Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Fictionalism" by Matti Eklund |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Balaguer, M., 1998, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, M., 1998a, “Attitudes Without Propositions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98: 805–26. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, S., 2005, “Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 322–38. (Scholar)
- Brock, S., 2002, “Fictionalism about Fictional Characters”, Noûs, 36: 1–21. (Scholar)
- Burgess, A. and J. Burgess, 2011, Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Burgess, J., 1983, “Why I am Not a Nominalist”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24: 93–105. (Scholar)
- Burgess, J., 2004, “Mathematics and Bleak House”, Philosophia Mathematica, 12: 18–36. (Scholar)
- Burgess, J. and G. Rosen, 1997, A Subject with no Object, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Crimmins, M., 1998, “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference”, Philosophical Review, 107: 1–48. (Scholar)
- Divers, J. and J. Hagen, 2006, “The Modal Fictionalist Predicament”, in F. MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dorr, C. and G. Rosen, 2002, “Composition as a Fiction”, in R. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Duhem, P., 1913, Le Système du Monde; histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, Paris: A. Hermann. Published in English as To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo, translated by Edmund Doland and Chaninah Maschler, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. (Scholar)
- Eklund, M., 2002, “Peter van Inwagen on Material Beings”, Ratio, 15: 245–56. (Scholar)
- Eklund, M., 2005, “Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 557–79. (Scholar)
- Eklund, M., 2009, “The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 705–12. (Scholar)
- Everett, A., 2005, “Against Fictional Realism”, Journal of Philosophy, 102: 624–49. (Scholar)
- Everett, A. and T. Hofweber, (eds.), 2000, Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1980, Science Without Numbers, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1989, Realism, Mathematics and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Fine, A., 1993, “Fictionalism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 1–18. (Scholar)
- French, P. and H. Wettstein, (eds.), 2001, Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XXV: Figurative Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Garfield, J., 2006, “Reductionism and Fictionalism: Comments on Siderits”, American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Comparative Philosophy, 6: 1–8. (Scholar)
- Higginbotham, J.,1985, “On Semantics”, Linguistic Inquiry, 16: 547–94. (Scholar)
- Hinckfuss, I., 1993, “Suppositions, Presuppositions, and Ontology”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23: 595–618. (Scholar)
- Hofweber, T., 2000, “Quantification and Non-Existent Objects”, in Everett and Hofweber (2000), pp. 249–73. (Scholar)
- Hussain, N., 2004, “The Return of Moral Fictionalism”, Philosophical Perspectives,18: 149–87. (Scholar)
- Hussain, N., 2007, “Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche's Free Spirits”, in B. Leiter and N. Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, B., 2007, “Truth vs Pretense in Discourse About Motion (Or, Why the Sun Really Does Rise)”, Noûs, 41: 289–317. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R., 2001, The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R., 2005, “Moral Fictionalism”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 287–313. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, M., (ed.), 2005, Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, M., 2005a, Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, M., 2008a, “Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference”, Analysis, 68: 133–43. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, M., 2008b, “The Trouble with Terminology”, Philosophical Books, 49: 33–41. (Scholar)
- Kennedy, C. and J. Stanley, 2009, “On ‘Average’”, Mind, 118: 583–646. (Scholar)
- Kim, S., 2005, “Modal Fictionalism and Analysis”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 116–33. (Scholar)
- Kroon, F., 2000, “Negative Existentials”, in Everett and Hofweber (2000), pp. 95–116. (Scholar)
- Kroon, F., 2004, “Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems”, Philosophical Review, 113: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Lenman, J., 2008, “Against Moral Fictionalism”, Philosophical Books, 49: 23–32. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1978, “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 37–46. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 2005, “Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 314–21. (Scholar)
- Lillehammer, H., 2004, “Moral Error Theory”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104: 95–111. (Scholar)
- MacBride, F., 1999, “Listening to Fictions: A Study of Fieldian Nominalism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50: 431–55. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
- McCormick, P., (ed.), 1985, The Reasons of Art/L'Art a ses Raisons, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. (Scholar)
- Melia, J., 1995, “On What There's Not”, Analysis, 55: 223–9. (Scholar)
- Melia, J., 2000, “Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument”, Mind, 109: 453–79. (Scholar)
- Nolan, D., and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, 1996, “Reflexive Fictionalisms”, Analysis, 56: 26–32 (Scholar)
- Nolan, D., G. Restall and C. West, 2005, “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 307–30. (Scholar)
- Ogden, C. K. (ed.), 1932, Bentham's Theory of Fictions, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. (Scholar)
- Richard, M., 2000, “Semantic Pretense”, in Everett and Hofweber (2000), pp. 205–32. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 1990, “Modal Fictionalism”, Mind, 99: 327–54. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 1994, “What is Constructive Empiricism?”, Philosophical Studies, 74: 143–78. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 2005, “Problems in the History of Fictionalism”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 14–64. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G. and J. Burgess, 2005, “Nominalism Reconsidered”, in S. Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1979, Expression and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, J. Annas and J. Barnes (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Sider, T., 1993, “Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk”, Analysis, 53: 285–9. (Scholar)
- Stanley, J., 2001, “Hermeneutic Fictionalism”, in French and Wettstein (2001), pp. 36–71. (Scholar)
- Szabó, Z., 2001, “Fictionalism and Moore's Paradox”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31: 293–308. (Scholar)
- Uzquiano, G., 2004, “Plurals and Simples”, The Monist, 87: 429–51. (Scholar)
- Vaihinger, H., 1911, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard. Published in English as The Philosophy of ‘As If’, translated by C.K. Ogden, London: Kegan Paul, 1923. (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, B., 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, B., 1994, “Gideon Rosen on Constructive Empiricism”, Philosophical Studies, 74: 179–92. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, P., 1985, “Pretence and Paraphrase”, in McCormick (1985), pp. 414–22. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, P., 1990, Material Beings, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, P., 2000, “Quantification and Fictional Discourse”, in Everett and Hofweber (2000), pp. 235–47. (Scholar)
- Walton, K., 1985, “Fictional Entities”, in McCormick (1985), pp. 403–13. (Scholar)
- Walton, K., 1990, Mimesis and Make-Believe, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Walton, K., 1993, “Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe”, European Journal of Philosophy, 1: 39–57. Reprinted in Kalderon (2005), pp. 65–87. (Scholar)
- Walton, K., 2000, “Existence as Metaphor?”, in Everett and Hofweber (2000), pp. 69–94. (Scholar)
- Wearing, C., forthcoming, “Metaphor, Idiom, and Pretense”, Noûs. (Scholar)
- Woodbridge, J., 2005, “Truth as a Pretense”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 134–77. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1998, “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 72: 229–6. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 2000, “A Paradox of Existence”, in Everett and Hofweber (2000), pp. 275–312. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 2000a, “Apriority and Existence”, in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 197–228. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 2001, “Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism”, in French and Wettstein (2001), pp. 72–102. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 2002, “Abstract Objects: A Case Study”, Philosophical Issues, 12: 220–40. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 2005, “The Myth of the Seven”, in Kalderon (2005), pp. 88–115. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 2006, “Non-Catastrophic Presupposition Failure”, in J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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