Search results for 'voluntary action' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Benjamin W. Libet (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  2.  60
    Hanoch Ben-Yami (2014). Voluntary Action and Neural Causation. Cognitive Neuroscience 5:217-218.
    I agree with Nachev and Hacker’s general approach. However, their criticism of claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened. I first say a few words on what voluntary action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the determination of voluntariness. I then turn to Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of possible covert automaticity and show why the case for it is weaker than they allow.
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  3.  43
    John Ladd (1952). Free Will and Voluntary Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (March):392-405.
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  4.  93
    Conor McHugh (2011). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
    Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth (...)
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  5.  16
    Monte Ransome Johnson (2013). Nature, Spontaneity, and Voluntary Action in Lucretius. In Daryn Lehoux, A. D. Morrison & Alison Sharrock (eds.), Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science. Oxford University Press
    In twenty important passages located throughout De rerum natura, Lucretius refers to natural things happening spontaneously (sponte sua; the Greek term is automaton). The most important of these uses include his discussion of the causes of: nature, matter, and the cosmos in general; the generation and adaptation of plants and animals; the formation of images and thoughts; and the behavior of human beings and the development of human culture. In this paper I examine the way spontaneity functions as a cause (...)
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  6. Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) (2003). Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.
    We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. Yet, performing and action and defining it are different matters. What counts as an action? When does it begin? Does the conscious desire to perform an action always precede the act? If not, is it really a voluntary action? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of (...)
     
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  7.  15
    Tomas Ekenberg (2015). Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):215-230.
    Anselm of Canterbury holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De (...)
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  8.  28
    Patrick Haggard & Henry C. Johnson (2003). Experiences of Voluntary Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):72-84.
    Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has (...)
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  9.  12
    Patrick Haggard & Helen Johnson (2003). Experiences of Voluntary Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has (...)
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  10.  7
    Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol (2015). Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the (...)
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  11.  7
    Bernhard Hommel (2003). Acquisition and Control of Voluntary Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press 34--48.
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  12. Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras (2002). Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness. Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.
  13. Judy Trevena & Jeff Miller (2010). Brain Preparation Before a Voluntary Action: Evidence Against Unconscious Movement Initiation. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):447-456.
    Benjamin Libet has argued that electrophysiological signs of cortical movement preparation are present before people report having made a conscious decision to move, and that these signs constitute evidence that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously. This controversial conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the electrophysiological signs recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl are associated only with preparation for movement. We tested that assumption by comparing the electrophysiological signs before a decision to move with signs present before a (...)
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  14. Modesto Gómez-Alonso (2016). Wittgenstein on the Will and Voluntary Action. In Jesús Padilla Gálvez (ed.), Action, Decision-Making and Forms of Life. De Gruyter 77-108.
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  15. Nelson Pike (1965). Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action. Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
  16. Herbert H. Jasper (1985). Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Experience and Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):543-543.
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  17. Robert Heinaman (1988). Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the Eudemian Ethics. Noûs 22 (2):253-281.
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  18.  42
    Jeanette Kennett, Addiction, Choice, and Disease : How Voluntary is Voluntary Action in Addiction?
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  19. M. J. Edwards (1996). Book Reviews : Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia by T.D.J. Chappell. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995. 214pp.Hb. 40. [REVIEW] Studies in Christian Ethics 9 (2):80-83.
  20.  22
    Edmund Wall (2001). Voluntary Action. Philosophia 28 (1-4):127-136.
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  21. David J. Furley (1967). Two Studies in the Greek Atomists: Study I, Indivisible Magnitudes; Study Ii, Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.
  22.  4
    Wolfgang Prinz (1997). Explaining Voluntary Action: The Role of Mental Content. In P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz 153--175.
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  23. Bernard J. Baars (1987). What is Conscious in the Control of Action? A Modern Ideomotor Theory of Voluntary Action. In D. Gorfein & Robert R. Hoffman (eds.), Learning and Memory: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum
  24.  16
    Robert Segal (1982). Pike on Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action. New Scholasticism 56 (3):329-339.
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  25.  12
    Stephen A. White (1991). Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action. Ancient Philosophy 11 (2):455-459.
  26.  22
    M. W. F. Stone (1997). T. D. J. Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.) Pp. 214, £40 Hb. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 33 (1):121-130.
  27.  14
    Trevor J. Saunders (1988). Epicurus' Swerve W. G. Englert: Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action. (American Philological Association: American Classical Studies, 16.) Pp. X + 215; 5 Diagrams in the Text. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1987. $21.95 (Members, $15), Paper, $12.95 (Members, $9). [REVIEW] The Classical Review 38 (02):284-286.
  28.  15
    Thomas J. Donaldson (1978). A Mistake in Anscombe's Account of Voluntary Action. Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (4):307-310.
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  29.  15
    G. F. Stout (1896). Voluntary Action. Mind 5 (19):354-366.
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  30.  10
    Robert Heinaman (1986). The Eudemian Ethics on Knowledge and Voluntary Action. Phronesis 31 (1):128-147.
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  31.  3
    J. S. Mann, Pasco Daphne & Bernard Bosanquet (1889). Symposium: What Takes Place in Voluntary Action? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 (2):61 - 76.
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  32. Elizabeth Asmis (1990). Free Action and the Swerve: Review of Walter G. Englert, "Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action". [REVIEW] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8:275.
  33. Jerome S. Bruner (1969). On Voluntary Action and its Hierarchical Structure* Jerome S. Bruner. In Arthur Koestler & John R. Smythies (eds.), Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences. London, Hutchinson 161.
     
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  34. T. D. J. Chappell (1995). Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action, and Akrasia. St. Martin's Press.
  35. Barbara Cruikshank (2007). Neopolitics : Voluntary Action in the New Regieme. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan 146.
     
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  36. E. Eliasson (2009). Magna Moralia 1187a29-1187b20: The Early Reception of Aristotles Notion of Voluntary Action. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 37:213 - 244.
  37. Walter Leszl (1991). Walter G. Englert, "Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action". [REVIEW] Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 46 (2):376.
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  38. Morten Overgaard (2003). Voluntary Action. Science and Consciousness Review 8:1-2.
     
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  39. Jeffrey S. Purinton (1990). Walter G. Englert, "Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action". [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1):123.
  40. Mariana Valverde (2007). Neopolitics : Voluntary Action in the New Regime. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-?-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan
     
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  41. Thomas Joseph White (2005). The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision. The Thomist 69 (4):497-534.
     
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  42. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing (...)
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  43.  5
    Jim Parkinson & Patrick Haggard (2013). Hedonic Value of Intentional Action Provides Reinforcement for Voluntary Generation but Not Voluntary Inhibition of Action. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1253-1261.
    Intentional inhibition refers to stopping oneself from performing an action at the last moment, a vital component of self-control. It has been suggested that intentional inhibition is associated with negative hedonic value, perhaps due to the frustration of cancelling an intended action. Here we investigate hedonic implications of the free choice to act or inhibit. Participants gave aesthetic ratings of arbitrary visual stimuli that immediately followed voluntary decisions to act or to inhibit action. We found that (...)
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  44.  2
    R. C. Davis (1942). The Pattern of Muscular Action in Simple Voluntary Movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology 31 (5):347.
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  45.  1
    Richard Jung (1985). Voluntary Intention and Conscious Selection in Complex Learned Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):544-545.
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  46.  6
    T. D. J. Chappell (1995). Reason, Passion, and Action: The Third Condition of the Voluntary. Philosophy 70 (273):453 - 459.
    1. ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them.’ 2.3.3) Unfortunately, Hume uses ‘reason’ to mean ‘discovery of truth or falsehood‘ as well as discovery of logical relations. So suppose we avoid, as Hume I think does not, prejudging the question of how many ingredients are requisite for action, by separating these two claims out: A. Reason is and ought only to be (...)
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  47.  16
    J. Lauwereyns (2006). Voluntary Control of Unavoidable Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):47-49.
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  48.  3
    Magnus Jiborn, Voluntary Coercion. Collective Action and the Social Contract.
    This work provides a game theoretical analysis of the classical idea of a social contract. According to what we might call the Hobbesian justification of the state, coercion is necessary in order to provide people with basic security and to enable them to successfully engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. The establishment and maintenance of a central coercive power, i.e. a state, can therefore be said to be in everyone's interest. The aim of this essay is to examine and evaluate these (...)
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  49. T. D. J. Chappell (1995). Reason, Passion, and Action: The Third Condition of the Voluntary. Philosophy 70 (273):453.
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  50. Kenneth J. Gergen (2007). From Voluntary to Relational Action : Responsibility in Question. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan
     
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