Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Counterfactual Theories of Causation" by Peter Menzies and Helen Beebee
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- Barker, S., 2004. “Analysing Chancy Causation without Appeal to Chance-raising”, in Dowe and Noordhof 2004, 120–37. (Scholar)
- Bebb, J., 2022. “Demarcating Contextualism and Contrastivism”, Philosophy, 97: 23–49. (Scholar)
- Bebb, J. and H. Beebee, 2023. “Causal Selection and Egalitarianism”, in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (Volume 5), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beebee, H., 2004a. “Chance-changing Causal Processes”, in Dowe and Noordhof 2004, 39–57. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004b. “Causing and Nothingness”, in Collins, Hall and Paul 2004, 291–308. (Scholar)
- –––, 2022. “The Genesis of Lewis’s
Counterfactual Analysis of Causation”, in H. Beebee & A. R.
J. Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of David
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- Beebee, H., C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies, (eds.), 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beebee, H., C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (eds.), 2017. Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bennett, J., 1987. “Event Causation: the Counterfactual Analysis”, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 367–86. (Scholar)
- Blanchard, T. and J. Schaffer, 2017. “Cause without Default”, in Beebee, Hitchcock and Price 2017, 175–214. (Scholar)
- Briggs, R., 2012. “Interventionist Counterfactuals”, Philosophical Studies, 160: 139–66. (Scholar)
- Broadbent, A., 2007. “Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15: 169–89. (Scholar)
- Buckle, S., 2004. Hume’s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, N., 2017. “Can Structural Equations Explain How
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- Chalupka, K., F. Eberhardt, and P. Perona, 2017. “Causal
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- Clarke, R., J. Shepherd, J. Stigall, R. Repko Waller, and C. Zarpentine, 2015. “Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgements”, Philosophical Psychology, 28: 279–93. (Scholar)
- Collins, J., 2000. “Preemptive Preemption”, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 223–34. (Scholar)
- Collins, J., N. Hall, and L. Paul (eds.), 2004. Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Contessa, G., 2006. “On the Supposed Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence; or: It Would Have Taken a Miracle!”, dialectica, 60: 461–73. (Scholar)
- DeMartino, G. F., 2021. “The Specter of Irreparable
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- Dowe, P., 2000. Physical Causation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Chance-lowering Causes”, in Dowe and Noordhof 2004, 28–38. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009. “Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality”, The Monist, 92: 23–40. (Scholar)
- Dowe, P. and P. Noordhof (eds.), 2004. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Edgington, D., 2011. “Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals”, in C. Hoerl, T. McCormack and S.R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 230–41. (Scholar)
- Elga, A., 2000. “Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence”, Philosophy of Science, 68 (Supplement): 313–24. (Scholar)
- Ehring, D., 1987. “Causal Relata”, Synthese, 73: 319–28. (Scholar)
- Fenton-Glynn, L., 2017. “A Proposed Probabilistic Extension
of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual
Cause’”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 68: 1061–124. (Scholar)
- Fernandes, A., 2022. “Back to the Present: How Not to Use Counterfactuals to Explain Causal Asymmetry”, philosophies, 7(2): 43. doi:10.3390/philosophies7020043 (Scholar)
- Flanders, W. D., 2006. “On the Relationship of Sufficient
Component Cause Models with Potential Outcome (Counterfactual)
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- Frisch, M., 2005. Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality:
Philosophical Issues in Classical Electrodynamics, New York:
Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. “Causation, Counterfactuals and Entropy”, in Price and Corry 2007. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010. “Does a Low-Entropy Constraint Prevent Us from Influencing the Past?”, in A. Hüttemann and G. Ernst (eds.), Time, Chance, and Reduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 13–33. (Scholar)
- Galles, D. and J. Pearl, 1998. “An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals”, Foundations of Science, 3: 151–82. (Scholar)
- Ganeri, J., P. Noordhof, and M. Ramachandran, 1996. “Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation”, Analysis, 56: 219–25. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “For a (Revised) PCA Analysis”, Analysis, 58: 45–7. (Scholar)
- Glynn, L., 2011. “A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62: 343–92. (Scholar)
- Hall, N., 2004. “Two Concepts of Causation”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 225–76. (Scholar)
- Halpern, J. and J. Pearl, 2001. “Causes and Explanations: A Structural-model Approach – Part I: Causes”, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, San Francisco: Morgan Kaufman, 194–202. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. “Causes and Explanations: A Structural-model Approach – Part I: Causes” (expanded version), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56: 843–87. (Scholar)
- Halpern, J. and C. Hitchcock, 2010. “Actual Causation and the Art of Modeling”, in R. Dechter, H. Geffner and J. Halpern (eds.), Heuristics, Probability, and Causality: A Tribute to Judea Pearl (London: College Publications), 383–406. (Scholar)
- Hausman, D., 1998. Causal Asymmetries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hiddleston, E., 2005. “Causal Powers”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56: 27–59. (Scholar)
- Hilton, D. and B. Slugoski, 1986. “Knowledge-Based Causal Attribution: The Abnormal Conditions Focus Model”, Psychological Review, 93: 75–88. (Scholar)
- Hitchcock, C., 1999. “Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50: 585–612. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs”, Journal of Philosophy, 98: 273–99. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Do All and Only Causes Raise the Probabilities of Effects?”, in Collins, Hall and Paul 2004, 403–18. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. “Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Philosophical Review, 116: 495–532. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017. “Actual Causation: What’s
the Use?”, in Beebee, Hitchcock and Price 2017,
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- Hitchcock, C. and J. Knobe, 2009. “Cause and Norm”, Journal of Philosophy, 106: 587–612. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P., 1987. Asymmetries in Time, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, D., 1748. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. (Scholar)
- Icard, T., J. Kominsky, and J. Knobe, 2017. “Normality and Actual Causal Strength”, Cognition, 161: 80–93. (Scholar)
- Ingthorsson, R. D., 2021. A Powerful Particulars View of Causation, New York and London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Kaiserman, A., 2017. “Causes and Counterparts”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95: 17–28. (Scholar)
- Kim, J., 1973a. “Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 217–36. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973b. “Causes and Counterfactuals”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–72. (Scholar)
- Knobe, J. and B. Fraser, 2008. “Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments”, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008), 441–8. (Scholar)
- Kominsky, J., J. Phillips, T. Gerstenberg, D. Lagnado, and J. Knobe, 2015. “Causal Superseding”, Cognition, 137: 196–209. (Scholar)
- Kutach, D., 2002. “The Entropy Theory of Counterfactuals”, Philosophy of Science, 69: 82–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013. Causation and its Basis in Fundamental Physics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kvart, I., 2001. “Counterexamples to Lewis’
‘Causation as Influence’”, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 79: 411–23. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Causation: Probabilistic and Counterfactual Analyses”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 359–86. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1973a. Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973b. “Causation”, Journal of Philosophy, 70: 556–67. Reprinted in his 1986a. Page references to reprinted version. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1986b. “Events”, in his 1986a. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986c. “Postscripts to
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- –––, 1986d. “Causal Explanation”, in his 1986a. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986e. The Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. “Causation as Influence”, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–97. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004a. “Causation as Influence” (expanded version), in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 75–106. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004b. “Void and Object”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 277–90. (Scholar)
- Lipton, P., 1991, “Contrastive Explanation and Causal Triangulation”, Philosophy of Science, 58: 687–97. (Scholar)
- Livengood, J. and E. Machery, 2007. “The Folk Probably
Don’t Think What You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation
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- Loewer, B., 2007. “Counterfactuals and the Second Law”, in Price and Corry 2007, 293–326. (Scholar)
- Maslen, C., 2004. “Causes, Contrasts, and the Nontransitivity of Causation”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 341–58. (Scholar)
- McDonnell, N., 2016. “Events and their Counterparts”, Philosophical Studies, 173: 1291–308. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018. “Making a Contribution and Making a Difference”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 303–12. (Scholar)
- McGrath, S., 2005. “Causation by Omission”, Philosophical Studies, 123: 125–48 (Scholar)
- Mellor, D. H., 1995. The Facts of Causation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “For Facts as Causes and Effects”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 309–24. (Scholar)
- Menzies, P., 1996. “Probabilistic Causation and the Pre-emption Problem”, Mind, 105: 85–117. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999. “Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Conceptions of Causation”, in H. Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 313–29. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2007. “Causation in Context”, in Price and Corry 2007, 191–223. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009. “Platitudes and Counterexamples”, in Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies 2009, 341–67. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017. “The Problem of Counterfactual
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- Montminy, M. and A. Russo, 2016. “A Defense of Causal Invariantism”, Analytic Philosophy, 57: 49–75 (Scholar)
- Noordhof, P., 1998. “Problems for the M-Set Analysis of Causation”, Mind, 107: 457–63. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999. “Probabilistic Causation, Preemption, and Counterfactuals”, Mind, 108: 95–125. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Prospects for a Counterfactual
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- –––, 2020. A Variety of Causes, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Northcott, R., 2008. “Causation and Contrast Classes”, Philosophical Studies, 139: 111–23. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018. “Pre-emption Cases May Support, Not Undermine, the Counterfactual Theory of Causation”, Synthese, 198: 537–55. (Scholar)
- Paul, L. A., 2004. “Aspect Causation”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 205–24. (Scholar)
- Paul, L. A. and N. Hall, 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pearl, J., 2000. Causality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Price, H., 1992. “Agency and Causal Asymmetry”, Mind, 101: 501–20. (Scholar)
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- Price, H. and R. Corry (eds.), 2007. Causation, Physics, and
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- Price, H. and B. Weslake, 2009. “The Time-Asymmetry of Causation”, in Beebee, Hitchcock, and Menzies 2009, 414–43. (Scholar)
- Ramachandran, M., 1997. “A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation”, Mind, 106: 263–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “A Counterfactual Analysis of Indeterministic Causation”, in Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 387–402. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J., 2000a. “Trumping Preemption”, Journal of Philosophy, 9: 165–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000b. “Causation by Disconnection”, Philosophy of Science, 67: 285–300. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. “Contrastive Causation”, Philosophical Review, 114: 297–328. (Scholar)
- Schulz, K., 2011. “‘If you’d wiggled A, then B
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- Spirtes, P., C. Glymour, and R. Scheines, 2001. Causation,
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- Steglich-Petersen, J., 2012. “Against the Contrastive
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- Woodward, J., 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Woodward, J. and C. Hitchcock, 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations. Part I: A Counterfactual Account”, Noûs, 37: 1–24. (Scholar)
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