Search results for 'value for its own sake' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  2.  4
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33 - 51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  3.  11
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Springer 115--129.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to (...)
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  4. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen (2000). II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33-51.
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  5.  13
    Erik W. Schmidt (2010). How to Value the Liberal Arts for Their Own Sake Without Intrinsic Values. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 17 (2):37-47.
    I argue that there is an important problem with framing the value of a liberal arts education through a contrast between intrinsic and instrumental value. The paper breaks down into three sections. First, I argue that the traditional divide between intrinsic and instrumental value conflates two pairs of related concepts and that distinguishing those concepts frees us from an important impasse found in contemporary discussions about the liberal arts. Second, I argue that a liberal arts education is (...)
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  6.  24
    Thaddeus Metz (2009). Higher Education, Knowledge For Its Own Sake, and an African Moral Theory. Studies in Philosophy and Education 28 (6):517-536.
    I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of ‘‘blue-sky’’ knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in ‘‘tangible’’ or ‘‘concrete’’ social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are (...)
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  7.  7
    Frederick Kraenzel (1991). Does Reason Command Itself for its Own Sake? Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (3):263-270.
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    Yannig Luthra (2015). Aristotle on Choosing Virtuous Action for its Own Sake. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):423-441.
    While Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sakes, he also claims that many virtuous actions are to be chosen as instrumental means to securing further ends. It would seem that an action is choiceworthy for its own sake only if it would be choiceworthy whether or not it served further ends. How, then, can such virtuous actions be choiceworthy for their own sakes? This article criticizes John Ackrill's and Jennifer Whiting's answers to this question. I (...)
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  9.  9
    T. S. Champlin (1987). Doing Something for Its Own Sake. Philosophy 62 (239):31 - 47.
    The idea of doing something for its own sake interests me for two reasons. First, I should like to understand better two opposing reactions that I have felt on coming across the phrase ‘for its own sake’ used in earnest. When told that knowledge is worth pursuing for its own sake and that this is what the study of science at a university ought to be like—not an adjunct to commercially motivated research in a product I design (...)
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  10.  45
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405-435.
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake. One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude (...)
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  11.  27
    Alan Ryan (2002). Does Inequality Matter—for its Own Sake? Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (1):225-243.
    This is a simple essay. It raises a familiar question about equality, adduces a very small amount of empirical evidence about the social consequences of equality as distinct from prosperity, and broods on the difficulty of providing a really persuasive answer to the question raised. I begin with the view that there simply cannot be anything intrinsically wrong with inequality, move on to the view that there are extrinsic reasons for anxiety, dividing these into conceptual and empirical reasons, though without (...)
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  12. Steve Fuller (2010). History of Science for its Own Sake? History of the Human Sciences 23 (4):95-99.
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  13.  10
    Adam Nguyen & Juan Meng (2013). Whether and to What Extent Consumers Demand Fair Pricing Behavior for Its Own Sake. Journal of Business Ethics 114 (3):529-547.
    This article contributes to scholarly understanding of the significance of procedural fairness in pricing contexts. It has been widely recognized that price fairness judgments concern both the outcome (fair price) and the procedure leading to the outcome (fair pricing). However, extant research has traditionally viewed procedural fairness as a means to outcome fairness. According to this instrumental view, procedural fairness is a component or antecedent of outcome fairness, but has no direct effects on consumers’ responses to prices. Building on the (...)
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  14.  6
    Maryann P. Feldman & Pierre Desrochers (2004). Truth for Its Own Sake: Academic Culture and Technology Transfer at Johns Hopkins University. Minerva 42 (2):105-126.
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  15.  10
    Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer 115.
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  16. T. S. Champlin (1987). Doing Something for its Own Sake. Philosophy 62 (239):31.
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  17. John Ladd (1958). On the Desire to Do One's Duty for Its Own Sake. In A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of Washington Press
     
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  18.  1
    Víctor Durà-Vilà (2016). Attending to Works of Art for Their Own Sake in Art Evaluation and Analysis: Carroll and Stecker on Aesthetic Experience. British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (1):83-99.
    Noël Carroll denies and Robert Stecker affirms that it is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience that it should be valued for its own sake. I make use of their controversy to argue for the psychological impossibility of discharging very common practices of art evaluation and analysis without undergoing an aesthetic experience valued for its own sake. By way of supporting my thesis and also making progress in Stecker and Carroll’s dispute about aesthetic experience, I analyse their methodological (...)
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  19.  6
    Simon P. James (2016). Protecting Nature for the Sake of Human Beings. Ratio 29 (2):213-227.
    It is often assumed that to say that nature should be protected for the sake of human beings just is to say that it should be protected because it is a means to one or more anthropocentric ends. I argue that this assumption is false. In some contexts, claims that a particular natural X should be protected for our sakes mean that X should be protected, not because it is a means to anthropocentric ends, but because it is part (...)
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  20.  2
    Patrick Giddy (2012). The Ideal of African Scholarship and its Implications for Introductory Philosophy: The Example of Placide Tempels. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):504-516.
    Thinking of an academic discipline in terms of a ‘social practice’ (MacIntyre) helps in formulating what the ideal captured in the slogan ‘African scholarship’ can contribute to the discipline. For every practice is threatened by the attractiveness of goods external to the practice – in particular, competitiveness for its own sake – and to counter this virtues of character are needed. African traditional culture prioritizes a normative picture of the human person which could very well contribute here to upholding (...)
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  21. Nicholas Stang (2012). Artworks Are Not Valuable for Their Own Sake. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (3):271-280.
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  22.  9
    Richard Taylor (1995). The Utilitarian Fallacy. Argumentation 9 (4):531-541.
    The utilitarian fallacy, most egregiously committed by J. S. Mill but perpetuated ever since, consists of supposing that “pleasure”, being a noun, is, in every true statement in which it occurs, the name of a feeling, and that “pleasant”, in any such statement, means that whatever is so described is conducive to that feeling. In fact, “pleasant” is more commonly used as a positive term of appraisal, indicating that the thing so described is liked, and usually liked for its own (...)
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  23.  62
    Meena Krishnamurthy (2013). Completing Rawls's Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and its Fair Value: The Argument From Self-Respect. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):179-205.
    Despite the vast literature on Rawls's work, few have discussed his arguments for the value of democracy. When his arguments have been discussed, they have received staunch criticism. Some critics have charged that Rawls's arguments are not deeply democratic. Others have gone further, claiming that Rawls's arguments denigrate democracy. These criticisms are unsurprising, since Rawls's arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty needs to include democratic liberties, are incomplete. In contrast to his trenchant remarks about core (...)
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  24. B. J. C. Madison (2015). Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3).
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming (...)
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  25. Meena Krishnamurthy (2012). Reconceiving Rawls's Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair Value. Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):258-278.
    Few have discussed Rawls's arguments for the value of democracy. This is because his arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty should include democratic liberties, are incomplete. Rawls says little about the inclusion of political liberties of a democratic sort – such as the right to vote – among the basic liberties. And, at times, what he does say is unconvincing. My aim is to complete and, where they fail, to reconceive Rawls's arguments and to show (...)
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  26.  15
    Anne C. Ozar (2010). The Value of a Phenomenology of the Emotions for Cultivating One's Own Character. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):303-317.
    This article demonstrates the unique value of a Husserlian phenomenological account of the affective (or “feeling”) dimension of emotional experience for realizing Aristotle’s vision of the cultivation of virtue. Through an analysis of envy, the author defends the claim that the affective dimension of self-assessment is central to the process of conceptualization by which we learn to apprehend our own emotional responses. Analytic conceptual analyses that dismiss the subjective, affective correlate of emotional experiences, therefore, fail to take seriously what (...)
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  27.  33
    Jonas Olson (2004). Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism About Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.
    The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus (...)
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  28.  19
    Michael S. Brady (2009). Curiosity and the Value of Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. OUP Oxford
    This chapter focuses on the question of whether true belief can have final value because it answers our ‘intellectual interest’ or ‘natural curiosity’. The idea is that sometimes we are interested in the truth on some issue not for any ulterior purpose, but simply because we are curious about that issue. It is argued that this approach fails to provide an adequate explanation of the final value of true belief, since there is an unbridgeable gap between our valuing (...)
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  29.  29
    Michael J. Zimmerman (2001). The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Rowman and Littlefield.
    At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other (...)
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  30. Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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  31.  2
    D. Meyerson (2015). The Moral Justification for the Right to Make Full Answer and Defence. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2):237-265.
    Why is it unjust to condemn an accused unheard? This article argues that the opportunity to be heard in one’s own defence is an intrinsic element of a just trial. Defenders of this view typically argue that respect for dignity, in the Kantian sense of rational agency, is the source of the inherent value of participation. My argument is different. I emphasise the relational and symbolic dimensions of participation. I draw on research in social psychology that shows, first, that (...)
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  32.  23
    Jonas Olson (2003). Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different (...)
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  33.  86
    Andrews Reath (2003). Value and Law in Kant's Moral Theory. [REVIEW] Ethics 114 (1):127-155.
    Paul Guyer’s Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a collection of essays written over a period of ten years on the roles of freedom, reason, law, and happiness in Kant’s practical philosophy. The centrality of these concepts has always been acknowledged, but Guyer proposes a different way to understand their interconnections. Kant extols respect for moral law and conformity to moral principle for its own sake while at the same time celebrating the value of human freedom and (...)
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  34.  99
    Jeffrey Ketland (2003). Can a Many-Valued Language Functionally Represent its Own Semantics? Analysis 63 (4):292–297.
    Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem can be generalized so that it applies to many-valued languages. We introduce a notion of strong semantic self-representation applicable to any (sufficiently rich) interpreted many-valued language L. A sufficiently rich interpreted many-valued language L is SSSR just in case it has a function symbol n(x) such that, for any f Sent(L), the denotation of the term n(“f”) in L is precisely ||f||L, the semantic value of f in L. By a simple diagonal construction (finding a sentence (...)
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  35.  62
    John A. Bailey (1979). On Intrinsic Value. Philosophia 9 (1):1-8.
    Intrinsic value is differentiated from extrinsic, And assumed to be an empirical characteristic. Then six definitional hypotheses are introduced as to what "x has intrinsic value" means. Under examination, All collapse but d5. In d5, "x has intrinsic value" means "x is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake." d5's relations to ethical hedonism are next examined. Last, Moore's objection, That what one likes intrinsically, One may believe to be bad or not good (...)
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  36.  31
    Gurpreet Rattan (2008). On the Value and Nature of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:235-251.
    The thought that truth is valuable for its own sake is obvious, yet difficult to explicate in a precise and vindicating way. The paper tries to explicate and vindicate this thought with an argument for the conclusion that truth is an epistemic value. Truth is an epistemic value in the sense that a commitment to the value of truth plays a role in the justification and explanation of a fundamental aspect of our epistemic practice, namely, critical (...)
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  37. Simon A. Hailwood (2003). How to Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy. Routledge.
    It is often claimed by environmental philosophers and green political theorists that liberalism, the dominant tradition of western political philosophy, is too focused on the interests of human individuals to give due weight to the environment for its own sake. In "How to be a Green Liberal", Simon Hailwood challenges this view and argues that liberalism can embrace a genuinely 'green', non-instrumental view of nature. The book's central claim is that nature's 'otherness', its being constituted of independent entities and (...)
     
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  38. Leonard David Katz (1986). Hedonism as Metaphysics of Mind and Value. Dissertation, Princeton University
    I develop and defend a hedonistic view of the constitution of human subjectivity, agency and value, while disassociating it from utilitarian accounts of morality and from the view that only pleasure is desired. Chapter One motivates the general question, "What really is of value in human living?", and introduces evaluative hedonism as an answer to this question. Chapter Two argues against preference satisfaction accounts of pleasure and of welfare, and begins the explication and defense of the hedonist's conception (...)
     
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  39.  10
    Simon P. James (2003). Zen Buddhism and the Intrinsic Value of Nature. Contemporary Buddhism 4 (2):143-157.
    It is a perennial theme in the literature on environmental ethics that the exploitation of the environment is the result of a blindness to (or perhaps a refusal to recognize) the intrinsic value of natural beings. The general story here is that Western traditions of thought have tended to accord natural beings value only to the extent that they prove useful to humans, that they have tended to see nature as only instrumentally valuable. By contrast, it is said (...)
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  40. Simon A. Hailwood (2014). How to Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy. Routledge.
    It is often claimed by environmental philosophers and green political theorists that liberalism, the dominant tradition of western political philosophy, is too focused on the interests of human individuals to give due weight to the environment for its own sake. In "How to be a Green Liberal", Simon Hailwood challenges this view and argues that liberalism can embrace a genuinely 'green', non-instrumental view of nature. The book's central claim is that nature's 'otherness', its being constituted of independent entities and (...)
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  41. Alex Standish (2008). Global Perspectives in the Geography Curriculum: Reviewing the Moral Case for Geography. Routledge.
    _‘For geographers across the globe this book provides the arguments for a return to the teaching of geography and why they should reject the politicisation of the subject by education policy makers and politicians. Standish’s careful critique shows the necessity of a depoliticised geography curriculum the irony of which would be that it would ensure that every child could point to Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan on a map.’_ Prof. Dennis Hayes – Oxford Brookes University, UK _'A prescient and critical analysis (...)
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  42.  2
    Megan J. Laverty (2015). “There Is No Substitute for a Sense of Reality”: Humanizing the Humanities. Educational Theory 65 (6):635-654.
    Do the humanities have a future? In the face of an increased emphasis on the so-called practical applicability of education, some educators worry that the presence of humanistic study in schools and universities is gravely threatened. In the short-term, scholars have rallied to defend the humanities by demonstrating how they do, in fact, advance our practical interests. Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues that the humanities uniquely support democratic citizenship by cultivating critical thinking and narrative imagination — two skills needed for (...)
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  43.  84
    Jennifer Whiting (2002). Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):270-290.
    Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value. This raises problems about how to reconcile Aristotle's requirement with (a) the fact that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves (usually benefits to others); and (b) Aristotle's apparent requirement that everything (including virtuous action) be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia. I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of (...)
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  44.  53
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s- sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s- sake attitudes can be identified. (...)
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  45.  40
    David A. Booth (2006). Money as Tool, Money as Resource: The Biology of Collecting Items for Their Own Sake. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):180-181.
    Money does not stimulate receptors in mimicry of natural agonists; so, by definition, money is not a drug. Attractions of money other than to purchase goods and services could arise from instincts similar to hoarding in other species. Instinctual activities without evolutionary function include earning a billion and writing for BBS. (Published Online April 5 2006).
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  46.  23
    Spencer K. Wertz (2007). The National Endowment for the Arts and its Opposition: Danto's Argument for Art for Our Sake. Journal of Aesthetic Education 41 (3):111-117.
    : A survey of arguments made by fiscal conservatives who wish to eliminate federal funding of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) is given and a critique of them stemming from Danto's argument for art for our sake. Following Hegel's lead, Danto shows us that there is an intimate relationship that exists between nations and their art—that is, that art is central to the political health of a nation. The arguments by conservatives are found wanting and pose no (...)
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  47.  5
    Frauke Pirscher (2016). Consuming for the Sake of Others: Whose Interests Count on a Market for Animal-Friendly Products? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (1):67-80.
    Many Europeans are concerned about the living conditions of farm animals because they view animals as beings that possess interests of their own. Against this background the introduction of an animal welfare label is being intensively discussed in Europe. In choosing a market-based instrument to take these concerns into account, normative judgments are made about the formation of preferences, the value system that is implicitly assumed, and the distribution of property rights. From the perspective of classical institutional economics it (...)
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  48.  1
    Jason Goldfarb (2016). Politics After Finitude: Žižek’s Redoubling of the Real and its Implications for The Left. International Journal of Žižek Studies 10 (2).
    Slavoj Žižek, alongside Quinton Meillassoux, takes up the position that correlationism – the idea that one can only know the world as it appears for one’s subjective perception of it – fails to account for its own articulation, and thus depoliticizes the formal space from which it can arise. Through his reading of Hegel and locating of the Kantian thing-in-itself within reality, Žižek claims that he can subvert Kantian correlationism and its consequent political ‘celebration of failure’. [i] This paper, however, (...)
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  49.  56
    Greg Moses (2013). A Compass for Valuation: Peircean Realism in Alain Locke's Functional Theory of Value. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 27 (4):402-424.
    Thanks largely to the efforts of Leonard Harris and scholars affiliated with the Alain Locke Society, Alain LeRoy Locke has for the past few decades been reconstructed as a "critical pragmatist" (see Carter and Harris 2010; Harris 1989, 1999). By Locke's own account, the "activist theory of knowledge" advanced by American pragmatism was a worthwhile innovation that had yet to become activist enough in its value theory (Harris 1989, 8). In pursuit of what we today term his critical pragmatism, (...)
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  50.  11
    Cynthia Townley (2011). A Defense of Ignorance: Its Value for Knowers and Roles in Feminist and Social Epistemologies. Lexington Books.
    By exploring diverse and sometimes positive roles for ignorance, A Defense of Ignorance offers a revisionary approach to epistemology that challenges core assumptions about epistemic values. Townley contributes innovative ways of thinking about the practicalities and politics of knowledge and argues for an expanded domain of responsible epistemic conduct. All social scientists, especially those interested in knowledge and in feminist scholarship, stand to benefit from Townley's arguments.
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