Search results for 'wrong kind of reasons' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
    In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because (...)
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  2. Nathaniel Sharadin (2013). Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7:1-8.
    Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called " right " and " wrong " kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong (...)
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  3.  68
    Richard Rowland (2013). Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences. Utilitas 25 (3):405-416.
    In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that (...)
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  4. Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
    According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge (...)
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  5.  31
    Christos Kyriacou (2013). How Not to Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):101-110.
    Ulrike Heuer (2011) has recently revisited ‘the wrong kind of reasons’ (WKR) problem for buckpassing accounts of value. She suggests that, insofar we want to avoid the problem, we have to abandon orthodox buckpassing accounts that incorporate a fitting attitude analysis of value. Instead, she proposes that we could do with a novel buckpassing account couched in terms of reasons for action. The aim of this paper is to show that the problem both remains in its (...)
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  6.  98
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right (...)
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  7.  8
    John Brunero (2015). Idealization and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Ethics 126 (1):153-161.
    I consider Antti Kauppinen’s recent proposal for solving the wrong kind of reasons problem for fitting attitude analyses through an appeal to the verdicts of ideal subjects. I present two problems for Kauppinen’s treatment of a foreseen objection, and construct a counterexample to his proposal as it applies to the wrong kind of reasons to admire someone. I then show how to construct similar counterexamples to his proposal as it applies to the wrong (...)
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  8.  23
    Christopher Howard (2016). In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.
    Skepticism about the ‘wrong kind’ of reasons—the view that wrong-kind reasons are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes—is more often assumed than argued for. Jonathan Way sets out to remedy this: he argues that skeptics about, but not defenders of, wrong-kind reasons can explain a distinctive pattern of transmission among such reasons and claims that this fact lends significant support to (...)
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  9.  24
    Heath White (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):339-364.
    The 'fitting-attitudes analysis' aims to analyze evaluative concepts in terms of attitudes, but suffers from the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem. This article critiques some suggested solutions to the WKR problem and offers one of its own, which appeals to the aims of attitudes. However, goodness is not a concept that can be successfully analyzed according to the method suggested here. Reasons are given why goodness should be thought of, instead, as a mind-independent property.
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  10.  49
    Richard Rowland (2014). Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Philosophical Studies (6):1-20.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards (...)
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  11.  59
    John Brunero (2010). Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang. Utilitas 22 (3):351-359.
    In his article , Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.
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  12.  14
    Micah Lott (2016). Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Utilitas 28 (1):28-40.
    In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and the for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall's argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than (...)
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  13. Pamela Hieronymi (2013). The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments). Ethics (1):114-127.
    Here I defend my solution to the wrong-kind-of-reason problem against Mark Schroeder’s criticisms. In doing so, I highlight an important difference between other accounts of reasons and my own. While others understand reasons as considerations that count in favor of attitudes, I understand reasons as considerations that bear (or are taken to bear) on questions. Thus, to relate reasons to attitudes, on my account, we must consider the relation between attitudes and questions. By considering (...)
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  14. Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  15. Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
    A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason (...)
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  16.  26
    Mark van Roojen (2013). Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Righ Kind of Reasons to Believe. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. 59-78.
    T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to (...)
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  17. Jonathan Way (2012). Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason. Ethics 122 (3):489-515.
    According to fitting-attitudes accounts of value, the valuable is what there is sufficient reason to value. Such accounts face the famous wrong kind of reason problem. For example, if an evil demon threatens to kill you unless you value him, it may appear that you have sufficient reason to value the demon, although he is not valuable. One solution to this problem is to deny that the demon’s threat is a reason to value him. It is instead a (...)
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  18. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons (...)
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  19. Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It (...)
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  20.  56
    Jennie Louise (2009). Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):345 - 364.
    The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are (...)
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  21. Gerald Lang (2008). The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 20 (4):472-489.
    Recent discussion of Scanlon's account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X, has generated the problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actually possesses. I briefly review some of the existing solutions offered (...)
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  22.  87
    Jonas Olson (2009). The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 21 (2):225-232.
    The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.
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  23.  31
    Lars Samuelsson (2013). The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Utilitas 25 (3):383-404.
    In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang's suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang's suggestion for (...)
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  24. Mark Schroeder (2012). The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons. Ethics 122 (3):457-488.
    Philosophers have come to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reasons for belief, intention, and other attitudes. Several theories about the nature of this distinction have been offered, by far the most prevalent of which is the idea that it is, at bottom, the distinction between what are known as ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. This paper argues that the object-given/state-given theory vastly overgeneralizes on a small set of data points, and in particular that any adequate account (...)
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  25.  71
    Philip Cook (2008). An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck. Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.
    Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its (...)
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  26.  9
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Introduction - Logos & Episteme, Special Issue: The Ethics of Belief. Logos and Episteme 6 (4):397-404.
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    Hanno Sauer (2014). The Wrong Kind of Mistake: A Problem for Robust Sentimentalism About Moral Judgment. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):247-269.
    IntroductionIn a 1971 interview broadcast on Granada TV Manchester, Woody Allen made one of his trademark self-deprecating remarks about an early film of his: “It was a boring picture, as I recall.” The interviewer responded with surprise: “I rather enjoyed it.” To which Allen replied: “Yes, but you’re mistaken.” In the world of humor, Allen’s reply sounds odd – which is why it is funny. In the moral domain, an exchange like this would not sound weird at all. What is (...)
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  28.  32
    Daniel von Wachter, Libet's Experiment Provides No Evidence Against Strong Libertarian Free Will Because It Investigates the Wrong Kind of Action.
    While other philosophers have pointed out that Libet’s experiment is compatible with compatibilist free will and also with some kinds of libertarian free will, this article ar- gues that it is even compatible with strong libertarian free will, i.e. a person’s ability to initiate causal processes. It is widely believed that Libet’s experiment has shown that all our actions have preceding unconscious causes. This article argues that Libet’s claim that the actions he invest- igated are voluntary is false. They are (...)
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  29.  63
    Peter Forrest (2009). The Philosophical Scandal of the Wrong Kind of Religious Disagreement. Sophia 48 (2):151-166.
    I argue for the following four theses: (1) The Dread Thesis: human beings should fear having false religious beliefs concerning some religious doctrines; (2) The Radical Uncertainty Thesis: we, namely most human beings in our culture at our time, are in a situation where we have to commit ourselves on the truth or falsity of some propositions of ultimate importance; (3) The Radical Choice Thesis: considerations of expected loss or gain do not always provide guidance as to how to commit (...)
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  30.  2
    Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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    Mark LeBar (2007). Prichard Vs. Plato: Intuition Vs. Reflection. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 1-32.
    This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should (...)
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  32.  1
    Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  33.  1
    Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  34. Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  35. Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  36. Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  37. Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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  38. Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrongkind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the (...)
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    Scott Woodcock (2009). Five Reasons Why Margaret Somerville is Wrong About Same-Sex Marriage and the Rights of Children. Dialogue 48 (4):867.
    ABSTRACT: In written work and a lecture at the 2008 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences that was co-sponsored by the Canadian Philosophical Association, Margaret Somerville has claimed that allowing same-sex marriage is unethical because doing so violates the inherently procreative function of marriage and thereby undermines the rights and duties that exist between children and their biological parents. In my paper, I offer five reasons for thinking that Somerville’s argument for this conclusion is unpersuasive. In each case (...)
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  40. Kent Hurtig, The Wrong Kind of Value.
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  41.  29
    Metaethics After Moore (2008). The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 20 (4).
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  42. Mark Schroeder (2010). Value and the Right Kind of Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
    Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of philosophers’ other (...)
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  43.  1
    Nir Eyal (2014). Two Kinds of To-Kind Benefits and Other Reasons Why Shared Vulnerability Can Keep Clinical Studies Ethical. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (12):22-24.
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  44. Paul F. Armstrong (1989). Chapter Five Right for the Wrong Reasons: A Critique of Sociology in Professional Adult Education. In Barry P. Bright (ed.), Theory and Practice in the Study of Adult Education: The Epistemological Debate. Routledge 94.
     
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  45.  29
    Ulrike Heuer (2010). Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan
  46.  85
    Pamela Hieronymi, Research Overview.
    In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.
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  47. Daniel Whiting (2014). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely (...)
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    Marcello Guarini (2013). Moral Case Classification and the Nonlocality of Reasons. Topoi 32 (2):267-289.
    This paper presents the results of training an artificial neural network (ANN) to classify moral situations. The ANN produces a similarity space in the process of solving its classification problem. The state space is subjected to analysis that suggests that holistic approaches to interpreting its functioning are problematic. The idea of a contributory or pro tanto standard, as discussed in debates between moral particularists and generalists, is used to understand the structure of the similarity space generated by the ANN. A (...)
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    Robert H. Kimball (2006). What's Wrong with Argumentum Ad Baculum? Reasons, Threats, and Logical Norms. Argumentation 20 (1):89-100.
    A dialogue-based analysis of informal fallacies does not provide a fully adequate explanation of our intuitions about what is wrong with ad baculum and of when it is admissible and when it is not. The dialogue-based analysis explains well why mild, benign threats can be legitimate in some situations, such as cooperative bargaining and negotiation, but does not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats to coerce and to intimidate. I propose an alternative deriving (...)
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  50.  70
    Jonas Olson (2009). Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365 - 378.
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such (...)
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