Search results for 'value for its own sake' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.score: 2331.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  2. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:33 - 51.score: 1551.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  3. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. In. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 115--129.score: 1176.0
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  4. Erik W. Schmidt (2010). How to Value the Liberal Arts for Their Own Sake Without Intrinsic Values. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 17 (2):37-47.score: 1134.0
    I argue that there is an important problem with framing the value of a liberal arts education through a contrast between intrinsic and instrumental value. The paper breaks down into three sections. First, I argue that the traditional divide between intrinsic and instrumental value conflates two pairs of related concepts and that distinguishing those concepts frees us from an important impasse found in contemporary discussions about the liberal arts. Second, I argue that a liberal arts education is (...)
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  5. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405 - 435.score: 1071.0
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value (...)
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  6. Thaddeus Metz (2009). Higher Education, Knowledge For Its Own Sake, and an African Moral Theory. Studies in Philosophy and Education 28 (6):517-536.score: 1033.6
    I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of ‘‘blue-sky’’ knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in ‘‘tangible’’ or ‘‘concrete’’ social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are (...)
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  7. Frederick Kraenzel (1991). Does Reason Command Itself for its Own Sake? Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (3):263-270.score: 771.0
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  8. Alan Ryan (2002). Does Inequality Matter—for its Own Sake? Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (1):225-243.score: 628.8
    This is a simple essay. It raises a familiar question about equality, adduces a very small amount of empirical evidence about the social consequences of equality as distinct from prosperity, and broods on the difficulty of providing a really persuasive answer to the question raised. I begin with the view that there simply cannot be anything intrinsically wrong with inequality, move on to the view that there are extrinsic reasons for anxiety, dividing these into conceptual and empirical reasons, though without (...)
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  9. Adam Nguyen & Juan Meng (2013). Whether and to What Extent Consumers Demand Fair Pricing Behavior for Its Own Sake. Journal of Business Ethics 114 (3):529-547.score: 628.8
    This article contributes to scholarly understanding of the significance of procedural fairness in pricing contexts. It has been widely recognized that price fairness judgments concern both the outcome (fair price) and the procedure leading to the outcome (fair pricing). However, extant research has traditionally viewed procedural fairness as a means to outcome fairness. According to this instrumental view, procedural fairness is a component or antecedent of outcome fairness, but has no direct effects on consumers’ responses to prices. Building on the (...)
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  10. Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 115.score: 609.6
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  11. Steve Fuller (2010). History of Science for its Own Sake? History of the Human Sciences 23 (4):95-99.score: 604.8
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  12. T. S. Champlin (1987). Doing Something for Its Own Sake. Philosophy 62 (239):31 - 47.score: 604.8
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  13. Richard Taylor (1995). The Utilitarian Fallacy. Argumentation 9 (4):531-541.score: 604.8
    The utilitarian fallacy, most egregiously committed by J. S. Mill but perpetuated ever since, consists of supposing that “pleasure”, being a noun, is, in every true statement in which it occurs, the name of a feeling, and that “pleasant”, in any such statement, means that whatever is so described is conducive to that feeling. In fact, “pleasant” is more commonly used as a positive term of appraisal, indicating that the thing so described is liked, and usually liked for its own (...)
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  14. Maryann P. Feldman & Pierre Desrochers (2004). Truth for Its Own Sake: Academic Culture and Technology Transfer at Johns Hopkins University. Minerva 42 (2):105-126.score: 604.8
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  15. John Ladd (1958). On the Desire to Do One's Duty for Its Own Sake. In A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of Washington Press.score: 604.8
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  16. Patrick Giddy (2012). The Ideal of African Scholarship and its Implications for Introductory Philosophy: The Example of Placide Tempels. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):504-516.score: 567.0
    Thinking of an academic discipline in terms of a ‘social practice’ (MacIntyre) helps in formulating what the ideal captured in the slogan ‘African scholarship’ can contribute to the discipline. For every practice is threatened by the attractiveness of goods external to the practice – in particular, competitiveness for its own sake – and to counter this virtues of character are needed. African traditional culture prioritizes a normative picture of the human person which could very well contribute here to upholding (...)
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  17. B. J. C. Madison (forthcoming). Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 462.0
    In this paper I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming (...)
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  18. Jonas Olson (2004). Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism About Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.score: 462.0
    The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus (...)
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  19. Jonas Olson (2003). Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.score: 435.0
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different (...)
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  20. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397 - 411.score: 434.0
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter ), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers , which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s- (...) attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued that one of these kinds is particularly difficult to include in an analysis of value simpliciter but not in an analysis of value for. (shrink)
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  21. Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 432.0
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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  22. John A. Bailey (1979). On Intrinsic Value. Philosophia 9 (1):1-8.score: 432.0
    Intrinsic value is differentiated from extrinsic, And assumed to be an empirical characteristic. Then six definitional hypotheses are introduced as to what "x has intrinsic value" means. Under examination, All collapse but d5. In d5, "x has intrinsic value" means "x is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake." d5's relations to ethical hedonism are next examined. Last, Moore's objection, That what one likes intrinsically, One may believe to be bad or not good (...)
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  23. Andrews Reath (2003). Value and Law in Kant's Moral Theory. Ethics 114 (1):127-155.score: 432.0
    Paul Guyer’s Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a collection of essays written over a period of ten years on the roles of freedom, reason, law, and happiness in Kant’s practical philosophy. The centrality of these concepts has always been acknowledged, but Guyer proposes a different way to understand their interconnections. Kant extols respect for moral law and conformity to moral principle for its own sake while at the same time celebrating the value of human freedom and (...)
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  24. Gurpreet Rattan (2008). On the Value and Nature of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:235-251.score: 432.0
    The thought that truth is valuable for its own sake is obvious, yet difficult to explicate in a precise and vindicating way. The paper tries to explicate and vindicate this thought with an argument for the conclusion that truth is an epistemic value. Truth is an epistemic value in the sense that a commitment to the value of truth plays a role in the justification and explanation of a fundamental aspect of our epistemic practice, namely, critical (...)
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  25. Michael J. Zimmerman (2001). The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Rowman and Littlefield.score: 432.0
    At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other (...)
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  26. Simon P. James (2003). Zen Buddhism and the Intrinsic Value of Nature. Contemporary Buddhism 4 (2):143-157.score: 432.0
    It is a perennial theme in the literature on environmental ethics that the exploitation of the environment is the result of a blindness to (or perhaps a refusal to recognize) the intrinsic value of natural beings. The general story here is that Western traditions of thought have tended to accord natural beings value only to the extent that they prove useful to humans, that they have tended to see nature as only instrumentally valuable. By contrast, it is said (...)
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  27. Jennifer Whiting (2002). Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):270-290.score: 420.0
    Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value. This raises problems about how to reconcile Aristotle's requirement with (a) the fact that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves (usually benefits to others); and (b) Aristotle's apparent requirement that everything (including virtuous action) be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia. I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of (...)
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  28. Lubomira Radoilska (2008). Truthfulness and Business. Journal of Business Ethics 79 (1/2):21 - 28.score: 417.0
    According to a common assumption, truthfulness cannot have an intrinsic value in business. Instead, it is considered only instrumentally valuable for business, because it contributes to successful trust-building. Some authors deny truthfulness even this limited role by claiming that truth-telling is not an essential part of business, which is a sui generis practice like poker. In this article, I argue that truthfulness has indeed an intrinsic value in business and identify the conceptual confusions underlying the opposite view. My (...)
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  29. Yingying Tang & Lei Zhong (2013). Toward a Demystification of Egalitarianism. Philosophical Forum 44 (2):149-163.score: 417.0
    The opponents of egalitarianism insist that distributional equality can never have intrinsic value, because it is hard to find how equal distribution could benefit people intrinsically. In this paper, we attempt to demystify the intrinsic value of distributional equality and suggest a possible direction of vindicating egalitarianism. First, we propose the principle that it is (epistemically) reasonable to regard x as an intrinsic value for a person S if S rationally desires x for its own sake. (...)
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  30. Jeffrey Ketland (2003). Can a Many-Valued Language Functionally Represent its Own Semantics? Analysis 63 (4):292–297.score: 415.2
    Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem can be generalized so that it applies to many-valued languages. We introduce a notion of strong semantic self-representation applicable to any (sufficiently rich) interpreted many-valued language L. A sufficiently rich interpreted many-valued language L is SSSR just in case it has a function symbol n(x) such that, for any f Sent(L), the denotation of the term n(“f”) in L is precisely ||f||L, the semantic value of f in L. By a simple diagonal construction (finding a sentence (...)
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  31. Ben Rogers (ed.) (2004). Is Nothing Sacred? Routledge.score: 394.0
    "I do feel a sense of the sacred in a number of respects and I could quote other scientists who feel the same." Richard Dawkins We call many things sacred, from cows, churches and paintings to flags and burial grounds. Is it still meaningful to talk of things being sacred, or is the idea merely a relic of a bygone religious age? Does everything--and every life--have its price? Is Nothing Sacred? is a stimulating and wide-ranging debate about some of the (...)
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  32. Allan Greenbaum (2005). Nature Connoisseurship. Environmental Values 14 (3):389 - 407.score: 393.0
    Environmentalists who seek to protect wild nature, biodiversity and so on for its own sake manifest a disposition to value the interesting at least on par with the useful. This disposition toward the interesting, which provides the affective and cognitive context for the discovery of intrinsic values in nature and the elaboration of ecocentric ethics, does not arise simply from learning about nature but is part of a more general socially inculcated cultural system. Nature connoisseurship exhibits formal parallels (...)
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  33. Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Wisdom and Curiosity? I Remember Them Well. The Times Higher Education Supplement (1,488):14.score: 390.0
    Academic inquiry has two basic inter-related aims. One is to explore intellectually aspects of our world of intrinsic interest and value, for its own sake, and to encourage non-academics to participate in such exploration, thus improving our knowledge and understanding. The other is, by intellectual means, to help humanity solve its problems of living, so that a more peaceful, just, democratic and environmentally enlightened world may be attained. Both are at present betrayed.
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  34. Thaddeus Metz (2013). Two Conceptions of African Ethics. Quest 25:141-61.score: 388.0
    I focus on D A Masolo’s discussion of morality as characteristically understood by African philosophers. My goals are both historical and substantive, meaning that I use reflection on Masolo’s book as an occasion to shed light not only on the nature of recent debates about African ethics, but also on African ethics itself. With regard to history, I argue that Masolo’s discussion of sub-Saharan morality suggests at least two major ways that the field has construed it, depending on which (...) is taken to be basic and which ones are deemed derivative. According to one perspective, the ultimate aim of a moral agent should be to improve people’s quality of life, which she can reliably do by supporting community in certain ways, while the other view is that community should instead be valued for its own sake, with the enhancement of welfare being morally relevant only insofar as it is part of that. I claim that Masolo does not indicate a clear awareness of how these two perspectives differ and is not explicit about how they relate to one another. After pointing out that Masolo is not alone in these respects, I draw what is meant to be a definitive, clear distinction between the two major ethical philosophies. Then, I provide what I deem to be conclusive reason to prefer the community- based conception of sub-Saharan ethics to the welfare-based one. (shrink)
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  35. Keqian Xu (1997). The Unique Features of Hui Shi's Thought: A Comparative Study Between Hui Shi and Other Pre-Qin Philosophers. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24 (2):231-253.score: 387.0
    Hui Shi (370-310B.C.E.?) is a unique one among the pre-Qin scholars. The object and orientation of his scholarship emphasized on “chasing after the materials” or the research for objective knowledge of natural things. He shows a tendency of tolerating and advocating diversity and variety, and intentionally pursuing new and unusual ideas. In certain degree he judges the value of knowledge by its truthfulness rather than its usefulness. As pointed out by Wing-tsit Chan, Hui shi represents a “tendency in ancient (...)
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  36. Robert Adams, Well-Being and Excellence.score: 387.0
    We have noted some fundamental distinctions between types of goodness or value. There is usefulness, or merely instrumental goodness, the value that something may have as a means to something else that is good or that is valued. Usefulness has an obvious importance, and connects with significant philosophical issues about instrumentality and probability; but more fundamental issues for ethical theory are posed by the goods or ends that the useful is to serve. Within the realm of what is (...)
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  37. Béatrice Han-Pile (2011). Nietzsche and Amor Fati. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):224-261.score: 387.0
    Abstract: This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity for us) and this, in the knowledge that our love will not modify our fate. Thus such love may seem impossible or pointless. I analyse the distinction between two different sorts of love (eros and agape) and the type of valuation they involve (in the first case, the object is loved (...)
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  38. Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.score: 387.0
    The purpose of this paper is to present a new argument against so-called fitting attitude analyses of intrinsic value, according to which, roughly, for something to be intrinsically good is for there to be reasons to want it for its own sake. The argument is indirect. First, I submit that advocates of a fitting-attitude analysis of value should, for the sake of theoretical unity, also endorse a fitting-attitude analysis of a closely related but distinct concept: the (...)
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  39. Tim O'Keefe (2002). The Cyrenaics on Pleasure, Happiness, and Future-Concern. Phronesis 47 (4):395-416.score: 387.0
    The Cyrenaics assert that (1) particular pleasure is the highest good, and happiness is valued not for its own sake, but only for the sake of the particular pleasures that compose it; (2) we should not forego present pleasures for the sake of obtaining greater pleasure in the future. Their anti-eudaimonism and lack of future-concern do not follow from their hedonism. So why do they assert (1) and (2)? After reviewing and criticizing the proposals put forward by (...)
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  40. Marek Piechowiak (1999). Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich międzynarodowej ochrony. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL.score: 387.0
    PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an application (...)
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  41. Alan Levinovitz (2012). The Zhuangzi and You 遊: Defining an Ideal Without Contradiction. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (4):479-496.score: 387.0
    You 遊 is a crucial term for understanding the Zhuangzi . Translated as “play,” “free play,” and “wandering,” it is usually defined as an ideal, playful Zhuangzian way of being. There are two problems with this definition. The first is logical: the Zhuangzi cannot consistently recommend playfulness as an ideal, since doing so vitiates the essence of you —it becomes an ethical imperative instead of an activity freely undertaken for its own sake. The second problem is performative: arguments for (...)
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  42. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Roman Ingarden. Ontology From a Phenomenological Point of View. Reports on Philosophy 22:121-142.score: 387.0
    Ontology is doubtless the most important part of Roman Ingarden’s (1893-1970) philosophy. Contrary to Husserl, Ingarden always believed that any serious philosophical investigation must involve an ontological basis and he tried to formulate a solid ontological framework for his philosophy. There are several reasons why this ontology deserves our attention. For those who are interested in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Ingarden’s ontology could be treated as an ingenious attempt to analyse the conceptual structure and hidden ontological assumptions of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (...)
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  43. Chenchulakshmi Kolla (2008). Some Perspectives on Business Ethics. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:89-96.score: 387.0
    Mahatma Gandhi inculcated and lived a value-based life in spite of the human limitations to live a perfect moral life. The seven social sins that he has listed are as follows: Politics without principle, Wealth without wor, Pleasure without conscience, Knowledge without character, Commerce without morality, Science without humanity, and Worship without sacrifice. The second and the fifth, get special attention in the context of the present issue on Business Ethics. It is a recognised aspect of social ethics that (...)
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  44. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (1999). Human Flourishing. Cambridge University Press.score: 384.0
    The essays in this volume examine the nature of human flourishing and its relationship to a variety of other key concepts in moral theory. Some of them trace the link between flourishing and human nature, asking whether a theory of human nature can allow us to develop an objective list of goods that are of value to all agents, regardless of their individual purposes or aims. Some essays look at the role of friendships or parent-child relationships in a good (...)
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  45. Brett W. Schultz (2011). Gonzo Strategies of Deceit: An Interview with Joaquin Segura. Continent 1 (2):117-124.score: 384.0
    Joaquin Segura. Untitled (fig. 40) . 2007 continent. 1.2 (2011): 117-124. The interview that follows is a dialogue between artist and gallerist with the intent of unearthing the artist’s working strategies for a general public. Joaquin Segura is at once an anomaly in Mexico’s contemporary art scene at the same time as he is one of the most emblematic representatives of a larger shift toward a post-national identity among its youngest generation of artists. If Mexico looks increasingly like a foreclosed (...)
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  46. Timothy Morton (2011). Objects as Temporary Autonomous Zones. Continent 1 (3):149-155.score: 381.0
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...)
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  47. Christina Hendricks (2008). Foucault's Kantian Critique: Philosophy and the Present. Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (4):357-382.score: 375.0
    In several lectures, interviews and essays from the early 1980s, Michel Foucault startlingly argues that he is engaged in a kind of critical work that is similar to that of Immanuel Kant. Given Foucault's criticisms of Kantian and Enlightenment emphases on universal truths and values, his declaration that his work is Kantian seems paradoxical. I agree with some commentators who argue that this is a way for Foucault to publicly acknowledge to his critics that he is not, as some of (...)
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  48. Nicholas Stang (2012). Artworks Are Not Valuable for Their Own Sake. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (3):271-280.score: 369.6
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  49. Greg Moses (2013). A Compass for Valuation: Peircean Realism in Alain Locke's Functional Theory of Value. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 27 (4):402-424.score: 336.0
    Thanks largely to the efforts of Leonard Harris and scholars affiliated with the Alain Locke Society, Alain LeRoy Locke has for the past few decades been reconstructed as a "critical pragmatist" (see Carter and Harris 2010; Harris 1989, 1999). By Locke's own account, the "activist theory of knowledge" advanced by American pragmatism was a worthwhile innovation that had yet to become activist enough in its value theory (Harris 1989, 8). In pursuit of what we today term his critical pragmatism, (...)
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  50. Meena Krishnamurthy (2012). Reconceiving Rawls's Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair Value. Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):258-278.score: 324.0
    Few have discussed Rawls's arguments for the value of democracy. This is because his arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty should include democratic liberties, are incomplete. Rawls says little about the inclusion of political liberties of a democratic sort – such as the right to vote – among the basic liberties. And, at times, what he does say is unconvincing. My aim is to complete and, where they fail, to reconceive Rawls's arguments and to show (...)
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