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Bibliography: Truthmakers in Metaphysics
  1. Mark Jago (2012). The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma. Mind 121 (484):903-918.
    Amongst those who feel the pull of the truthmaker principle (that truths require for their truth a truthmaker to exist), there is disagreement as to whether it applies to all truths or merely to some distinguished subset. Those in the latter camp, the non-maximalists, argue that there are no ducks in my bath is true not because of something’s existence, but because of the lack of ducks in my bath. Maximalists, by contrast, insist that truths are made true (...)
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  2. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
    On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint (...)
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  3.  9
    Brian Embry (forthcoming). How Not To Be a Truthmaker Maximalist: Francisco Peinado on Truthmakers for Negative Truths. In Robert Pasnau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press 159-183.
    A seventeenth-century scholastic attempt to restrict the truthmaker principle to positive truths.
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  4. Timothy Perrine (2015). Undermining Truthmaker Theory. Synthese 192 (1):185-200.
    Truthmaker theorists hold that there is a metaphysically explanatory relation that holds between true claims and what exists. While some critics try to provide counterexamples to truthmaker theory, that response quickly leads to a dialectical standoff. The aim of this paper is to move beyond that standoff by attempting to undermine some standard arguments for truthmaker theory. Using realism about truth and a more pragmatic account of explanation, I show how some of those arguments can be undermined.
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  5.  94
    Eduardo Barrio & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended Again. Analysis 75 (1):3-8.
    In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and (...)
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  6.  89
    Jamin Asay, Truthmaker Theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truthmaker theory is the branch of metaphysics that explores the relationships between what is true and what exists. Discussions of truthmakers and truthmaking typically start with the idea that truth depends on being, and not vice versa. For example, if the sentence ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’ is true, then there are kangaroos living in Australia. And if there are kangaroos living in Australia, then the sentence ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’ is true. But we can ask whether the sentence is (...)
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  7. Friederike Moltmann, A Truthmaker Semantics for 'Cases'.
    This paper presents a systematic semantic study of constructions with the noun 'case' in English (and the same sorts of constructions in other languages). It argues that 'case'-constructions are an overt reflection of the exact truthmaking relation of Kit Fine’s recent truthmaker semantics. The paper argues that ‘cases’, the entities described by the noun 'case' in English, are situations playing the truth-making role within a contextually specified case-space. The paper will also argue that not only sentences have truthmakers (or (...)
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  8.  95
    Alexander Skiles (2014). Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist? Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659.
    Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: (...)
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  9. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended. Analysis 66 (3):260–264.
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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  10.  4
    Fraser MacBride (2005). Lewis's Animadversions on the Truthmaker Principle. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon 117-40.
    The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But states of affairs violate Hume's prohibition of necessary connections between distinct existences. So Lewis offered to replace the Truthmaker Principle with the weaker principle that ‘truth supervenes upon being’. This chapter argues that even this principle violates Hume's prohibition. Later Lewis came to ‘withdraw’ his doubts about the (...)
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  11.  16
    Gustavo Picazo (2014). Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory. Philosophia 42 (3):713-739.
    The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and sentences, and (...)
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  12.  43
    Timothy Pawl (2014). Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):539-550.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ahead of Print.
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  13. Bradley Rettler (2016). The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1405-1425.
    In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something that makes true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that (...)
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  14. Jonathan Schaffer (2010). The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.
    I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arisingfrom (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.
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  15. Alessandro Giordani (2015). The Truthmaker Solution to the Gettier Problems. Epistemologia 38:66-78.
    A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on the idea that knowledge can be defined as justified true belief provided that the source of one’s justification is suitably connected with what makes the believed proposition true. Different developments of this basic intuition have been recently criticized on the basis of a series of arguments aiming at showing that no truthmaker theory can allow us to solve Gettier problems, since the very idea underlying such solution is ineffective. (...)
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  16.  96
    Noël B. Saenz (2014). Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity. Faith and Philosophy 31 (4):460-474.
    Divine Simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic properties. Recently, Jeffrey Brower has put forward an account of divine simplicity that has it that God is the truthmaker for all intrinsic essential predications about him. This allows Brower to preserve the intuitive thought that God is not a property but a concrete being. In this paper, I provide two objections to Brower’s account that are meant (...)
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  17. Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
    When there is truth, there must be some thing (or things) to account for that truth: some thing(s) that couldn’t exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world. The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class (...)
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  18. Ross P. Cameron (2010). From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism. Noûs 44 (1):178 - 198.
    I argue that the truthmaker theorist should be a priority monist if she wants to avoid commitment to mysterious necessary connections. In section 1 I briefly discuss the ontological options available to the truthmaker theorist. In section 2 I develop the argument against truthmaker theory from the Humean denial of necessary connections. In section 3 I offer an account of when necessary connections are objectionable. In section 4 I use this criterion to narrow down the options from (...)
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  19. Mark Jago (2012). The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329.
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the (...)
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  20. Sam Baron (2015). Tensed Truthmaker Theory. Erkenntnis 80 (5):923-944.
    Presentism faces a serious challenge from truthmaker theory. Standard solutions to the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed in one of two ways. Easy road presentists invoke new entities to satisfy the requirements of truthmaker theory. Hard road presentists, by contrast, flatly refuse to give in to truthmaker demands. Recently, a third way has been proposed. This response seeks to address the truthmaking problem by tensing our truthmaker principles. These views, though intuitive, are under-developed. In this (...)
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  21. Julian Dodd (2007). Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles. Synthese 156 (2):383-401.
    This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither (...)
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  22. Mark Jago (2013). The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.
    According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. (...)
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  23. Timothy Pawl (2012). Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):197-218.
    I argue that Traditional Christian Theism is inconsistent with Truthmaker Maximalism, the thesis that all truths have truthmakers. Though this original formulation requires extensive revision, the gist of the argument is as follows. Suppose for reductio Traditional Christian Theism and the sort of Truthmaker Theory that embraces Truthmaker Maximalism are both true. By Traditional Christian Theism, there is a world in which God, and only God, exists. There are no animals in such a world. Thus, it is (...)
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  24. Josh Parsons (1999). There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.
    In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], (...)
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  25. Ross P. Cameron (2005). Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism. Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.
    In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
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  26.  85
    Barry Smith (1999). Truthmaker Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291.
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion (...)
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  27.  26
    Robin Stenwall (2016). Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions. Acta Analytica 31 (1):59-76.
    It is generally thought that truthmaking has to be an internal relation because if it weren’t, then, as David Armstrong argues, “everything may be a truthmaker for any truth”. Depending on whether we take an internal relation to be one that is necessitated by the mere existence of its terms or one that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata, the truthbearers involved in the truthmaking relation must either have their contents essentially or intrinsically. In this paper, I (...)
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  28. Peter Milne (2005). Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker. Analysis 65 (3):221–224.
    First paragraph: Truthmaker theory maintains that for every truth there is something, some thing, some entity, that makes it true. Balking at the prospect that logical truths are made true by any particular thing, a consequence that may in fact be hard to avoid (see Restall 1996, Read 2000), this principle of truthmaking is sometimes restricted to (logically) contingent truths. I aim to show that even in its restricted form, the principle is provably false.
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  29. Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
    Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...)
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  30.  29
    Chad Vance (2014). Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem. Ratio 27 (3):291-305.
    Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is (...)
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  31.  20
    Barry Smith & Jonathan Simon (2007). Truthmaker Explanations. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag 18--79.
    This paper is a fresh attempt to articulate the role of a theory of truthmakers. We argue that truthmaker theory constitutes a cornerstone of good methodology in metaphysics, but that a conflation of truthmaker theory with the theory of truth has been responsible for certain excesses associated with truthmaker-based approaches in the recent literature. If truthmaker theory is not a component of a theory of truth, then truthmaker maximalism – the view that every truth has (...)
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  32.  23
    Matthew Simpson (2014). Defending Truthmaker Non‐Maximalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):288-291.
    Jago argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don't exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago's point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of (...)
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  33.  67
    Peter Schulte (2014). Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):249-268.
    Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. (...)
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  34.  27
    Barry Smith (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231 – 234.
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion (...)
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  35.  24
    Naoaki Kitamura (2014). Is Any Alleged Truthmaker for Negatives Explanatorily Deficient? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):200-207.
    Some truthmaker theorists posit a distinctive kind of entity to solve the problem of providing ontological grounding for negative truths. Recently, A. M. Griffith has raised a general objection against these alleged truthmakers based on an explanatory constraint on truthmaking and the existence condition of these entities. This paper counters the objection by placing it on the horns of a dilemma: the argument must either specify that the existence condition in question is a conceptual matter or insist that the (...)
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  36.  44
    Takeshi Akiba (2011). Why Should the Truthmaker Principle Be Restricted? Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):115-134.
    According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall (...)
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  37.  25
    Pablo Rychter (2014). Truthmaker Theory Without Truthmakers. Ratio 27 (3):276-290.
    Truthmaking without truthmakers (TWT, for short) is the thesis that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. The first substantial part of this paper (section 2) is devoted to developing a particular version of TWT and at the same time defending TWT in general from arguments against it that have been advanced by orthodox truthmaker theorists. In the second part (...)
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  38.  2
    Naoaki Kitamura (2014). Truthmaker Theory as a Method in Ontology. Kagaku Tetsugaku 47 (1):1-17.
    This paper aims to precisely characterize the theoretical significance of the notion of truthmakers. First, the closeness of the alleged principle of truthmaker theory and the realistic intuition on which it rests is assessed, thereby determining to what extent a certain kind of general objection against truthmaker theory carries weight. Second, the principle of truthmaker theory is reformulated on the basis of this assessment, and truthmaker theory is argued to offer a methodological role for identifying fundamental (...)
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  39.  5
    J. Wisnewski (2007). Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):49-52.
    Advocates of truthmaker theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a truthmaker) and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a propostion). My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve truthmaker theory.
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  40. Uriah Kriegel (2015). Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):153-180.
    The ontological theory of the later Franz Brentano is often referred to as ‘reism.’ But what exactly is reism, and how is it related to modern-day nominalism? In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Brentano’s reism as a specific variety of nominalism. This variety, although motivated by distinctly modern concerns about truthmakers, adopts a strategy for providing such truthmakers that is completely foreign to modern nominalism. The strategy rests on proliferation of coincident concrete particulars. For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ (...)
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  41. Stephen Yablo (2016). Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1).
  42. Peter Milne (2013). Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker II. Analysis 73 (3):473-481.
    A proof employing no semantic terms is offered in support of the claim that there can be truths without truthmakers. The logical resources used in the proof are weak but do include the structural rule Contraction.
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  43. John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):188 – 207.
  44.  26
    Bradley Rettler (2016). Erratum To: The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1427-1427.
    These are the acknowledgements omitted from the original article. "Thanks to Jon Jacobs, Dan Korman, Kate Ritchie, and audiences at the 2012 University of Texas, Biola, and Pacific APA conferences for providing comments on and objections to various early drafts, and to a referee for this journal whose excellent comments helped me improve the paper substantially. Special thanks to Tim Pawl, Mike Rea, Noel Saenz, and Alex Skiles for spending many hours talking through these ideas and commenting on early drafts. (...)
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  45. Sam Baron (2013). A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.
    Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of (...)
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  46. Philip Goff (2010). Orthodox Truthmaker Theory Cannot Be Defended by Cost/Benefit Analysis. Analysis 70 (1):45-50.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  47.  10
    John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):185-207.
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  48.  37
    Tora Koyama (2007). Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker. Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (2):49-59.
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  49.  6
    Trenton Merricks (2009). Truthmaker. In Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa & Gary Rosenkrantz (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd. ed. Blackwell
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  50.  64
    Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2006). Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? Analysis 66 (2):154–157.
    Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.
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