Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Bayesian Epistemology" by William Talbott |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Barnes, Eric Christian, “Predictivism for Pluralists”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005): 421-450. (Scholar)
- Bayes, Thomas, “An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (1764) 53: 37-418, reprinted in E.S. Pearson and M.G. Kendall, eds., Studies in the History of Statistics and probability (London: Charles Griffin, 1970). (Scholar)
- Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2003).
- Carnap, Rudolf, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1950).
- Carnap, Rudolf, The Continuum of Inductive Methods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1952).
- Carnap, “Meaning Postulates”, in Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: Phoenix Books; 1956): 222-229. (Scholar)
- Charles, J., Hocker, A., Lacker, H., Le Diberder, F.R., T'Jampens, S., “Bayesian Statistics at Work: the Troublesome Extraction of the CKM Phase alpha”, URL: http://aps.arxiv.org/abs/hep-ph/0607246(7/22/2006). (Scholar)
- Christensen, David, Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2004).
- Christensen, David, “Measuring Confirmation,” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 437-461. (Scholar)
- de Finetti, Bruno, “La Prevision: ses lois logiques, se sources subjectives” (Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincare 7 (1937): 1-68. Translated into English and reprinted in Kyburg and Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability (Huntington, NY: Krieger; 1980). (Scholar)
- Doob, J.L., “What is a Martingale?”, American Mathematical Monthly 78 (1971): 451-462. (Scholar)
- Earman, John, Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1992).
- Eells, Ellery, and Branden Fitelson. “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence”, Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 663-672. (Scholar)
- Eells, Ellery, and Branden Fitelson. “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support”, Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 129-142. (Scholar)
- Fitelson, Branden. “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings Supplement) (1999): S362-378. (Scholar)
- Fitelson, Branden. “Review of James Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory”, in Mind 112 (2003): 545-551. (Scholar)
- Gaifman, H., and Snir, M., “Probabilities over Rich Languages”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1982): 495-548. (Scholar)
- Garber, Daniel, “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, in J. Earman, ed., Testing Scientific Theories, Midwest Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. X (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; 1983): 99-131. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin I., Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1999).
- Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1983).
- Glymour, Clark, Theory and Evidence (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1980).
- Hacking, Ian, “Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability”, Philosophy of Science 34 (1967): 311-325. (Scholar)
- Hempel, Carl G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press; 1965).
- Horwich, Paul, Probability and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1982).
- Howson, Colin, and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open Court; 1993).
- Jaynes, E.T., “Prior Probabilities”, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-4 (1968): 227-241. (Scholar)
- Jaynes, E.T. (ed. by G. Larry Bretthorst), Probability Theory: The Logic of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003).
- Jeffrey, Richard, The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1983).
- Jeffrey, Richard, Probability and the Art of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1992).
- Jeffreys, Harold, Theory of Probability, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; ([1948] 1961).
- Joyce, James M., “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science 65 (1998): 575-603. (Scholar)
- Joyce, James M., The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1999).
- Kaplan, Mark, Decision Theory as Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1996).
- Keynes, John Maynard, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan; 1921).
- Kitcher, Philip, “The Division of Cognitive Labor”, Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 5-22. (Scholar)
- Lange, Marc, “Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization”, Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 294-324. (Scholar)
- Laplace, P. S. Marquis de, Théorie Analytique des Probabilitis, 3d ed. (Paris: Gauthier-Villars; ([1820] 1886).
- Levi, Isaac, The Enterprise of Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 1980)
- Levi, Isaac, The Fixation Of Belief And Its Undoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1991).
- Lewis, David, “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance”, in Richard C. Jeffrey, ed., Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1980): 263-293. (Scholar)
- Maher, Patrick, “Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery”, PSA, vol. 1 (1988): 273-285. (Scholar)
- Maher, Patrick, Betting on Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993).
- Mikkelson, Jeffrey M., “Dissolving the Wine/Water Paradox”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2004): 137-145. (Scholar)
- Pollock, John L., Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1990).
- Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson; 1968).
- Quine, W.V.O., “Carnap on Logical Truth”, in The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House; 1966): 100-125. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, Frank P., “Truth and Probability,” in Richard B. Braithwaite (ed.), Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Check on 1931 publication date), pp. 156-198. (Scholar)
- Réyni, A., “On a New Axiomatic Theory of Probability”, Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae 6 (1955): 285-385. (Scholar)
- Rosenkrantz, R.D., Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing; 1981).
- Savage, Leonard, The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover; 1972).
- Seidenfeld, Teddy, Joseph B. Kadane, and Mark J. Schervish, “On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers”, Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 225-244. (Scholar)
- Shimony, Abner, “An Adamite Derivation of the Calculus of Probability”, in J.H. Fetzer, ed., Probability and Causalty (Dordrecht: Reidel; 1988). (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian, Pragmatics and Empiricism (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1984).
- Skyrms, Brian, TheDynamics of Rational Deliberation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1990).
- Sober, Elliott, “Bayesianism—Its Scope and Limits”, in Richard Swinburne, ed., Bayes's Theorem (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2002): 21-38. (Scholar)
- Strevens, Michael, “Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic, or Mere Inductive Framework?”, Synthese 141 (2004): 365-379. (Scholar)
- Teller, Paul, “Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference”, in W. Harper and C.A. Hooker, eds., Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science (Dordrecht: D. Reidel; 1976). (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, Bas C., “Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal Probability”, in R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan, eds., Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grunbaum (Dordrecht: Reidel; 1983). (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, Bas C., “Belief and the Will”, Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984): 235-256. (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, Bas C., “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens”, Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 7-37. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Jon, “Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability”, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 50 (1999): 401-416. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Jon, “Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities,” in W. E. Harper and G. R. Wheeler, eds., Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. (Amsterdam: Elsevier; 2007). (Scholar)
- Zynda, Lyle, “Old Evidence and New Theories”, Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 67-95. (Scholar)
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