Search results for 'voluntary action' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Benjamin W. Libet (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.score: 78.0
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  2. John Ladd (1952). Free Will and Voluntary Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (March):392-405.score: 75.0
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  3. Conor McHugh (2011). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.score: 66.0
    Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth (...)
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  4. Rico Fischer Dorit Wenke (2013). Anticipation and the Control of Voluntary Action. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 66.0
    Anticipation and the control of voluntary action.
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  5. Monte Ransome Johnson (2013). Nature, Spontaneity, and Voluntary Action in Lucretius. In Daryn Lehoux, A. D. Morrison & Alison Sharrock (eds.), Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science. Oxford University Press.score: 63.0
    In twenty important passages located throughout De rerum natura, Lucretius refers to natural things happening spontaneously (sponte sua; the Greek term is automaton). The most important of these uses include his discussion of the causes of: nature, matter, and the cosmos in general; the generation and adaptation of plants and animals; the formation of images and thoughts; and the behavior of human beings and the development of human culture. In this paper I examine the way spontaneity functions as a cause (...)
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  6. Bernhard Hommel (2003). Acquisition and Control of Voluntary Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press. 34--48.score: 60.0
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  7. Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) (2003). Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. Yet, performing and action and defining it are different matters. What counts as an action? When does it begin? Does the conscious desire to perform an action always precede the act? If not, is it really a voluntary action? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of (...)
     
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  8. Florian Waszak Simone Kühn, Ruth Seurinck, Wim Fias (2010). The Internal Anticipation of Sensory Action Effects: When Action Induces FFA and PPA Activity. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 4.score: 54.0
    Voluntary action – in particular the ability to produce desired effects in the environment – is fundamental to human existence. According to ideomotor theory we can achieve goals in the environment by means of anticipating their outcomes. We aimed at providing neurophysiological evidence for the assumption that performing actions calls for the activation of brain areas associated with the sensory effects usually evoked by the actions. We conducted an fMRI study in which right and left button presses lead (...)
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  9. Ezequiel Morsella T. Andrew Poehlman, Tiffany K. Jantz (2012). Adaptive Skeletal Muscle Action Requires Anticipation and “Conscious Broadcasting”. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 54.0
    Historically, the conscious and anticipatory processes involved in voluntary action have been associated with the loftiest heights of nervous function. Concepts like mental time travel, ‘theory of mind,’ and the formation of the ‘self’ have been at the center of many attempts to determine the purpose of consciousness. Eventually, more reductionistic accounts of consciousness emerged, proposing rather that conscious states play a much more basic role in nervous function. Though the widely held ‘integration consensus’ proposes that conscious states (...)
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  10. Keith Hossack (2003). Consciousness in Act and Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.score: 48.0
    This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions (...)
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  11. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.score: 48.0
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing (...)
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  12. Nelson Pike (1965). Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action. Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.score: 45.0
  13. Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras (2002). Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness. Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.score: 45.0
  14. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window Onto Agentive Self-Awareness. Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.score: 45.0
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...)
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  15. Judy Trevena & Jeff Miller (2010). Brain Preparation Before a Voluntary Action: Evidence Against Unconscious Movement Initiation. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):447-456.score: 45.0
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  16. Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.score: 45.0
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional (...)
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  17. Patrick Haggard & Henry C. Johnson (2003). Experiences of Voluntary Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.score: 45.0
  18. M. W. F. Stone (1997). T. D. J. Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.) Pp. 214, £40 Hb. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 33 (1):121-130.score: 45.0
  19. Robert Heinaman (1988). Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the Eudemian Ethics. Noûs 22 (2):253-281.score: 45.0
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  20. M. J. Edwards (1996). Book Reviews : Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia by T.D.J. Chappell. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995. 214pp.Hb. 40. [REVIEW] Studies in Christian Ethics 9 (2):80-83.score: 45.0
  21. Thomas J. Donaldson (1978). A Mistake in Anscombe's Account of Voluntary Action. Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (4):307-310.score: 45.0
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  22. G. F. Stout (1896). Voluntary Action. Mind 5 (19):354-366.score: 45.0
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  23. Robert Segal (1982). Pike on Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action. New Scholasticism 56 (3):329-339.score: 45.0
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  24. Robert Heinaman (1986). The Eudemian Ethics on Knowledge and Voluntary Action. Phronesis 31 (1):128-147.score: 45.0
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  25. Robert D. Heslep (2012). Education for Computers. Studies in Philosophy and Education 31 (4):357-364.score: 45.0
    The computer engineers who refer to the education of computers do not have a definite idea of education and do not bother to justify the fuzzy ones to which they allude. Hence, they logically cannot specify the features a computer must have in order to be educable. This paper puts forth a non-standard, but not arbitrary, concept of education that determines such traits. The proposed concept is derived from the idea of education embedded in modern standard-English discourse. Because the standard (...)
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  26. Edmund Wall (2001). Voluntary Action. Philosophia 28 (1-4):127-136.score: 45.0
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  27. Stephen A. White (1991). Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action. Ancient Philosophy 11 (2):455-459.score: 45.0
  28. Bednark Jeff, Steffens Michelle & Cunnington Ross (2013). Shifts in Spatial Attention Predict Decisions for Voluntary Action. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 45.0
  29. The Editor (1896). Voluntary Action. Mind 5 (19):354-366.score: 45.0
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  30. John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal Tognazzini (2009). Nelson Pike,'Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action'(1965). Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.score: 45.0
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  31. Harold Bekkering Sasha Ondobaka (2012). Hierarchy of Idea-Guided Action and Perception-Guided Movement. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 45.0
    The ideomotor theory of voluntary behavior assumes that the selection and control of a concrete goal-directed movement depends on imagining its direct perceptual consequences. However, this perception-guided assumption neglects the fact that behavioral control entails a hierarchical mechanism wherein conceptual expectations - action goals - can modulate lower level perceptuo-motor representations. In this paper, we focus on the hierarchical nature of voluntary behavior by distinguishing between perceptual representations of images that relate to attainment of concrete movement goals (...)
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  32. Trevor J. Saunders (1988). Epicurus' Swerve W. G. Englert: Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action. (American Philological Association: American Classical Studies, 16.) Pp. X + 215; 5 Diagrams in the Text. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1987. $21.95 (Members, $15), Paper, $12.95 (Members, $9). [REVIEW] The Classical Review 38 (02):284-286.score: 45.0
  33. Bernard J. Baars (1987). What is Conscious in the Control of Action? A Modern Ideomotor Theory of Voluntary Action. In D. Gorfein & Robert R. Hoffman (eds.), Learning and Memory: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 45.0
  34. Jerome S. Bruner (1969). On Voluntary Action and its Hierarchical Structure* Jerome S. Bruner. In. In Arthur Koestler & John R. Smythies (eds.), Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences. London, Hutchinson. 161.score: 45.0
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  35. T. D. J. Chappell (1995). Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action, and Akrasia. St. Martin's Press.score: 45.0
  36. Barbara Cruikshank (2007). Neopolitics : Voluntary Action in the New Regieme. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan. 146.score: 45.0
     
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  37. John Dilworth (forthcoming). Some Fundamental Philosophical Issues Might Best Be Resolved Together, in a Manner Initially Describable Within the Compass of a Short Article. Arguably Free Will, Voluntary Action, Control, Agency, Personhood and Consciousness Are Thus Treatable, Using No Ontological Concepts Beyond Those Involved in Explaining Two Levels of Evolutionarily Constrained Causation. Philosophical Frontiers: Essays and Emerging Thoughts.score: 45.0
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  38. E. Eliasson (2009). Magna Moralia 1187a29-1187b20: The Early Reception of Aristotles Notion of Voluntary Action. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 37:213 - 244.score: 45.0
     
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  39. Waszak Florian (2011). Increased Voluntary Action Preparation Facilitates Congruent Stimulus-Driven Responding. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 5.score: 45.0
  40. David J. Furley (1967). Two Studies in the Greek Atomists: Study I, Indivisible Magnitudes; Study Ii, Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.score: 45.0
  41. Patrick Haggard & Helen Johnson (2003). Experiences of Voluntary Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.score: 45.0
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  42. Herbert H. Jasper (1985). Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Experience and Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):543-543.score: 45.0
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  43. J. S. Mann, Pasco Daphne & Bernard Bosanquet (1889). Symposium: What Takes Place in Voluntary Action? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 (2):61 - 76.score: 45.0
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  44. Morten Overgaard (2003). Voluntary Action. Science and Consciousness Review 8:1-2.score: 45.0
     
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  45. Wolfgang Prinz (1997). Explaining Voluntary Action: The Role of Mental Content. In P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz. 153--175.score: 45.0
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  46. Mariana Valverde (2007). Neopolitics : Voluntary Action in the New Regime. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-?-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan.score: 45.0
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  47. Miguel Vásquez (2012). Intencionalidad, libre albedrío y acción racional: un acercamiento a las posturas de John Searle y Anthony Kenny. Apuntes Filosóficos 20 (38):89-102.score: 45.0
    Resumen El presente trabajo pretende revisar el concepto de intencionalidad de John Searle a la luz de la noción de objetividad de García-Carpintero así como la concepción de libre arbitrio que de dicho concepto podría llegar a desprenderse. Asimismo, y con el fin de esclarecer qué podría entenderse por acción voluntaria nos valdremos de algunos comentarios hechos por Kenny en los cuales el autor intenta explicar qué es exactamente eso que solemos llamar una acción racional. Palabras clave: intencionalidad; objetividad;libre arbitrio;acción (...)
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  48. Thomas Joseph White (2005). The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision. The Thomist 69 (4):497-534.score: 45.0
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  49. Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.score: 42.0
    This book deals with foundational issues in the history of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explanation of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a "simple" mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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  50. Bernhard Hommel (2013). Dancing in the Dark: No Role for Consciousness in Action Control. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 42.0
    Dancing in the dark: no role for consciousness in action control.
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