Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Concepts" by Eric Margolis |
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- Crane, T. (1995). The Mechanical Mind, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
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- Davidson, D. (1975). Thought and Talk. In his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. (1977). A Cure for the Common Code. Reprinted in D. Dennett (1978) Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. (Scholar)
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- Fodor, J. (1981). The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy. In his Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (2003). Hume Variations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. (1992). Holism: A Shopper's Guide, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes, Cognition, 58: 253–270. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis, Cognition, 28: 3–71. (Scholar)
- Gallistel, C.R. & King, A. (2009). Memory and the Computational Brain: Why Cognitive Science Will Transform Neuroscience, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Gallistel, C.R. (1990). The Organization of Learning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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- Gentner, D. & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2003). Language in Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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- Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Gonnerman, C. & Weinberg, J. (2010). Two Uneliminated Uses for ‘Concepts’: Hybrids and Guides for Inquiry, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 211–212
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- Hampton, J. (2010). Concept Talk Cannot Be Avoided, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 212–213
- Hampton, J. & Jönsson, M. (2011). Typicality and Compositionality: The Logic of Combining Vague Concepts, in M. Werning, W. Hintzen, & E. Machery (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. (1987). (Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics, in E. LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics, London: Academic Press. (Scholar)
- Hauser, M. (2000). Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
- Hermer-Vazquez, L., Spelke, E., & Katsnelson, A. (2001). Sources of Flexibility in Human Cognition: Dual-Task Studies of Space and Language, Cognitive Psychology, 39: 3–36. (Scholar)
- Hespos, S. & Spelke, E. (2004). Conceptual Precursors to Language, Nature, 430: 453–456. (Scholar)
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- Hume, D. (1748/1975). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Jackendoff, R. (1989). What is a Concept, that a Person May Grasp It? Mind & Language, 4: 68–102. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a Functional Kind, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 217–218
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- Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. (1997). Regress Arguments Against the Language of Thought, Analysis, 57: 60–66. (Scholar)
- Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science, in E. Margolis & S. Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 3–81. (Scholar)
- Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. (2001). The Poverty of the Stimulus Argument, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52: 217–76. (Scholar)
- Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. (2002). Radical Concept Nativism, Cognition, 86: 25–55. (Scholar)
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- Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. (2004). Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style, Cognition, 92: B1-B12. (Scholar)
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- Margolis, E. (1998). How to Acquire a Concept, Mind & Language, 13: 347–369. (Scholar)
- Margolis, E. & Laurence, S. (1999). Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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- Margolis, E. & Laurence, S. (2010). Concepts and Theoretical Unification, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 219–220. (Scholar)
- Margolis, E. & Laurence, S. (forthcoming). Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition, Mind & Language. (Scholar)
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