Search results for 'weakness of will' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Transforming Will (2010). Samoans Have a Word for “Will”—Loto—but Anthropologists Have Not Always Translated It Thusly, Which Puzzled Me When I First Began Doing Ethnography in American Sāmoa in the 1980s. I Was Taking a Language Class Kindly Offered to Stateside Teachers by a High-Ranking Member of the Government. He Decided to Teach Us a Love Song, Chanting the Language Into Our Heads. He Gave Us the Samoan Version and an English Translation with Every Word Glossed but One—Loto. After Class, I Asked Him to Translate It. He ... [REVIEW] In Keith M. Murphy & C. Jason Throop (eds.), Toward an Anthropology of the Will. Stanford University Press. 123.score: 1500.0
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  2. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Weakness of Will. In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 729.0
    One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that not only have many terms been used to refer to weakness of will – “akrasia” and “incontinence” have often been used as synonyms of “weakness of will” – but quite different phenomena have been discussed in the literature. This is why the present entry starts with taxonomic considerations. The second section turns to the question of whether it is possible to freely and intentionally act against one’s better judgment.
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  3. Christian Miller (2004). Book Review: Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):242-245.score: 729.0
    This volume is a collection of papers, all but one of which were presented at a conference on the same topic at the University of Montreal in 2001. The editors have also added a brief introduction, half of which is devoted to a very quick overview of some of the relevant background literature on weakness of will and practical irrationality, while the other half summarizes the main claims of each of the papers in the volume. The contributors, in (...)
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  4. Richard Holton, Inverse Akrasia and Weakness of Will.score: 720.0
    The standard account of weakness of will identifies it with akrasia, that is, with action against one's best judgment. Elsewhere I have argued that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. Many cases of weak willed action will not be akratic: in over-readily abandoning a resolution an agent may well do something that they judge at the time to be best. Indeed, in so far as temptation typically gives rise (...)
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  5. Christopher Cordner (1985). Jackson on Weakness of Will. Mind 94 (374):273-280.score: 720.0
    I begin with a resume ofJ ackson's position. I shall follow this with some counter- examples; and end with a diagnosis of why the problems with Jackson's account arise. In objecting to Jackson's account I am not presupposing the truth of one or other particular account of akrasia. What I am supposing is that unless we recognize some kind of conflict of mind as engaged at the time of action, we are not speaking of akrasia. I hive argued that Jackson, (...)
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  6. James Beebe (2013). Weakness of Will, Reasonability, and Compulsion. Synthese 190 (18):4077-4093.score: 720.0
    Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has (...)
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  7. Rachel McKinnon & Mathieu Doucet (forthcoming). This Paper Took Too Long to Write: A Puzzle About Overcoming Weakness of Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-21.score: 720.0
    This paper took too long to write: A puzzle about overcoming weakness of will. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.827394.
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  8. Annemarie Kalis, Andreas Mojzisch, Sophie Schweizer & Stefan Kaiser (2008). Weakness of Will, Akrasia and the Neuropsychiatry of Decision-Making: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 8 (4):402-17.score: 720.0
    This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate (usually referred to as akrasia) and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework (building on existing models of decision-making stages), focusing on (...)
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  9. Christopher Kaczor (2013). The Parts of Prudence and Scientific Solutions for Weakness of Will. Diametros 38:127-132.score: 720.0
    This essay outlines a view of practical wisdom drawing on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. In it, I discuss the presuppositions of practical wisdom, namely the ordering to the end of true human happiness. Next, the focus shifts to the “parts” or elements of practical wisdom in order to highlight the intellectual aspects of practical wisdom as a cognitive perfection. Finally, the essay addresses prudence as practical, the actual carrying out of the right deed, at the right time and (...)
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  10. Lubomira Radoilska (2013). Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford University Press.score: 720.0
    Mental conflict not always amounts to weakness of will. Irresistible motives not always speak of addiction. This book proposes an integrated account of what singles out these phenomena: addiction and weakness of will are both forms of secondary akrasia. By integrating these two phenomena into a classical conception of akrasia as poor resolution of an unnecessary conflict – valuing without intending while intending without valuing – the book makes an original contribution to central issues in moral (...)
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  11. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Tópicos 43:25-50.score: 720.0
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  12. John J. Davenport (2002). Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will. Journal of Ethics 6 (3):235–259.score: 672.0
    This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's mature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of "moral sanity." This theory, presented in _Responsibility and Control_, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weak reasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication that agents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can be responsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still faces several problems. It does not (...)
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  13. Patrick Fleming (2010). Hume on Weakness of Will. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (4):597-609.score: 639.0
  14. Bela Szabados & Eldon Soifer (1999). Hypocrisy, Change of Mind, and Weakness of Will: How to Do Moral Philosophy with Examples. Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):60-78.score: 630.0
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  15. Dylan Dodd (2005). Intentions, Plans, and Weakness of Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):45-52.score: 630.0
  16. Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2003/2007). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.score: 558.0
    Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area. Issues covered include classical questions, such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, (...)
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  17. Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.) (2003/2007). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 558.0
    Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area.
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  18. Alison McIntyre (2006). What is Wrong with Weakness of Will? Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):284-311.score: 549.0
    What is wrong with weakness of will? Alison MCINTYRE The Journal of philosophy 103:66, 284-311, Journal of Philosophy, 2006. Faiblesse; Volont{\'e}; Will; Philosophie morale; Moral philosophy.
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  19. Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.score: 549.0
    Weakness of will has been widely discussed from at least three points of view. It has been examined historically, with Aristotle recently occupying centre stage. It has been analysed conceptually, with the question of its nature and possibility in the forefront. It has been considered normatively in relation to both rational action and moral character. My concern is not historical and is only secondarily conceptual: while I hope to clarify what constitutes weakness of will, I presuppose, (...)
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  20. Richard Holton (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241-262.score: 549.0
    Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from (...)
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  21. Dylan Dodd (2009). Weakness of Will as Intention-Violation. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.score: 549.0
    According to the traditional view of weakness of will, a weak-willed agent acts in a way inconsistent with what she judges to be best.1 Richard Holton has argued against this view, claiming that ‘the central cases of weakness of will are best characterized not as cases in which people act against their better judgment, but as cases in which they fail to act on their intentions’ (1999: 241). But Holton doesn’t think all failures to act on (...)
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  22. Edmund Henden (2004). Weakness of Will and Divisions of the Mind. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):199–213.score: 549.0
    Some authors have argued that, in order to give an account of weakness of the will, we must assume that the mind is divisible into parts. This claim is often referred to as the partitioning claim. There appear to be two main arguments for this claim. While the first is conceptual and claims that the notion of divisibility is entailed by the notion of non-rational mental causation (which is held to be a necessary condition of weakness of (...)
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  23. C. Miller (2004). Review of S. Stroud and C. Tappolet (Eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):242-245.score: 549.0
    This volume is a collection of papers, all but one of which were presented at a conference on the same topic at the University of Montreal in 2001. The editors have also added a brief introduction, half of which is devoted to a very quick overview of some of the relevant background literature on weakness of will and practical irrationality, while the other half summarizes the main claims of each of the papers in the volume.
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  24. Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.score: 540.0
    Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (...)
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  25. Joshua May & Richard Holton (2012). What in the World is Weakness of Will? Philosophical Studies 157 (3):341–360.score: 540.0
    At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one‘s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton (1999, 2009) claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele (2010) argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As (...)
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  26. Gary Watson (1977). Skepticism About Weakness of Will. Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.score: 540.0
    My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to socratism, it is possible for a person knowingly to act contrary to his or her better judgment. But this description does not exhaust the common view of weakness. Also implicit in (...)
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  27. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2010). Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.score: 540.0
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two (...)
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  28. Sarah Buss (1997). Weakness of Will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):13–44.score: 540.0
    My chief aim is to explain how someone can act freely against her own best judgment. But I also have a second aim: to defend a conception of practical rationality according to which someone cannot do something freely if she believes it would be better to do something else. These aims may appear incompatible. But I argue that practical reason has the capacity to undermine itself in such a way that it produces reasons for behaving irrationally. Weakness of (...) is possible because it is possible to conclude that one has sufficient reason to reject the verdicts of one's own reason. (shrink)
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  29. Robert Audi (1979). Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment. Noûs 13 (2):173-196.score: 540.0
    Weakness of will is a common phenomenon of human experience. But what is it? It has proved highly resistant to analysis, and even the accounts that seem to capture our intuitions about what weakness of will is raise problems about how it is possible. This is because these accounts seem inconsistent with some highly plausible principles about action. My aim here is to propose a new account of weakness of will and its relation to (...)
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  30. Frank Jackson (1984). Weakness of Will. Mind 93 (369):1-18.score: 540.0
    I think that clear sense can be made of weakness of will in terms of agents' acting against the dictates of their reason; and that this can be done without becoming enmeshed in the faculties of the mind, and without denying what is right about Humean views about reason and desire. My starting point is, in fact, a Humean position about reason and desire.
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  31. Paul Hoffman (2008). Freedom and Weakness of Will. Ratio 21 (1):42–54.score: 540.0
    Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish (...)
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  32. J. C. B. Gosling (1990). Weakness of the Will. Routledge.score: 540.0
    Weakness of the Will gives an excellent historical survey of philosophers' puzzles about the possibility of deliberately taking the worse course. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, a selection of medieval philosophers, and more contemporary philosophers are explored to illustrate why and how they avoid discussing the problem.
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  33. Gwynneth Matthews (1966). Weakness of Will. Mind 75 (299):405-419.score: 540.0
    'Backsliding', 'weakness of, will', ' moral weakness', '"lack of self-restraint', 'lack of self-control'. Do all these have the same meaning ? Is there a philosophical problem here, and if so, what precisely is it? How is an account of what happens in cases to which these terms apply related to the meaning of the words, and to the philosophical problem? These are the questions which I shall try to discuss in this paper.
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  34. Kai-Yee Wong, Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought.score: 540.0
    This essay applies John Searle’s account of weakness of will to explore the classical Chinese problem of weak-willed action. Searle’s discussion focuses on the shortcomings of the Western classical model of rationality in explaining weakness of will, so he naturally says little about the practical ethical problem of overcoming weak-willed action, the focus of the relevant Chinese texts. Yet his theory of action, specifically his notion of the Background, suggests a compelling approach to the practical issue, (...)
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  35. Chris Fraser, Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought.score: 540.0
    This essay applies John Searle’s account of weakness of will to explore the classical Chinese problem of weak-willed action. Searle’s discussion focuses on the shortcomings of the Western classical model of rationality in explaining weakness of will, so he naturally says little about the practical ethical problem of overcoming weak-willed action, the focus of the relevant Chinese texts. Yet his theory of action, specifically his notion of the Background, suggests a compelling approach to the practical issue, (...)
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  36. Risto Saarinen (1994). Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan. E.J. Brill.score: 540.0
    This book sets out to examine the medieval understanding of Aristotle's famous discussion of "weakness of the will" (akrasia, incontinentia) in the seventh book of his Nicomachean Ethics. The medieval views are outlined primarily on the basis of the commentaries on Aristotle's "Ethics by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Walter Burley, Gerald Odonis and John Buridan. An investigation of the earlier Augustinian discussion concerning reluctant actions (invitus facere) rounds out the study. The recent studies of weakness of (...)
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  37. James R. Beebe, The Folk Conception of Weakness of Will.score: 540.0
    Philosophers have long puzzled over the phenomenon of weakness of will. Some (e.g., Socrates in the Protagoras ; Hare, 1952, 1963; Watson, 1977) have questioned whether weak-willed action is genuinely possible, since it requires that agents do one thing while sincerely believing they ought to do something else. Others have been skeptical about whether weak-willed actions can be free, since agents who display weakness of will sometimes seem to be overcome or enslaved by their desires or (...)
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  38. Sarah Stroud (2003). Weakness of Will and Practical. In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 121.score: 540.0
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  39. Sarah Stroud (2007). Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oup Oxford.score: 540.0
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  40. Bonnie Kent (2007). Aquinas and Weakness of Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):70–91.score: 537.0
    Aquinas’s admirers, reacting against Donald Davidson’s criticisms of hirn, commonly argue (a) that the will does play a role in Aquinas’s account of incontinence, and (b) that his explanation of incontinent action turns on the weakness of the will. The first part of this paper argues that they are correct about (a) but wholly mistaken about (b). Aquinas rarely even mentions the weakness of the will, and he neverinvokes it to explain why someone acts counter (...)
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  41. Henrique Schneider (2008). No Problem with Weakness of the Will. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:53-58.score: 531.0
    Weakness of the Will can impose a problem for most theories of rationality, since they try to assess rationality in the framework of one theory. Here, Akrasia is divides in three different types and each analyzed separately. First, someone changes her mind on her action. Second, someone “forced” to change her action without changing her mind. This force is alien to the will and can be a psychological cause. Finally, third, the same alien force is working upon (...)
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  42. Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.score: 522.0
    I develop an account of weakness of the will that is driven by experimental evidence from cognitive and social psychology. I will argue that this account demonstrates that there is no such thing as weakness of the will: no psychological kind corresponds to it. Instead, weakness of the will ought to be understood as depletion of System II resources. Neither the explanatory purposes of psychology nor our practical purposes as agents are well-served by (...)
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  43. Edmund Henden (2004). Intentions, All-Out Evaluations and Weakness of the Will. Erkenntnis 61 (1):53-74.score: 522.0
    The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because of an assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspond to the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a very common response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberate action does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of the support for this view has come from the (...)
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  44. Paulo Sousa & Carlos Mauro (forthcoming). The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.score: 522.0
    The evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.843057.
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  45. Tom J. F. Tillemans (2008). Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections Upon Śāntideva's Arguments with Himself. [REVIEW] Argumentation 22 (1):149-163.score: 522.0
    Let it be granted that Buddhism has, e.g., in its logical literature, detailed canons and explicit rules of right reason that, amongst other things, ban inconsistency as irrational. This is the normative dimension of how people should think according to many major Buddhist authors. But do important Buddhist writers ever recognize any interesting or substantive role for inconsistency and forms of irrationality in their account of how people actually do think and act? The article takes as its point of departure (...)
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  46. George Ainslie (2005). Précis of Breakdown of Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):635-650.score: 480.0
    Behavioral science has long been puzzled by the experience of temptation, the resulting impulsiveness, and the variably successful control of this impulsiveness. In conventional theories, a governing faculty like the ego evaluates future choices consistently over time, discounting their value for delay exponentially, that is, by a constant rate; impulses arise when this ego is confronted by a conditioned appetite. Breakdown of Will (Ainslie 2001) presents evidence that contradicts this model. Both people and nonhuman animals spontaneously discount the value (...)
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  47. Risto Saarinen (2011). Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought. Oxford University Press.score: 477.0
    In addition to considering the work of a broad range of Renaissance authors (including Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, and Francesco Piccolomini), Risto ...
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  48. Theodore Scaltsas (1986). Weakness of Will in Aristotle's Ethics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):375-382.score: 477.0
    I argue that in "en", Aristotle allows not only for weak akrasia but also for "strong akrasia". In weak akrasia, The agent makes only a "nominal" choice according to the right principle, While in strong akrasia he/she makes a "real" choice, But still acts against it. I show that, Although aristotle does not give a detailed account of strong akrasia, Such an account can be reconstructed on the basis of the analyses and examples of choice and akratic behaviour provided by (...)
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  49. Alfred R. Mele (2002). Autonomy, Self-Control and Weakness of Will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.score: 477.0
  50. Michael Bratman (1979). Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will. Noûs 13 (2):153-171.score: 468.0
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
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