Search results for 'truthmaker' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Truthmakers in Metaphysics
  1. Mark Jago (2012). The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma. Mind 121 (484):903-918.score: 18.0
    Amongst those who feel the pull of the truthmaker principle (that truths require for their truth a truthmaker to exist), there is disagreement as to whether it applies to all truths or merely to some distinguished subset. Those in the latter camp, the non-maximalists, argue that there are no ducks in my bath is true not because of something’s existence, but because of the lack of ducks in my bath. Maximalists, by contrast, insist that truths are made true (...)
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  2. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.score: 18.0
    On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint (...)
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  3. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended. Analysis 66 (3):260–264.score: 18.0
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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  4. Alexander Skiles (forthcoming). Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist? Synthese:1-11.score: 18.0
    Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers—that arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it (...)
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  5. Gustavo Picazo (forthcoming). Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory. Philosophia:1-27.score: 18.0
    The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and sentences, and (...)
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  6. Timothy Pawl (2013). Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-12.score: 15.0
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ahead of Print.
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  7. Julian Dodd (2007). Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles. Synthese 156 (2):383-401.score: 14.0
    This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither (...)
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  8. Mark Jago (2013). The Problem with Truthmaker‐Gap Epistemicism. Thought 1 (4):320-329.score: 14.0
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the (...)
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  9. Chad Vance (2014). Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem. Ratio 26 (4).score: 14.0
    Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is (...)
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  10. Barry Smith & Jonathan Simon (2007). Truthmaker Explanations. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. 18--79.score: 13.0
    This paper is a fresh attempt to articulate the role of a theory of truthmakers. We argue that truthmaker theory constitutes a cornerstone of good methodology in metaphysics, but that a conflation of truthmaker theory with the theory of truth has been responsible for certain excesses associated with truthmaker-based approaches in the recent literature. If truthmaker theory is not a component of a theory of truth, then truthmaker maximalism – the view that every truth has (...)
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  11. Ross P. Cameron (2010). From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism. Noûs 44 (1):178 - 198.score: 12.0
    I argue that the truthmaker theorist should be a priority monist if she wants to avoid commitment to mysterious necessary connections. In section 1 I briefly discuss the ontological options available to the truthmaker theorist. In section 2 I develop the argument against truthmaker theory from the Humean denial of necessary connections. In section 3 I offer an account of when necessary connections are objectionable. In section 4 I use this criterion to narrow down the options from (...)
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  12. Jonathan Schaffer (2010). The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.score: 12.0
    I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arisingfrom (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.
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  13. Jamin Asay & Sam Baron (2012). Unstable Truthmaking. Thought 1 (3):230-238.score: 12.0
    Recent discussion of the problem of negative existentials for truthmaker theory suggests a modest solution to the problem: fully general negative truths like do not require truthmakers, whereas partially general negative truths like do. This modest solution provides a third alternative to the two standard solutions to the problem of negative existentials: the endorsement of truthmaker gaps, and the appeal to contentious ontological posits. We argue that this modest, middle-ground position is inconsistent with certain plausible general principles for (...)
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  14. Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.score: 12.0
    When there is truth, there must be some thing (or things) to account for that truth: some thing(s) that couldn’t exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world. The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class (...)
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  15. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 12.0
    The ontological theory of the later Franz Brentano is often referred to as ‘reism.’ But what exactly is reism, and how is it related to modern-day nominalism? In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Brentano’s reism as a specific variety of nominalism. This variety, although motivated by distinctly modern concerns about truthmakers, adopts a strategy for providing such truthmakers that is completely foreign to modern nominalism. The strategy rests on proliferation of coincident concrete particulars. For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ (...)
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  16. Ross P. Cameron (2005). Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism. Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.score: 12.0
    In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
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  17. Timothy Pawl (2012). Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):197-218.score: 12.0
    I argue that Traditional Christian Theism is inconsistent with Truthmaker Maximalism, the thesis that all truths have truthmakers. Though this original formulation requires extensive revision, the gist of the argument is as follows. Suppose for reductio Traditional Christian Theism and the sort of Truthmaker Theory that embraces Truthmaker Maximalism are both true. By Traditional Christian Theism, there is a world in which God, and only God, exists. There are no animals in such a world. Thus, it is (...)
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  18. Josh Parsons (1999). There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.score: 12.0
    In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], (...)
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  19. Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.score: 12.0
    Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...)
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  20. Barry Smith (1999). Truthmaker Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291.score: 12.0
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion (...)
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  21. Peter Schulte (2014). Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):249-268.score: 12.0
    Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. (...)
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  22. Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill (forthcoming). Minimal Truthmakers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 12.0
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this paper we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a (...)
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  23. Peter Milne (2005). Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker. Analysis 65 (3):221–224.score: 12.0
    First paragraph: Truthmaker theory maintains that for every truth there is something, some thing, some entity, that makes it true. Balking at the prospect that logical truths are made true by any particular thing, a consequence that may in fact be hard to avoid (see Restall 1996, Read 2000), this principle of truthmaking is sometimes restricted to (logically) contingent truths. I aim to show that even in its restricted form, the principle is provably false.
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  24. Barry Smith (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231 – 234.score: 12.0
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion (...)
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  25. Jago Mark (2013). The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.score: 12.0
    (2013). The cost of truthmaker maximalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 460-474.
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  26. Pablo Rychter (2014). Truthmaker Theory Without Truthmakers. Ratio 27 (2).score: 12.0
    Truthmaking without truthmakers (TWT, for short) is the thesis that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. The first substantial part of this paper (section 2) is devoted to developing a particular version of TWT and at the same time defending TWT in general from arguments against it that have been advanced by orthodox truthmaker theorists. In the second part (...)
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  27. J. Wisnewski (2007). Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem. Organon F 14 (1):49-52.score: 12.0
    Advocates of truthmaker theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a truthmaker) and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a propostion). My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve truthmaker theory.
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  28. Sam Baron (2013). A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.score: 11.0
    Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of (...)
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  29. Nicholas Unwin, Truthmakers, Deflationism and Weak Correspondence.score: 10.0
    A line of argument, presented by David Lewis, to show that the correspondence theory of truth is not a real alternative to deflationism is developed. It is shown that truthmakers, construed as concrete events or states of affairs, are unsatisfactory entities, since we do not know how to individuate them or how to identify their essential qualities. Furthermore, the real work is usually done by supervenience relations, which have little to do with truth. It is argued that the Equivalence Schema (...)
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  30. Peter Milne (2013). Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker II. Analysis 73 (3):473-481.score: 10.0
    A proof employing no semantic terms is offered in support of the claim that there can be truths without truthmakers. The logical resources used in the proof are weak but do include the structural rule Contraction.
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  31. Jennifer Hornsby (2005). Truthmaking Without Truthmaker Entities. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oup Oxford.score: 10.0
     
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  32. Fraser MacBride (2005). Lewis's Animadversions on the Truthmaker Principle. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.score: 10.0
  33. Philipp Keller (2007). A World of Truthmakers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. 18--105.score: 9.0
    I will present and criticise the two theories of truthmaking David Armstrong offers us in Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), show to what extent they are incompatible and identify troublemakers for both of them, a notorious – Factualism, the view that the world is a world of states of affairs – and a more recent one – the view that every predication is necessary. Factualism, combined with truthmaker necessitarianism – ‘truthmaking is necessitation’ – leads Armstrong to an all-embracing totality (...)
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  34. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). Why Truthmakers. In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press. 17-31.score: 9.0
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and (...)
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  35. Philip Goff (2010). Orthodox Truthmaker Theory Cannot Be Defended by Cost/Benefit Analysis. Analysis 70 (1):45-50.score: 9.0
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  36. John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):188 – 207.score: 9.0
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  37. Yann Schmitt (2013). The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):117-130.score: 9.0
    In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty, why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that (...)
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  38. Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2006). Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? Analysis 66 (2):154–157.score: 9.0
    BACKGROUND: The majority of flow cytometric DNA content analyses are performed on whole peripheral blood, bone marrow or tumor samples containing significant numbers of non-malignant cells which hamper specific DNA content analysis. Simultaneous analysis of DNA content and immunophenotype greatly improves the specificity of DNA-ploidy measurements. Therefore, a three-color flow cytometric assay using DRAQ5 was developed and validated. METHODS: The results of DNA content analysis using DRAQ5 and propidium iodide were compared using peripheral blood samples of 15 healthy volunteers. The (...)
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  39. Ned Markosian (forthcoming). The Truth About the Past and the Future. In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching Time and the Open Future. Springer.score: 9.0
    This paper is about The Truthmaker Problem for Presentism. I spell out a solution to the problem that involves appealing to indeterministic laws of nature and branching semantics for past- and future-tensed sentences. Then I discuss a potential glitch for this solution, and propose a way to get around that glitch. Finally, I consider some likely objections to the view offered here, as well as replies to those objections.
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  40. Takeshi Akiba (2011). Why Should the Truthmaker Principle Be Restricted? Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):115-134.score: 9.0
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  41. Tora Koyama (2007). Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker. Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (2):49-59.score: 9.0
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  42. Roy A. Sorensen, Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox.score: 9.0
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  43. Graham Stevens (2008). Truthmaker-Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 51 (203):293.score: 9.0
     
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  44. Rachael Briggs (2012). Truthmaking Without Necessitation. Synthese 189 (1):11-28.score: 8.0
    I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a "Duplication Principle", according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition P just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T entails the truth of P, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as "things the way they are", validates two appealing (...)
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  45. Peter Schulte (2011). Truthmakers: A Tale of Two Explanatory Projects. Synthese 181 (3):413-431.score: 8.0
    Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project, I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated, which, when combined with a (...)
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  46. Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Necessary Connections. Synthese 161 (1):27-45.score: 8.0
    In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary (...)
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  47. Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking for Modal Skeptics. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):303-312.score: 8.0
    Standard truthmaker theory has generally assumed a realist account of de re modality and essences. But there are reasons to be skeptical about such a view, and for considering antirealist alternatives. Can truthmaker theory survive in the face of such skepticism? I argue that it can, but that only certain antirealist perspectives on de re modality are acceptable for truthmaker theory. In particular, either a quasi-realist or conventionalist account of de re modality is needed to provide the (...)
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  48. D. M. Armstrong (2000). Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking. The Monist 83 (1):150-160.score: 8.0
    Analyzes difficult case in the theory of truthmaking. Account on the notion of a truthmaker by philosopher Bertrand Russell; Context of the correspondence theory of truth; Requisites of a truthmaker; Discussion on negative truths, universally quantified truths and modal truths.
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  49. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis. Mind 115 (460):957-982.score: 8.0
    In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment (...)
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