Search results for 'truthmaker' (try it on Scholar)

306 found
Sort by:
See also:
Bibliography: Truthmakers in Metaphysics
  1. Mark Jago (2012). The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma. Mind 121 (484):903-918.score: 24.0
    Amongst those who feel the pull of the truthmaker principle (that truths require for their truth a truthmaker to exist), there is disagreement as to whether it applies to all truths or merely to some distinguished subset. Those in the latter camp, the non-maximalists, argue that there are no ducks in my bath is true not because of something’s existence, but because of the lack of ducks in my bath. Maximalists, by contrast, insist that truths are made true (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.score: 24.0
    On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended. Analysis 66 (3):260–264.score: 24.0
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Alexander Skiles (2014). Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist? Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659.score: 24.0
    Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jamin Asay, Truthmaker Theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    Truthmaker theory is the branch of metaphysics that explores the relationships between what is true and what exists. Discussions of truthmakers and truthmaking typically start with the idea that truth depends on being, and not vice versa. For example, if the sentence ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’ is true, then there are kangaroos living in Australia. And if there are kangaroos living in Australia, then the sentence ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’ is true. But we can ask whether the sentence is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Timothy Perrine (2015). Undermining Truthmaker Theory. Synthese 192 (1):185-200.score: 24.0
    Truthmaker theorists hold that there is a metaphysically explanatory relation that holds between true claims and what exists. While some critics try to provide counterexamples to truthmaker theory, that response quickly leads to a dialectical standoff. The aim of this paper is to move beyond that standoff by attempting to undermine some standard arguments for truthmaker theory. Using realism about truth and a more pragmatic account of explanation, I show how some of those arguments can be undermined.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Eduardo Barrio (forthcoming). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended Again. Analysis:anu121.score: 24.0
    n this note we argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. In section 2 we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In section 3 we shall argue that, even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and they invalidate the logic that Mlne uses in his proof. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gustavo Picazo (2014). Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory. Philosophia 42 (3):713-739.score: 24.0
    The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and sentences, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Timothy Pawl (2013). Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-12.score: 21.0
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ahead of Print.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Julian Dodd (2007). Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles. Synthese 156 (2):383-401.score: 20.0
    This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Mark Jago (2013). The Problem with Truthmaker‐Gap Epistemicism. Thought 1 (4):320-329.score: 20.0
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mark Jago (2013). The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.score: 20.0
    According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Sam Baron (forthcoming). Tensed Truthmaker Theory. Erkenntnis.score: 20.0
    Presentism faces a serious challenge from truthmaker theory. Standard solutions to the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed in one of two ways. Easy road presentists invoke new entities to satisfy the requirements of truthmaker theory. Hard road presentists, by contrast, flatly refuse to give in to truthmaker demands. Recently, a third way has been proposed. This response seeks to address the truthmaking problem by tensing our truthmaker principles. These views, though intuitive, are under-developed. In this (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Chad Vance (2014). Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem. Ratio 27 (3):291-305.score: 20.0
    Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Naoaki Kitamura (2014). Is Any Alleged Truthmaker for Negatives Explanatorily Deficient? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):200-207.score: 20.0
    Some truthmaker theorists posit a distinctive kind of entity to solve the problem of providing ontological grounding for negative truths. Recently, A. M. Griffith has raised a general objection against these alleged truthmakers based on an explanatory constraint on truthmaking and the existence condition of these entities. This paper counters the objection by placing it on the horns of a dilemma: the argument must either specify that the existence condition in question is a conceptual matter or insist that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Barry Smith & Jonathan Simon (2007). Truthmaker Explanations. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. 18--79.score: 19.0
    This paper is a fresh attempt to articulate the role of a theory of truthmakers. We argue that truthmaker theory constitutes a cornerstone of good methodology in metaphysics, but that a conflation of truthmaker theory with the theory of truth has been responsible for certain excesses associated with truthmaker-based approaches in the recent literature. If truthmaker theory is not a component of a theory of truth, then truthmaker maximalism – the view that every truth has (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ross P. Cameron (2010). From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism. Noûs 44 (1):178 - 198.score: 18.0
    I argue that the truthmaker theorist should be a priority monist if she wants to avoid commitment to mysterious necessary connections. In section 1 I briefly discuss the ontological options available to the truthmaker theorist. In section 2 I develop the argument against truthmaker theory from the Humean denial of necessary connections. In section 3 I offer an account of when necessary connections are objectionable. In section 4 I use this criterion to narrow down the options from (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jonathan Schaffer (2010). The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.score: 18.0
    I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arisingfrom (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.score: 18.0
    When there is truth, there must be some thing (or things) to account for that truth: some thing(s) that couldn’t exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world. The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ross P. Cameron (2005). Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism. Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.score: 18.0
    In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Timothy Pawl (2012). Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):197-218.score: 18.0
    I argue that Traditional Christian Theism is inconsistent with Truthmaker Maximalism, the thesis that all truths have truthmakers. Though this original formulation requires extensive revision, the gist of the argument is as follows. Suppose for reductio Traditional Christian Theism and the sort of Truthmaker Theory that embraces Truthmaker Maximalism are both true. By Traditional Christian Theism, there is a world in which God, and only God, exists. There are no animals in such a world. Thus, it is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Josh Parsons (1999). There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.score: 18.0
    In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.score: 18.0
    Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Barry Smith (1999). Truthmaker Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291.score: 18.0
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter Schulte (2014). Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):249-268.score: 18.0
    Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Peter Milne (2005). Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker. Analysis 65 (3):221–224.score: 18.0
    First paragraph: Truthmaker theory maintains that for every truth there is something, some thing, some entity, that makes it true. Balking at the prospect that logical truths are made true by any particular thing, a consequence that may in fact be hard to avoid (see Restall 1996, Read 2000), this principle of truthmaking is sometimes restricted to (logically) contingent truths. I aim to show that even in its restricted form, the principle is provably false.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Barry Smith (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231 – 234.score: 18.0
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Pablo Rychter (2014). Truthmaker Theory Without Truthmakers. Ratio 27 (3):276-290.score: 18.0
    Truthmaking without truthmakers (TWT, for short) is the thesis that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. The first substantial part of this paper (section 2) is devoted to developing a particular version of TWT and at the same time defending TWT in general from arguments against it that have been advanced by orthodox truthmaker theorists. In the second part (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. J. Wisnewski (2007). Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem. Organon F 14 (1):49-52.score: 18.0
    Advocates of truthmaker theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a truthmaker) and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a propostion). My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve truthmaker theory.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Adrian Heathcote (2014). The Truthmaker Account Is Not a Causal Theory. Acta Analytica 29 (3):383-388.score: 18.0
    It is argued that the part-whole account of the relation between evidence and the larger state of affairs the evidence is evidence of—an account that was elucidated in the paper ‘Truthmaking, Evidence of, and Impossibility Proofs’ —provides a better basis for epistemology than causal relations between events. I apply this to a well-known phenomenon in physics which suggests that causal connectedness is not necessary for knowledge.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Uriah Kriegel (2014). Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).score: 17.0
  32. Sam Baron (2013). A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.score: 17.0
    Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Peter Milne (2013). Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker II. Analysis 73 (3):473-481.score: 16.0
    A proof employing no semantic terms is offered in support of the claim that there can be truths without truthmakers. The logical resources used in the proof are weak but do include the structural rule Contraction.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Fraser MacBride (2005). Lewis's Animadversions on the Truthmaker Principle. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.score: 16.0
  35. Philip Goff (2010). Orthodox Truthmaker Theory Cannot Be Defended by Cost/Benefit Analysis. Analysis 70 (1):45-50.score: 15.0
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):188 – 207.score: 15.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2006). Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? Analysis 66 (2):154–157.score: 15.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Takeshi Akiba (2011). Why Should the Truthmaker Principle Be Restricted? Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):115-134.score: 15.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Tora Koyama (2007). Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker. Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (2):49-59.score: 15.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Roy A. Sorensen, Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox.score: 15.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Graham Stevens (2008). Truthmaker-Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 51 (203):293.score: 15.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Jamin Asay & Sam Baron (2012). Unstable Truthmaking. Thought 1 (3):230-238.score: 14.0
    Recent discussion of the problem of negative existentials for truthmaker theory suggests a modest solution to the problem: fully general negative truths like do not require truthmakers, whereas partially general negative truths like do. This modest solution provides a third alternative to the two standard solutions to the problem of negative existentials: the endorsement of truthmaker gaps, and the appeal to contentious ontological posits. We argue that this modest, middle-ground position is inconsistent with certain plausible general principles for (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill (forthcoming). Minimal Truthmakers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 14.0
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this paper we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Nicholas Unwin, Truthmakers, Deflationism and Weak Correspondence.score: 12.0
    A line of argument, presented by David Lewis, to show that the correspondence theory of truth is not a real alternative to deflationism is developed. It is shown that truthmakers, construed as concrete events or states of affairs, are unsatisfactory entities, since we do not know how to individuate them or how to identify their essential qualities. Furthermore, the real work is usually done by supervenience relations, which have little to do with truth. It is argued that the Equivalence Schema (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Philipp Keller (2007). A World of Truthmakers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. 18--105.score: 11.0
    I will present and criticise the two theories of truthmaking David Armstrong offers us in Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), show to what extent they are incompatible and identify troublemakers for both of them, a notorious – Factualism, the view that the world is a world of states of affairs – and a more recent one – the view that every predication is necessary. Factualism, combined with truthmaker necessitarianism – ‘truthmaking is necessitation’ – leads Armstrong to an all-embracing totality (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). Why Truthmakers. In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press. 17-31.score: 11.0
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Rachael Briggs (2012). Truthmaking Without Necessitation. Synthese 189 (1):11-28.score: 10.0
    I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a "Duplication Principle", according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition P just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T entails the truth of P, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as "things the way they are", validates two appealing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Peter Schulte (2011). Truthmakers: A Tale of Two Explanatory Projects. Synthese 181 (3):413-431.score: 10.0
    Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project, I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated, which, when combined with a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Charles Hermes (2013). Truthmakers and the Direct Argument. Philosophical Studies (2):401-418.score: 10.0
    The truthmaker literature has recently come to the consensus that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical propositional logic. This development has huge implications for the free will literature. Since free will and moral responsibility are primarily ontological concerns (and not semantic concerns) the logic of truthmaking ought to be central to the free will debate. I shall demonstrate that counterexamples to transfer principles employed in the direct argument occur precisely where a plausible logic of truthmaking diverges from (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 306