. Shaw (2014). What is a Truth-Value Gap? Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (6):503-534.
    Truth-value gaps have received little attention from a foundational perspective, a fact which has rightfully opened up gap theories to charges of vacuousness. This paper develops an account of the foundations of gap-like behavior which has some hope of avoiding such charges. I begin by reviewing and sharpening a powerful argument of Dummett’s to constrain the options that gap theorists have to make sense of their views. I then show that within these strictures, we can give an account (...)
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  11.  75
    Richmond H. Thomason (1970). Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps. Theoria 36 (3):264-281.
  12.  4
    James R. Shaw (2016). Magidor on Anomaly and Truth-Value Gaps. Inquiry 59 (5):513-528.
    In Category Mistakes, Ofra Magidor provides two arguments against the view that category mistakes express propositions that are not truth-evaluable at some world. I argue that her first, Williamsonian argument against this view begs the question, and that her second argument rests on a misleading conception of how semantic defect results in infelicity judgments. I conclude by conceding that she is still correct to stress that the view she opposes face noteworthy foundational and empirical challenges.
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  13. Bas C. van Fraassen (1966). Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic. Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
  14. Richard Holton (2000). Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):135-165.
    The question is asked whether one can consistently both be a minimalist about truth, and hold that some meaningful assertoric sentences fail to be either true or false. It is shown that one can, but the issues are delicate, and the price is high: one must either refrain from saying that the sentences lack truth values, or else one must invoke a novel non-contraposing three-valued conditional. Finally it is shown that this does not help in reconciling minimalism with emotivism, where (...)
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  15.  56
    Michael Glanzberg (2003). Against Truth-Value Gaps. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press 151--94.
    ∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...)
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  16.  63
    Fred Sommers (1965). Truth Value Gaps: A Reply to Mr. Odegard. Analysis 25 (3):66 - 68.
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  17.  5
    I. Rumfitt (1997). The Categoricity Problem and Truth-Value Gaps. Analysis 57 (4):223-235.
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  18.  61
    Fred Johnson (1999). Rejection and Truth-Value Gaps. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):574-577.
    A theorem due to Shoesmith and Smiley that axiomatizes two-valued multiple-conclusion logics is extended to partial logics.
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  19. John McDowell (1982). Truth-Value Gaps. In L. J. Cohen (ed.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI: Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. North Holland Publishing Co
     
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  20.  10
    Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148 - 156.
  21.  5
    Peter W. Woodruff (1970). Logic and Truth Value Gaps. In Karel Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Problems in Logic. Dordrecht,Reidel 121--142.
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  22.  4
    Joseph Margolis (1971). Proper Names, Truth-Value Gaps, and Paraphrastic Programs. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):197 - 200.
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  23.  9
    Roop Rekha Verma (1978). Denial, Contradiction and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophia 8 (2-3):383-388.
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  24.  2
    Holton Richard (2000). Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Studies 97 (2).
  25. Tyler Burge (1981). Karttunen Lauri and Peters Stanley. Conventional Implicature. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Oh Choon-Kyu and Dinneen David A., Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 1–56.Gazdar Gerald. A Solution to the Projection Problem. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Oh Choon-Kyu and Dinneen David A., Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 57–89.Fodor Janet Dean. In Defense of the Truth Value Gap. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Oh Choon-Kyu and Dinneen David A., Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 199–224.Kempson Ruth M.. Presupposition, Opacity, and Ambiguity. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Oh Choon-Kyu and Dinneen David A., Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 283–297.Thomason S. K.. Truth-Value Gaps, Many Truth Values, and Possible Worlds. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presuppositio. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (2):412-415.
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  26. Hans G. Herzberger (1980). Supervaluations Without Truth-Value Gaps. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6:15.
     
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  27. Hans G. Herzberger (1980). Supervaluations Without Truth-Value Gaps. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (sup1):15-27.
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  28. Mark Richard (2010). Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. OUP Oxford
     
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  29.  30
    Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini (2014). Supervaluationism: Truth, Value and Degree Functionality. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):136-144.
    This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
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  30.  35
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  31. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1989). Are All Tautologies True? Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  32.  35
    Elia Zardini (2015). The Opacity of Truth. Topoi 34 (1):37-54.
    The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions (...)
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  33.  73
    Anders J. Schoubye (2009). Descriptions, Truth Value Intuitions, and Questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (6):583-617.
    Since the famous debate between Russell (Mind 14: 479–493, 1905, Mind 66: 385–389, 1957) and Strawson (Mind 59: 320–344, 1950; Introduction to logical theory, 1952; Theoria, 30: 96–118, 1964) linguistic intuitions about truth values have been considered notoriously unreliable as a guide to the semantics of definite descriptions. As a result, most existing semantic analyses of definites leave a large number of intuitions unexplained. In this paper, I explore the nature of the relationship between truth value intuitions and non-referring definites. (...)
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  34.  31
    Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (2004). 语言分类系统、真值间隔和不可通约性 — 对库恩关于不可通约性的分类学解释之重建. World Philosophy 世界哲学 2004 (5).
    摘要:通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上,因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足,本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy)、真值语义理论 (a semantic theory of truth-value),以及跨语言交流的真值条件理论 (a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication) 之基础上,对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释进行了重建。根据这种重建,如果两个科学语言具有不相匹配的分类结构,则当一科学语言的核心语句在其所属语境中具有真值、而在另一科学语言之语境中考虑缺乏真值时,这两 种科学语言乃不可通约。通过这种重建,库恩对于不可通约性的成熟解释并非基于保真 (truth-preserving) 可译性或不可译性的概念,而是基于保留真值状态 (truth-value-preserving) 的跨语言交流概念之上。这种重建使得库恩有关不可通约性的解释更具坚实的理论基础、也在概念上更加完整。.
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  35.  1
    F. Parlamento (2014). Truth-Value Semantics and Functional Extensions for Classical Logic of Partial Terms Based on Equality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (3):383-395.
    We develop a bottom-up approach to truth-value semantics for classical logic of partial terms based on equality and apply it to prove the conservativity of the addition of partial description and selection functions, independently of any strictness assumption.
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  36. Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  37. Roy T. Cook (2009). What is a Truth Value and How Many Are There? Studia Logica 92 (2):183 - 201.
    Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes (...)
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  38. Lynch Michael (2009). The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press
    There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
     
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  39.  67
    Raphael Woolf (2009). Truth as a Value in Plato's Republic. Phronesis 54 (1):9-39.
    To what extent is possession of truth considered a good thing in the Republic? Certain passages of the dialogue appear to regard truth as a universal good, but others are more circumspect about its value, recommending that truth be withheld on occasion and falsehood disseminated. I seek to resolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of truths, which I label 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical'. Philosophical truths, I argue, are considered unqualifiedly good to possess, whereas non-philosophical truths are regarded as worth possessing (...)
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  40.  7
    Hans Rott (2006). The Value of Truth and the Value of Information : On Isaac Levi's Epistemology. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press 179.
    The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in his model of (...)
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  41.  24
    James R. Shaw (2015). Anomaly and Quantification. Noûs 49 (1):147-176.
    I argue for two theses about semantically anomalous utterances (more commonly called "category mistakes") like "sequestered slaps reel evergreen rights". First, semantic anomaly generates a unique form of semantically enforced quantifier domain restriction. Second, the best explanation for why anomaly interacts with quantifiers in this way is that anomalous utterances are truth-valueless. After arguing for these points, I trace out two consequences these theses have in semantics and logic. First, I argue they motivate a trivalent semantics on which truth-valueless material (...)
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  42.  14
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). A Fregean Principle. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.
    Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds.
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  43. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate—a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is (...)
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  44. Gottfried Gabriel (1984). Fregean Connection: Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):372-376.
    It is shown how frege's problematic connection between truth-Value and "bedeutung" (of a sentence) becomes more plausible when set against the background of german language and philosophy, Especially by comparing frege's position with the value-Theoretical school of neo-Kantianism (w windelband).
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  45. Ervin Laszlo (2005). Religion Versus Science: The Conflict in Reference to Truth Value, Not Cash Value. Zygon 40 (1):57-61.
    The rift between science and religion needs to be assessed not merely on pragmatic grounds, on the basis of the effect of scientific versus religious beliefs on people's behavior, as John Caiazza's essay does, but also and above all in regard to the cogency of the respective beliefs in reference to what we can reasonably assume is the true face of reality. About such truth value, the conflict is not irremediable; there are elements of belief regarding the nature of reality (...)
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  46.  71
    Gautam Sengupta (1983). On Identifying Reference with Truth-Value. Analysis 43 (2):72 - 74.
    The purpose of the paper is to refute the fregean assumption that declarative sentences refer to truth-Values. A consequence of the assumption is that the truth-Value of a declarative sentence containing another as part remains unchanged when the part is replaced by another sentence having the same truth-Value, Provided that the part as part has only customary reference and expresses a complete thought. The refutation proceeds by demonstrating this consequence to be false.
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  47. Bernhard Weiss (1996). Anti-Realism, Truth-Value Links and Tensed Truth Predicates. Mind 105 (420):577-602.
    Antirealism about the past is apparently in conflict with our acceptance of a set of systematic linkages between the truth-values of differently tensed sentences made at different times. Arguments based on acceptance of these so-called truth-value links seem to show that fully accounting for our use of the past and future tenses will involve use of a notion of truth which is not epistemically constrained and is thus antirealistically unacceptable. I elaborate these difficulties through an examination of work by (...)
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  48.  23
    H. Hunt (2006). The Truth Value of Mystical Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):5-43.
    Can mystics intuit something of what modern physicists calculate? And if so, how? The question of the relation between the classical mysticisms and modern science is approached in Part I in terms of the multiple forms and definitions of 'truth value'. Intuition/epiphany, pragmatism, coherence, and correspondence are considered as forms of truth that have also been proposed for unitive mystical experience. Since 'correspondence' or 'representation' has been the definition at the core of modern science, it in particular is approached by (...)
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  49.  62
    Marcia Eaton (1972). The Truth Value of Literary Statements. British Journal of Aesthetics 12 (2):163-174.
    After summarizing approaches taken previously to the problem of the determination of truth-Value of statements constituting literary works (ryle, Russell, Quine, Strawson, Davidson, Et. Al.) the author argues for a treatment of the problem based upon the linguistic status of such statements as translocutions and their relation to the context in which they occur.
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  50.  12
    Ioanna Patsioti-Tsacpounidis (2008). The Truth-Value of the Aristotelian 'Areti'. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 2:165-172.
    This paper examines the concept of ‘areti’ as encountered in the Aristotelian ethical system in order to establish its relationship to the modern concept of virtue as well as to that of moral truth, that is, to identify its truth-value. I intend to show that the Aristotelian ‘areti’ as a developed state of character and as an advanced stage of ethical understanding entails moral truth. ‘Areti’ as a good-in-itself possesses an intrinsic value which reflects moral truth, and as a (...)
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