Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Representational Theories of Consciousness" by William Lycan |
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- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1965). ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, in R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: Second Series. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell.) (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.) (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D.M. (1981). ‘What is Consciousness?’, in The Nature of Mind. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.) (Scholar)
- Bar-On, D., and D. Long (2001). ‘Avowals and First-Person Privilege’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 311-335. (Scholar)
- Block, N.J. (1978). ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IX. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). (Scholar)
- Block, N.J. (1990). ‘Inverted Earth’, in Tomberlin (1990). Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Block, N.J. (1995). ‘On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 227-47. (Scholar)
- Block, N.J. (1996). ‘Mental Paint and Mental Latex’, in Villanueva (1996). (Scholar)
- Burge, T. (1988). ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 85: 649-53. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., and D.R. Hilbert (1997). ‘Colors and Reflectances', in Byrne and Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Color. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Byrne, A. (2001). ‘Intentionalism Defended’, Philosophical Review 110: 199-239. (Scholar)
- Butchvarov, P. (1980). ‘Adverbial Theories of Consciousness', in P. French, T.E. Uehing and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V: Studies in Epistemology. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.) (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D.J. (1996). The Conscious Mind. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D.J. (2004). ‘The Representational Character of Experience’, in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.) (Scholar)
- Churchland, P.M. (1985). ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States’, Journal of Philosophy 82: 8-28. (Scholar)
- Clark, A. (2000). A Theory of Sentience. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Crane, T. (2001). Elements of Mind. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Crane, T. (2003). ‘The Intentional Structure of Consciousness', in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Davidson, D. (1987). ‘Knowing One's Own Mind’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 60, No. 3. (Scholar)
- Davies, M., and G. Humphreys (eds.) (1993). Consciousness. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell.) (Scholar)
- Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.) (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (1986). ‘Misrepresentation’, in R.J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (1993). ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind 102: 263-83. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (1996). ‘Phenomenal Externalism’, in Villanueva (1996). (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (2003). ‘How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?’, in B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access and First Person Authority. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.) (Scholar)
- Fodor, J.A. (1975). The Language of Thought. (New York: Crowell.) (Scholar)
- Fodor, J.A. (1987). Psychosemantics. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Gennaro, R. (1995). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. (Philadelphia: John Benjamins.) (Scholar)
- Goodman, N. (1951). The Structure of Appearance. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) (Scholar)
- Gray, R. (2003). ‘Tye's Representationalism: Feeling the Heat?’, Philosophical Studies 115: 245-56. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. (1990).‘ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in Tomberlin (1990). Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Heil, J. (1988). ‘Privileged Access’, Mind 47: 238-51. Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Hintikka, K.J.J. (1969). ‘On the Logic of Perception’, in N.S. Care and R.H. Grimm (eds.), Perception and Personal Identity. (Cleveland, OH: Case Western Reserve University Press.) (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. (1984). ‘Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 34: 147-52. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. (2000). ‘Narrow Content and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’, Presidential Address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New York City (June, 2000). (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. (1977). Perception. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. (1982). ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-36. Reprinted in Lycan (1999). (Scholar)
- Kim, J. (1995). ‘Mental Causation: What, Me Worry?’, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, 6: Content. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.) (Scholar)
- Kind, A. (2003). ‘What's So Transparent about Transparency?’, Philosophical Studies 115: 225-44. (Scholar)
- Kraut, R. (1982). ‘Sensory States and Sensory Objects’, Noûs 16: 277-95. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U. (2002a). ‘PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness', Philosophical Psychology 15: 55-64. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U. (2002b). ‘Phenomenal Content’, Erkenntnis 57: 175-98. (Scholar)
- Leeds, S. (1993). ‘Qualia, Awareness, Sellars’, Noûs 27: 303-30. (Scholar)
- Levine, J. (2001). Purple Haze. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Levine, J. (2003). ‘Experience and Representation’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Lewis, C.I. (1929). Mind and the World Order. (New York: C. Scribners Sons.) (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. (1983). ‘Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation’, Philosophical Review 92: 3-32. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. (1997). ‘Naming the Colours’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 325-42. (Scholar)
- Lloyd, D. (1991). ‘Leaping to Conclusions: Connectionism, Consciousness, and the Computational Mind’, in T. Horgan and J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. (Dordrecht: Kluwer.) (Scholar)
- Loar, B. (1990). ‘Phenomenal States’, in Tomberlin (1990). (Scholar)
- Loar, B. (2003). ‘Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (1987). Consciousness. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (1990). ‘What is the Subjectivity of the Mental?’, in Tomberlin (1990). (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (1998). ‘In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia’ (Replies to Neander, Rey and Tye), in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (ed.) (1999). Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell.) (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (2001). ‘The Case for Phenomenal Externalism’, in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 15: Metaphysics (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing.) (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (2003). ‘Perspectivalism and the Knowledge Argument’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Macpherson, F. (2006). ‘Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience’, Noûs 40: 82-117. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T. (1974). ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review 82: 435-56. (Scholar)
- Neander, K. (1998). ‘The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness’, in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- Nelkin, N. (1989). ‘Unconscious Sensations’, Philosophical Psychology 2: 129-41. (Scholar)
- Nickel, B. (2006). ‘Against Intentionalism’, Philosophical Studies [forthcoming]. [Preprint available from author (PDF)] (Scholar)
- Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and Content. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Pitcher, G. (1970). ‘Pain Perception’, Philosopical Review 79: 368-93. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H. (1975). ‘The Meaning of "Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII: Language, Mind and Knowledge. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.) (Scholar)
- Rey, G. (1983). ‘A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness’, in Davidson, R., G.E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. (New York: Plenum Press.) (Scholar)
- Rey, G. (1991). ‘Sensations in a Language of Thought’, in Villanueva (1991). (Scholar)
- Rey, G. (1998). ‘A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience’, in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- Rosenthal, D. (1991). ‘The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality’, in Villanueva (1991). (Scholar)
- Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). ‘Thinking that One Thinks’, in Davies and Humphreys (1993). (Scholar)
- Searle, J.R. (1990). ‘Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 585-642. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W. (1956). ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.) (Scholar)
- Sellars, W. (1967). Science and Metaphysics. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.) (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S. (1991). ‘Qualia and Consciousness', Mind 100: 507-24. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S. (1994a). ‘Phenomenal Character’, Noûs 28: 21-38. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S. (1994b). ‘Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense. Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 271-90. (Scholar)
- Siewert, C. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. (Princeton: Princeton University Press.) (Scholar)
- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). ‘Sensations and Brain Processes', Philosophical Review 68: 141-156. (Scholar)
- Smith, Q., and A. Jokic (eds.) (2003). Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R. (1996). ‘On a Defense of the Hegemony of Representation’, in Villanueva (1996). (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, S. (2000). Matters of Mind. (London: Routledge.) (Scholar)
- Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.) (Scholar)
- Tomberlin, J.E. (ed.) (1990). Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4). (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.) (Scholar)
- Tomberlin, J.E. (ed.) (1998). Language, Mind, and Ontology (Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12). (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.) (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1986). ‘The Subjectivity of Experience’, Mind 95: 1-17. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1992). ‘Visual Qualia and Visual Content’, in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1994). ‘Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum’, Noûs 28: 159-83. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1998). ‘Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism’, in Tomberlin (1998). (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (2002). ‘Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience’, Noûs 36: 137-51. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (2003a). ‘Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?’, in Smith and Jokic (2003). (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (2003b). Consciousness and Persons. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.) (Scholar)
- Van Gulick, R. (1985). ‘Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental’, Philosophical Topics 13: 51-70. (Scholar)
- Villanueva, E. (ed.) (1991). Philosophical Issues, 1: Consciousness. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.) (Scholar)
- Villanueva, E. (ed.) (1996). Philosophical Issues, 7: Perception. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.) (Scholar)
- Wager, A. (1999). ‘The Extra Qualia Problem: Synaesthesia and Representationism’, Philosophical Psychology 12: 263-81. (Scholar)
- White, S. (1987). ‘What Is It Like to Be a Homunculus?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68: 148-74. (Scholar)
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