Sociological research on moral panics, long understood as “struggles for cultural power,” has focused on the social groups and media conditions that enable moral panics to emerge, and on the consequences of moral panics for the social control systems of societies. In this article I turn instead to modeling the specific cultural process of how the conditions for a moral panic are turned into an actual moral panic, moving the understanding of moral panic away from its Durkheimian origins and towards (...) a process-relational cultural sociology. Drawing on Roland Barthes’ theory of myth and Kenneth Burke’s dramatism, the paper posits the cultural process of resignification via synecdoche and metanarrative as the driver of the disproportion, concern, hostility, consensus, and volatility of moral panics. This process can be carefully traced in the case of the Salem Witch Trials; a retrospective reading reveals the same process at work in the “Mods and Rockers” panic analyzed by Stanley Cohen. Beyond moral panics, theorizing resignification as a non-exclusive counterpoint to framing and ideational embeddedness enriches the theoretical repertoire of cultural sociology. “Deep culture” and mythological signification can, using the schema proposed here, be understood as practical accomplishments—rhetorical responses to particular situations that, when performed successfully, legitimate violence and other forms of domination. (shrink)

In 1590, after Norway’s most famous witch trial, Anne Pedersdotter was burned alive. Resource scarcity and religious competition transformed an old superstition into a witch craze to which Anne fell victim. Her story became a play in 1908 and a film in 1943. The two adaptations attempt to give Anne’s persecution more modern explanations. In the play Anne Pedersdotter, Anne has psychic powers that make her neighbors think she is a Satanic collaborator. In the film Day of Wrath, (...) Anne embodies humanistic aspirations that would have been delusional in her own era and that are perhaps also poorly adapted to human nature in general. The trial and the two fictional versions of the trial all illustrate how thought patterns that evolved for small groups of foragers can be overstimulated in post-agricultural environments. This article identifies cognitive dispositions that, in periods of crisis, can trigger persecution of outsiders, discusses how those universal mechanisms man­ifest themselves in different cultural contexts, and examines the historically specific beliefs and values that animate the two fictional versions of Anne’s story. The article concludes with reflections on how the evolved cognitive mechanisms that led to beliefs in witchcraft often manifest themselves, in the present, as conspiracy beliefs directed at minorities. (shrink)

While contemporary readers may find what appear to be appealing streaks of liberalism in Montaigne's 'Essays', I argue that a more careful analysis suggests that Montaigne's overall stance is quietistic and conservative. To help support this claim I offer a close reading of 'Essays' III.11 ("Of Cripples"), where Montaigne offers his famous critique of the witch trials of early modern Europe. Once Montaigne's objections to the witch trials are properly understood, we see that Montaigne did not (...) seriously or consistently dispute the church's authority in political matters, though certain undeveloped seeds of liberalism do leave an unresolved tension in his writings. (shrink)

The concept of a witch hunt is frequently invoked, in recent times, to describe a kind of procedure for deciding the guilt of a person against whom an accusation has been made. But what exactly is a witch hunt? In this paper, ten conditions are formulated as a cluster of properties characterizing the witch hunt as a framework in which arguments are used: (1) pressure of social forces, (2) stigmatization, (3) climate of fear, (4) resemblance to a (...) fair trial, (5) use of simulated evidence, (6) simulated expert testimony, (7) nonfalsifiability characteristic of evidence, (8) reversal of polarity, (9) non-openness, and (10) use of the loaded question technique. The witch hunt, as characterized by these criteria, is shown to function as a negative normative structure for evaluating argumentation used in particular cases. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Montaigne on Witches and the Authority of Religion in the Public SphereBrian RibeiroThe pleasure in reading Michel de Montaigne, the French Counter-Reformer and fideistic skeptic, is due in no small part to the ways in which he so frequently defeats our expectations. The surprises occur at several levels, beginning with the very titles of his essays, which frequently have little to do with the topics he actually discusses. Who, (...) for example, would expect an essay titled "Of Three Good Women" (II.35) to praise the three women for their variously successful attempts at committing suicide—and little else? Or who would expect an essay with the innocent title "On Some Verses of Virgil" (II.5) to be richly confessional, as well as very explicitly sexual? Or, as one final example, who would expect an essay "Of Cripples" (II.11) to either (a) discuss the witch trials or (b) discuss cripples principally in terms of whether the lame make better sexual partners?The surprises are not confined to the formal features of Montaigne's text, but also appear in the views he articulates. We would not expect an early modern Frenchman to write so sympathetically and even admiringly about the cannibals of the New World (I.31). Nor would we expect an early modern French Catholic to write in opposition to the witch trials. Montaigne does both—with incredible finesse. But despite the attractively progressive attitude seemingly manifested in these two stances, Montaigne's overall view is in fact far more conservative and quietistic than we might expect, were we judging based only on these few cases. And so he surprises us yet again: We are surprised to find him opposing the witch trials, and we are surprised a second time to find that his opposition does not signal any deeper tendency toward progressive or politically liberal views. In short, there is good reason [End Page 235] to see Montaigne's general stance as firmly traditional. While he sometimes expresses apparently progressive views, he does so in a way that has no stable basis in his overall conceptual scheme, as I will argue. Of course, merely observing this tension in Montaigne's work is nothing new. Hugo Friedrich, writing in 1949, and discussing II.11, claimed that "Montaigne bravely takes a position against the delusion of the masses and against clerical fanaticism."1 But in the same passage (and elsewhere) Friedrich shows himself to be well-aware that this apparent radicalism is balanced by Montaigne's conservatism.2 That tension—in a nutshell—encapsulates the debate.3 However, "Of Cripples" presents this tension in its most perplexing form, making a detailed analysis of II.11 our best hope of making progress on the debate.4To support these claims I propose to offer a careful textual analysis of Montaigne's discussion of the witch trials in "Of Cripples."5 After considering several philosophical interpretations of his key Augustinian principle, I will argue that Montaigne's critique of the witch trials is primarily driven by problems internal to the religious perspective, and so does not represent an attempt to circumscribe the authority of religion in the public sphere more generally.6 Such a position, then, is both traditional and quietistic—another of Montaigne's surprises for his readers. If this is correct, then one of the principal texts used for promoting a "liberal" Montaigne—namely, II.11—can be be reappropriated by the defenders of a "quietistic" Montaigne. Nonetheless, even on my reading, there remain some incompletely resolved tensions. That, perhaps, is no less than we should expect from history's only self-proclaimed "accidental philosopher."7IMontaigne opens "Of Cripples" by discussing the Gregorian reform of the calendar, which had been adopted in France in 1582. Yet as odd as this opening is, it serves to quickly introduce a familiar theme in the Essays: Even so basic a matter as the calendar is subject to "[s] o much uncertainty"—just like everything else—that "we are every day in doubt" about how to "keep a record of past events" (F, pp. 784–85). These thoughts are then quickly transformed into a skeptical reflection on human reason itself... (shrink)

Research ethics committees (RECs) evaluate whether the risk-benefit ratio of a study is acceptable. Decentralized clinical trials (DCTs) are a novel approach for conducting clinical trials that potentially bring important benefits for research, including several collateral benefits. The position of collateral benefits in risk-benefit assessments is currently unclear. DCTs raise therefore questions about how these benefits should be assessed. This paper aims to reconsider the different types of research benefits, and their position in risk-benefit assessments. We first propose (...) a categorization of research benefits, based on the types of benefits that can be distinguished from the literature and ethical guidelines. Secondly, we will reconsider the position of collateral benefits. We argue that these benefits are not fundamentally different from other benefits of research and can therefore be included in risk-benefit assessments of DCTs. (shrink)

A world in which atheism has replaced religion is the dream of Oxford evolutionary biologist and “New Atheist” activist, Richard Dawkins. He thinks that religious belief is irrational superstition that leads to violence (like the inquisition), intolerance (like homophobia), ignorance (like creationism), and corruption (like red hot Catholic love). In fact, in the episode “Go God Go,” it is the cartoon version of Dawkins himself who pioneered the efforts culminating in religion's demise. First, one has to understand what science is. (...) Science is a method for discovering the truth about the world. Many philosophers argue that science and religion are perfectly compatible. Religion is about ethics and meaning, but science is about explaining the way the world works. Religion has led to a lot of violence—the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, witch trials, 9/11, and more. And it's certain that the end of religion wouldn't eliminate all violence. (shrink)

An exploration of the untamed crossroads where 'the feline' and 'the feminine' mingle and make magic. From ancient Egypt to early modern Venice to Edo Japan, the witch trials to the Women's March, Catwoman to cat ladies, kitten play to cat conventions, this book tracks the cat's circuitous connection to women and femininity through a magical lens. By combining historical research, pop culture and art analyses, and original interviews, this book uncovers what the 'feral feminine' might mean to (...) witches, sluts, feminists, artists, historians, philosophers, cat ladies, and cat lovers today. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 in (...) the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Benedict XVI: A Life. Volume 2, Professor and Prefect to Pope and Pope Emeritus 1966–The Present by Peter SeewaldEmil AntonBenedict XVI: A Life. Volume 2, Professor and Prefect to Pope and Pope Emeritus 1966–The Present by Peter Seewald, translated by Dinah Livingstone (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2021), viii + 568 pp.What better way to spend Pope Benedict XVI's ninety-fifth birthday (which turned out to be his last) than by (...) visiting his birth house in Marktl am Inn at his birth minute—4.15 AM! In addition to five Finnish pilgrims, twenty or so local grandmas and grandpas attended the now-traditional early morning prayer, which this year fell on Holy Saturday, the very liturgical day on which Joseph Ratzinger was born and baptized. Other destinations on a do-it-yourself Ratzinger pilgrimage included Freising (studies and ordination), Regensburg (professorial years), Altötting (favorite Marian sanctuary), childhood villages and towns (Tittmoning, Aschau am Inn, Hufschlag, Traunstein), and of course Munich (seminary and episcopal years), with beer, good food, and Apfelstrudel at the Augustiner Klosterwirt.Such a trip is highly recommended, even though there were no Ratzinger books in the "Theology" section of University of Regensburg's bookshop, reflecting his persona non grata status in German academia. In Altötting, however, Peter Seewald's magnificent biography was on offer, as well as icon-like pictures of Pope Benedict and candles with his image on them—good for both admirers and critics!In English, Seewald's biography is divided into two volumes (for my review of volume 1, see Nova et Vetera [English] 20, no. 3), the second one comprising three parts: (1) professor, (2) prefect, and (3) Pope. The book was certainly worth the wait and does not disappoint: the research and analysis are excellent, the style is enjoyable, and interesting new details are revealed, such as the "endless outbursts of crying" and "violent quarrels with cardinals" of "popess" (as the housekeeper was called in the curia) Ingrid Stampa, who "kept Ratzinger's diary, edited official speeches and even decided who could meet the Holy Father" (351).As a journalist, Seewald is especially strong on the German press coverage [End Page 285] of Ratzinger. During his time as archbishop of Munich, "Ratzinger took part so frequently in the public debate that the Süddeutsche Zeitung feared that it would be a 'big shock' for millions of Upper Bavarian Catholics if his name did not appear in any edition of the four Munich daily papers" (109). Ratzinger's predominantly negative media image seems to stem to a great extent from the actions of Hans Küng. Asked about the cancellation of Küng's missio canonica at a youth event in 1979, Ratzinger said off the cuff that it was right, since Küng was actively disputing essential doctrines of the Catholic Church (128). The comments were published without authorization, which led to Küng accusing Ratzinger of "falling back on pre-conciliar customs of heresy-hunting, insinuation and defamation" (129). After the publication of Vittorio Messori's The Ratzinger Report in 1985, Küng "crashed in with a sweeping blow in the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit" (170), not failing to bring up his "litany of complaints: the 'case of Galileo,' the 'Chinese rites controversy,' 'putting all the most important European thinkers on the Index (Descartes, Kant, Sartre etc.),' '9 million victims of witch trials'" (171). According to Seewald, this momentous article, ending with the claim that Ratzinger was "afraid of the truth more than anything else," provided the endlessly reproduced media image of the prefect.Seewald singles out the Bild journalist Andreas Englisch as a striking example of the kind of deliberate manipulation typical of so-called expert reporters. After Benedict XVI's election, Englisch admitted with apparent remorse that, in previous reporting, in order to make John Paul II's "light shine more brightly," he had "needed an enemy to make the story more dramatic" (192). Seewald continues: "However, Englisch had no scruples about later applying his business model to books about Pope Francis, whom he raised almost to heaven, in order finally to shove the retired Benedict XVI down to hell" (192... (shrink)

A thorough and careful report on the variety and extent of offenses prosecuted by the Puritan churches from colonial times into the nineteenth century, with some asides on civil cases, such as the Salem witch trials. The text is lively with verbatim testimony. A large bibliography frankly notes the various reasons why some records are "unavailable."--E. T.

A thorough and careful report on the variety and extent of offenses prosecuted by the Puritan churches from colonial times into the nineteenth century, with some asides on civil cases, such as the Salem witch trials. The text is lively with verbatim testimony. A large bibliography frankly notes the various reasons why some records are "unavailable."--E. T.

A thorough and careful report on the variety and extent of offenses prosecuted by the Puritan churches from colonial times into the nineteenth century, with some asides on civil cases, such as the Salem witch trials. The text is lively with verbatim testimony. A large bibliography frankly notes the various reasons why some records are "unavailable."--E. T.

Various historical sources from the Renaissance--including transcripts of trials for witchcraft, writings on demonology and textbooks of pharmaceutical botany--describe vegetal ointments prepared by women accused of witchcraft and endowed with marked psychoactive properties. Here, we examine the botanical composition and the possible pharmacological actions of these ointments. The results of our study suggest that recipes for narcotic and mind-altering salves were known to Renaissance folk healers, and were in part distinct from homologous preparations of educated medicine. In addition, our (...) study reveals an unexpected connection of these vegetal psychotropes with archaic chtonic beliefs, confirming the tight association between rituals and cults entered on the Underworld and the image of the Medieval witch. (shrink)

Denounced by neighbors and scrutinized by demonologists, the early modern French witch also confessed, self-identified as a witch and as the author of horrific deeds. What led her to this point? Despair, solitude, perhaps even physical pain, but most decisively, demonology's two-pronged prosecutorial and truth-seeking confessional apparatus. This book examines the systematic and well-oiled machinery that served to extract, interpret, and disseminate witches' confessions in early modern France. For the demonologist, confession was the only way to find out (...) the truth about the clandestine activities of witches. For the witch, however, trial confessions opened new horizons of selfhood. In this book, Virginia Krause unravels the threads that wove together the demonologist's will to know and the witch's subjectivity. By examining textual and visual evidence, Krause shows how confession not only generated demonological theory but also brought forth a specific kind of self, which we now recognize as the modern subject. (shrink)

A case study is presented of the development of computer-based support tools for power engineers in the electricity supply industry. The objective was to develop an expert system to support witching schedule production. A user-centred approach was followed which led the user community to conclude that a switching schedule production assistant (SSPA) was required which would leave control with the power engineer. Prototype systems were developed and evaluated in user trials which revealed that a significant and more general purpose (...) tool would be a computer generated electricity network display that the engineers could manipulate. The paper concludes that the process of enabling users to evaluate alternative forms of technology can facilitate the development systems that are useful, acceptable and usable. (shrink)

A central debate in philosophy of race is between eliminativists and conservationists about what we ought do with ‘race’ talk. ‘Eliminativism’ is often defined such that it’s committed to holding that (a) ‘race’ is vacuous and races don’t exist, so (b) we should eliminate the term ‘race’ from our vocabulary. As a stipulative definition, that’s fine. But as an account of one of the main theoretical options in the debate, it’s a serious mistake. I offer three arguments for why eliminativism (...) should not be tethered to vacuity or error theory, and three arguments for why the view shouldn’t be understood in terms of eliminating the term ‘race’ from our vocabulary. Instead, I propose we understand the debate as concerning whether certain uses of ordinary race terms are typically wrong. This proposal is quite simple, and naturally suggested by the common gloss that eliminativism about ‘race’ is akin to a commonsensical view about 'witch' talk. But nonetheless, I argue that it offers a significant recharacterization of this core debate in philosophy of race. (shrink)

The book provides a comprehensive exploration of witchcraft beliefs and practices in the rural region of Eastern Slovenia. Based on field research conducted at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it examines witchcraft in the region from folkloristic, anthropological, as well as historical, perspectives. Witchcraft is presented as part of social reality, strongly related to misfortune and involved in social relationships. The reality of the ascribed bewitching deeds, psychological mechanisms that may help bewitchment to work, circumstances in which bewitchment narratives (...) can be mobilised, reasons for a person to acquire a reputation of the witch in the entire community, and the role that unwitchers fulfilled in the community, are but a few of the many topics discussed. In addition, the intertwinement of social witchcraft with narratives of supernatural experiences, closely associated with supernatural beings of European folklore, forming part of the overall witchcraft discourse in the area, is explored. (shrink)

The assumption that witchcraft is a universal phenomenon does not do justice to the category of persons known as the "aje" in Yoruba culture. The aje evidence behavior and skills that make them into a special class of human beings in their own right. Evidence of the danger of treating some Western concepts as universals.

Witches, Whores, and Sorcerers: The Concept of Evil in Early Iran. By S. K. Mendoza Forrest. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011. Pp. x + 231.

These considerations illuminate an ontology of the witch by first disclosing how “witch,” as a linguistic gesture, carries a world of meaning, ethics, and a culture of being originating in the body. Witches and witchcraft speak to a communal situatedness of being by acknowledging the power we have over ourselves, others, and that singular lack of control we often experience in everyday life. In dialogue with Ada Agada, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I offer an interpretation of the (...) body schema through what I call the “witching-body,” drawing on historical and anthropological examples of witchcraft as related to personhood, thus demonstrating how embodiment philosophy and ontology are already alive in everyday ritual and magical acts. I explain the other’s contradiction of everydayness and transcendence through the reflexivity of self-sensing-self and how aspects of our own body, such as organs and emotions, may be occult or other to us. The everydayness of witchcraft and the ungraspable ambiguity of the witch speak to this necessary transcendence we experience with everyday others; there is both a banality and an infinite plurality. We yearn to know the witch because through the embodied existential expressions of “witch” we find what constitutes being a person. (shrink)

This paper is about intentional identity, the phenomenon of intentional attitudes having a common focus. I present an argument against an approach to explaining intentional identity, defended by Nathan Salmon, Terence Parsons and others, that involves positing exotic objects. For example, those who adopt this sort of view say that when two astronomers had beliefs about Vulcan, their attitudes had a common focus because there is an exotic object that both of their beliefs were about. I argue that countenancing these (...) exotic objects does not help us explain intentional identity. (shrink)

The classical Athenian philosopher Socrates was tried in 399 BCE on the basis of two notoriously ambiguous charges: corrupting the youth and impiety (in Greek, asebeia). A majority of the 501 dikasts (Athenian citizen-jurors) voted to convict him. Socrates was ultimately sentenced to death by drinking a hemlock-based liquid. This well-known account of the trial is by Plato, one of Socrates' students and a famous philosopher in his own right. Whether Socrates was punished unjustly is a contested issue which to (...) this day inspires discussions about the nature and meaning of justice. (shrink)

Interpretation -- Introduction -- Interpreting Plato -- The political culture of Plato's early dialogues -- Dialogue -- Character and history -- The mouthpiece principle -- Forms of evidence -- Desire -- Socrates and eros -- The subjectivist conception of desire -- Instrumental and terminal desire -- Rational and irrational desires -- Desire in the critique of Akrasia -- Interpreting Lysis -- The deficiency conception of desire -- Inauthentic friendship -- Platonic desire -- Antiphilosophical desires -- Knowledge -- Excellence as wisdom (...) -- The epistemic unity of excellence -- Dunamis and technê -- Goodness and form -- The epistemological priority of definitional knowledge -- Ordinary ethical knowledge -- Method -- The Socratic fallacy -- Socrates' pursuit of definitions -- Hupothesis -- Two postulates -- The geometrical illustration -- Geometrical analysis -- The method of reasoning from a postulate -- Elenchus and hupothesis -- Knowledge and aitia -- F-conditions -- Cognitive security -- Aporia -- Forms of aporia -- Dramatic aporia -- The example of Charmides -- Charmides as autobiography -- The politics of Sôphrosunê -- Critias' Philotimia -- Self-knowledge and the knowledge of knowledge -- Knowledge of knowledge and knowledge of the good -- Philosophy and the polis. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I discuss Polycarp Ikuenobe's view that it is rational to believe, in an African context, in the existence of witches and witchcraft. First, I attempt to show that it is not possible to prove empirically that witches and witchcraft are real, as Ikuenobe assumes. I argue that even though witches and witchcraft are part of the social reality in which many Africans live, they do not have the same ontological status as theoretical entities in scientific research. (...) Second, I try to show that Ikuenobe's attempt to demonstrate that the belief in witches and witchcraft has a rational foundation is not convincing. Admittedly, Africans, who live in magic-ridden cultures, have reasons that locally justify their belief in witches and witchcraft. However, when the justification offered for this belief is assessed by external standards, employed within scientific discourse, it turns out to be insufficient. (shrink)

Robert E. Butts (1928-1997) was a philosopher and historian of science whose central concerns were the distinction between the rational and the irrational. He viewed scientific rationality as our major defence against the various conditions that encourage witch hunts and similar outbursts of irrationality, with all their attendant pain and terror. Butts saw himself as a pragmatic realist, combining what he took to be the best aspects of logical empiricism with a historically informed pragmatism, deeply appreciative of the methods (...) of science, trying to describe a kind of rationality essential in the struggle to preserve human values. This volume gathers previously unpublished essays and lectures with some previously published, thematically related essays. It includes essays and lectures on philosophical aspects of the European witch hunt, on scientific rationality and methodology, and on the relationships between science and philosophy exhibited in the writings of such historically significant figures as Leibniz, D'Alembert, Hume, Kant, Carnap and Kuhn. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper is about the context of Albert Einstein's concerns at the time of a most intense intellectual effort — his own and that of a small group of scientists concerned with classical quantum theory. I describe contemporaneous interactions and differing views about the prospects for and the significance of the First Solvay Congress of 1911 as voiced by major participants. There are two axes around which the paper evolves: the Einstein-Nernst-Lorentz dialogue and the public institutional creation of the (...) “Solvay” stage. In certain ways, this paper is about personal and institutional patronage: the working out of a difficult theoretical impasse requires individual and collective moral support. It is about the forging of the identity of a scientific problem and the personal and institutional setting, the public space, in which this problem was collectively addressed. But I also uncover heuristic playfulness and flexibility which accompanies theoretical change. (shrink)

The outsourcing of clinical trials to Latin America by the transnational innovative pharmaceutical industry began about twenty years ago. Using archival information and field work in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, the authors discuss the regulatory contexts and the ethical dimensions of human experimentation in the region. More than 80% of all clinical trials in the region take place in these countries, and the European Medicines Agency has defined them as priority countries in Latin America. The (...) authors raise questions about the quality of data obtained from the trials and the violation of human rights during their implementation. Their findings are presented in this volume, the first in-depth analysis of clinical trials in the region.. (shrink)

Philosophical critics standardly read behaviorism as a program for defining the concepts of folk psychology in equivalent behavioral terms. This is a misreading. Behaviorism is a program for getting rid of ill-defined mentalistic terms in favor of better defined behavioral idiom. In short, it is a program not for conceptual analysis but for verbal reform. Therefore, criticizing behaviorists for failing to define mentalistic concepts is like criticizing opponents of the Spanish Inquisition for failing to define witchcraft.

"In May 1621 Francis Bacon's political career came to an abrupt end as a consequence of his being impeached from the office of Lord Chancellor of England. Later in the same year he composed his most imaginative political testament, the History of the Reign of King Henry VII. These two events were by no means coincidental. Of his several vocations, politics was the one that mattered most to Bacon, and he did not go willingly into retirement. The History, like so (...) many of his writings, was intended to persuade James I of his redoubtable abilities as a counselor of kings. [The author] fits the story of that year into the pattern of Bacon's life, beginning with a narrative account of the impeachment, an episode testifying to weaknesses both in Bacon's political position as well as in his personal character. [The author] examines Bacon's political career during the preceding years for what they tell us about Bacon's mind. To understand Bacon in politics, [the author] believes, it must be realized how distinctive habits of intellect and sensibility permeate everything he wrote and that virtually everything he wrote was intended to serve his political ambition. Finally, [the author] analyzes the History to show that it must be read not only as a summary portrait of Bacon's civil career but as a justification of his ideas and himself. Setting the History into Bacon's life makes apparent how much of his achievement sprang from his skills as a rhetorician. Words were his greatest gift and one that he always exploited. [The author]'s study demonstrates the extent to which Bacon was also a prisoner of his talent"--. (shrink)

This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex conceptual structures departing from more basic ones. The central thesis of the paper is that there are what I call “functionally structured concepts”, these are non-harmonic concepts in Dummett’s sense that might be legitimized if there is a function that justifies the tie between the inferential connection the concept allows us to trace. Proving this requires enhancing the russellian existential analysis of definite descriptions to apply to (...) functions and using this in proving the legitimacy of such concepts. The utility of the proposal is shown for the case of thick ethical terms and an attempt is made to use it in explaining the development of natural numbers. This last move could allow us to go one step lower in explaining the genesis of natural numbers while maintaining the notion of abstract numbers as higher order entities. (shrink)

There is little about globalized modern magical-religious Witchcraft that isn’t borrowed. It is well established that it is a creative response to modernity rather than an ancient continuous practice. Its inventiveness also makes it ripe for charges of religious appropriation. Complaints are compounded by claims that Nature Religions and New Age are consumerist movements, shaped by principles of alienated capitalism, fostered by ethnocentric views and coloniality. For British practitioners, anxieties about ethical practices mean they have recently turned to scrutinizing their (...) own practice, but their questions focus on whether the entangled colonial histories of modern Witchcraft mean it is an inherently appropriated practice. In part this reflects changing political conditions, but it is also informed by the alignment of history with formal accounts over twenty years ago. I consider whether Liz Bucar’s (2022) valuable advice – to borrow more and better – will help shine some light on these debates. (shrink)

Impossible love -- Between nature and culture -- Surviving, forever foreign -- Cryptic crossing -- Touching transcendence, in the flesh -- The tragedy of Christianity.