Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Functionalism" by Janet Levin |
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- Alter, T. (2007). “Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?”, in Alter and Walter (2007), 65–76. (Scholar)
- Alter, T. and Walter, S. (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Antony, L. and Levine, J. (1997). “Reduction With Autonomy”. Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 83–105. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981). The Nature of Mind. University of Queensland Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1993). “Causes are perceived and introspected”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 29–29. (Scholar)
- Baker, L. R. (1995). “Metaphysics and mental Causation”, in Heil and Mele 1995, 75–96. (Scholar)
- Balog, K. (1999). “Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem”. Philosophical Review, 108 (4): 497–528. (Scholar)
- Bealer, G. (1997). “Self-Consciousness”. Philosophical Review, 106: 69–117. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001). “The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail”. Philosophical Studies, 105 (3): 281–307. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002). “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance”, in Gendler, T.and Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 71–126. (Scholar)
- Bennett, K. (2003). “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It”. Noûs 37(3): 471–497. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “Mental Causation”. Philosophy Compass, 2 (2): 316–337. (Scholar)
- Block, N. (1980a). Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1980b). “Troubles With Functionalism”, in Block 1980a, 268–305. (Scholar)
- ––– (1980c). “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?”. Philosophical Review, 89: 257–274. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986). “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology”, in French, Euling, and Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10: 615–678. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990). “Inverted Earth”, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 4, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 52–79. (Scholar)
- ––– (1997). “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back”, Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 107–132. (Scholar)
- Block, N., Flanagan, O., Guzeldere, (eds.) 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Block, N. and Fodor, J. (1972). “What Psychological States Are Not”. Philosophical Review, 81: 159–181. (Scholar)
- Block, N. and Stalnaker, R. (1999). “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”, Philosophical Review, 108 (1): 1–46. (Scholar)
- Burge, T. (1979). “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73–121. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995). “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice”, in Heil and Mele 1995, 97–120. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A. and Prior, J. (2006). “Bad Intensions”, in Garcia-Carpintiero, M. and Macia, J. (eds.) Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 38–54. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1999). “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2): 473–496. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002). “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 145–200. (Scholar)
- ––– (2006). “The Foundation of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in M. Garcia-Carpintiero, M. and J. Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55–140. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Chomsky, N. (1959). “Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior”. Language, 35: 26–58; reprinted in Block 1980, 48–63. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P. (1981). “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes”. Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005). “Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective”. Journal of Philosophy, 102: 33–50. (Scholar)
- Crane, T. (1995). “The Mental Causation Debate”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 69 (Supplement): 211–236. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D. (1963). “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Journal of Philosophy, 60: 685–700. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. (1978a). “Intentional Systems”, in Dennett 1978c, 3–22. (Scholar)
- ––– (1978b). “Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness”, in Dennett 1978c, 149–173. (Scholar)
- ––– (1978c). Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988). “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.),Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 43–77. (Scholar)
- Field, H. (1980), “Mental Representation”, in Block 1980, 78–114. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (1968). Psychological Explanation. New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- ––– (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990a). “Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation”, in J. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–29. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990b). “Making Mind Matter More”, in J. Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 137–159. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994). The Elm and the Expert. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Frege, G. (1892/1952). “On Sense and Reference”, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Work of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Funkhouser, E. (2007). “Multiple Realizability”. Philosophy Compass, 2 (2): 303–315. (Scholar)
- Geach, P. (1957). Mental Acts. London: RKP. (Scholar)
- Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. (1993). “The psychology of folk psychology”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (1): 15–28. (Scholar)
- Hardin, C.L. (1988). Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow. Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Hill, C. (1993). “Qualitative characteristics, type materialism, and the circularity of analytic functionalism”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (1): 50–51. (Scholar)
- ––– (1997). “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem”. Philosophical Studies, 87: 61–85. (Scholar)
- Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. (1999). “There are Fewer Things in Reality than Dreamt of in Chalmers' Philosophy”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2): 445–454. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. (1984). “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 147–183. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and Woodward, J. (1985). “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay”. Philosophical Review, 94: 197–226. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. (1982). “Epiphenomenal Qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996). “Mental Causation”. Mind, 105 (419): 377–413. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998). “Postscript on Qualia”, in F. Jackson, Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge, 76–79. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism”, in Alter and Walter 2007, 52–64. (Scholar)
- Kim, J. (1989). “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”, in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: Bradford. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “Causation and Mental Causation”, in McLaughlin and Cohen 2007, 227–242. (Scholar)
- Kobes, B. (1993). “Self-attributions help constitute mental types”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (1): 54–56. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U. (2003). “Is intentionality dependent on consciousness?”. Philosophical Studies, 116 (3): 271–307. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Levin, J. (1985). “Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 11 (Supplement): 85–104. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986). “Could Love be Like a Heatwave?”, Philosophical Studies, 49: 245–261. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998). “Must Reasons be Rational?”, in Philosophy of Science, 55: 199–217. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002). “Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64 (3): 571–591. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008). “Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously”. Mind and Language, 23 (4): 402–425. (Scholar)
- Levine, J. (1983). “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 354–361. (Scholar)
- ––– (1993). “On Leaving Out What it's Like”, in M. Davies and G. Humphries (eds.), Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 121–136. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001). Purple Haze. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. (1966). “An Argument for the Identity Theory”. Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. (Scholar)
- ––– (1972). “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, in Block 1980, 207–215. (Scholar)
- ––– (1980). “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Block 1980, 216–222. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990). “What Experience Teaches”, in Lycan 1990, 499–519. (Scholar)
- Loar, B. (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987). “Social Content and Psychological Content”, in P. Grimm and D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 99–110. (Scholar)
- ––– (1997). “Phenomenal States” (revised version), in Block, et al. 1997, 597–616. (Scholar)
- ––– (1999). “David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2): 439–444. (Scholar)
- Loewer, B. (2002). “Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind and the Physical World”.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65 (3): 555–662. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough”, in McLaughlin and Cohen 2007, 243–264. (Scholar)
- Ludlow, Nagasawa, and Stoljar. (2004). There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Knowledge and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ludwig, K. (1998). “Functionalism, Causation, and Causal Relevance”. Psyche, 4(3) (March). (Scholar)
- Lycan, W. (1987). Consciousness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990a). Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990b). “The Continuity of Levels of Nature”, in Lycan 1990, 77–96. (Scholar)
- Macdonald, C. and Macdonald, G. (1995). “How to be Psychologically Relevant”, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation (Volume 1), Oxford: Blackwell, 60–77. (Scholar)
- Malcolm, N. (1968). “The Conceivability of Mechanism”. Philosophical Review, 77: 45–72. (Scholar)
- McCullagh, M. (2000). “Functionalism and Self-Consciousness”. Mind and Language, 15 (5): 481–499. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J. (1985). “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism”, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 387–398. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, B. (2006). “Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenaliam?”. Consciousness Studies, 13 (1–2): 39–66. (Scholar)
- ––– (forthcoming), in E. Sosa (ed.), Essays in Homor of Jaegwon Kim. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- McLaughlin, B. and Cohen, J. (2007). Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
- Melnyk, A. (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T. (1974). “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”,Philosophical Review, 83: 435–450. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000). “The Psycho-physical Nexus”, in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.). New Essays on the A Priori. New York: Oxford University Press, 434–471 (Scholar)
- Nemirow, L. (1990). “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance”, in Lycan 1990a, 490–498. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “So This is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis”, in Alter and Walter 2007, 32–51. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C. (1999). Being Known. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pitt, D. (2004). “The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to think that P?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69 (1): 1–36. (Scholar)
- Place, U.T. (1956). “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology, 47: 44–50. (Scholar)
- Prior, E., Pargetter, R., and Jackson, F. (1982). “Three Theses About Dispositions”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (3): 251–257. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H. (1960). “Minds and Machines”, reprinted in Putnam 1975b, 362–385. (Scholar)
- ––– (1963). “Brains and Behavior”, reprinted in Putnam 1975b, 325–341. (Scholar)
- ––– (1967). “The Nature of Mental States”, reprinted in Putnam 1975b, 429–440. (Scholar)
- ––– (1973). “Philosophy and our Mental Life”, reprinted in Putnam 1975b, 291–303. (Scholar)
- ––– (1975a). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, reprinted in Putnam 1975b, 215–271. (Scholar)
- ––– (1975b). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V. (1953). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
- Rey, G. (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). “Resisting Normativism in Psychology”, in McLaughlin and Cohen 2007, 69–84. (Scholar)
- Rupert, R. (2006). “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessitated Effects”. Noûs, 40: 256–283. (Scholar)
- Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutcheson. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J. (2003). “Overdetermining Causes”. Philosophical Studies, 114: 23–45. (Scholar)
- Searle, J. (1980). “Minds, Brains and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417–457 (Scholar)
- ––– (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W. (1956). “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in M. Scriven, P. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 1. Minneapolis: U.of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Shagrir, O. (2005). “The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism”, in Y. Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 220–250 (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S. (1984). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984a). “Phenomenal similarity”, in Shoemaker 1984, 159–183. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984b). “Functionalism and qualia”, in Shoemaker 1984, 184–205. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984c). “Some varieties of functionalism”, in Shoemaker 1984, 261–286. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996). The first-person perspective and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996a). “Introspection and the self”, in Shoemaker 1996, 3–24. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996b). “On knowing one's own mind”, in Shoemaker 1996, 25–49. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996c). “First-person access”, in Shoemaker 1996, 50–73. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996d). “Self-knowledge and ‘inner sense’: Lecture I”, in Shoemaker 1996, 201–223. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001). “Realization and Mental Causation”, in C. Gillet and B. Loewer, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 74–98. (Scholar)
- Sider, T. (2003). “What's so Bad About Overdetermination?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 716–726. (Scholar)
- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). “Sensations and Brain Processes”. Philosophical Review, 68: 141–156. (Scholar)
- Soames, S. (2004). Reference and Description. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R. (2002). “What is it Like to Be a Zombie?”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 385–400. (Scholar)
- Sterelny, K. (1993). “Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (1): 81–83. (Scholar)
- Stich, S. (1981). “Dennett on Intentional Systems”, Philosophical Topics, 12: 39–62. (Scholar)
- ––– (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Tooley, M. (2001). “Functional concepts,referentially opaque contexts, causal relations, and the definition of theoretical terms”. Philosophical Studies, 105 (3): 251–279. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Van Gulick, R. (1989). “What Difference Does Consciousness Make?” Philosophical Topics, 17: 211–230. (Scholar)
- Wedgwood, R. (2007). “Normativism Defended”, in McLaughlin and Cohen 2007, 85–101. (Scholar)
- White, S. (1986). “Curse of the Qualia”, Synthese, 68: 333–368. (Scholar)
- White, S., (2007). “Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise”, in Alter and Walter 2007, 210–248. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S. (1992). “Mental Causation”. Philosophical Review, 101: 245–280. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000). “Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81 (1): 98–122. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002). “Coulda, Shoulds, Woulda”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 441–492. (Scholar)
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