Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Virtue Epistemology" by John Greco |
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Works Cited
- Axtell, G., and A. Carter, 2008, “Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophical Papers, 37: 413–434. (Scholar)
- Baehr, J., 2006a, “Character in Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies, 128: 479–514. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 193–212. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Four Varieties of Character-based Virtue Epistemology,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45, 469–502. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Epistemic Malevolence,” Metaphilosophy, 41: 189–213. (Scholar)
- Battaly, H., 2008, “Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass, 3: 639–663. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Epistemic Self-Indulgence,” Metaphilosophy, 41: 214–234. (Scholar)
- Brogaard, Berit, 2006, “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36: 335–354. (Scholar)
- Code, L., 1987, Epistemic Responsibility, Hanover: University Press of New England and Brown University Press. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy.
- Fricker, Miranda, 2003, “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing,” Metaphilosophy, 34: 154–173. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing,, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. I., 1992, “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,” in A. I. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Greco, J., 1999, “Agent Reliabilism,” in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Virtues and Rules in Epistemology,” in L. Zagzebski and A. Fairweather, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002 “Virtues in Epistemology” in P. Moser, ed., Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003,“Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “A Different Sort of Contextualism,” Erkenntnis, 61: 383–400. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 17: 57–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “What's Wrong with Contextualism?” The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 416–436. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Knowledge and Success From Ability,” Philosophical Studies, 142: 17–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hookway, C., 2004, Truth, Rationality and Pragmatism: Themes From Peirce, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, David, 1748, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, J., 1992, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lackey, J., 2007, “Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know,” Synthese, 158: 345–361. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Knowledge and credit,” Philosophical Studies, 142: 27–42. (Scholar)
- Lehrer, K., 2000, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, Boulder: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- Levin, M., 2004, “Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 397–410. (Scholar)
- Montmarquet, J., 1993, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Peirce, C., 1955, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler, New York: Dover. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2005, Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Recent Work on Epistemic Value,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 85–110. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008a, “Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 437–447. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited,” Metaphilosophy, 39: 66–88. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Epistemic Value and Apt Performance,” Philosophical Studies, 143: 407–416. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Knowledge and Understanding,” in Pritchard, D., A. Millar, and A. Haddock,The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 5–88. (Scholar)
- Reid, T., 1764, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. (Scholar)
- –––, 1785, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. (Scholar)
- Riggs, W., 1998, “What Are the ‘Chances’ of Being Justified?,” The Monist, 81: 452–472. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Reliability and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 79–96. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding,” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “The Value Turn in Epistemology,” in New Waves in Epistemology, V. Hendricks and D.H. Pritchard (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Why Epistemologists Are So Down on Their Luck,” Synthese, 158: 329–344. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Two Problems of Easy Credit,” Synthese, 169: 201–216. (Scholar)
- Roberts, R. C., and W. Jay Wood, 2007, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1956, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and Reality, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975, “The Structure of Knowledge: (I) Perception; (II) Minds; (III) Epistemic Principles,” in Action, Knowledge, and Reality, H. Castañeda (ed.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill. (Scholar)
- Solomon, D., “Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1980, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 3–25. Reprinted in Sosa 1991. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known?”, Philosophical Topics, 26: 373–384. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Skepticism and Contextualism,” Philosophical Issues, 10: 1–18. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology,” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1: A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Zagzebski, L., 1996, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “What is Knowledge?” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Recovering Understanding,” in Knowledge Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, ed. Matthias Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good,” Metaphilosophy, 34: 12–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, On Epistemology, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth. (Scholar)
Collections
- Axtell, G., (ed.), 2000, Knowledge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Brady, M. S. and Pritchard, D. H., (eds.), 2003, Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Brady, M. S. and Pritchard, D. H., (eds.), 2003, Virtues: Moral and Epistemic, special double issue of Metaphilosophy, 34. (Scholar)
- DePaul, M. and Zagzebski, L. (eds.), 2003, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fairweather, A. and Zagzebski, L., (eds.), 2001, Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Greco, J., (ed.), 2004, Sosa and his Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, J., (ed.), 1996, Warrant in Contemporary Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Steup, M., (ed.), 2001, Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Villanueva, E., (ed.), 1994, Truth and Rationality, Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
Dedicated Journal Issues
- Noûs, 27 (1), (1993).
- Philosophical Issues, 5 (1994).
- Philosophical Studies, 78 (1995).
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60 (1), (2000).
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66 (2), (2003).
- Philosophical Studies, 130 (1), (2006).
- Philosophical Papers, 37 (3), (2008).
- Teorema, 27 (1), (2009) (in Spanish). (Scholar)
- Philosophical Studies, 143 (3), (2009).
- Philosophical Studies, 143 (4), (2009).
- Metaphilosophy, 41 (1–2), (2010)
Other Important Works
- Axtell, G., 1996, “Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 10: 172–198. (Scholar)
- Axtell, G., 1997, “Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 410–430. (Scholar)
- Axtell, G., 1998, “The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology,” The Monist, 81: 488–508. (Scholar)
- Battaly, H. and A. Coplan, 2009, “Is Dr. House Virtuous,” Film and Philosophy, 13. (Scholar)
- BonJour, L. and Sosa, E., 2003, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Carter, A., 2009, “Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety's (Recent) Discontents,”, Philosophia 38: 517–532. (Scholar)
- Code, L., 1984, “Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45 (1): 29–50. (Scholar)
- Driver, J., 1989, “The Virtues of Ignorance,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 373–84. (Scholar)
- Greco, J., 1993, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23: 413–432. (Scholar)
- Greco, J., 1994, “Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of ‘Relevant Possibility’,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 32: 61–77. (Scholar)
- Grimm, S., 2001, “Ernest Sosa, Knowledge and Understanding” Philosophical Studies, 106 (3): 171–191. (Scholar)
- Haddock, A., A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds.), 2009, Epistemic Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Henderson, D., 1994, “Epistemic Competence,” Philosophical Papers, 23 (3): 139–167. (Scholar)
- Henderson, D., 2008, “Testimonial Belief and Epistemic Competence,” Noûs, 42 (2): 190–221. (Scholar)
- Henderson, D. and T. Horgan, 2009, “Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions,” in K. Steuber, G. Damschen, and R Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions, Berlin: DeGruyter. (Scholar)
- Hibbs, T. S., 2001, “Aquinas, Virtue and Recent Epistemology,” Review of Metaphysics, 52 (3): 573–594. (Scholar)
- Hookway, C., 1993, “Mimicking Foundationalism: on Sentiment and Self-control,” European Journal of Philosophy, 1 (2): 155–173. (Scholar)
- Hookway, C., 1994, “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2 (2): 211–227. (Scholar)
- Kelp, C., 2009, “Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17 (4): 583–587. (Scholar)
- Kelp, C., 2009, “Knowledge and Safety,” Journal of Philosophical Research, 34: 51–53. (Scholar)
- Kelp, C., 2009, “Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety and Cognitive Achievements,” Journal of Philosophical Research, 34: 21–31. (Scholar)
- Lepock, C., 2011, “Unifying the Intellectual Virtues,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83: 106–128. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, J., 2011, “Virtue Epistemology,” in the Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker (eds.), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Montmarquet, J., 1987, “Epistemic Virtue,” Mind, 96: 482–497. (Scholar)
- Napier, S., 2008, Virtue Epistemology: Motivation and Knowledge, Continuum Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 1993, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 1993, “Why We Need Proper Function,” Noûs, 27, 1: 66–82 (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2003, “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck,” Metaphilosophy, 34: 106–30. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2006, What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2009, Knowledge, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2010, “Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis,” Synthese, 175: 133–151. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1985, “The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence: Justification in Epistemology,” Synthese, 64: 3–28. Reprinted in Sosa 1991. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1993, “Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,” Noûs, 27 (1): 51–65. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1997, “How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson form Descartes,” Philosophical Studies, 85: 229–249. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1999, “How must Knowledge be Modally Related to what is Known?” in Philosophical Topics, 26 (1–2): 373–384. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1999, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 141–55. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 2003, “Beyond Internal Foundations to External Virtues,” in Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 2009, Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1: Reflective Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Taliaferro, C., 2001, “The Virtues of Embodiment,” Philosophy, 76: 111–125. (Scholar)
- Vaesen, K., 2011, “Knowledge Without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended Cognition,” Synthese, 181: 515–529. (Scholar)
- Wood, J., 1998, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually
Virtuous, Grand Rapids: Intervarsity Press.
(Scholar) - Zagzebski, L., 1997, “Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 71 (Supplement): 1–17. (Scholar)
- Zagzebski, L., 2005, “Virtue Epistemology” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
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