Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Animal Consciousness" by Colin Allen |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Akins, K. A. (1993). “A bat without qualities,” in Consciousness, M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell.
- Alcock, J. (1992). “Review of Griffin 1992,” Natural History, 101 (9): 62–65. (Scholar)
- Allen, C. (1992a). “Mental content,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43: 537–553. (Scholar)
- –––. (1992b). “Mental content and evolutionary explanation,” Biology and Philosophy, 7: 1–12. (Scholar)
- –––. (1995). “Intentionality: Natural and artificial,” in H. Roitblat and J.-A.Meyer (eds.) Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (1997). “Animal cognition and animal minds,” in Philosophy and the Sciences of the Mind: Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science (Volume 4), P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Pittsburgh and Konstanz: Pittsburgh University Press and the Universitätsverlag Konstanz: pp. 227–243. (Scholar)
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- Allen, C. & Bekoff, M. (1997). Species of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. See especially ch. 8. (Scholar)
- Allen, C., Fuchs, P.N., Shriver, A. & Wilson, H. (2005). “Deciphering Animal Pain,” in M. Aydede (ed.) Pain: New Essays on the Nature of Pain and the Methodology of its Study, Cambrdige, MA: MIT Press; pp. 352–366. (Scholar)
- Allen, C., Grau, J., and Meagher, M. (2009). “The Lower Bounds of Cognition: What do Spinal Cords Reveal?” in J. Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–142. (Scholar)
- Allen, C. & Saidel, E. (1998). “The Evolution of Reference,” in D. Cummins and C. Allen (eds.), The Evolution of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Andrews, K. (1996). “The first step in the case for great ape equality: the argument for other minds,” Etica & Animali, 8/96 (Special issue devoted to The Great Ape Project): 131–141. (Scholar)
- Ârhem, P., Liljenström, H, and Lindahl, B.I.B. (2002). “Evolution of Consciousness: Report of Agora Workshop in Sigtuna, Sweden, August 2001,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9: 81–84. (Scholar)
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- Atoji, Y. and Wild, J.M. (2005). “Afferent and efferent connections of the dorsolateral corticoid area in comparison with connections of the temporoparieto-occipital area in the pigeon (Columbia livia),” Journal of Comparative Neurology, 485: 165–182. (Scholar)
- Baars, B.J. (1997). “In the Theatre of Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, A Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4: 292–309. (Scholar)
- Byrne, R.W., Lee, P.C., Njiraini, N., Poole, J.H., Sayialel, K., Sayialel, S., Bates, L.A., and Moss, C.J. (2008). “Do Elephants Show Empathy?” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10–11: 204–225. (Scholar)
- Bekoff, M. (2007). The Emotional Lives of Animals, Novato, Calif: New World Library. (Scholar)
- Bekoff, M. & Allen, C. (1997). “Cognitive ethology: slayers, skeptics, and proponents,” in Anthropomorphism, Anecdote, and Animals, R. Mitchell et al. (eds.), New York: SUNY Press. (Scholar)
- Bekoff, M., Allen, C., & Burghardt, G.M. (eds.) (2002). The Cognitive Animal, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Bermond, B. (2001). “A neuropsychological and evolutionary approach to animal consciousness and animal suffering,” Animal Welfare Supplement, 10: 47–62.
- Block, N. (1995). “On A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. (Scholar)
- –––. (2005). “Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9: 41–89. (Scholar)
- Blumberg, M. S. & Wasserman, E. A. (1995). “Animal mind and the argument from design,” Am. Psychologist, 50: 133–144. (Scholar)
- Brigandt, I. (2005). “The instinct concept of the early Konrad Lorenz,” Journal of the History of Biology, 38 (3): 571–608. (Scholar)
- Browne, D. (2004). “Do dolphins know their own minds?” Biology & Philosophy, 19: 633–653. (Scholar)
- Burghardt, G. (1985). “Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective,” American Psychologist, 40 (8): 905–19. (Scholar)
- Burkhardt, R. W. Jr. (1997). “The founders of ethology and the problem of animal subjective experience,” in Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics: Perspectives from the Netherlands, M. Dol, S. Kasanmoentalib, S. Lijmbach, E. Rivas & R. van den Bos (eds.), Assen, the Netherlands: van Gorcum, pp. 1–13. (Scholar)
- Byrne R. W. & Whiten, A. (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cabanac,M., Cabanac, J., Paren, A. (2009). “The emergence of consciousness in phylogeny,” Behavioural Brain Research, 2 (198): 267–272. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P. (1989). “Brute Experience,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 258–269. (Scholar)
- –––. (1992). The Animals Issue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (1996). Language, Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (1998a). “Natural Theories of Consciousness” European Journal of Philosophy, 6: 203–222. (Scholar)
- –––. (1998b). “Animal Subjectivity”, Psyche, 4 (3) [Available online]; see also “Replies to Critics: Explaining Subjectivity”, (his response to commentators), in Psyche, 6 (3), 2000 [Available online]. (Scholar)
- –––. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A naturalistic theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (2009). “Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look,” Mind & Language, 23: 58–89. (Scholar)
- Chandroo, K.P., Yue, S., & Moccia, R.D. (2004). “An evaluation of current perspectives on consciousness and pain in fishes,” Fish and Fisheries, 5: 281–295. (Scholar)
- Cheney, D. L., and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). How Monkeys See the World: Inside the mind of another species, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (2007). Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Clark, R.E. & Squire, L.R. (1998). “Classical Conditioning and Brain Systems: The Role of Awareness,” Science, 280: 77–81. (Scholar)
- Crist, E. (2002). “The inner life of earthworms: Darwin's argument and its implications,” in M. Bekoff, C. Allen, and G.M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 3–8. (Scholar)
- Crowley, S. J. and Allen, C. (2008). “Animal Behavior: E pluribus unum?” in M. Ruse (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Biology, Oxford University Press: pp. 327–348. (Scholar)
- Crystal, J.D. and Foote, A.L. (2009). “Metacognition in animals,” Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Darwin, C. (1871). The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, New York: Appleton. (Scholar)
- –––. (1881). The formation of vegetable mould, through the action of worms, with observations on their habits, London: John Murray. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D. (1975). “Thought and talk,” in S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dawkins, M.S. (1985). “The scientific basis for assessing suffering in animals,” in In Defense of Animals, P. Singer (ed.), New York: Blackwell, 27–50. (Scholar)
- –––. (1993). Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, New York: W. H. Freeman. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. C. (1969) Content and Consciousness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- –––. (1983). “Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6: 343–390. (Scholar)
- –––. (1987). The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (1995). “Animal consciousness and why it matters,” Social Research, 62: 691–710. (Scholar)
- –––. (1997). Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding of Consciousness, New York: Basic Books (Science Masters Series). (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Dubbeldam, J. (2009). “The Trigeminal System in Birds and Nociception,” Central Nervous System Agents in Medicinal Chemistry, 9: 150–158. (Scholar)
- Edelman D. & Seth, A. (2009). “Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach,” Trends in Neuroscience, 9: 476–84. (Scholar)
- Elwood, R.W. and Appel, M. (2009). “Pain experience in hermit crabs?” Animal Behaviour, 77: 1243–1246 . (Scholar)
- Epstein, R., Lanza, R. P., and Skinner, B. F. (1981). “Self-awareness in the pigeon,” Science, 212: 695–696. (Scholar)
- Farah, M.J. (2008). “Neuroethics and the Problem of Other Minds: Implications of Neuroscience for the Moral Status of Brain-Damaged Patients and Nonhuman Animals,” Neuroethics, 1: 9–18. (Scholar)
- Fisher, J. A. (1990). “The myth of anthropomorphism,” Originally published in M. Bekoff & D. Jamieson (eds.), Interpretation and explanation in the study of animal behavior: Vol. 1, Interpretation, intentionality, and communication, Boulder: Westview Press. Reprinted in M. Bekoff & D. Jamieson (eds.), Readings in Animal cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. (Scholar)
- Fujita, K., Blough, D. S., & Blough, P. M. (1991). “Pigeons see the Ponzo illusion,” Animal Learning and Behavior, 19: 283–293. (Scholar)
- Gaita, R. (2003). The Philosopher's Dog: Friendships with Animals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Gallup, G. G., Jr. (1970). “Chimpanzees: Self-recognition,” Science, 167: 86-87. (Scholar)
- Gallup, G. G., Jr., Anderson, J. R., & Shillito, D. J. (2002). “The Mirror Test,” in Bekoff, Allen, & Burghardt 2002. (Scholar)
- Gardner, R. A., Gardner, B. T., & Van Cantfort, T. E. (1989). Teaching sign language to chimpanzees, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. (Scholar)
- Gennaro, R. J. (2004). “Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine,” in R.J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. (Scholar)
- Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2007a). “The transition to experiencing: I. Limited learning and limited experiencing,” Biological Theory, 2 (3): 218–230. (Scholar)
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- Giurfa, M., Zhang, S.W., Jenett, A., Menzel, R., and Srinivasan, M.V. (2001). “The concepts of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in an insect,” Nature, 410: 930–933. (Scholar)
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- Griffin, D. R. (1976). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience, New York: Rockefeller University Press. (second edition: 1981). (Scholar)
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- –––. (1992). Animal Minds, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––. (2002). “What is it like?” in M. Bekoff, C. Allen, and G. M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Griffin, D. R. and Speck, G. B. (2004). “New evidence of animal consciousness,” Animal Cognition, 7: 5–18. (Scholar)
- Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B. & Tomasello, M. (2000). “Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see,” Animal Behavior, 59: 771–785. (Scholar)
- Hare B., Call J., Tomasello M. (2001). “Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?” Animal Behaviour, 63: 139–151. (Scholar)
- Hare, B., & Wrangham, R. (2002). “Integrating two evolutionary models for the study of social cognition,” in Bekoff, Allen, & Burghardt 2002. (Scholar)
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- Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2002). “The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?” Science, 298: 1569–1579. (Scholar)
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