Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Dispositions" by Sungho Choi |
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- Armstrong, D.M., Martin, C.B. & Place, U.T., 1996, Dispositions: A Debate, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
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- Chalmers, A., 1999, ‘Making Sense of Laws Physics’, in H. Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 3–16. (Scholar)
- Cheng, K.Y., 2010, ‘Intrinsic Finks and Attributions of Rule-Following Dispositions’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 80: 209–220. (Scholar)
- Choi, S., 2003, ‘Improving Bird's Antidotes’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81: 573–580. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005a, ‘Dispositions and Mimickers’, Philosophical Studies 122:183–188. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005b, ‘Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 55: 495–503. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, ‘The Simple vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions’, Synthese 148: 369–379. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, ‘Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals’, Mind 117: 795–841. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, ‘The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78: 563–590. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism’, The Monist 94: 103–120 (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming a, ‘Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction’, Noûs.
- –––, forthcoming b, ‘What is a Dispositional Masker?’, Mind. (Scholar)
- Clarke, R., 2008, ‘Intrinsic Finks’, The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 512–518. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘Opposing Powers’, Philosophical Studies 149: 153–160. (Scholar)
- Cohen, D. & Handfield, T., 2007, ‘Finking Frankfurt’, Philosophical Studies 135: 363–374. (Scholar)
- Contessa, G., 2011, ‘Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Issue 1933-1592. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00435.x [Online version of record published before inclusion in an issue]. (Scholar)
- Corry, R., 2011, ‘Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws of Nature?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 263–275. (Scholar)
- Cross, T., 2005, ‘What is a Disposition?’, Synthese 144: 321–341. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1977, ‘Laws of Nature’, Philosophy of Science 44: 248–268. (Scholar)
- Earman, J., 1984, ‘Laws of Nature: The Empiricist Challenge’, in R. Bogdan (ed.), D.M. Armstrong, Dordrecht: Reidel, 191–223. (Scholar)
- Ellis, B., 1999, ‘Causal Powers and the Laws of Nature’, in H. Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 19–34. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘Causal Powers and Categorical Properties’, in A. Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, London: Routledge, 133–142. (Scholar)
- Ellis, B. & Lierse, C., 1994, ‘Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 27–45. (Scholar)
- Everett, A., 2009, ‘Intrinsic Finks, Masks, and Mimics’, Erkenntnis 71: 191–203. (Scholar)
- Fara, M., 2005, ‘Dispositions and Habituals’, Noûs 39: 43–82. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, ‘Masked Abilities and Compatibilism’, Mind 117: 843–865. (Scholar)
- Fine, K., 2002, ‘The Varieties of Necessity’, in T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.),Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253–281. (Scholar)
- Foster, J., 1982, The Case for Idealism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1954, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Gundersen, L., 2002, ‘In Defence of the Conditional Account of Dispositions’, Synthese 130: 389–411. (Scholar)
- Handfield, T., 2005, ‘Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly 55: 452–461. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008a, ‘Humean Dispositionalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86: 113–126. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, ‘Unfinkable Dispositions’, Synthese 160: 297–308. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, ‘The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes’, in T. Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–31. (Scholar)
- Handfield, T. & Bird, A., 2008, ‘Dispositions, Rules, and Finks’, Philosophical Studies140: 285–98. (Scholar)
- Harré, R., 1970, ‘Powers’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21: 81–101. (Scholar)
- Harré, R. & Madden, E.H., 1975, Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Hauska, J., 2008a, ‘In Defence of Causal Bases’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86: 23–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, ‘Dispositions and Normal Conditions’, Philosophical Studies 139:219–232. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J., 2002, ‘Advice for Physicalists’, Philosophical Studies 109: 53–74. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J. & Manley, D., 2005, ‘Review of Stephen Mumford's Dispositions’, Noûs 39: 179–195. (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 2003, From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, ‘Dispositions’, Synthese 144: 343–356. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1995, ‘Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 253–268. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, ‘Mental Causation’, Mind 105: 377–415. (Scholar)
- –––,1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jacobs, J.D., 2010, ‘A Powers Theory of Modality – or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds’, Philosophical Studies 151: 227–248 (Scholar)
- Johnston, M., 1992, ‘How to Speak of the Colors’, Philosophical Studies 68: 221–263. (Scholar)
- Kaila, E., 1939, Inhimillinen tieto, Helsinki: Otava. (Scholar)
- –––, 1942, ‘Über den physikalischen Realitatsbegriff’, Acta Philosophia Fennica 4: 33–34. (Scholar)
- Kim, J., 1990, ‘Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation’, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 36–56. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Kistler, M., 2002, ‘The Causal Criterion of Reality and the Necessity of Laws of Nature’, Metaphysica 3: 57–86. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972, ‘Naming and Necessity’, in D. Davidson & G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel, 253–355. (Scholar)
- Langton, R., 1998, Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, ‘Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 129–136. (Scholar)
- Langton, R. & Lewis, D., 1998, ‘Defining "Intrinsic"’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 333–345. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986a, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986b, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, ‘Finkish Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly 47: 143–158. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, ‘Ramseyan Humility’, in D. B. Mitchell & R. Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 203–222. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E.J., 2010, ‘On the Individuation of Powers’, in A. Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, New York: Routledge, 8–26. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L., 1973, Truth, Probability and Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977, ‘Dispositions, Grounds and Causes’, Synthese 34: 361–370. (Scholar)
- Malzkorn, W., 2000, ‘Realism, Functionalism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly 50: 452–469. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘Defining Disposition Concepts: A Brief History of the Problem’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32: 335–353. (Scholar)
- Manley, D. & Wasserman, R., 2007, ‘A Gradable Approach to Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly 57: 68–75. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, ‘On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals’, Mind 117: 59–84. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, ‘Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples’, Mind. (Scholar)
- Marmodoro, A., 2009, ‘Do Powers Need Powers to Make Them Powerful?: From Pandispositionalism to Aristotle’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 26: 337–352. (Scholar)
- Martin, C.B., 1994, ‘Dispositions and Conditionals’, The Philosophical Quarterly 44: 1–8. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, ‘On the Need for Properties: The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back’, Synthese 112: 193–231. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, The Mind in Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Martin, C.B. & Heil, J., 1998, ‘Rules and Powers’, Philosophical Perspectives 12: 238–312. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, ‘The Ontological Turn’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23: 34–60. (Scholar)
- McKitrick, J., 2003a, ‘A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81: 155–174. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, ‘The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 349–369. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, ‘A Defence of the Causal Efficacy of Dispositions’, Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy 5: 110–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, ‘Are Dispositions Causally Relevant?’, Synthese 144: 357–371. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D.H., 1974, ‘In Defence of Dispositions’, The Philosophical Review 83: 157–181. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, ‘The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions’, Mind 109: 757–780. (Scholar)
- Menzies, P., 2009, ‘Critical Notices of Nature's Metaphysics by Alexander Bird’, Analysis 69: 769–778. (Scholar)
- Molnar, G., 1999, ‘Are Dispositions Reducible?’, The Philosophical Quarterly 49: 1–17. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mumford, S., 1998, Dispositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘Realism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions: Reply to Malzkorn’, The Philosophical Quarterly 51: 375–378. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Laws in Nature, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, ‘The Ungrounded Argument’, Synthese 149: 471–489. (Scholar)
- Ney, A., 2007, ‘Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 41–60. (Scholar)
- Pap, A., 1958. ‘Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic’, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 196–224. (Scholar)
- Popper, K., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson & Co. (Scholar)
- Prior, E., 1982, ‘The Dispositional/Categorical Distinction’, Analysis 42: 93–96. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, Dispositions, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. (Scholar)
- Prior, E., Pargetter, R. & Jackson, F., 1982, ‘Three Theses about Dispositions’, American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 251–257. (Scholar)
- Psillos, S., 2006, ‘What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 137–156. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F., 1978, Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economic, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Rives, B., 2005, ‘Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct from Their Bases and Causally Impotent’, American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 19–31. (Scholar)
- Robinson, D., 1993, ‘Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties’, Philosophical Studies 69: 1–34. (Scholar)
- Robinson, H., 1982, Matter and Sense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Schaffer, J., 2003, ‘Overdetermining Causes’, Philosophical Studies 114: 23–45. (Scholar)
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- Schlosser, M. E., 2011, ‘The Metaphysics of Rule-Following’, Philosophical Studies 155: 345–369. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1958. ‘Counterfactuals, Dispositions and the Causal Modalities’, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol.2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 225–308. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1980, ‘Causality and Properties’, in P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Dordrecht: Reidel, 109–135. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, ‘Causal and Metaphysical Necessity’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 59–77. (Scholar)
- Shope, R.K., 1978, ‘The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy’, Journal of Philosophy 75: 397–413. (Scholar)
- Smith, A.D., 1977, ‘Dispositional Properties’, Mind 86: 439–445. (Scholar)
- Smith, M. & Stoljar, D., 1998, ‘Global Response-Dependence and Noumenal Realism’, The Monist 81: 85–111. (Scholar)
- Steinberg, J., 2010, ‘Dispositions and Subjunctives’, Philosophical Studies148: 323–341. (Scholar)
- Storer, T., 1951, ‘On Defining "Soluble"’, Analysis 11: 134–137. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F., 1980, ‘Reply to Evans’, in Z. van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, New York: Oxford University Press, 273–282. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, R., 1980, ‘Properties, Causation, and Projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker’, in L.J. Cohen & M. Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic, Oxford: Clarendon, 313–320. (Scholar)
- Swoyer, C., 1982, ‘The Nature of Natural Laws’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60: 203–223. (Scholar)
- Teller, P., 2002, ‘Critical Study: Nancy Cartwright's The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science’, Noûs 36: 699–725. (Scholar)
- Tooley, M., 1977, ‘The Nature of Laws’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 667–698. (Scholar)
- Whittle, A., 2006, ‘On an Argument for Humility’, Philosophical Studies 130: 461–497. (Scholar)
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- Williams, N.E., 2009, ‘The Ungrounded Argument is Unfounded: A Response to Mumford’, Synthese 170: 7–19. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘Puzzling Powers: The Problem of Fit’, in A. Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, New York: Routledge, 84–105. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Dispositions and the Argument from Science’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 79–90. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1999, ‘Intrinsicness’, Philosophical Topics 26: 590–627. (Scholar)
- Yli-Vakkuri, J., 2010, ‘Conditional and Habitual Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions’, The Philosophical Quarterly 60: 624–630. (Scholar)
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