Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Externalism About Mental Content" by Joe Lau |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Adams and Aizawa (2001). “The Bounds of Cognition,” Philosophical Psychology, 14(1): 43–64. (Scholar)
- Block, Ned (1990). “Inverted Earth,” in Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, Paul (1989a). “Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 5–26. (Scholar)
- ––– (1989b). “The Rule-Following Considerations,” Mind, 98: 507–49. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998). “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori,” in Wright, Smith, and Macdonald (1998), pp. 271–284. (Scholar)
- Bridges, J. (2006). “Davidson's transcendental externalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(2): 290–315. (Scholar)
- Brown, Jessica (1995). “The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis, 55: 149–56. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). “Contents just aren't in the head,” Erkenntnis, 58 (1): 1–6. (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler (1979). “Individualism and the Mental,” in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, IV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 73–121. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986). “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review, 95: 3–45. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988). “Individualism and Self-Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649–63. (Scholar)
- ––– (1993). “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice,” in Heil and Mele (eds.) Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 97–120. (Scholar)
- Butler, Keith (1996). “Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision,” Mind and Language, 11(4): 313–37. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D. (2005). “The representational character of experience,” in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chomsky, Noam (1986). Knowledge of Language : Its Nature, Origin, and Use, New York: Praeger. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). “Language and Nature,” Mind, 104 (416): 1–59. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000). New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998). “The extended mind,” Analysis, 58: 10–23. (Scholar)
- Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010). “Memento's Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended” in Menary 2010, pp. 43–66. (Scholar)
- Cowie, Fiona (1999). What's Within?: Nativism Reconsidered, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Crane, T. (1991). “All the difference in the world,”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 1–25. (Scholar)
- Cummins, Robert (1991). “Methodological Reflections on Belief,” in Radu Bogan Mind and Common Sense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald (1980). “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” in his Essays On Actions and Events, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987). “Knowing One's Own Mind,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 61: 441–458. (Scholar)
- Davies, Martin (1991). “Individualism and Perceptual Content,” Mind, 100: 461–484. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998). “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant,” in C. MacDonald, B. Smith, and C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 321–361. (Scholar)
- Deutsch, M. (2005). Intentionalism and intransitivity,” Synthese, 144(1): 1–22. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Elman, J. et al. (1996). Rethinking Innateness : A Connectionist Perspective on Development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Farkas, K. (2003). “What is externalism?” Philosophical Studies, 112(3): 187–208. (Scholar)
- Falvey, K. and Owens, J. (1994). “Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism,” Philosophical Review, 103: 107–37. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry (1980). “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 1. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987). Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994). The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001). “Doing without what's within: Fiona Cowie's critique of nativism,” Mind, 110(437): 99–148. (Scholar)
- Frances, B. (2007). “Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks,” Philosophical Studies, 133: 199–232. (Scholar)
- ––– (1999). “On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content,” Philosophical Studies, 93: 45–75. (Scholar)
- Gallois, A. and O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1996). “Externalism and Scepticism,” Philosophical Studies, 81: 1–26. (Scholar)
- Gallistel, C. R. (1990). The Organization of Learning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Georgalis, N. (1999). “Rethinking Burge's thought experiment,” Synthese, 118: 145–64. (Scholar)
- Gibbons, John (1993). “Identity Without Supervenience,” Philosophical Studies, 70 59–80. (Scholar)
- Griffiths, P.E. (2002). “What is Innateness?” The Monist, 85(1): 70–85. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert (1987). “(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics,”, in Ernie LePore, ed., New Directions in Semantics, London: Academic Press, pp. 55–81. (Scholar)
- Haugeland, J. (1995). “Mind Embodied and Embedded,” Acta Philosophica Fennica, 58: 233–267. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., and J. Tienson (2002). “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,”, in D. J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 520–532. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, Amir (2001). “Contents just are in the head,” Erkenntnis, 54(3): 321–344. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, Amir (2005). “Externalism, the environment, and thought-tokens,” Erkenntnis, 63(1): 133-138. (Scholar)
- Hurley, Susan (1998). “Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure, and Externalism”, Analysis, 58 (1): 1–6. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank (1996). “Mental Causation,” Mind, 105(419): 377–414. (Scholar)
- Kitcher, Patricia (1991). “Narrow Psychology and Wide Functionalism,” in Richard Boyd, Phil Gasper, and J.D. Trout, (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 671–685. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul (1972). Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (1979). “A puzzle about belief,” in Meaning and Use, edited by A. Margalit. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.
- ––– (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Larson, Richard and Segal, Gabriel (1995). Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Loar, Brian (1988). “Social Content and Psychological Content,” in Grimm and Merrill (eds.) Contents of Thought, University of Arizona Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990). “Perosnal References,” in E. Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Ludlow, Peter (1995). “Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow-switching,” Analysis, 55: 45-49; reprinted as chapter 12 in Ludlow and Martin (1998). (Scholar)
- ––– (2003). “Referential Semantics for I-languages?,” in Antony, L.M. and Hornstein, N. (eds). Chomsky and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 140–161. (Scholar)
- Ludlow, Peter and Martin, Norah (1998). Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W. (1987). Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996). Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- MacDonald, C. (1990). “Weak Externalism and Mind-Body Identity,” Mind, 99: 387–404. (Scholar)
- Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. (2004). “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style,” Cognition, 92(3): B1-B12. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, B. (2003). “McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism,” in Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Skepticism, and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 79–96. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, B. and Tye, M. (1998). “Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge,” in Wright, Smith, and Macdonald (1998), pp. 285–320. (Scholar)
- McKinsey, Michael (1991). “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis, 51: 9–16. (Scholar)
- McGinn, Colin (1977). “Charity, interpretation, and belief,” Journal of Philosophy, 74: 521–535. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984). Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (1989). Mental Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Menary, Richard (ed.) (2010). The Extended Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Millikan, Ruth (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Noë, A. (2005). Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.) (2003). New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambrdige, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Papineau, David (1993). Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Patterson, Sarah (1990). “The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 313–332. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher (1993). “Externalist explanation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 203–230. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994). “Content, Computation and Externalism,” Mind and Language, 9(3): 30–35. (Scholar)
- Pitt, David (2000). “Nativism and the Theory of Content,” Protosociology, 14: 222–239. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1975). “The Meaning of Meaning,” Philosophical Papers, Vol. II : Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H. (1982). Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Rey, G. (1998). “A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience,” in Tomberlin, J.E. (ed.) (1998) Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. (Scholar)
- Rowlands, M. (1992). “Externalism and Token-Token Identity,” Philosophia, 22: 359–375. (Scholar)
- Sawyer, S. (1999). “An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:(4): 358–378. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998). “Priviledged Access to the World,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(4): 523–533. (Scholar)
- Segal, Gabriel (1989). “Seeing What is Not There,” The Philosophical Review, 98(2): 189–214. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000). A Slim Book about Narrow Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Silverberg, Arnold (2006). “Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision,” Minds and Machines, 16(4): 495–524. (Scholar)
- Soames, Scott (1998). “Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox,” Philosophical perspectives, 12, Language, Mind, and Ontology, pp. 313–348. (Scholar)
- Spelke, Elizbeth (1994). “Initial Knowledge : Six Suggestions,” in Cognition, 50: 431–445. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert (1990). “Narrow Content,” in Anderson and Owens (eds.) Propositional Attitudes, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- ––– (1993). “Twin Earth Revisited,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 297–311. (Scholar)
- Stich, Stephen (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Unger, Peter (1984). Philosophical Relativity, Minnesota : University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Warfield, T. (1992). “Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism are Compatible,” Analysis, 52: 232–237. (Scholar)
- ––– (1997). “Externalism, Self-Knowledge and the Irrelevance of Slow-Switching,” Analysis, 57(4): 282–84; reprinted as chapter 13 in Ludlow and Martin (1998). (Scholar)
- Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. (2001). “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics: 29(1–2): 429–459. (Scholar)
- White, Stephen (1992). “Narrow Content and Narrow Interpretation,” in The Unity of the Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Wikforss, A. (2001). “Social externalism and conceptual errors,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 217–31. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, R. A. (1994). “Wide Computationalism,” Mind, 103: 351–372. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Wright, C. (2000). “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox, and Putnam's Proof,” Philosophical Topics, 10: 140–163. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., Smith, B., and Macdonald, C. (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen (1997). “Wide Causation,” Noûs (Volume 31 Supplement), Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 11: Mind, Causation, and World), pp. 251–281. (Scholar)
Generated Sat May 18 12:45:38 2013
