Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemic Paradoxes" by Roy Sorensen |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Aikin, K. Scott, 2011, Epistemology and the regress problem, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Anderson, C. Anthony, 1983, “The Paradox of the Knower”, The Journal of Philosophy, 80: 338–355. (Scholar)
- Binkley, Robert, 1968, “The Surprise Examination in Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, 65/2: 127–136. (Scholar)
- Bommarito, Nicolas, 2010, “Rationally Self-Ascribed Anti-Expertise”, Philosophical Studies, 151: 413–419. (Scholar)
- Bovens, Luc, 1995, “‘P and I will believe that not-P’: diachronic constraints on rational belief”, Mind, 104/416: 737–760.
- Burge, Tyler, 1984, “Epistemic Paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 81/1: 5–29. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978a, “Buridan and Epistemic Paradox”, Philosophical Studies, 34: 21–35. (Scholar)
- Buridan, John, 1982, John Buridan on Self-Reference: Chapter Eight of Buridan's ‘Sophismata’, G. E. Hughes (ed. & tr.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Carnap, Rudolph, 1950, The Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Christensen, David, 2010, “Higher Order Evidence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 185–215. (Scholar)
- Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, Academica , H. Rackham (trans.) Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb, 1933.
- Collins, Arthur, 1979, “Could our beliefs be representations in our brains?”, Journal of Philosophy, 74/5: 225–43. (Scholar)
- Cooper, John (ed.), 1997, Plato: The Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Egan, Andy and Adam Elga, 2005, “I can't believe I'm stupid”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19/1: 77–93.
- Feyerabend, Paul, 1988, Against Method, London: Verso. (Scholar)
- Fitch, Frederic, 1963, “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28/2: 135–142. (Scholar)
- Gödel, Kurt, 1983, “What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?”, Philosophy of Mathematics, Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 258–273. (Scholar)
- Hacking, Ian, 1975, The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hajek, Alan, 2005, “The Cable Guy paradox”, Analysis, 65/2: 112–119. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1973, Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John, 2004, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Hintikka, Jaakko, 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Hughes, G. E., 1982, John Buridan on Self-Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David and Richard Montague, 1960, “A Paradox Regained”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1: 79–90. (Scholar)
- Klein, Peter, 2007, “How to be an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification”, Philosophical Studies, 134: 77–25–29. (Scholar)
- Knight, Kevin, 2002, “Measuring Inconsistency”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 31/1: 77–98. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 2011, “Two Paradoxes of Knowledge”, in S. Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–51. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, Jonathan L., 1998, “The Epistemic Paradoxes”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Boston: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Kyburg, Henry, 1961, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1998, “Lucas against Mechanism”, Papers in Philosophical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 166–9. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David and Jane Richardson, 1966, “Scriven on Human Unpredictability”, Philosophical Studies, 17/5: 69–74. (Scholar)
- Lucas, J. R., 1964, “Minds, Machines and Gödel”, in Minds and Machines, ed. Alan Ross Anderson. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- Makinson, D. C., 1965, “The Paradox of the Preface”, Analysis, 25: 205–207. (Scholar)
- Malcolm, Norman, 1963, Knowledge and Certainty, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E., 1942, “A reply to my critics”, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, edited by P. A. Schlipp. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.
- Nerlich, G. C., 1961, “Unexpected Examinations and Unprovable Statements”, Mind, 70/280: 503–514. (Scholar)
- Peirce, Charles Sanders, 1931–1935, The Collected Works of Charles Sanders Peirce, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Plato, Plato: The Complete Works, John M. Cooper (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
- Poncins, Gontran de, 1988, Kabloona in collaboration with Lewis Galantiere, New York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, originally published 1941. (Scholar)
- Post, John F., 1970, “The Possible Liar”, Nous, 4: 405–409. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V., 1953, “On a so-called Paradox”, Mind, 62/245: 65–7. (Scholar)
- –––, 1969, “Epistemology Naturalized”, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Quiddities, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Read, Stephen, 1979, “Self-Reference and Validity”, Synthese, 42/2: 265–74. (Scholar)
- Sainsbury, R. M., 1995, Paradoxes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Salerno, Joseph, 2009, New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scriven, Michael, 1964, “An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior”, in Scientific Psychology: Principles and Approaches, ed. Benjamin B. Wolman and Ernest Nagel, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
- Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, R. G. Bury (trans.) Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1933.
- Skyrms, Brian, 1982, “Causal Decision Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 79/11: 695–711. (Scholar)
- Sorensen, Roy, 1988a, Blindspots, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988b, “Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals”, Philosophical Quarterly, 38 (October) 433– 454. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Vagueness and Contradiction, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Formal Problems in Epistemology”, The Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul Moser, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 539–568. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a, “Paradoxes of Rationality”, The Handbook of Rationality, ed. Al Mele, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257–275. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, A brief history of the paradox, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thomson, J. F., 1962, “On Some Paradoxes”, in Analytical Philosophy, ed. R. J. Butler. New York: Barnes & Noble, pp. 104–119. (Scholar)
- Tymoczko, Thomas, 1984, “An Unsolved Puzzle about Knowledge”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 437–458. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, Bas, 1984, “Belief and the Will”, Journal of Philosophy, 81: 235–256 (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens”, Philosophical Studies, 77: 7–37 (Scholar)
- Veber, Michael, 2004, “What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence?”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 54/217: 557–569. (Scholar)
- Weiss, Paul, 1952, “The Prediction Paradox”, Mind, 61/242: 265–9. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wynne-Tyson, Jon, 1985, The Extended Circle, Fontwell, Sussex: Centaur Press. (Scholar)
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