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  1. Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
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  2. Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
    The second volume in the Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing.
     
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  3.  47
    Timothy Williamson (2013). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    Timothy Williamson gives an original and provocative treatment of deep metaphysical questions about existence, contingency, and change, using the latest resources of quantified modal logic. Contrary to the widespread assumption that logic and metaphysics are disjoint, he argues that modal logic provides a structural core for metaphysics.
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  4. Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
    Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is a kind (...)
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  5. Timothy Williamson (2011). Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.
    Abstract: Some proponents of “experimental philosophy” criticize philosophers' use of thought experiments on the basis of evidence that the verdicts vary with truth-independent factors. However, their data concern the verdicts of philosophically untrained subjects. According to the expertise defence, what matters are the verdicts of trained philosophers, who are more likely to pay careful attention to the details of the scenario and track their relevance. In a recent article, Jonathan M. Weinberg and others reply to the expertise defence that there (...)
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  6. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  7.  65
    Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2016). Skill. Noûs 50 (3).
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  8. Timothy Williamson (2005). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
    §I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of (...)
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  9. Phyllis Illari & Jon Williamson (2012). What is a Mechanism? Thinking About Mechanisms Across the Sciences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):119-135.
    After a decade of intense debate about mechanisms, there is still no consensus characterization. In this paper we argue for a characterization that applies widely to mechanisms across the sciences. We examine and defend our disagreements with the major current contenders for characterizations of mechanisms. Ultimately, we indicate that the major contenders can all sign up to our characterization.
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  10.  26
    Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Reply to Goodman. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
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  11.  14
    Jon Williamson (2010). In Defence of Objective Bayesianism. OUP Oxford.
    Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.
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  12. Timothy Williamson (2010). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The second volume in the _Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy_, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing.
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  13. Timothy Williamson (2004). Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement. Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.
    1. What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it (...)
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  14. Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press Uk.
    'An outstanding contribution to analytic epistemology... original and ingenius arguments... Knowledge and its Limits has raised the standards of epistemological discussion to a higher level.' -Grazer Philosophische Studien 'Radical and challenging... without question an important exercise of the 'let me show you a new way of looking at things' kind; something we sorely need in epistemology.' -Frank Jackson, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 'The best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.' -Keith DeRose, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (...)
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  15. Timothy Williamson (2014). Very Improbable Knowing. Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
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  16.  54
    Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2007). Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.
    We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory (...)
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  17. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):1-14.
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between good and (...)
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  18. Timothy Williamson (1996). Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
    This paper aims to identify the constitutive rule of assertion, conceived by analogy with the rules of a game. That assertion has such rules is by no means obvious; perhaps it is more like a natural phenomenon than it seems. One way to find out is by supposing that it has such rules, in order to see where the hypothesis leads and what it explains. That will be done here. The hypothesis is not perfectly clear, of course, but we have (...)
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  19.  82
    Jon Williamson (2004). Bayesian Nets and Causality: Philosophical and Computational Foundations. OUP Oxford.
    Bayesian nets are widely used in artificial intelligence as a calculus for causal reasoning, enabling machines to make predictions, perform diagnoses, take decisions and even to discover causal relationships. This book, aimed at researchers and graduate students in computer science, mathematics and philosophy, brings together two important research topics: how to automate reasoning in artificial intelligence, and the nature of causality and probability in philosophy.
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  20.  18
    Michael Wilde & Jon Williamson, Bayesianism and Information.
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    Laura Williamson (2014). Patient and Citizen Participation in Health: The Need for Improved Ethical Support. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (6):4-16.
    Patient and citizen participation is now regarded as central to the promotion of sustainable health and health care. Involvement efforts create and encounter many diverse ethical challenges that have the potential to enhance or undermine their success. This article examines different expressions of patient and citizen participation and the support health ethics offers. It is contended that despite its prominence and the link between patient empowerment and autonomy, traditional bioethics is insufficient to guide participation efforts. In addition, the turn to (...)
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  22. Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
    This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The (...)
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    Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2014). Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy. Topoi 33 (2):339-360.
    Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of mechanisms produced by other methods. We argue, in contrast, that evidence of mechanisms needs to be viewed as complementary to, rather than inferior to, evidence of correlation. In this paper we first set out the case for treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation in (...)
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  24.  20
    David Williamson, Gary Lynch-Wood & John Ramsay (2006). Drivers of Environmental Behaviour in Manufacturing SMEs and the Implications for CSR. Journal of Business Ethics 67 (3):317 - 330.
    The authors use empirical research into the environmental practices of 31 manufacturing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to show that ‚business performance’ and ‚regulation’ considerations drive behaviour. They suggest that this is inevitable, given the market-based decision-making frames that permeate and dominate the industry in which manufacturing SMEs operate. Since the environment is a pillar of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the findings have important implications for CSR policy, which promotes voluntary actions predicated on a business case. It is argued that (...)
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  25. Timothy Williamson (2013). How Deep is the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press 291-312.
    The paper argues that, although a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (or justification) can be drawn, it is a superficial one, of little theoretical significance. The point is not that the distinction has borderline cases, for virtually all useful distinctions have such cases. Rather, it is argued by means of an example, the differences even between a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of a posteriori knowledge may be superficial ones. In both cases, (...)
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  26.  16
    Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Reply to Sider. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-10.
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  27. Timothy Williamson (2005). I *-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1-23.
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity (...)
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  28. Timothy Williamson (2007). Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
     
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  29.  35
    Timothy Williamson (2016). Replies to King, deRosset and Kment. Analysis 76 (2):201-222.
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  30. Timothy Williamson (2003). Everything. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.
    On reading the last sentence, did you interpret me as saying falsely that everything — everything in the entire universe — was packed into my carry-on baggage? Probably not. In ordinary language, ‘everything’ and other quantifiers (‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘every dog’, ...) often carry a tacit restriction to a domain of contextually relevant objects, such as the things that I need to take with me on my journey. Thus a sentence of the form ‘Everything Fs’ is true as uttered in a (...)
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  31. Jon Williamson, Maximising Entropy Efficiently.
    Recommended citation: . . Link¨ oping Electronic Articles in Computer and Information Science, Vol. 7(2002): nr 0. http://www.ep.liu.se/ea/cis/2002/00/. September 18, 2002. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILMEE"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/thermodynamics-and-statistical-mechanics' rel='section'>Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-physical-science' rel='section'>Philosophy of Physical Science</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILMEE&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fkar.kent.ac.uk%2F7376%2F" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILMEE'>2 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILMEE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILMEE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILMEE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILMEE','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILMEE"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILBP' onclick="ee('click','WILBP')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILBP')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILBP')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILBP#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>173 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILBP"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (1998). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Bare Possibilia.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Erkenntnis</em> 48 (2/3):257--73.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The theorems of the simplest and strongest sensible quantified modal logic include the Barcan Formula and its converse. Both formulas face strong intuitive objections. This paper develops a theory of possibilia to meet those objections. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILBP"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/essentialism-and-quantified-modal-logic' rel='section'>Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILBP&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1023%2FA%3A1005331819843" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILBP'>7 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILBP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILBP')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILBP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILBP','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILBP"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 43 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILBP"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILVAI' onclick="ee('click','WILVAI')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILVAI')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILVAI')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILVAI#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>61 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILVAI"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2010). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Vagueness and Ignorance.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/BYRAAL">Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</a></em>. Routledge 145 - 177.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILVAI"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/epistemic-theories-of-vagueness' rel='section'>Epistemic Theories of Vagueness</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_used bargain'><a class='price_used bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0415462444?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=0415462444&condition=used">$28.80 used</a></span>   <span class='price_new'><a class='price_new' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0415462444?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=0415462444&condition=new">$39.13 new</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon'><a class='price_amazon' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/Arguing-About-Language-Philosophy/dp/0415462444?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=0415462444">$50.00 direct from Amazon</a></span>   (collection)   <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Arguing-About-Language-Philosophy/dp/0415462444%3FSubscriptionId%3D1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2%26tag%3Dphilp-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D0415462444">Amazon page</a></div><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILVAI&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F4106976" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-WILVAI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILVAI')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILVAI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILVAI','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILVAI"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 16 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILVAI"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILBR' onclick="ee('click','WILBR')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILBR')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILBR')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILBR#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>214 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILBR"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2003). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Understanding and Inference.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</em> 77 (1):249–293.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined<span id="WILBR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILBR-abstract2").show();$("WILBR-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILBR-abstract2" style="display:none"> and rejected. It is suggested that epistemological questions cannot be reduced to questions in the theory of thought and meaning. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILBR-abstract2").hide();$("WILBR-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILBR"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/deductive-reasoning' rel='section'>Deductive Reasoning</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/epistemology-of-logic' rel='section'>Epistemology of Logic</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/logic-and-philosophy-of-logic' rel='section'>Logic and Philosophy of Logic</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/inference' rel='section'>Inference</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/inferentialist-accounts-of-meaning-and-content' rel='section'>Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/transmission-of-warrant' rel='section'>Transmission of Warrant</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILBR&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%2F1467-8349.00111" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILBR'>6 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILBR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILBR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILBR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILBR','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILBR"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 30 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILBR"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILRIA-2' onclick="ee('click','WILRIA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILRIA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILRIA-2')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILRIA-2#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>167 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILRIA-2"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2009). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/ALMTPO-3">The Philosophy of David Kaplan</a></em>. Oxford University Press 137--159.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Two opposing tendencies in the philosophy of language go by the names of ‘referentialism’ and ‘inferentialism’ respectively. In the crudest version of the contrast, the referentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the referential semantics for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the language, perhaps as those which preserve truth on that semantics (since a referential semantics for a language determines the truth-conditions of its sentences). By contrast, the inferentialist account of meaning gives<span id="WILRIA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILRIA-2-abstract2").show();$("WILRIA-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILRIA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> centre stage to the inference rules for the language, which are then used to explain its referential semantics, perhaps as the semantics on which the rules preserve truth. On pain of circularity, we cannot combine both directions of explanation. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILRIA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILRIA-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILRIA-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/inferentialist-accounts-of-meaning-and-content' rel='section'>Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/specific-expressions' rel='section'>Specific Expressions</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_used bargain'><a class='price_used bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/019536788X?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp02-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=019536788X&condition=used">$34.00 used</a></span>   <span class='price_new bargain'><a class='price_new bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/019536788X?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp02-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=019536788X&condition=new">$45.95 new</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon'><a class='price_amazon' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-David-Kaplan-Joseph-Almog/dp/019536788X?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp02-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=019536788X">$115.00 direct from Amazon</a></span>   (collection)   <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-David-Kaplan-Joseph-Almog/dp/019536788X%3FSubscriptionId%3DAKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA%26tag%3Dphilp02-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D019536788X">Amazon page</a></div><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILRIA-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0011%2F1325%2FReference.pdf" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILRIA-2'>3 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILRIA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILRIA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILRIA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILRIA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILRIA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 17 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILRIA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eRUSGVS' onclick="ee('click','RUSGVS')" onmouseover="ee('over','RUSGVS')" onmouseout="ee('out','RUSGVS')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/RUSGVS#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>62 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/RUSGVS"><span class='name'>Federica Russo</span> & <span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span> (2011). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Generic Versus Single-Case Causality: The Case of Autopsy.</span> <span class='hint'>[REVIEW]</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>European Journal for Philosophy of Science</em> 1 (1):47-69.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper addresses questions about how the levels of causality (generic and single-case causality) are related. One question is epistemological: can relationships at one level be evidence for relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this question, categorised according to whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are independent. A second question is metaphysical: can relationships at one level be reduced to relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this<span id="RUSGVS-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("RUSGVS-abstract2").show();$("RUSGVS-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="RUSGVS-abstract2" style="display:none"> second question, categorised according to whether single-case relations are reduced to generic, generic relations are reduced to single-case, or the levels are independent. We then explore causal inference in autopsy. This is an interesting case study, we argue, because it refutes all three epistemologies and all three metaphysics. We close by sketching an account of causality that survives autopsy—the epistemic theory. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("RUSGVS-abstract2").hide();$("RUSGVS-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-RUSGVS"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/philosophy-of-medicine-miscellaneous' rel='section'>Philosophy of Medicine, Miscellaneous</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-science-misc' rel='section'>Philosophy of Science, Misc</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=RUSGVS&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs13194-010-0012-4" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/RUSGVS'>11 more</a>)   <div id="la-RUSGVS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RUSGVS')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RUSGVS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RUSGVS','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/RUSGVS"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 13 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RUSGVS"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILRTC-13' onclick="ee('click','WILRTC-13')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILRTC-13')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILRTC-13')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILRTC-13#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>76 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILRTC-13"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2013). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Inquiry</em> 56 (1):77-96.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The five commentators on my paper ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ (GCEL) demonstrate how fruitful the topic can be. Especially in Brian Weatherson's contribution, and to some extent in those of Jennifer Nagel and Jeremy Goodman, much of the material constitutes valuable development and refinement of ideas in GCEL, rather than criticism. In response, I draw some threads together, and answer objections, mainly those in the papers by Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña and by Goodman. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILRTC-13"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/doxastic-and-epistemic-logic' rel='section'>Doxastic and Epistemic Logic</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/logic-and-philosophy-of-logic' rel='section'>Logic and Philosophy of Logic</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/safety-and-sensitivity' rel='section'>Safety and Sensitivity</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-gettier-problem' rel='section'>The Gettier Problem</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILRTC-13&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1080%2F0020174X.2013.775016" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILRTC-13'>4 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILRTC-13" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILRTC-13')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILRTC-13" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILRTC-13','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILRTC-13"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 7 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILRTC-13"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eFARCAA' onclick="ee('click','FARCAA')" onmouseover="ee('over','FARCAA')" onmouseout="ee('out','FARCAA')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/FARCAA#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>219 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/FARCAA"><span class='name'>Michael Fara</span> & <span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2005). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Counterparts and Actuality.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Mind</em> 114 (453):1-30.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue<span id="FARCAA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("FARCAA-abstract2").show();$("FARCAA-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="FARCAA-abstract2" style="display:none"> that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("FARCAA-abstract2").hide();$("FARCAA-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-FARCAA"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/counterpart-theory' rel='section'>Counterpart Theory</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=FARCAA&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1093%2Fmind%2Ffzi001" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/FARCAA'>10 more</a>)   <div id="la-FARCAA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FARCAA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-FARCAA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FARCAA','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/FARCAA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 24 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FARCAA"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILIKN' onclick="ee('click','WILIKN')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILIKN')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILIKN')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILIKN#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>197 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILIKN"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2011). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Improbable Knowing.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In T. Dougherty (ed.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/DOUEAI-2">Evidentialism and its Discontents</a></em>. Oxford University Press</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know<span id="WILIKN-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILIKN-abstract2").show();$("WILIKN-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILIKN-abstract2" style="display:none"> that P (we can’t strengthen ¬KKp to K¬Kp)! If we can construct such cases, we may be able to use them to understand some puzzling epistemic phenomena. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILIKN-abstract2").hide();$("WILIKN-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILIKN"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-kk-principle' rel='section'>The KK Principle</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/varieties-of-knowledge' rel='section'>Varieties of Knowledge</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_used bargain'><a class='price_used bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0199563500?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=0199563500&condition=used">$57.01 used</a></span>   <span class='price_new'><a class='price_new' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0199563500?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=0199563500&condition=new">$70.66 new</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon'><a class='price_amazon' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/Evidentialism-its-Discontents-Trent-Dougherty/dp/0199563500?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=0199563500">$77.79 direct from Amazon</a></span>   (collection)   <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Evidentialism-its-Discontents-Trent-Dougherty/dp/0199563500%3FSubscriptionId%3DAKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA%26tag%3Dphilp-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D0199563500">Amazon page</a></div><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILIKN&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0014%2F1319%2FOrielho.pdf" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-WILIKN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILIKN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILIKN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILIKN','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILIKN"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 11 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILIKN"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILTPO-115' onclick="ee('click','WILTPO-115')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILTPO-115')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILTPO-115')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILTPO-115"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2008). <span class='pub_name recTitle'><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The Philosophy of Philosophy.</span></span></a><span class='pubInfo'> Wiley-Blackwell.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The second volume in the _Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy_, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILTPO-115">No categories</div><div class="options"><div id="la-WILTPO-115" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILTPO-115')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILTPO-115" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILTPO-115','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILTPO-115"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 13 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILTPO-115"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILS-13' onclick="ee('click','WILS-13')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILS-13')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILS-13')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILS-13#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>27 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILS-13"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2016). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Summary.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Analysis</em> 76 (2):153-155.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILS-13">No categories</div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILS-13&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fanalysis.oxfordjournals.org%2Fcgi%2Fcontent%2Fshort%2F76%2F2%2F153%3Frss%3D1" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-WILS-13" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILS-13')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILS-13" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILS-13','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILS-13"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eHAEPLA-2' onclick="ee('click','HAEPLA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAEPLA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAEPLA-2')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/HAEPLA-2#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>47 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/HAEPLA-2"><span class='name'>Rolf Haenni</span>, <span class='name'>Jan-Willem Romeijn</span>, <span class='name'>Gregory Wheeler</span> & <span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span> (2011). <span class='pub_name recTitle'><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks.</span></span></a><span class='pubInfo'> Synthese Library.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-HAEPLA-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/bayesian-reasoning-misc' rel='section'>Bayesian Reasoning, Misc</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/imprecise-credences' rel='section'>Imprecise Credences</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/logical-probability' rel='section'>Logical Probability</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_used bargain'><a class='price_used bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/9400700075?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp02-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=9400700075&condition=used">$58.34 used</a></span>   <span class='price_new'><a class='price_new' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/9400700075?SubscriptionId=AKIAI4HPG2KEPF5SCBQA&tag=philp02-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=9400700075&condition=new">$95.06 new</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon'><a class='price_amazon' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" 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src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAEPLA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAEPLA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/HAEPLA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 8 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAEPLA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eALEBRR' onclick="ee('click','ALEBRR')" onmouseover="ee('over','ALEBRR')" onmouseout="ee('out','ALEBRR')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/ALEBRR#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>1 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/ALEBRR"><span class='name'>Elena Alessandri</span>, <span class='name'>Victoria J. Williamson</span>, <span class='name'>Hubert Eiholzer</span> & <span class='name'>Aaron Williamon</span> (2015). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Beethoven Recordings Reviewed: A Systematic Method for Mapping the Content of Music Performance Criticism.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Frontiers in Psychology</em> 6.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-ALEBRR"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/cognitive-sciences' rel='section'>Cognitive Sciences</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=ALEBRR&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2015.00057" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/ALEBRR'>2 more</a>)   <div id="la-ALEBRR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ALEBRR')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ALEBRR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ALEBRR','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/ALEBRR"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 1 citation</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ALEBRR"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILCT' onclick="ee('click','WILCT')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILCT')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILCT')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILCT#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>203 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILCT"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2006). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Conceptual Truth.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</em> 80 (1):1–41.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The paper criticizes epistemological conceptions of analytic or conceptual truth, on which assent to such truths is a necessary condition of understanding them. The critique involves no Quinean scepticism about meaning. Rather, even granted that a paradigmatic candidate for analyticity is synonymy with a logical truth, both the former and the latter can be intelligibly doubted by linguistically competent deviant logicians, who, although mistaken, still constitute counterexamples to the claim that assent is necessary for understanding. There are no analytic or<span id="WILCT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCT-abstract2").show();$("WILCT-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILCT-abstract2" style="display:none"> conceptual truths in the epistemological sense. The critique is extended to purportedly analytic inference rules. An alternative account is sketched on which understanding a word is a matter of participation in a linguistic practice, while synonymy and concept identity consist in sameness of truth-conditional semantic properties. Although there are philosophical questions about concepts, the idea that philosophical questions in general are conceptual questions generates only an illusion of insight into philosophical methodology. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCT-abstract2").hide();$("WILCT-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILCT"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-analytic-synthetic-distinction' rel='section'>The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILCT&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%2Fj.1467-8349.2006.00136.x" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILCT'>10 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILCT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILCT')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILCT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILCT','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILCT"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 20 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILCT"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILNCA-2' onclick="ee('click','WILNCA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILNCA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILNCA-2')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILNCA-2#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>157 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILNCA-2"><span class='name'>T. Williamson</span> (2010). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Necessitism, Contingentism, and Plural Quantification.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Mind</em> 119 (475):657-748.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Necessitism is the view that necessarily everything is necessarily something; contingentism is the negation of necessitism. The dispute between them is reminiscent of, but clearer than, the more familiar one between possibilism and actualism. A mapping often used to ‘translate’ actualist discourse into possibilist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of a first-order modal language to a sentence the contingentist (but not the necessitist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables<span id="WILNCA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILNCA-2-abstract2").show();$("WILNCA-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILNCA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> the necessitist to extract a ‘cash value’ from what the contingentist says. Similarly, a mapping often used to ‘translate’ possibilist discourse into actualist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of the language to a sentence the necessitist (but not the contingentist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables the contingentist to extract a ‘cash value’ from what the necessitist says. Neither mapping is a translation in the usual sense, since necessitists and contingentists use the same language with the same meanings. The former mapping is extended to a second-order modal language under a plural interpretation of the second-order variables. It is proved that the latter mapping cannot be. Thus although the necessitist can extract a ‘cash value’ from what the contingentist says in the second-order language, the contingentist cannot extract a ‘cash value’ from some of what the necessitist says, even when it raises significant questions. This poses contingentism a serious challenge. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILNCA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILNCA-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILNCA-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/plural-quantification' rel='section'>Plural Quantification</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILNCA-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1093%2Fmind%2Ffzq042" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILNCA-2'>9 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILNCA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILNCA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILNCA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILNCA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILNCA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 11 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILNCA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eSUTER' onclick="ee('click','SUTER')" onmouseover="ee('over','SUTER')" onmouseout="ee('out','SUTER')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/SUTER#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>308 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/SUTER"><span class='name'>John Sutton</span> & <span class='name'>Kellie Williamson</span> (2014). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Embodied Remembering.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In L. Shapiro (ed.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/SHATRH">The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition</a></em>. Routledge</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Experiences of embodied remembering are familiar and diverse. We settle bodily into familiar chairs or find our way easily round familiar rooms. We inhabit our own kitchens or cars or workspaces effectively and comfortably, and feel disrupted when our habitual and accustomed objects or technologies change or break or are not available. Hearing a particular song can viscerally bring back either one conversation long ago, or just the urge to dance. Some people explicitly use their bodies to record, store, or<span id="SUTER-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("SUTER-abstract2").show();$("SUTER-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="SUTER-abstract2" style="display:none"> cue memories. Others can move skilfully, without stopping to think, in complex and changing environments thanks to the cumulative expertise accrued in their history of fighting fires, or dancing, or playing hockey. The forms of memory involved in these cases may be distinct, operating at different timescales and levels, and by way of different mechanisms and media, but they often cooperate in the many contexts of our practices of remembering. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("SUTER-abstract2").hide();$("SUTER-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-SUTER"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/embodied-memory' rel='section'>Embodied Memory</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/memory-and-cognitive-science' rel='section'>Memory and Cognitive Science</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/theories-of-memory' rel='section'>Theories of Memory</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div id="tr-SUTER" title="Translate" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv" style="cursor:pointer" onclick="translateEntry('SUTER')"><i class="fa fa-language"></i> Translate</div>   <a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=SUTER&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FSUTER.pdf" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a>   <div id="la-SUTER" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('SUTER')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-SUTER" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('SUTER','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-SUTER"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eRUSECA-3' onclick="ee('click','RUSECA-3')" onmouseover="ee('over','RUSECA-3')" onmouseout="ee('out','RUSECA-3')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/RUSECA-3#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>32 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/RUSECA-3"><span class='name'>Federica Russo</span> & <span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span> (2011). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Epistemic Causality and Evidence-Based Medicine.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences</em> 33 (4).</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Causal claims in biomedical contexts are ubiquitous albeit they are not always made explicit. This paper addresses the question of what causal claims mean in the context of disease. It is argued that in medical contexts causality ought to be interpreted according to the epistemic theory. The epistemic theory offers an alternative to traditional accounts that cash out causation either in terms of “difference-making” relations or in terms of mechanisms. According to the epistemic approach, causal claims tell us about which<span id="RUSECA-3-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("RUSECA-3-abstract2").show();$("RUSECA-3-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="RUSECA-3-abstract2" style="display:none"> inferences (e.g., diagnoses and prognoses) are appropriate, rather than about the presence of some physical causal relation analogous to distance or gravitational attraction. It is shown that the epistemic theory has important consequences for medical practice, in particular with regard to evidence-based causal assessment. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("RUSECA-3-abstract2").hide();$("RUSECA-3-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-RUSECA-3"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/philosophy-of-medicine' rel='section'>Philosophy of Medicine</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-science-misc' rel='section'>Philosophy of Science, Misc</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=RUSECA-3&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fphilsci-archive.pitt.edu%2F8351%2F1%2Fepcause-medicine.pdf" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/RUSECA-3'>6 more</a>)   <div id="la-RUSECA-3" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('RUSECA-3')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-RUSECA-3" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('RUSECA-3','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/RUSECA-3"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 10 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-RUSECA-3"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eCLATET' onclick="ee('click','CLATET')" onmouseover="ee('over','CLATET')" onmouseout="ee('out','CLATET')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/CLATET#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>19 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/CLATET"><span class='name'>Brendan Clarke</span>, <span class='name'>Donald Gillies</span>, <span class='name'>Phyllis Illari</span>, <span class='name'>Frederica Russo</span> & <span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span> (2013). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The Evidence That Evidence-Based Medicine Omits.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Preventive Medicine</em> 57:745-747.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">According to current hierarchies of evidence for EBM, evidence of correlation is always more important than evidence of mechanisms when evaluating and establishing causal claims. We argue that evidence of mechanisms needs to be treated alongside evidence of correlation. This is for three reasons. First, correlation is always a fallible indicator of causation, subject in particular to the problem of confounding; evidence of mechanisms can in some cases be more important than evidence of correlation when assessing a causal claim. Second,<span id="CLATET-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("CLATET-abstract2").show();$("CLATET-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="CLATET-abstract2" style="display:none"> evidence of mechanisms is often required in order to obtain evidence of correlation . Third, evidence of mechanisms is often required in order to generalise and apply causal claims. While the EBM movement has been enormously successful in making explicit and critically examining one aspect of our evidential practice, i.e., evidence of correlation, we wish to extend this line of work to make explicit and critically examine a second aspect of our evidential practices: evidence of mechanisms. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("CLATET-abstract2").hide();$("CLATET-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-CLATET"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/philosophy-of-medicine-misc' rel='section'>Philosophy of Medicine, Misc</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-science-misc' rel='section'>Philosophy of Science, Misc</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=CLATET&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sciencedirect.com%2Fscience%2Farticle%2Fpii%2FS0091743512005452" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/CLATET'>4 more</a>)   <div id="la-CLATET" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CLATET')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CLATET" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CLATET','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/CLATET"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 6 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CLATET"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILLMA' onclick="ee('click','WILLMA')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILLMA')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILLMA')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILLMA#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>215 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILLMA"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (2013). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Erkenntnis</em> (S2):1-21.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The paper is a critique of the widespread conception of logic as a neutral arbiter between metaphysical theories, one that makes no `substantive’ claims of its own (David Kaplan and John Etchemendy are two recent examples). A familiar observation is that virtually every putatively fundamental principle of logic has been challenged over the last century on broadly metaphysical grounds (however mistaken), with a consequent proliferation of alternative logics. However, this apparent contentiousness of logic is often treated as though it were<span id="WILLMA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILLMA-abstract2").show();$("WILLMA-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILLMA-abstract2" style="display:none"> neutralized by the possibility of studying all these alternative logics within an agreed metalogical framework, typically that of first-order logic with set theory. In effect, metalogic is given the role of neutral arbiter. The paper will consider a variety of examples in which deep logical disputes re-emerge at the meta-level. One case is quantified modal logic, where some varieties of actualism require a modal meta-language (as opposed to the usual non-modal language of possible worlds model theory) in order not to make their denial of the Barcan formula self-defeating. Similarly, on some views the intended model theory for second-order logic can only be given in a second-order metalanguage—this may be needed to avoid versions of Russell’s paradox when the first-order quantifiers are read as absolutely unrestricted. It can be shown that the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness eventually forces fuzzy logical treatments of vagueness to use a fuzzy metalanguage, with consequent repercussions for what first-order principles are validated. The difficulty of proving the completeness of first-order intuitionistic logic on its intended interpretation by intuitionistically rather than just classically valid means is a more familiar example. These case studies will be discussed in some detail to reveal a variety of ways in which even metalogic is metaphysically contested, substantial and non-neutral. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILLMA-abstract2").hide();$("WILLMA-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILLMA"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/fuzzy-logic' rel='section'>Fuzzy Logic</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/logic-and-philosophy-of-logic' rel='section'>Logic and Philosophy of Logic</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILLMA&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs10670-013-9474-z" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILLMA'>6 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILLMA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILLMA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILLMA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILLMA','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILLMA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 4 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILLMA"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILOTS-2' onclick="ee('click','WILOTS-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILOTS-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILOTS-2')" class='entry'><div style='float:right' class='subtle'> <a href='/rec/WILOTS-2#analytics'><span style='color:#10A010'>99 <i class="fa fa-download"></i></span></a></div><span class="citation"><a target='_blank' href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILOTS-2"><span class='name'>Timothy Williamson</span> (1999). <span class='articleTitle recTitle'>On the Structure of Higher-Order Vagueness.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Mind</em> 108 (429):127-143.</span></span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Discussions of higher-order vagueness rarely define what it is for a term to have nth-order vagueness for n>2. This paper provides a rigorous definition in a framework analogous to possible worlds semantics; it is neutral between epistemic and supervaluationist accounts of vagueness. The definition is shown to have various desirable properties. But under natural assumptions it is also shown that 2nd-order vagueness implies vagueness of all orders, and that a conjunction can have 2nd-order vagueness even if its conjuncts do not.<span id="WILOTS-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILOTS-2-abstract2").show();$("WILOTS-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILOTS-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> Relations between the definition and other proposals are explored; reasons are given for preferring the present proposal. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILOTS-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILOTS-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILOTS-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/higher-order-vagueness' rel='section'>Higher-Order Vagueness</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILOTS-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1093%2Fmind%2F108.429.127" target='_blank' ><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILOTS-2'>10 more</a>)   <div id="la-WILOTS-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILOTS-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILOTS-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Save in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILOTS-2','')"><i class="fa fa-floppy-o"></i> My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILOTS-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 30 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILOTS-2"></span></div></div></li> </ol> </div> <div id='prevNextHtml' class='centered'><center><table><td><span class='prevNext'><img border='0' src='/philpapers/raw/icons/back-g.png'></td><td>1 — 50 / 770</td><td><span class='prevNext'><span title='Next page' class='clickable' onclick='goToNextPage()'><img border='0' src='/philpapers/raw/icons/forward.png'></span></span></td></table></center></div> </td> <td class="side_td"> <form name="expform"> <div class="sideBox"> <div class="sideBoxH">BibTeX / EndNote / RIS / etc</div> <div class="sideBoxC"> Export this page: <div style='margin-top:5px'> <select name="expf" id="expf" onChange="$('expLimit').show()"> <option value=''>Choose a format..</option> <option value='htm'>Formatted text</option><option value='txt'>Plain text</option><option value='bib'>BibTeX</option><option value='zot'>Zotero</option><option value='enw'>EndNote</option><option value='ris'>Reference Manager</option></select> <div id='expLimit' style="display:none"> Limit to <input type="text" id="expLimitI" size="3" value="500"> items. <input type="button" value="Export" onclick=" if ($F('expf')) { $('ap-format').value=$F('expf'); $('ap-limit').value=$F('expLimitI'); refreshWith($('allparams')); } else { alert('You must first choose a format.') } "> </div> </div> </div> </div> </form> <form id="moreOptions" name="more"> <div class="sideBox"> <div class="sideBoxH">Restrictions</div> <div class="sideBoxC"> <input class='checkbox' type='checkbox' name='proOnly' id='proOnly' onClick="createCookie('proOnly',this.checked ? 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