Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation" by Robert M. Gordon |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
Principal Sources:
- Adolphs, R. et al., 2000, “A Role for Somatosensory Cortices in the Visual Recognition of Emotion as Revealed by Three-Dimensional Lesion Mapping,” Journal of Neuroscience, 20 (7): 2683–2690. (Scholar)
- Currie, G., and Ravenscroft, I., 2002, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Diessel, H., and Tomasello, M., 2001, “The acquisition of finite complement clauses in English: A usage based approach to the development of grammatical constructions,” Cognitive Linguistics, 12: 97–141. (Scholar)
- Gallese, V., & Goldman, A., 1998, “Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2: 493–501. (Scholar)
- Gallese, V., 2001, “The ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis: from mirror neurons to empathy,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8: 33–50. (Scholar)
- Gallagher, S., 2007, “Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory,” in D. Hutto and M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-assessed, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
- Gallese, V., 2007, “Before and Below ‘Theory of Mind’: Embodied Simulation and the Neural Correlates of Social Cognition,” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 362: 659–669 (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 1989, “Interpretation Psychologized,” Mind and Language, 4: 161–185; reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone (eds.), Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A.I., 2006, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gopnik, A. and Wellman, H.M., 1992: “Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory,” Mind and Language, 7: 145–71. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R., 1986, “Folk Psychology as Simulation”, Mind and Language, 1: 158–171; reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone (eds.), Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R., 1995, “Simulation Without Introspection or Inference From Me to You,” in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, M. Davies & T. Stone (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 53–67. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R., 2004, “Intentional Agents Like Myself,” in Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science, Volume 2, S. Hurley & N. Chater (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Harris, P., 1989, Children and Emotion, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Heal, J., 1986, “Replication and Functionalism”, in Language, Mind, and Logic, J. Butterfield (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone (eds.), Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995. (Scholar)
- Hurley, S., 2004, “The Shared Circuits Hypothesis: A Unified Functional Architecture for Control, Imitation, and Simulation,” in Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science, Volume 1, S. Hurley & N. Chater (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Mitchell, J.P., 2005, “The false dichotomy between simulation and theory-theory: the argument's error,”Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(8): 363–364. (Scholar)
- Nichols, S., and Stich, S., 2003, Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding of Other Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
- Perner J., and Kuhlberger, A., 2005, “Mental Simulation: Royal Road to Other Minds?,” in Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Divide Between Self and Others, New York: Guilford Press (Scholar)
- Stich, S. & Nichols, S., 1992, “Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?,” Mind and Language, 7: 35–71; reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone (eds.), Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995. (Scholar)
- Tomasello, M., and Rakoczy, H., 2003, “What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality,” Mind and Language, 18: 121–147. (Scholar)
- Wimmer, H. and J. Perner, 1983, “Beliefs About Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception,” Cognition, 13: 103–128. (Scholar)
Collections:
- Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. (eds.), 1996, Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Davies, M. and Stone T. (eds.), 1995, Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (The introductory chapter offers an excellent overview and analysis of the initial debate.) (Scholar)
- Davies, M. and Stone T. (eds.), 1995, Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Dokic, J. and Proust, J. (eds.), 2002, Simulation and Knowledge of Action (Advances in Consciousness Research 45), Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (“The volume explores the two main versions of simulation theory, Goldman's introspectionism and Gordon's radical simulationism.”) (Scholar)
- Koegler, H. and Stueber, K. (eds.), 2000, Empathy and Agency: the Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences, Boulder: Westview Press. (“An anthology about the relevance of the simulation theory to philosophy of the social sciences”) (Scholar)
Further Readings
- Goldman, A., 1993, “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16: 15–28. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R. M., and J. Barker, 1994, “Autism and the ‘theory of mind’ debate,” in Philosophical Psychopathology: A Book of Readings, G. Graham and L. Stephens (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 163–181. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R.M., 1995, “Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator,” Ethics, 105: 727–742; reprinted in Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science, L. May, M. Friedman, & A. Clark (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1999, “All That Can Be at Issue in The Theory-theory Simulation Debate,” Philosophical Papers, 28(2): 77–95. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C. (ed.), 1994, Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Perner, J., 1991, Understanding the Representational Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Weisskopf, D., “Mental mirroring as the origin of attributions,” Mind and Language, 20: 495–520. (Scholar)
- Wellman, H. M., 1990, The Child's Theory of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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