Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Belief" by Eric Schwitzgebel |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Allen, Colin (1992), “Mental content”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, 537–553. (Scholar)
- Allen, Colin and Marc Bekoff (1997), Species of mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Andrews, Kristin (2002), “Interpreting autism: A critique of Davidson on thought and language”, Philosophical Psychology, 15, 317–332. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), “Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation”, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic, eds., Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford), 201–219. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D.M. (1968), A materialist theory of the mind (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- ––– (1980), The nature of mind (Ithaca: Cornell). (Scholar)
- ––– (1973), Belief, truth, and knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D.M., C.B. Martin, and U.T. Place (1996), Dispositions (London: Routledge). (Scholar)
- Audi, Robert (1972), “The concept of believing”, Personalist, 53, 43–62. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994), “Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe”, Nous, 28, 419–434. (Scholar)
- Baker, Lynne R. (1995), Explaining attitudes (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Bayne, Tim, and Elisabeth Pacherie (2005), “In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions”, Mind and Language, 20, 163–188. (Scholar)
- Block, N. (1991), “Troubles with functionalism”, in D.M. Rosenthal, ed., The nature of mind (New York: Oxford), 211–228. (Scholar)
- Bortolotti, Lisa (2010), Delusions and other irrational beliefs (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Braddon-Mitchell, David and Frank Jackson (1996), The philosophy of mind and cognition (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Braithwaite, R.B. (1932–1933), “The nature of believing”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33, 129–146. (Scholar)
- Brandom, Robert B. (1994), Making it explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard). (Scholar)
- Bratman, Michael (1999), Faces of intention (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler (1977), “Belief de re”, Journal of Philosophy, 75, 119–138. (Scholar)
- Campbell, John (2001), “Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 8, 89–100. (Scholar)
- Carnap, Rudolf (1956), Meaning and necessity, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago). (Scholar)
- Carruthers, Peter (1996), Language, thought, and consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the laws of physics lie (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick M. (1957), Perceiving (Ithaca: Cornell). (Scholar)
- Churchland, Paul M. (1981), “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67–90. (Scholar)
- Cohen, L. Jonathan (1989), “Belief and acceptance”, Mind, 98, 367–389. (Scholar)
- ––– (1992), An essay on belief and acceptance (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Crimmins, Mark (1992), Talk about beliefs (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Cummins, Robert (1996), Representations, targets, and attitudes (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Currie, Gregory (2000), “Imagination, delusion, and hallucinations”, Mind and Language, 15, 168–183. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald (1982), “Rational animals”, Dialectica, 36, 317–327. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984), Inquiries into truth and interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon). (Scholar)
- Dennett, Daniel C. (1969), Content and consciousness (London: Routledge). (Scholar)
- ––– (1978), Brainstorms (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- ––– (1987), The intentional stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- ––– (1991), “Real patterns”, Journal of Philosophy, 87, 27–51. (Scholar)
- Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR (2000) (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association). (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred (1988), Explaining behavior (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry H. (1978), “Mental representation”, Erkenntnis, 13, 9–61. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry A. (1968), Psychological explanation (New York: Random House). (Scholar)
- ––– (1975), The language of thought (New York: Cromwell). (Scholar)
- ––– (1981), Representations (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- ––– (1987), Psychosemantics (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- ––– (1990), A theory of content (Cambridge, MA: MIT).
- Fodor, Jerry and Ernest Lepore (1992), Holism (Oxford: Blackwell). (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry A. and Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988), “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis”, Cognition, 28, 3–71. (Scholar)
- Frankish, Keith (2004), Mind and Supermind (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Gallagher, Shaun (2009), “Delusional realities”, in M. R. Broome and L. Bortolotti, eds., Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford), 245–266. (Scholar)
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008a), “Alief and belief”, Journal of Philosophy, 105: 634–663. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008b), “Alief in action, and reaction”, Mind and Language, 23: 552–585. (Scholar)
- Gettier, Edmund L. (1963), “Is justified true belief knowledge?”, Analysis 23, 121–123. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert (1973), Thought (Princeton: Princeton). (Scholar)
- ––– (1986), Change in view (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- ––– (1987), “(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics”, in E. LePore, ed., New directions in semantics (London: Academic), 55–81. (Scholar)
- Heil, John (1992), The nature of true minds (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Hume, David (1740), Treatise of human nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford, 1978). (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, Richard C. (1983), The logic of decision, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago). (Scholar)
- Jeshion, Robin (2002), “Acquaintanceless de re belief”, in J.K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and D. Shier, eds., Meaning and truth (New York: Seven Bridges), 53–78. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David (1968), “Quantifying in”, Synthese, 19, 178–214. (Scholar)
- Kihlstrom, John F. (2004), “Implicit methods in social psychology”, in The SAGE handbook of methods in social psychology, Carol Sansone, Carolyn C. Morf, and A.T. Panter (eds.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 195–212. (Scholar)
- Lane, Kristin A., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Brian A. Nosek, and Anthony G. Greenwald (2007), “Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: IV”, in Implicit measures of attitudes, Bernd Wittenbrink and Norbert Schwarz (eds.), New York: Guilford, 59–102. (Scholar)
- Lehrer, Keith (1990), Metamind (Oxford: Clarendon). (Scholar)
- Lewis, David (1972), “Psychophysical and theoretical identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249–258. (Scholar)
- ––– (1979), “Attitudes de dicto and de se”, Philosophical Review, 88, 513–543. (Scholar)
- ––– (1980), “Mad pain and Martian pain”, in N. Block, ed., Readings in the philosophy of psychology, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard), 216–222. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994), “Lewis, David: Reduction of Mind”, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A companion to the philosophy of mind (Oxford: Blackwell), 412–431. (Scholar)
- Loar, Brian (1981), Mind and meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Lycan, William G. (1981a), “Form, function, and feel”, Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24–50. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981b), Toward a homuncular theory of believing, Cognition and Brain Theory, 4, 139–159. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986), “Tacit belief”, in R.J. Bogdan, ed., Belief: Form, content, and function (Oxford: Clarendon), 61–82. (Scholar)
- Marcus, Ruth B. (1990), “Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50, 132–153. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995), “The anti-naturalism of some language centered accounts of belief”, Dialectica, 49, 113–129. (Scholar)
- Millikan, Ruth G. (1984), Language, thought, and other biological categories (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- ––– (1993), White queen psychology and other essays for Alice (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Mumford, Stephen (1998), Dispositions (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Papineau, David (1984), “Representation and explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 51, 550–572. (Scholar)
- Price, H. H. (1969), Belief (London: Allen & Unwin). (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O. (1951), “Two dogmas of empiricism”, Philosophical Review, 60, 20–43. (Scholar)
- ––– (1956), “Quantifiers and propositional attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 53, 177–186. (Scholar)
- ––– (1960), Word and object (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Perner, Josef (1991), Understanding the representational mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip (1993), The common mind (New York: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Petty, Richard E., Russell H. Fazio, and Pablo Briñol (eds., 2009), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures, New York: Taylor and Francis. (Scholar)
- Prior, Elizabeth (1983), Dispositions (Aberdeen: Aberdeen). (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1975), Mind, language, and reality (London: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- Ramsey, Frank P. (1931), The foundations of mathematics, and other logical essays (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). (Scholar)
- Robbins, Philip (2004), “To structure, or not to structure?”, Synthese, 139, 55–80. (Scholar)
- Routley, Richard (1981), “Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals”, Inquiry, 24, 385–417. (Scholar)
- Ryle, Gilbert (1949), The concept of mind (New York: Barnes & Noble). (Scholar)
- Schacter, Daniel L. (1987), “Implicit memory: History and current status”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 501–518. (Scholar)
- Schacter, Daniel L. and Endel Tulving, “What are the memory systems of 1994?”, in D.L. Schacter and E. Tulving, eds., Memory systems 1994 (Cambridge, MA: MIT), 1–38. (Scholar)
- Schacter, Daniel L., Anthony D. Wagner, and Randy L. Buckner (2000), “Memory systems of 1999”, in E. Tulving and F.I.M. Craik, eds., The Oxford handbook of memory (Oxford: Oxford), 627–643. (Scholar)
- Schwitzgebel, Eric (2001), “In-between believing”, Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 76–82. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002), “A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief”, Nous, 36, 249–275.
- ––– (2010), “Acting contrary to our professed beliefs, or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 531–553. (Scholar)
- Scott, Rose M. and Renee Baillargeon (2009), “Which penguin is this? Attributing false beliefs about object identity at 18 months”, Child Development, 80, 1172–1196. (Scholar)
- Searle, John R. (1983), Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge). (Scholar)
- ––– (1992), The rediscovery of the mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Sellars, Wilfrid (1956), “Empiricism and the philosophy of mind”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, 253–329. (Scholar)
- ––– (1969), “Language as thought and as communication”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29, 506–527. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney (2003), Identity, cause, and mind (expanded edition) (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian (2000), Choice and chance, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson). (Scholar)
- Smolensky, Paul (1995), “Connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought”, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald, eds., Connectionism (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell), 164–198. (Scholar)
- Soames, Scott (1987), “Direct reference, propositional attitudes and semantic content”, Philosophical Topics, 15, 47–87. (Scholar)
- Southgate, B., A. Senju, and G. Csibra (2007), “Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds”, Psychological Science, 18, 587–592. (Scholar)
- Squire, Larry R. (1987), Memory and brain (New York: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Smith, Peter (1982), “On animal beliefs”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 20, 503–512. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert (1984), Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Stanley, Jason, and Timothy Williamson (2001), “Knowing how”, Journal of Philosophy, 92, 411–444. (Scholar)
- Stephens, G. Lynn, and George Graham. (2004), “Reconceiving delusions”, International Review of Psychiatry, 16, 236–241. (Scholar)
- Stich, Stephen P. (1979), “Do animals have beliefs?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57, 15–28. (Scholar)
- Stich, Stephen P. (1983), From folk psychology to cognitive science (Cambridge, MA: MIT). (Scholar)
- Taylor, Kenneth A. (2002), De re and de dicto: Against the conventional wisdom. Philosophical Perspectives 16, 225–265. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980), The scientific image (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- van Gelder, Tim (1990), “Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a classical theme”, Cognitive Science, 14, 355–384. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. David (2000), The possibility of practical reason (Oxford: Clarendon). (Scholar)
- Wellman, Henry M., David Cross, and Julanne Watson (2001), “Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: The truth about false belief”, Child Development, 72, 655–684. (Scholar)
- Wettstein, H. (2004), The magic prism (Oxford: Oxford). (Scholar)
- Wilson, Timothy D., Samuel Lindsey, and Tonya T. Schooler (2000), “A model of dual attitudes”, Psychological Review, 107: 101–126.
- Wittenbrink, Bernd, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. (2007), Implicit measures of attitudes, New York: Guilford. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Aaron (2007), “The nature of belief”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14(11): 61–82. (Scholar)
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