Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Fitting Attitude Theories of Value" by Daniel Jacobson |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Anderson, Elizabeth (1993). Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Brandt, Richard (1946). “Moral Valuation.” Ethics 56: 106–21. (Scholar)
- Brentano, Franz (1969) [1889]. The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, ed. Oskar Kraus and Roderick Chisholm, trans. Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth Schneewind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Bykvist, Krister (2009). “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails.” Mind 118(469): 1–30. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Roger (2000). “Review of Jon Kupperman, Value…and What Follows.” Philosophy 75: 458–62. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Roger (2005). “Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck.” Analysis 65.1: 80–85. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan (2000). “Should We Pass the Buck?” In Philosophy, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, ed. Anthony O'Hear. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Danielsson, Sven and Jonas Olson (2007). “Brentano and the Buck-Passers.” Mind 116: 511-522. (Scholar)
- Darwall, Stephen (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (1992). “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends.” The Philosophical Review 101: 115–89. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2000a). “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 65–90. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2000b). “Sentiment and Value.” Ethics 110: 722–748. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2003). “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism).” Reprinted in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2006a). “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David Copp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2006b). “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 1, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2009). “Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimentalism and the Instability of Affect.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ewing, A. C. (1948). The Definition of Good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Gaut, Berys (2007). Art, Emotion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Heathwood, Chris (2008). “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47–73. (Scholar)
- Hieronymi, Pamela (2005). “The Wrong Kind of Reason.” The Journal of Philosophy 102: 437–457. (Scholar)
- Hume, David (1740/1975). Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jacobson, Daniel (2008). “Review of Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. March 10, URL=<http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12584> (Scholar)
- Lewis, David (1989). “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 63: 113–37. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John (1985). “Values and Secondary Qualities.” Reprinted in McDowell (1998). (Scholar)
- McDowell, John (1987). “Projection and Truth in Ethics.” Reprinted in McDowell (1998). (Scholar)
- McDowell, John (1996). “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” Reprinted in McDowell (1998). (Scholar)
- McDowell, John (1998). Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, David (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling (2003). “Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck?” Analysis 63: 328–331. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Mulligan, Kevin (1998). “From Appropriate Emotions to Values.” The Monist 81: 161–88. (Scholar)
- Olson, Jonas (2004). “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54: 295–300. (Scholar)
- Olson, Jonas (2009). “Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(4):365–378. (Scholar)
- Parfit, Derek (2001). “Rationality and Reasons.” In Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values, eds. D. Egonsson, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson, and T. Rönnow-Rasmussen. Aldershot. (Scholar)
- Piller, Christian (2006). “Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences.” Philosophy 81: 155–182. (Scholar)
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen (2004). “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value.” Ethics 114: 391–423. (Scholar)
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen (2006). “Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56: 114–120. (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph (2009). “Reasons: Practical and Adaptive.” In Reasons for Actions, eds. David Sobel and Steven Wall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ross, W. D. (1939). Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Scruton, Roger (1987). “Laughter.” In The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall. Albany: SUNY Press, 1987. (Scholar)
- Skorupski, John (1997). “Reasons and Reason.” Reprinted in Ethical Explorations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. (Scholar)
- Smith, Adam (1982) [1790]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Stratton-Lake, Philip (2005). “How to Deal with Evil Demons: Comment on Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen.” Ethics 115: 788–798. (Scholar)
- Stratton-Lake, Philip and Brad Hooker (2006). “Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness.” In Metaethics after Moore, eds. Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Suikkanen, Jussi (2004). “Reasons and Value—In Defense of the Buck-Passing Account.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7: 513–535. (Scholar)
- Väyrynen, Pekka (2006). “Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.” In Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1: 295–324. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David (1976). “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life.” Reprinted in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David (1987). “A Sensible Subjectivism?” In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. (Scholar)
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