Why do war crimes occur? Are perpetrators of war crimes always blameworthy? In an original and challenging thesis, this book argues that war crimes are often explained by perpetrators' beliefs, goals, and values, and in these cases perpetrators may be blameworthy even if they sincerely believed that they were doing the right thing.

Larry May argues that the best way to understand war crimes is as crimes against humanness rather than as violations of justice. He shows that in a deeply pluralistic world, we need to understand the rules of war as the collective responsibility of states that send their citizens into harm's way, as the embodiment of humanity, and as the chief way for soldiers to retain a sense of honour on the battlefield. Throughout, May demonstrates that the principle of (...) humanness is the cornerstone of international humanitarian law, and is itself the basis of the traditional principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality. He draws extensively on the older Just War tradition to assess recent cases from the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia as well as examples of atrocities from the archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. (shrink)

War crimes are being committed in Ukraine today, but who should be held responsible? By looking at the literature on responsibility and violence by Philippa Foot and John Harris, this article argues that there are grounds for holding Vladimir Putin responsible for war crimes in Ukraine, even if he did not give the command for these crimes and other atrocities to be carried out.

In December 2019, President Trump pardoned Eddie Gallagher, a Navy Seal convicted of war crimes committed while serving in Iraq in 2017. Did Gallagher commit these crimes because he is a bad person, or were his actions the result of situational factors, such as stress and fatigue? These different explanations of Gallagher’s crimes reflect two ways of thinking about the causes of war crimes and how to prevent them: character-based views and situationist accounts. Character-based views attribute (...) war crimes to failures of individual military personnel to live up to military virtues, whereas situationist accounts focus on external factors (such as battlefield stress) as the primary cause of war crimes. While both situationist and character accounts highlight important aspects of the causes of war crimes, in this article I argue that they do not account for the fact that war crimes can (and have) come to be seen as compatible with military virtues. By not acknowledging this fact, these accounts of war crimes fail to address the fact that some of the most egregious war crimes occurred not because military personnel failed to embody the military virtues of their institution, but because they embodied them all too well. (shrink)

In a paper published in 2006, I argued that the best way of defending something like our current practices of punishing war criminals would be to base the justification of this practice on an expressive theory of punishment. I considered two forms that such a justification could take—a ‘denunciatory’ account, on which the purpose of punishment is supposed to communicate a commitment to certain kinds of standard to individuals other than the criminal and a ‘communicative’ account, on which the purpose (...) of the punishment is to communicate with the perpetrator, and argued for a denunciatory account which I developed at some length. In this paper I would like to reconsider the plausibility of a communicative account. One difficulty that such accounts face is that the punishment of war criminals often involves the inflicting of harsh treatment on them by individuals who are members of states other than their own. On a communicative account this is problematic: on such an account—or at least on the version of it proposed by Duff (2000)—it is essential that those who are punish and those who punish them belong to a single community. When this requirement is not satisfied harsh treatment does not constitute punishment. Duff has argued that the problem can be solved by regarding all human beings as members of a single moral community: here I argue that this suggestion is unsatisfactory and propose an alternative. One consequence of my account is that if it is correct there may limitations on the range of kinds of war criminal that can legitimately be punished by international tribunals. (shrink)

This timely volume addresses urgent questions about the nature of war crimes, nationalism, ethnic cleansing and collective responsibility from a variety of moral, political and legal perspectives.

The “asymmetry myth” is that war crimes are committed by one's enemies but never, or hardly ever, by one's own combatants. The myth involves not only a common failure to acknowledge our own actual war crimes but also inadequate reactions when we are forced to recognize them. It contributes to the high likelihood that wars, just or unjust in their causes, will have a high moral cost. This cost, moreover, is a matter needing consideration in the jus ante (...) bellum circumstances of preparedness for war as well as of conduct within it. As part of the symposium on Ned Dobos's book, Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, I will argue that the strength of the asymmetry myth is sustained by certain forms of romantic nationalism linked to the glamorization of military endeavor. (shrink)

What do we know about war crimes and justice? What are the discursive practices through which the dominant images of war crimes, atrocity and justice are understood? In this wide ranging text, Michael J. Shapiro contrasts the justice-related imagery of the war crimes trial with?literary justice?: representations in literature, film, and biographical testimony, raising questions about atrocities and justice that juridical proceedings exclude. By engaging with the ambiguities exposed by the artistic and experiential genres, reading them alongside (...) policy and archival documentation and critical theoretical discourses, Shapiro?s War Crimes, Atrocity, and Justice challenges traditional notions of?responsibility? in juridical settings. His comparative readings instead encourage a focus on the conditions of possibility for war crimes as they arise from the actions of states, non-state agencies and individuals involved in arms trading, peace keeping, sex trafficking, and law enforcement and adjudication. Theory springs to life as Shapiro draws on examples from legal discourse, literature, media, film, and television, to build a nuanced picture of politics and the problem of justice. It will be of great interest to students of film and media, literature, cultural studies, contemporary philosophy and political science. (shrink)

What do we know about war crimes and justice? What are the discursive practices through which the dominant images of war crimes, atrocity and justice are understood? In this wide ranging text, Michael J. Shapiro contrasts the justice-related imagery of the war crimes trial with literary justice: representations in literature, film, and biographical testimony, raising questions about atrocities and justice that juridical proceedings exclude. By engaging with the ambiguities exposed by the artistic and experiential genres, reading them (...) alongside policy and archival documentation and critical theoretical discourses, Shapiros War Crimes, Atrocity, and Justice challenges traditional notions of responsibility in juridical settings. His comparative readings instead encourage a focus on the conditions of possibility for war crimes as they arise from the actions of states, non-state agencies and individuals involved in arms trading, peace keeping, sex trafficking, and law enforcement and adjudication. Theory springs to life as Shapiro draws on examples from legal discourse, literature, media, film, and television, to build a nuanced picture of politics and the problem of justice. It will be of great interest to students of film and media, literature, cultural studies, contemporary philosophy and political science. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a default presumption that punishment has some deterrent effect, and that the burden of proof is upon those who allege that the costs of any particular penal system are insufficient to offset its deterrent benefits. This burden of proof transmits to the discussion of international law, with the conclusion that it is those who oppose international jurisdiction, rather than their opponents, who must prove their position. This they have so far failed to do.

The civilian death toll during the Second World War Battle of Okinawa was very high. This was the result of sheer brutality resulting from racism and hatred, but also from unethical strategic decisions. This article chronicles decisions made on both sides – and accompanying actions – that arguably amount to crimes against humanity. In addition to the strategic decisions that contributed to the high death toll, actions such as rape, killing of surrendering soldiers, looting and mutilating the dead, and (...) failures to protect one's own civilian population are recounted and discussed. (shrink)

War, undoubtedly, is an arena of killing, struggle, and weakening the enemy. However, under no circumstances is it a place where any action can be tolerated. Despite the existence of rules and laws governing the behavior of warriors during war, certain actions are considered crimes and prohibited even in times of war. These actions are referred to as "war crimes" and are evaluated within the framework of international humanitarian law. While Islamic jurisprudence does not explicitly use the term (...) "war crimes," the concept and content are deeply rooted in Islamic fiqh books, particularly in sections discussing the ethics and manners of war and expeditions. Islamic law has established provisions and regulations that indicate that a warrior who desires any action during war is not free to do so. It has established strict rules and regulations that regulate the behavior of Muslims within the framework of organizing war and armed conflicts. The ethical rules developed by Islamic law extensively regulate how Muslims should behave during war and conflicts. Islamic law has identified certain categories that should not be targeted during war, and it distinguishes between whether it is legal or illegal to target combatants and non-combatants. The civilian population, as well as specific categories such as the wounded, are considered off-limits and protected. The civilian category includes all individuals who do not participate in war activities, including children, women, and the elderly. It is essential to protect them, ensure that they do not suffer harm, and uphold the principles of humanity. Furthermore, Islamic Sharia has provided rules that protect war captives. They are granted a special status, ensuring their protection and humane treatment. Torturing them or forcing them to convert to Islam is strictly prohibited. The fair treatment of captives and their humane treatment is mandated by Islamic law. It should be noted that Islamic law not only prohibits attacks on individuals but also considers targeting civilian property that is unused by the enemy or resembles a neutral party as a crime. These include places such as hospitals, places of worship, historical and archaeological sites. The historical experience of Islam presents the most significant reflection of these rules established by Islamic law. Throughout Islamic history, during the prophetic period and the subsequent caliphal conquests, Muslims adhered to these rules, and history has shown that Muslim wars were more humane. During these periods, respect for human rights was maintained towards the enemy, and war crimes were not committed. Islam, being a religion that prioritizes peace and justice, aims for wars to be conducted in a fair and humane manner. Thus, Islamic law has implemented significant regulations to protect civilian and military targets, ensure the humane treatment of war captives, and conduct war in a more humane manner. Islamic principles and legal rules aim to uphold respect for human values even during times of war. (shrink)

Genghis Khan is supposed to have said, “Man’s highest joy is victory: to conquer one’s enemies, to hunt them down, to deprive them of their possessions, to make their loved ones weep, and to bed their wives and daughters.” Today, no ruler would dare utter such sentiments, and what the Khan called man’s highest joy would now be condemned everywhere as crimes against humanity and “grave breaches”—lawyerspeak for the most serious war crimes. Nevertheless, the U.S. killed more civilians (...) in a few minutes at Hiroshima than the Golden Horde did in its ruthless conquest of China; and the last ten years alone have witnessed civil wars and genocides of nearly incomprehensible cruelty and atrocity. Whether we think of General Mladic handing out candy to Muslim children in Srebenica shortly after ordering thousands of their fathers and brothers shot, or doped-up child soldiers in Sierra Leone chopping the arms off other children, or Saddam Hussein gassing Kurdish villagers, we confront the perplexing phenomenon that the past half-century has combined an incredible outpouring of humanitarian laws, treaties, and declarations with levels of wartime criminality that may exceed those in the Thirty Years’ War. Any light that philosophers might shed on this grotesque disconnect between moral ideals and reality would be welcome. So would more focused inquiry on the moral basis of international humanitarian law, or on the distribution of blame among politicians, perpetrators, planners, and passive supporters of mass atrocities. (shrink)

This updated and revised second edition of Donald A. Wells's popular 'War Crimes and Laws of War', originally published in 1984, traces the rules of war since ancient times. The major sources of the rules or 'laws' of war are explored: the congresses of the Hague, Geneva, and the United Nations. But an abyss exists between what military manuals allow and what the congresses prohibit; this book attempts to resolve this dilemma. An important text for military college courses and (...) international relations, as well as social philosophy courses. Co-published with the North American Society for Social Philosophy. Here is what reviewers had to say about the first edition. (shrink)

This timely volume addresses urgent questions about the nature of war crimes, nationalism, ethnic cleansing and collective responsibility from a variety of moral, political and legal perspectives.

I want to ask you about a painting that hangs in your office. It’s rather gruesome. You’ve commented to me that mostly U.S. citizens don’t seem to know who it is, but most foreigners that come to visit you and see it recognize it immediately.

This paper examines the recent actions by the United States in Iraq in the light of just war principles, and sets forth a program for holding accountable those most responsible for war crimes in Iraq.

This chapter applies insights from the expressive theory of punishment to the case of the punishment of war criminals by international tribunals. Wringe argues that although such cases are not paradigmatic cases of punishment, the denunciatory account can still cast light on them. He argues that war criminals can be seen as members of an international community for which international tribunals can act as a spokesperson. He also argues that in justifying the punishment lof war criminals we should pay especial (...) attention to the expressive function of the trial. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to provide overview of the punishment of war crimes. It considers first the rationale of the law of war, the identification and scope of war crimes, and proceeds to consider the justification of punishing war crimes, arguing for a consequentialist view with side-constraints. It then considers the alternative of reconciliation.

This article argues in favor of holding leaders responsible for international crimes but also worries quite a bit about what would be a fair standard of mens rea for these leaders. Section 1 sets out the key facts of the case and the basis of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia Trial Chamber's conviction of General Tihomir Blaskic. Section 2 presents the basis of the ICTY Appeals Court's overruling of the Trial Chamber's decision. Section 3 focuses on the issue (...) of mens rea concerning those who command others to commit such crimes as the taking of hostages and the use of human shields. Section 4 sets out a limited argument in favor of negligence as a type of mens rea in international criminal law. Finally, section 5 discusses the relevance of the idea of the theory of joint criminal liability in such cases. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes one of the central assumptions of Michael Walzer’s version of just war theory, as presented in his main work devoted to war ethics. As requested by the author of Just and Unjust Wars, the controversial nature of the principle of the moral equality of soldiers is revealed by discussing the actual course of events of a historical military conflict – namely, the outbreak of World War II, one of the main issues dealt with in Walzer’s book. (...) The exclusion of individual responsibility of people involved in a military operation which finds no moral justification seems to entail a number of consequences that put a heavy burden on Walzer’s overall model of military ethics. In order to ensure the necessary level of coherence of just war theory one may need to modify Walzer’s principle of the moral equality of soldiers – at least in relation to the participants of total war. (shrink)

Given the basic tenets of just war theory and those of United States law regard- ing compensatory justice, it is argued that the U.S. invasion of Iraq from 2003-present is morally unjust and that the U.S. owes substantial reparations to Iraq.

The international community has yet to develop a broadly accepted philosophical rationale for the extraterritorial adjudication of war crimes. Instead, several justifications exist in a state of tension that produces uncertainties in the applicable legal doctrines and policies. This article explains how the competition between the “atrocities” approach on the one hand, and the statist and humanitarian rationales on the other, causes instability in the regime. It advocates for increased attention to the philosophical grounding of extraterritorial war crimes (...) trials, particularly in light of the increasing frequency of such trials before international courts as well as national courts exercising universal jurisdiction. (shrink)

Given the basic tenets of just war theory and those of United States law regarding compensatory justice, it is argued that the U.S. invasion of Iraq from 2003-present is morally unjust and that the U.S. owes substantial reparations to Iraq. Imajuci u vidu osnovna nacela pravednog rata, kao i nacela kompenzacijske pravde pravnog poretka Sjedinjenih Americkih Drzava, autor zastupa stanoviste da je americka invazija na Irak, od 2003. godine do danas, moralno nepravedna i da SAD duguju znatnu odstetu Iraku.

The article examines the emergence in the 1990s of the issue of “Comfort women” and the conditions that led to the holding of The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery. It argues that it was a response both to victims’ needs and to the prevailing revisionism concerning the violence committed during the Asian-Pacific war by the Japanese army, which had been the subject of the Tokyo war crimes trials of 1946-1948. The (...) women’s tribunal represents a significant moment in the recognition and condemnation of the specific violence perpetrated against women in wartime and during armed conflicts: it is both the result of of new paradigms in women’s history and oral history, and the starting point for active support for women victims of violence. L’article examine les conditions qui ont permis la tenue du Tribunal international des femmes de Tokyo pour juger du système de l’esclavage sexuel institué par l’armée impériale japonaise pendant la guerre d’Asie-Pacifique (1937-1945). Il considère qu’il a été à la fois une réponse aux besoins des victimes et au révisionnisme ambiant sur les questions des violences commises pendant la guerre d’Asie-Pacifique et jugées lors du procès militaire de Tokyo en 1946-1948. Moment important pour la reconnaissance et la condamnation des violences exercées à l’encontre des femmes en temps de guerre et lors des conflits armés, il est à la fois l’aboutissement de nouveaux paradigmes en histoire des femmes et histoire orale, et le point de départ pour un soutien actif aux femmes victimes de violence. (shrink)

"The evidence for a direct link between the militia and the military is beyond any dispute and has been overwhelmingly documented by UNAMET over the last four months. But the scale and thoroughness of the destruction of East Timor in the past week has demonstrated a new level of open participation of the military in the implementation of what was previously a more veiled operation.".

본고에서는 한강학파가 임진난이라는 현실적 고통에 어떠한 방식으로 직면해 있으며, 그들이 이를 대응하고 극복하기 위해 어떠한 노력을 해나갔는지에 대한 양상을 살펴보는 것을 목적으로 한다. 한강학파는 조선 중기 대구권에서 주로 활동한 한강 정구를 중심으로 형성된 학파를 말한 다. 정구는 경(敬)을 통한 마음 수양과 의(義)를 통한 사회실천의 전통을 모두 받아들이면서 자 신의 학문적 토대로 삼았다. 그는 학문적 회통성과 개방성뿐만 아니라 경의협지의 수양 정신을 사회적 실천으로 확장시켜 학문의 실천성까지 담보하고자 하였다. 그리고 이러한 특징은 특히 임진난이라는 위기 상황을 겪으면서 구체화된다. 이에 한강학파는 임진난 당시 국난을 (...) 극복하 기 위한 직간접적인 노력을 통해 영남지역을 주도하는 세력으로 그 위상이 급부상하게 된다. 따라서 본고에서는 임진난 전후로 정구와 그의 문인들이 임진난이라는 위기상황을 대응 하고 극복하는 양상을 통해 당시의 학계를 주도한 그들의 학문의 정체성과 연속성을 확인해 보고자 하였다. 이에 따라 세 가지의 카테고리를 통해 살펴보고자 한다. 먼저 한강학파의 성 장과 그들의 학문이 형성된 사상적 기반을 살펴본다. 한강학파는 정구의 사상적 흐름을 이 어 받고 있는데, 정구의 학문을 소개하면서 한강학파의 학문적 연원을 살펴본다. 그 다음으 로는 임진난 당시 의병활동의 전개 양상과 피난 생활 및 문학적 대응 양상을 살펴본다. 그들 의 처세 양상은 달랐지만 필자는 이들 모두 국난을 극복하기 위한 직간접적인 양상으로 보 았다. 임진난 이후 한강학파는 향촌사회 중심으로 사회재건활동에 진력하는데, 이 또한 그 들의 강한 사회적 실천성을 확인할 수 있는 하나의 자료가 될 것이다. (shrink)

The following is simultaneously an essay in sociological theory, in cultural sociology, and in the empirical reconstruction of postwar Western history. Per theory, it introduces and specifies a model of cultural trauma - a model that combines a strong cultural program with concern for institutional and power effects - and applies it to large-scale collectivities over extended periods of time. Per cultural sociology, the essay demonstrates that even the most calamitous and biological of social facts - the prototypical evil of (...) genocidal mass murder - can be understood only inside of symbolic codes and narratives; that these frames change substantially depending on social circumstances; and that this culture process is critical to establishing understandings of moral responsibility. Empirically, this essay documents, in social and cultural detail, using both secondary and primary sources, how it was that the `Holocaust' gradually became the dominant symbolic representation of evil in the late twentieth century, and what its consequences have been for the development of a supra-national moral universalism that may restrict genocidal acts in the future. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:January 25, 2012 (9:31 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3102\russell 31,2 064 red.wpd 1 See Russell’s exposure of this derogatory contraction of “Viet Nam Cong San” (“Vietnamese Communists”) in his War Crimes in Vietnam (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 45n. On the importance of language, cf. the legendary remark of Russell’s correspondent, Mohammad Ali: “I ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet Cong.… No Viet Cong ever called me nigger.” Russell (...) attempted to enlist Ali on behalf of the iwct (see the ra for their letters of 8 April, 18, 31 May, 11 Sept., 17 Oct., 15 Nov. and 16 Dec. 1967). russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 31 (winter 2011–12): 167–87 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 ibliographies, rchival nventories, ndexes A SECONDARY BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL: LONDON, STOCKHOLM AND ROSKILDE Stefan Andersson [email protected] i.wintroduction T he International War Crimes Tribunal (iwct) on the United States’ warfare in Vietnam was founded in 1966 through the moral outrage of the British philosopher and political activist Bertrand Russell, his private secretary Ralph Schoenman, Ken Coates, Chris Farley and other people connected to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. They wanted to inform the world about the us government’s attempts to convince the Vietnamese population (who were mainly peasants) that capitalism is a better political-economical system than communism, by killing as many “Vietcong”1 and unarmed seniors, women and children as possible with regular carpet bombing, cluster and phosphorus bombs, napalm, Agent Orange and other illegal weaponry, and oTering the survivors pleasant lodgingsinwired-inhamlets far away from their homes and the graves of their ancestors. This charm oTensive went on for more than ten years, and although three times as many bombs fell on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as were dropped during the whole Second World War, surprisingly enough the Vietnamese were not to be converted. In the 1960s this macabre spectacle could be watched on television all over the world, but very few protested against it. Until 1968 the majority of American January 25, 2012 (9:31 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3102\russell 31,2 064 red.wpd 168 stefan andersson 2 See Norman Mailer’s Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History (New York, New American Library, 1968). He met up with Noam Chomsky, “a slim sharp-featured man with an ascetic expression, and an air of gentle but absolute moral integrity” (p. 180). Both were arrested and spent a night in prison together. 3 See Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 348. See also Natalie Atkin, “From Margin to Mainstream: American Peace Movements, 1950s– 1970s”, in issue “Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the usa since 1945”, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen, no. 32 (2004): 175–92. 4 See May 1970: Birth of the Antiwar University (New York: PathWnder P., 1971). 5 The so-called “Chicago conspiracy trials” or “Chicago 7 trials” that followed, when sevendefendants—AbbieHoTman,JerryRubin,DavidDellinger,TomHayden,Rennie Davis, John Froines and Lee Weiner—were charged with conspiracy and inciting to riot, showed that the us government was not going to tolerate such “unpatriotic” and “criminal ” behaviour. See James Tracy, Direct Action: Radical PaciWsm from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1996), pp. 145–51. 6 See Mark Kurlansky, 1968: the Year That Rocked the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), and David Caute, 1968: the Year of the Barricades (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), pp. 3, 7–8, 12z–13. 7 Fredrik Logevall, “De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963–1964”, PaciWc Historical Review 61 (1992): 69–102. citizens were for the war, although some earlier, well-attended rallies against it, like the 1967 march on the Pentagon in late October,2 might have made some think diTerently. sds (Students for a Democratic Society)3 and other antiwar organizations never became the united force that could challenge the government ’s reliance on what Nixon called the “silent majority”. It was not until the us attacked Cambodia... (shrink)