Search results for 'we' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Sam We (University of Colombo)
Profile: Wol We (Linkoping University)
  1.  6
    George Lakoff (1980/2003). Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press.
    The now-classic Metaphors We <span class='Hi'>Livespan> By changed our understanding of metaphor and its role in language and the mind. Metaphor, the authors explain, (...)is a fundamental mechanism of mind, one that allows us to use what we know about our physical and social experience to provide understanding of countless other subjects. Because such metaphors structure our most basic understandings of our experience, they are "metaphors we <span class='Hi'>livespan> by"--metaphors that can shape our perceptions and actions without our ever noticing them. In this updated edition of Lakoff and Johnson's influential book, the authors supply an afterword surveying how their theory of metaphor has developed within the cognitive sciences to become central to the contemporary understanding of how we think and how we express our thoughts in language. (shrink)
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  2. Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to (...)
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  3. David J. Butler (2012). A Choice for 'Me' or for 'Us'? Using We-Reasoning to Predict Cooperation and Coordination in Games. Theory and Decision 73 (1):53-76.
    Cooperation is the foundation of human social life, but it sometimes requires individuals to choose against their individual self-interest. How then is cooperation sustained? How do (...)we decide when instead to follow our own goals? I develop a model that builds on Bacharach (in: Gold, Sugden (eds) Beyond individual choice: teams and frames in game theory, 2006) ‘circumspect we-reasoningto address these questions. The model produces a threshold cost/benefit ratio to describe when we-reasoning players should choose cooperatively. After assumptions regarding player types and beliefs, we predict how the extent of cooperation varies across games. Results from two experiments offer strong support to the models and predictions herein. (shrink)
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  4.  15
    Alessandra Smerilli (2012). We-Thinking and Vacillation Between Frames: Filling a Gap in Bacharach's Theory. Theory and Decision 73 (4):539-560.
    We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars (...)who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharachs theory, generalizing the interdependence hypothesis and building on his intuition about vacillation. It is a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can come to mind in the face of a decision problem. The vacillation model makes we-reasoning more easily usable in game theory. (shrink)
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  5.  9
    Jeppe Sinding Jensen (forthcoming). How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality andWe-ModeSocial Cognition. Topoi:1-12.
    The topics of social ontology, culture, and institutions constitute a problem complex that involves a broad range of human social and cultural cognitive capacities. We-mode social (...)cognition and shared intentionality appear to be crucial in the formation of social ontology and social institutions, which, in turn, provide the bases for the social manifestation of collective and shared psychological attitudes. Humans havehybrid mindsthat inhabit culturalcognitive ecosystems. Essentially, these consist of social institutions and distributed cognition that afford the common grounds for the objectives of we-mode shared intentionality. As such, they stabilize social cognition normatively and offer predictive power in social interaction. Full-blown we-mode shared intentionality fundamentally depends on the functions of social institutions. (shrink)
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  6.  89
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). We and the Plural Subject. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):235-259.
    Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory defines social collectives in terms of common knowledge of expressed willingness to participate in some joint action. The author critically examines (...)Gilbert's application of this theory to linguistic phenomena involving "we," arguing that recent work in linguistics provides the tools to develop a superior account. The author indicates that, apart from its own relevance, one should care about this critique because Gilbert's claims about the first person plural pronoun play a role in the argument in favor of her recent theory of political obligation. Key Words: collective agentGilbertplural subjectsemanticswe. (shrink)
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  7.  11
    Jaap van Brakel (1999). We. Ethical Perspectives 6 (3):268-276.
    Williams's comments raise the questions I'll here address: what sort of wes are there?, what goes with the 'we of science and logic'?, and what goes (...) with the 'parochial us'? The quotations from Williams suggest that there are two wes, the contrastive and inclusive we. (shrink)
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  8.  25
    Carla Bazzanella (2002). The Significance of Context in Comprehension: The `We Case'. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 7 (3):239-254.
    This paper deals with some of the issues raised about the use of context in language, that is,the pragmatic side of the problem; morespecifically it aims (...)to stress the significanceand complexity of context. In real life context is exploited both in production and in <span class='Hi'>comprehensionspan>.I will deal here mainly with <span class='Hi'>comprehensionspan>:after briefly referring to cognitive contextsand their interaction with knowledge andcomprehension, and touching on the relationbetween language and context, I will analyzethe uses of an indexical pronoun, we,which may both include and exclude speaker/sand/or interlocutor/s, and cannot beinterpreted without referring to an`integrated'' view of context. (shrink)
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  9.  74
    Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Schiffer presents a groundbreaking account of meaning and belief, and shows how it can illuminate a range of crucial problems regarding language, mind, knowledge, and ontology. (...)
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  10.  68
    Andrew Brenner (forthcoming). What Do We Mean When We AskWhy is There Something Rather Than Nothing?&quot;. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Lets call the sentencewhy is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. Theres no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if (...) any, is correct, but occasionally theres also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isnt one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentencewhy is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the speaker. In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that other proposals according to which the Question has one uniquely adequate interpretation are false. Second, I give several examples of the way in which the meaning of the Question can vary depending on the ontology to which it is coupled. Third, I explore the implications of my thesis for the manner in which we should approach future attempts to answer the Question. (shrink)
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  11. Louis Vervoort & Yves Gingras, Macroscopic Oil Droplets Mimicking Quantum Behavior: How Far Can We Push an Analogy?
    We describe here a series of experimental analogies between fluid mechanics and quantum mechanics recently discovered by a team of physicists. These analogies arise in droplet systems (...)
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  12.  51
    Ross P. Cameron (forthcoming). Do We Need Grounding? Inquiry:1-13.
    Many have been tempted to invoke a primitive notion of grounding to describe the way in which some features of reality give rise to others. Jessica Wilson (...)
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  13.  22
    Dan Zahavi (2015). Self and Other: From Pure Ego to Co-Constituted We. Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.
    In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood (...)
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  14.  88
    Philippe Gagnon (2010). What We Have Learnt From Systems Theory About the Things That Natures Understanding Achieves”. In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén & Taede Smedes (eds.), How do we Know? Understanding in Science and Theology. Forum Scientiarum
    The problem of knowledge has been centred around the study of the content of our consciousness, seeing the world through internal representation, without any satisfactory account of (...)
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  15.  74
    Dwayne A. Tunstall (2010). Review Essay: An Odd Black Solidarity, Indeed: Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 2005). Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (1):111-122.
  16. J. David Velleman (2009). How We Get Along. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the manuscript of a book on meta-ethics. From the Introduction: Maybe the grounding of morality lies closer to the social surface than philosophers like (...)to think, neither in the structure of practical reason nor in a telos of human nature but rather in our mundane ways of muddling through togetherthat is, in how we get along. Our ways of getting along must themselves rest on the bedrock of practical reason and human nature, but they may form, as it were, a layer of topsoil without which morality could never take root. If so, then asking how moral norms can sprout straight out of our rationality or humanity may be futile. (shrink)
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  17.  8
    Adina Preda & Kristin Voigt (2015). The Social Determinants of Health: Why Should We Care? American Journal of Bioethics 15 (3):25-36.
    A growing body of empirical research examines the effects of the so-calledsocial determinants of healthon health and health inequalities. Several high-profile publications have issued (...) policy recommendations to reduce health inequalities based on a specific interpretation of this empirical research as well as a set of normative assumptions. This article questions the framework defined by these assumptions by focusing on two issues: first, the normative judgments about the fairness of particular health inequalities; and second, the policy recommendations issued on this basis. We argue that the normative underpinnings of the approach are insufficiently supported and that the policy recommendations do not necessarily follow from the arguments provided. Furthermore, while many of the policies recommendedsuch as improving people's living conditions and reducing inequalities in wealth and powerare justified in their own right, the way these recommendations are tied to health is problematic. (shrink)
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  18. Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel (2012). Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What's Right and What to Do About It. Princeton University Press.
    When confronted with an ethical dilemma, most of us like to think we would stand up for our principles. But we are not as ethical as we (...)
     
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  19. Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Whether We Can See Intentions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that (...)we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible. (shrink)
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  20.  64
    Gilles Fauconnier (2002). The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. Basic Books.
    Until recently, cognitive science focused on such mental functions as problem solving, grammar, and pattern-the functions in which the human mind most closely resembles a computer. (...)But humans are more than computers: we invent new meanings, imagine wildly, and even have ideas that have never existed before. Today the cutting edge of cognitive science addresses precisely these mysterious, creative aspects of the mind.The Way We Think is a landmark analysis of the imaginative nature of the mind. Conceptual blending is already widely known in research laboratories throughout the world; this book, written to be accessible to both lay readers and interested scientists, is its definitive statement. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner show that conceptual blending is the root of the cognitively modern human mind, and that conceptual blends themselves are continually combined and reblended to create the rich mental fabric in which we live.The Way We Think shows how this blending operates; how it is affected by (and gives rise to) language, identity, culture, and invention; and how we imagine what could be and what might have been. The result is a bold and exciting new view of how the mind works. (shrink)
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  21. Julian Savulescu (2001). Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics 15 (5-6):413-426.
    We have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should selec.
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  22. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Adam Lindgreen (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Value Chains: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going? Journal of Business Ethics 123 (1):1-12.
    We outline the drivers, main features, and conceptual underpinnings of the compliance paradigm. We then use a similar structure to investigate the drivers, main features, and conceptual (...)
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  23. Jacoby Adeshei Carter & Sarah Louise Scott (2013). When Reason Fails Us: How We Act and What We Do When We Do Not Know What to Do. The Pluralist 8 (1):63-96.
    An important feature of so-called rational decision making, at least in times of crisis, is arational: that is, our ability to decide manifests features of our (...)characters or the values we hold rather than our reasoning abilities.1 Such a position stands in obvious opposition to the Western philosophical tradition. Consider, by comparison, the view of Immanuel Kant, who held that reason could, and perhaps sometimes ought to, operate independently of (and in opposition to) our sentiments. Contrary to Kant, William James argues in "The Sentiment of Rationality" that arational mental states and phenomenasuch as feelings, emotions, values, and attitudesare indispensable to practical rationality (317). The attempt to .. (shrink)
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  24. Anjan Chatterjee (2015). The Aesthetic Brain: How We Evolved to Desire Beauty and Enjoy Art. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The Aesthetic Brain takes readers on an exciting journey through the world of beauty, pleasure, and art. Using the latest advances in neuroscience and evolutionary psychology, Anjan (...)
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  25. Bart Streumer (2013). Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.
    According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we (...)
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  26.  6
    Philip Johnson-Laird (2006). How We Reason. OUP Oxford.
    Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet, it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This new (...)book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning. (shrink)
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  27. Nate Charlow (2013). What We Know and What to Do. Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
    This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, (...)
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  28. Massimo Pigliucci (2007). Do We Need an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis? Evolution 61 (12):2743-2749.
    The Modern Synthesis (MS) is the current paradigm in evolutionary biology. It was actually built by expanding on the conceptual foundations laid out by its predecessors, Darwinism (...)
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  29. N. Katherine Hayles (1999). How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. University of Chicago Press.
    In this age of DNA computers and artificial intelligence, information is becoming disembodied even as the "bodies" that once carried it vanish into virtuality. While some marvel (...)span> to the 1952 novel _Limbo_ by <span class='Hi'>cyberneticsspan> aficionado Bernard Wolfe; from the concept of self-making to Philip K. Dick's literary explorations of hallucination and reality; and from artificial life to postmodern novels exploring the implications of seeing humans as cybernetic systems. Although becoming posthuman can be nightmarish, Hayles shows how it can also be liberating. From the birth of <span class='Hi'>cyberneticsspan> to artificial life, _How We Became Posthuman_ provides an indispensable account of how we arrived in our virtual age, and of where we might go from here. (shrink)
     
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  30.  8
    Zohar Bronfman, Noam Brezis, Hilla Jacobson & Marius Usher (2014). We See More Than We Can ReportCost FreeColor Phenomenality Outside Focal Attention. Psychological Science 25.
    The distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is a subject of intensive debate. According to one view, visual experience overflows the capacity of the attentional and (...)
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  31. Massimo Pigliucci (2005). Evolution of Phenotypic Plasticity: Where Are We Going Now? Trends in Ecology and Evolution 20 (9):481-486.
    The study of phenotypic plasticity has progressed significantly over the past few decades. We have moved from variation for plasticity being considered as a nuisance in evolutionary (...)
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  32.  69
    Chandra Sripada & Sara Konrath (2011). Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action. Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative (...)considerations. In this paper, we investigate theChairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather by attributions of underlying values and characterological dispositions to the agent. In a second study, we examined people's judgments about what they think drives asymmetric intuitions in the Chairman case and found that people are highly inaccurate in identifying which features of the case their intuitions track. In the final part of the paper, we discuss how the statistical methods used in this study can help philosophers with the critical features problem, the problem of figuring out which among the myriad features present in hypothetical cases are the critical ones that our intuitions are responsive to. We show how the methods used in this study have some advantages over both armchair methods used by traditional philosophers and survey methods used by experimental philosophers. (shrink)
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  33.  62
    Berent Enç (2003). How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford University Press.
    Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions; we think we can tell what intentions are; we are (...)confident about evaluating reasons offered in rational justification of action. Berent Enc provides a philosopher's sustained examination of these issues: he portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new and surprising accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike will find How We Act a provocative and enlightening read. (shrink)
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  34. Bence Nanay (2011). Do We See Apples as Edible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322.
    Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an (...)
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  35. Daniel M. Wegner (2003). The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.
    We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could (...)
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  36. Paula Rubio‐Fernández (2015). Can We Forget What We Know in a FalseBelief Task? An Investigation of the TrueBelief Default. Cognitive Science 40 (1):n/a-n/a.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute (...)their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true-belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false-belief question according to their own knowledge and the true-belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true-belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false-belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false-belief tasks may be key to their performance. (shrink)
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  37. Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2013). How We Think Mādhyamikas Think: A Response To Tom Tillemans. Philosophy East and West 63 (3):426-435.
    In his article in this issue, " 'How do Mādhyamikas Think?' Revisited," Tom Tillemans reflects on his earlier article "How do Mādhyamikas Think?" (2009), itself a response to (...) earlier work of ours (Deguchi et al. 2008; Garfield and Priest 2003). There is much we agree with in these non-dogmatic and open-minded essays. Still, we have some disagreements. We begin with a response to Tillemans' first thoughts, and then turn to his second thoughts.Tillemans (2009) maintains that it is wrong to attribute to Nāgārjuna or to his Mādhyamika followers a strong dialetheism, according to which some contradictions of the form p ∧ ¬p are to be accepted. He argues that, nonetheless, a weak dialetheism may be implicit in the .. (shrink)
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  38.  77
    Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating? Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
    The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exists in the future. If such an action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who (...)would not otherwise have existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having been performed. The problem arises when it is argued that the actions do not harm these peoplebecause the actions do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be.1 Consider: Radioactive Waste Policy: We are trying to decide whether to adopt a permissive radioactive waste policy. This policy would be less inconvenient to us than our existing practices. If we enact the newly-proposed policy, then we will cause there to be radioactive pollution that will cause illness and suffering. However, the policy will have such significant effects on public policy and industry functioning, that different people will exist in the future depending on whether we enact the policy. Two things should be emphasized. First, the illness and suffering caused will be very serious: deformed babies, children with burns from acid rain, and adults dying young from cancer. Second, the policy will affect who will exist in the future because our present practices invade peoples everyday lives, for example by affecting recycling practices in the home; these practices will change if the policy is adopted. Furthermore, whether we adopt the policy will determine which plants are built where, what jobs are available, and what trucks are on the road. These effects will create small differences in everyones lives which ultimately affect who meets whom and who conceives with whom, or at least when people conceive. This affects who exists in the future. (shrink)
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  39.  9
    Berent Enc (2006). How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Clarendon Press.
    Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions; we think we can tell what intentions are; we are (...)confident about evaluating reasons offered in rational justification of action. Berent En provides a philosopher's sustained examination of these issues: he portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new and surprising accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike will find How We Act a provocative and enlightening read. (shrink)
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  40.  72
    Mark T. Nelson (2010). We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties. Mind 119 (473):83-102.
    In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. (...)
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  41.  13
    Ingar Brinck, Vasudevi Reddy & Dan Zahavi, The Primacy of the We?
    The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we (...)
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  42. Mary Midgley (2000). Biotechnology and Monstrosity: Why We Should Pay Attention to the &quot;Yuk Factor&quot;. Hastings Center Report 30 (5):7-15.
    We find our way in the world partly by means of the discriminatory power of our emotions. The gut sense that something is repugnant or unsavorythe (...)sort of feeling that many now have about various forms of biotechnologysometimes turns out to be rooted in articulable and legitimate objections, which with time can be spelled out, weighed, and either endorsed or dismissed. But we ought not dismiss the emotional response at the outset asmere feeling.”. (shrink)
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  43.  15
    Ingar Brinck, Vasu Reddy & Dan Zahavi, The Primacy of the We?
    How should we conceive of the foundations of sociality? A much debated question concerns whether it is concrete interpersonal encounters or the existence of a primitive plural (...)
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  44.  9
    Peter E. Mudrack & E. Sharon Mason (2013). Ethical Judgments: What Do We Know, Where Do We Go? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 115 (3):575-597.
    Investigations into ethical judgments generally seem fuzzy as to the relevant research domain. We first attempted to clarify the construct and determine domain parameters. This attempt required (...)
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  45.  29
    Vincent C. Müller (2015). Which Symbol Grounding Problem Should We Try to Solve? Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 27 (1):73-78.
    Floridi and Taddeo propose a condition ofzero semantic commitmentfor solutions to the grounding problem, and a solution to it. I argue briefly that their condition (...)
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  46. Celia B. Harris, Paul Keil, John Sutton, Amanda Barnier & Doris McIlwain (2011). We Remember, We Forget: Collaborative Remembering in Older Couples. Discourse Processes 48 (4):267-303.
    Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memory can occur when <span class='Hi'>rememberingspan> is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitive (...)span> during in-depth interviews with 12 older married couples. These interviews consisted of three recall tasks: (1) word list recall; (2) personal list recall, where stimuli were relevant to the couplesshared past; and (3) an open-ended autobiographical interview. We conducted these tasks individually and then collaboratively two weeks later. Across each of the tasks, although some couples demonstrated collaborative inhibition, others demonstrated collaborative facilitation. We identified a number of factors that predicted collaborative success, in particular, group-level strategy use. Our results show that collaboration may help or hinder memory, and certain interactions are more likely to produce collaborative benefits. (shrink)
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  47.  41
    Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Dillon Plunkett & Tania Lombrozo (2016). Depth and Deference: When and Why We Attribute Understanding. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):373-393.
    Four experiments investigate the folk concept of “<span class='Hi'>understandingspan>,” in particular when and why it is deployed differently from the concept of knowledge. We argue (...)span>, and that this is true, in part, because <span class='Hi'>understandingspan> attributions play a functional role in identifying experts who should be heeded with respect to the general field in question. These claims are supported by our findings that people differentially withhold attributions of <span class='Hi'>understandingspan> when the object of attribution has minimal explanatory information. We also show that this tendency significantly correlates with peoples willingness to defer to others as potential experts. This work bears on a pressing issue in epistemology concerning the place and value of <span class='Hi'>understandingspan>. Our results also provide reason against positing a simple equation of knowledge and <span class='Hi'>understandingspan>. We contend that, because deference plays a crucial role in many aspects of everyday reasoning, the fact that we use <span class='Hi'>understandingspan> attributions to demarcate experts reveals a potential mechanism for achieving our epistemic aims in many domains. (shrink)
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  48. Eric T. Olson (2007). What Are We? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar (...)questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer. (shrink)
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  49. Alex Voorhoeve (2014). How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? Ethics 125 (1):64-87.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to (...)
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  50. Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
    This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the authors earlier work on the topic in question. While (...)the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions fromaction intentions”, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and otheraim-intentions”) from this perspective and it also defends the authors earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it. (shrink)
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