Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Dualism" by Howard Robinson |
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- Almog, J. (2001): What am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Aquinas, St Thomas (1912): Summa Theologica, Washbourne, London. (Scholar)
- Aristotle, De Anima, Bk III, D.W. Hamlyn (trans.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968/1993.
- Armstrong, D. M. (1968): A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge and Kegan Paul, ch. 2. (Scholar)
- Averill, E. W. and Keating, B. (1981): ‘Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics?’, Mind 90, 102–7. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A. J. (1963): ‘The concept of a person’, in The Concept of a Person and other Essays, Macmillan, London, 82–128. (Scholar)
- Baker, M. C. and Goetz, S. (eds) (2011): The Soul Hypothesis, Continuum, London. (Scholar)
- Berkeley, G. (1710 / 1949): Principles of Human Knowledge in A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Vol. 2, pp. 41–113, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. (Scholar)
- Bricke, J. (1975): ‘Interaction and physiology’, Mind 84, 255–9. (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D. (1925): The Mind and its Place in Nature, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, New York. (Scholar)
- Collins, C. (1997): ‘Searle on consciousness and dualism’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5, 15–33. (Scholar)
- Collins, R. (2011): ‘Energy of the soul’, in Baker, (2011). (Scholar)
- Crane, T. (2003): ‘Mental substances’. In A. O'Hear (ed.) Minds and Persons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D. (1971): ‘Mental events', in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds) Experience and Theory, Duckworth, London. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D, (1987): ‘Three kinds of intentional psychology’, in The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 43–68. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R. (1641 / 1996): ‘Meditation VI’, in Meditations on the First Philosophy, J. Cottingham (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ducasse, C, (1961): ‘In defence of dualism’, in S. Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, Collier, New York, 85–9. (Scholar)
- Eccles, J. (1980): The Human Psyche, Springer, New York. (Scholar)
- –––. (1987): ‘Brain and mind: two or one?’ In C. Blakemore and S Green fields, (eds) Mindwaves, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Efron, A. (1992): ‘Residual asymmetric dualism: a theory of mind-body relations’, Journal of Mind and Behaviour 13, 113–36. (Scholar)
- Feigl, H. (1958): ‘The “mental” and the “physical”’, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell, (eds) Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, 370–497. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (1974): ‘Special sciences and the disunity of science as a working hypothesis', Synthese, 28, 77–115. (Scholar)
- Foster, J. (1968): ‘Psycho-physical causal relations’, American Philosophical Quarterly 5. (Scholar)
- –––. (1989): ‘A defence of dualism’, in J. Smythies and J. Beloff, (eds), The Case for Dualism, University of Virginia Press.
- –––. (1991): The Immaterial Self, Routledge. (Scholar)
- Green, C. (2003): The Lost Cause, Oxford Forum. (Scholar)
- Hamlyn, D. W. (1978): ‘Aristotle's Cartesianism’, Paedia: Special Aristotle Issue, 8–15. (Scholar)
- Hart, W. D. (1988): Engines of the Soul, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- –––. (1994): ‘Dualism’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, 265–7. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J. (2007): ‘Cartesian dualism’. In P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (eds), Persons Human and Divine, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Heil, J. (1998): Philosophy of Mind, Routledge, London and New York, Ch. 2, ‘Descartes's legacy’. (Scholar)
- Herbert, R. T. (1998): ‘Dualism/materialism’, Philosophical Quarterly 48, 159–75. (Scholar)
- Himma, K. E. (2005): ‘When a problem for all is a problem for none: substance dualism, physicalism and the mind-body problem’, Australian Journal of Philosophy (Scholar)
- Hodgson, D. (1988): The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Honderich, T. (1981): ‘Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems’, Inquiry 24, 277–303. (Scholar)
- Hume, D. (1739 / 2000): A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, Pt IV, sect. VI, and Appendix, D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Huxley, T. H. (1893): ‘On the hypothesis that animals are automata’, Collected Essays, vol. 1, New York, 199–250. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. (1982): ‘Epiphenomenal qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 127–136. (Scholar)
- James, W. (1890): Principles of Psychology, Macmillan, London. (Scholar)
- Kenny, Anthony (1989): The Metaphysics of Mind, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Kim, J. (2003): ‘Lonely souls: causality and substance dualism’. In T. O'Connor and D. Robb (eds), Philosophy of Mind:contemporary readings, Routledge, London. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Lahav, R. and Shanks, N. (1982): ‘How to be a scientifically respectable “property dualist”’, Journal of Mind and Behaviour 13, 211–32. (Scholar)
- Larmer, R. (1986): ‘Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy’, International Philosophical Quarterly 26, 277–85. (Scholar)
- Latham, N. (2000): ‘Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world’, Philosophical Studies 98, 67–93. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J. (1992): ‘The problem of psychophysical causation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, 263–76. (Scholar)
- –––. (1993): ‘The causal autonomy of the mental’ Mind 102, 629–44. (Scholar)
- –––. (1996): Subjects of Experience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- –––. (2006): ‘Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation’. Erkenntnis 65 (1): 5–23. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C. (1993): ‘Consciousness and cosmology: hyperdualism ventilated’, in M. Davies and G. Humphreys, (eds), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Madell, G. (1981): The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. (Scholar)
- Mills, E. (1996): ‘Interaction and overdetermination’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 33, 105–15. (Scholar)
- –––. (1997): ‘Interactionism and physicality’, Ratio 10, 169–83. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M. C. (1984): ‘Aristotelian dualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 197–207. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M. C. and Rorty, A. O. (1992): Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. and McDonough, J. K. (1998): ‘Numbers, minds and bodies: a fresh look at mind-body dualism’, Philosophical Perspectives 12, 349–71. (Scholar)
- Oderberg, D. S. (2005): ‘Hylemorphic dualism’, Social Philosophy and Policy 22, 70–99. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D. (1971): ‘Personal identity’, Philosophical Review 80, 3–27. (Scholar)
- –––. (1984): Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Penelhum, T. (1970): Survival and Disembodies Existence, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (Scholar)
- Penfield, W. (1975): The Mystery of the Mind, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. (Scholar)
- Penrose, R. (1990): The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- Pietroski, P. M. (1994): ‘Mental causation for dualists’, Mind and Language 9, 336–66. (Scholar)
- Plato, Phaedo in J. Cooper (ed.) Plato: Complete Works, pp. 49–100, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Popper, K. R. (1953): ‘Language and the mind-body problem: a restatement of interactionism’, in Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy. Reprinted (1962) in Conjectures and Refutations, Basic Books. (Scholar)
- –––. (1955): ‘A note on the mind-body problem’, Analysis 15, 131–5.
- Popper, K. and Eccles, J. (1977): The Self and its Brain, Springer, New York. (Scholar)
- Reid, T. (1969): ‘Concerning memory’, in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass.. First published, 1785. (Scholar)
- Richardson, R. C. (1982): ‘The ‘scandal’ of Cartesian dualism’, Mind 91, 20–37. (Scholar)
- Robinson, H. (1982): Matter and Sense, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- –––. (1983): ‘Aristotelian dualism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1, 123–44. (Scholar)
- –––. (2003): ‘Dualism’, in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Oxford, 85–101. (Scholar)
- –––. (forthcoming): ‘Personal identity, self and time’, in A. Batthany (ed.) Mind: its Place in the World. Non-reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness, Vienna. (Scholar)
- Rosenburg, J. F. (1988): ‘On not knowing who or what one is: reflections on the intelligibility of dualism’, Topoi 7, 57–63. (Scholar)
- Rozemond, M. (2002): Descartes's Dualism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (Scholar)
- Ryle, G. (1949): The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, London, esp. ch. 1. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W. (1954): ‘A note on Popper's argument for dualism’, Analysis 15, 23–4. (Scholar)
- Sherrington, C. S. (1942): Man on his Nature, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S. (1984): Identity, Cause, and Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Smook, R. (1988): ‘Egoicity and Twins’, Dialogue, 27, 277–86. (Scholar)
- Smythies, J. R. and Beloff, J, (eds) (1989): The Case for Dualism, University of Virginia Press. (Scholar)
- Sprigge, T. L. S. (1993): James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality, Open Court, Chicago. (Scholar)
- –––. (1994): ‘Consciousness’, Synthese 98, 73–93. (Scholar)
- Stapp, H. P. (1993): Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. F. (1959): Individuals, Methuen, London. (Scholar)
- Sussman, A. (1981): ‘Reflections on the chances for a scientific dualism’, Journal of Philosophy 78, 95–118. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, R. (1986): The Evolution of the Soul, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Revised edition (1997). (Scholar)
- Taliaferro, C. (1996): Consciousness and the Mind of God, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Vendler, Z. (1972): Res Cogitans, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. (Scholar)
- –––. (1984): The Matter of Minds, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
- von Rooijen, K. (1987): ‘Interactionism and evolution: a critique of Popper’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38, 87–92. (Scholar)
- von Wright, G. H. (1994): ‘On mind and matter’, Journal of Theoretical Biology 171, 101–10. (Scholar)
- Watson, J. B. (1913): ‘Psychology as the behaviourist views it’, Psychological Review, vol. 20, 158–77. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, D. W. (2004): ‘Should a Christian be a mind-body dualist?’. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell, Malden MA. (Scholar)
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