Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Free Will" by Timothy O'Connor |
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- Adams, Robert (1987). “Must God Create the Best?,” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, 51–64. (Scholar)
- Almeida, Michael (2008). The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings. New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Aquinas, Thomas (BW / 1945). Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (2 vol.). New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- ––– (SPW / 1993). Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. T. McDermott. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Aristotle (NE / 1985). Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985. (Scholar)
- Augustine (FCW / 1993). On the Free Choice of the Will, tr. Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A.J. (1982). “Freedom and Necessity,” in Watson (1982b), ed., 15–23. (Scholar)
- Baker, Lynne (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Botham, Thad (2008). Agent-causation Revisited. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller. (Scholar)
- Bourke, Vernon (1964). Will in Western Thought. New York: Sheed and Ward. (Scholar)
- Campbell, C.A. (1967). In Defence of Free Will & other essays. London: Allen & Unwin Ltd. (Scholar)
- Campbell, Joseph Keim (2007). “Free Will and the Necessity of the Past,” Analysis 67 (294), 105–111. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick (1976). Person and Object. LaSalle: Open Court. (Scholar)
- ––– (1982). “Human Freedom and the Self,” in Watson (1982b), 24–35. (Scholar)
- Clarke, Randolph (1993). “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” in O'Connor (1995), ed., 201–15. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). “Indeterminism and Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32, 125–138. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996). “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action,” Philosophical Topics 24 (Fall), 19–48. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). “Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3), 408-421. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009). “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind 118 (470), 323-351. (Scholar)
- Dennett, Daniel (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Descartes, René (PWD / 1984). Meditations on First Philosophy [1641] and Passions of the Soul [1649], in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I-III, translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Donagan, Alan (1985). Human Ends and Human Actions: An Exploration in St. Thomas's Treatment. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. (Scholar)
- Dilman, Ilham (1999). Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Double, Richard (1991). The Non-Reality of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Duns Scotus, John (QAM / 1986). “Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, Q.15” in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality [selected and translated by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.]. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1986. (Scholar)
- Edwards, Jonathan (1754 / 1957). Freedom of Will, ed. P. Ramsey. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ekstrom, Laura (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001). “Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in Kane 2001, 309-322. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003). “Free Will, Chance, and Mystery,” Philosophical Studies, 113, 153–180. (Scholar)
- Farrer, Austin (1958). The Freedom of the Will. London: Adam & Charles Black. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (1999). “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 110, 93–139. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001). “Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism,” in Kane (2001), 281-308. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005), ed. Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, Vol.I-IV. London: Routledge.
- ––– (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228), 464–471. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010). “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories,” Philosophical Review 119 (3), 315–316. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin, Kane, Robert, Pereboom, Derk, and Vargas, Manuel (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Walden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark. (1992). “When the Will is Free,” in O'Connor (1995), ed., 239–269. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998) Responsibility and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, Harry (1969). “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66, 829–39. (Scholar)
- ––– (1982). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in Watson (1982), ed., 81–95. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988). The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1992). “The Faintest Passion,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66, 5–16. (Scholar)
- Franklin, Christopher (2009). “Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: the New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010). “Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument,” Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. (Scholar)
- –––(forthcoming). “The Problem of Enhanced Control,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl (1990). On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1997). “Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency,” The Journal of Ethics 1, 85–98. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002) “Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts,” in Kane, ed., (2002), 386–405. (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl and Palmer, David (2010). “On Mele and Robb's Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2), 440-446. (Scholar)
- Goetz, Stewart C. (2002). “Review of O'Connor, Persons and Causes,” Faith and Philosophy 19, 116–20. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1), 83-105. (Scholar)
- Haji, Ishtiyaque (2004). “Active Control, Agent-Causation, and Free Action,” Philosophical Explorations 7(2), 131-48. (Scholar)
- –––(2009). Incompatibilism's Allure. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. (Scholar)
- Hiddleston, Eric (2005). “Critical Notice of Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes,” Noûs 39 (3), 541–56. (Scholar)
- Hobbes, Thomas and Bramhall, John (1999) [1655–1658]. Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ed. V. Chappell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Moser, Paul, eds. (2002). Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, David (1748 /1977). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Kane, Robert (1995). “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” in O'Connor (1995), ed., 115–150. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996). The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kane, Robert, ed., (2002). Oxford Handbook on Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kant, Immanuel (1788 / 1993). Critique of Practical Reason, tr. by Lewis White Beck. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.
- Kapitan, Tomis (2001). “A Master Argument for Compatibilism?” in Kane 2001, 127–157. (Scholar)
- Kraay, Klaas J. (2010). “The Problem of No Best World,” in Charles Taliaferro and Paul Draper (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 491–99. (Scholar)
- Kretzmann, Norman (1997). The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Leibniz, Gottfried (1710 / 1985). Theodicy. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
- Levy, Neil (2007). Neuroethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Levy, Neil and McKenna, Michael (2009). “Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” Philosophy Compass 4(1), 96–133. (Scholar)
- Libet, Benjamin (2002). “Do We Have Free Will?” in Kane, ed., (2002), 551–564. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E.J. (2008). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- MacDonald, Scott (1998). “Aquinas's Libertarian Account of Free Will,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2, 309–328. (Scholar)
- Magill, Kevin (1997). Freedom and Experience. London: MacMillan. (Scholar)
- McCann, Hugh (1998). The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- McKenna, Michael (2008). “Frankfurt's Argument Against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples,” Noûs 42 (4), 770–793. (Scholar)
- Mele, Alfred (1995). Autonomous Agents (New York: Oxford University Press). (Scholar)
- ––– (2003). Motivation and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Morris, Thomas (1993). “Perfection and Creation,” in E. Stump. (1993), ed., 234–47 (Scholar)
- Murray, Michael (1993). “Coercion and the Hiddenness of God,” American Philosophical Quarterly 30, 27–38. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002). “Deus Absconditus,” in Howard-Snyder amd Moser (2002), 62–82. (Scholar)
- Nozick, Robert (1995). “Choice and Indeterminism,” in O'Connor (1995), ed., 101–14. (Scholar)
- O'Connor, Timothy (1993). “Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 499–526. (Scholar)
- –––, ed., (1995). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). “Freedom With a Human Face,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Fall 2005, 207–227. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008a). “Agent-Causal Power,” in Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 189-214. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008b). Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009a). “Degrees of Freedom,” Philosophical Explorations 12 (2), 119-125. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009b). “Conscious Willing and the Emerging Sciences of Brain and Behavior,” in George F. R. Ellis, Nancey Murphy, and Timothy O'Connor, eds., Downward Causation And The Neurobiology Of Free Will. New York: Springer Publications, 2009, 173-186. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010). “Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom,” in Robert Kane (ed.) Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. (Scholar)
- Pasnau, Robert (2002). Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004). “Is Our Concept of Agent-Causation Coherent?” Philosophical Topics 32, 275-86. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). “Defending Hard Incompatibilism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, 228-47. (Scholar)
- –––, ed., (2009). Free Will. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip (2001). A Theory of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pink, Thomas (2004). Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plato (CW / 1997). Complete Works, ed. J. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
- Quinn, Phillip (1983). “Divine Conservation, Continuous Creation, and Human Action,” in A. Freddoso, ed. The Existence and Nature of God. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. (Scholar)
- Reid, Thomas (1969). Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, ed. B. Brody. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Rowe, William (1995). “Two Concepts of Freedom,” in O'Connor (1995), ed. 151–71. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004). Can God Be Free?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sartre, John Paul (1956). Being and Nothingness. New York: Washington Square Press. (Scholar)
- Schopenhauer, Arthur (1839 / 1999). Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, ed. G. Zoller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schlosser, Markus E. (2008). “Agent-Causation and Agential Control,” Philosophical Explorations 11 (1), 3-21. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994) [1297-99]. Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, tr. Vos Jaczn et al. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Shatz, David (1986). “Free Will and the Structure of Motivation,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, 451–482. (Scholar)
- Smilansky, Saul (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Speak, Daniel James (2007). “The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226), 76-95. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). “Papistry: Another Defense,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1), 262-268. (Scholar)
- Strawson, Galen (1986). Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, Peter (1982). “Freedom and Resentment,” in Watson (1982), ed., 59–80. (Scholar)
- Stump, Eleonore, ed., (1993). Reasoned Faith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996). “Persons: Identification and Freedom,” Philosophical Topics 24, 183–214. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003). Aquinas. London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Timpe, Kevin (2006). “The Dialectic Role of the Flickers of Freedom,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2), 337–368. (Scholar)
- Todd, Patrick and Neal Tognazzini (2008). “A Problem for Guidance Control,” Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (233), 685–92. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994). “When the Will is Not Free,” Philosophical Studies, 75, 95–113. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). “When Is the Will Free?” in O'Connor (1995), ed., 219–238. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter (2001) “Free Will Remains a Mystery,” in Kane (2001), 158–179. (Scholar)
- Wainwright, William (1996). “Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe, and the Necessity of Creation,” in J. Jordan and D. Howard-Snyder, eds., Faith Freedom, and Rationality. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 119–133. (Scholar)
- Wallace, R. Jay (2003). “Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections,” in Watson, ed., (2003b), 424–452. (Scholar)
- Watson, Gary (1987). “Free Action and Free Will,” Mind 96, 145–72. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003a). “Free Agency,” in Watson, ed., 1982b. (Scholar)
- –––, ed., (2003b). Free Will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wegner, Daniel (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Widerker, David (2005). “Agent-Causation and Control,” Faith and Philosophy 22 (1), 87-98. (Scholar)
- ––– (2006). “Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios,” Journal of Philosophy 103 (4), 163-187. (Scholar)
- Widerker, David and McKenna, Michael, eds., (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- Wolf, Susan (1990). Freedom Within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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