References to Hume’s Works

In the entry above, we follow the convention given in the Nortons’ Treatise and Beauchamp’s Enquiries: we cite Book. Part. Section. Paragraph; followed by references to the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions. Thus T 1.2.3.4/34: will indicate Treatise Bk.1, Pt.2, Sec.3, Para.4/ Selby-Bigge pg.34. References to Abstract [TA] are to the two editions of the Treatise mentioned above (paragraph/page). In the case of the Enquiries we cite Section and Paragraph; followed by page reference to the Selby-Bigge edition. Thus EU 12.1/149 refers to Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect.12, Para. 1 / Selby-Bigge pg. 149.

Secondary Literature

• Árdal, Pall, 1966. Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Chapter 4: Liberty. (Scholar)
• Ayer, A.J., 1954. “Freedom and Necessity”, Philosophical Essays, London: Macmillan; reprinted in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982 [pp. 15–23]. (Scholar)
• Beebee, Helen, and Alfred Mele, 2002. “Humean Compatibilism”, Mind, 111(442): 201–223. (Scholar)
• Berofsky, Bernard (ed.), 1966. Free Will and Determinism, New York & London: Harper & Row. (Scholar)
• Berofsky, Bernard, 2012. Nature’s Challenge to Free Will, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Botterill, George, 2002. “Hume on Liberty and Necessity”, in P. Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 277–300. (Scholar)
• Bricke, John, 1988. “Hume on Freedom to Act and Personal Evaluation”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 5: 141–56. (Scholar)
• –––, 2011. “Hume on Liberty and Necessity”, in E.S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Buckle, Stephen, 2001. Hume’s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon; Section 8 [Of Liberty and Necessity]. (Scholar)
• Campbell, C.A., 1951. “Is ‘Freewill’ a Pseudo-Problem?”, Mind, 60: 446–65; reprinted in Berofsky (ed.) 1966, pp. 112–35. (Scholar)
• Clarke, Samuel, 1704. A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God And Other Writings, E. Vailati (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (Scholar)
• Collins, Anthony, 1717. A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty; reprinted in J. O’Higgins (ed.), Determinism and Freewill, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Donald, 1963. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, reprinted in Davidson 1980, pp. 3–19. (Scholar)
• –––, 1973. “Freedom to Act”, reprinted in Davidson 1980, pp. 63–81. (Scholar)
• –––, 1980. Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Dennett, Daniel, 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Fields, Lloyd, 1988. “Hume on Responsibility”, Hume Studies, 14: 161–75. (Scholar)
• Flew, Antony, 1961. Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
• –––, 1984. “Paul Russell on Hume’s ‘Reconciling Project’”, Mind, 93: 587–88. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986. David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science, Oxford: Blackwell, Chapter 8 [Necessity, Liberty and the Possibility of Moral Science]. (Scholar)
• Frankfurt, Harry, 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, reprinted in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 81–95. (Scholar)
• Garrett, Don, 1997. Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 6 [Liberty and Necessity]. (Scholar)
• Harris, James, 2005. Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
• –––, 2012. “Free Will”, in A. Bailey & D. O’Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, London & New York: Continuum. (Scholar)
• Hobbes, Thomas, 1650. The Elements of Law, F. Tonnies (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928. (Scholar)
• –––, 1651. Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. (Scholar)
• –––, 1654. Of Liberty and Necessity, selections reprinted in D.D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists: 1650–1800 (Volume 1), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, pp. 61–70. (Scholar)
• Kane, Robert, 2005. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kemp Smith, Norman, 1941. The Philosophy of David Hume, London: MacMillan, Chapter 20. (Scholar)
• Locke, John, 1689 [1700]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4th edition, P. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
• Mackie, J.L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. (Scholar)
• McKenna, Michael, 2004. “Compatibilism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Compatibilism/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/Compatibilism/>. (Scholar)
• Millican, Peter, 2010. “Hume’s Determinism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 40.4: 611–642. (Scholar)
• Penelhum, Terence, 1975. Hume, London: Macmillan, Chapter 6: The Will. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993. “Hume’s Moral Psychology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, D.F. Norton (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; reprinted in Penelhum 2000. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998. “Critical Notice of Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28: 81–94. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000a. “Hume and Freedom of the Will”, in T. Penelhum 2000b. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000b. Themes in Hume: The Self, the Will, Religion, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Perry, John, 2010. “Wretched Subterfuge: A Defense of the Compatibilism of Freedom and Natural Causation”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 84(2): 93–113. (Scholar)
• Pitson, A.E., 2002. Hume’s Philosophy of the Self, London: Routledge [Chapter 7: Hume and Agency]. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006. “Liberty, Necessity, and the Will”, in The Blackwell Companion to Hume’s Treatise, S. Traiger (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 2016. “Hume, Free Will and Moral Responsibility”, in P. Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hume, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press: 380–400. (Scholar)
• Reid, Thomas, 1788. Active Powers of the Human Mind, B. Brody (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. (Scholar)
• Russell, Paul, 1983. “The Naturalism of Hume’s ‘Reconciling Project’”, Mind, 92: 593–600. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985. “Hume’s ‘Reconciling Project’: A Reply to Flew”, Mind, 94: 587–90. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988. “Causation, Compulsion and Compatibilism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 25: 313–21; reprinted in Russell 2017. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990. “Hume on Responsibility and Punishment”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20: 539–64; reprinted in Russell (ed.) forthcoming. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995. Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006. “Moral Sense and Virtue in Hume’s Ethics”, in T. Chappell (eds.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008. The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism. and Irreligion, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, Chapter 16 [Freedom Within Necessity: Hume’s Clockwork Man]. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013. “Hume’s Anatomy of Virtue”, in D. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 230–251; reprinted in Russell (ed.) forthcoming. (Scholar)
• –––, 2015. “Hume’s ‘Lengthy Digression’: Free Will in the Treatise”, in A. Butler & D. Ainslie (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 230–251; reprinted in Russell (ed.) forthcoming. (Scholar)
• –––, 2016. “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism”, in P. Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hume, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted in Russell (ed.) forthcoming. (Scholar)
• –––, 2017. The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• ––– , 2021. Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays , New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Russell, Paul, and Anders Kraal, 2005 [2017]. “Hume on Religion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/hume-religion/#RelMor/>.
• Schlick, Moritz, 1939. ‘When is a Man Responsible?,’ David Rynin (trans.), in Problems of Ethics, New York: Prentice Hall, pp. 143–158; reprinted in Berofsky (ed.) 1966, pp. 54–63. (Scholar)
• Smart, J.C.C., 1961. “Free Will, Praise and Blame”, Mind, 70: 291–306. (Scholar)
• Smith, Adam, 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon, 1976. (Scholar)
• Strawson, P.F., 1962. “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48: 187–211; reprinted in P. Russell & O. Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp 63–83; page reference is to the reprint. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, London: Metheun. (Scholar)
• Stroud, Barry, 1977. Hume, London: Routledge, Chapter 7: Action, Reason and Passion. (Scholar)
• Wallace, R. Jay, 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Williams, Bernard, 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993. Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995. Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)

A Brief Guide to Further Reading

The above citations may be used as the basis for further reading on this subject in the following way. Influential statements of the classical interpretation of Hume’s intentions can be found in Flew (1962), Penelhum (1975) and Stroud (1977). Prominent statements of 20^th century classical compatibilism that are generally taken to follow in Hume’s tracks include Schlick (1939), Ayer (1954) and Smart (1961). Davidson (1963) provides an important statement of the causal theory of action based on broadly Humean principles. A complete statement of the naturalistic interpretation is provided in Russell (1995), esp. Part I. For a critical response to this study see Penelhum (1998; 2000a), and also the earlier exchange between Russell (1983, 1985) and Flew (1984). The contributions by Botterill (2002) and Pitson (2016) follow up on some of the issues that are at stake here. For an account of Hume’s views on punishment – a topic that is closely connected with the problem of free will – see Russell (1990) and Russell (1995 – Chp. 10). For a general account of the 18^th century debate that Hume was involved in see Harris (2005) and Russell (2008), Chap. 16. See also O’Higgins introduction [in Collins (1717)] for further background. The works by Hobbes, Locke, Clarke and Collins, as cited above, are essential reading for an understanding of the general free will debate that Hume was involved in. Smith (1759) is a valuable point of contrast in relation to Hume’s views, insofar as Smith develops a naturalistic theory of responsibility based on moral sentiment (which Strawson follows up on). However, Smith does not discuss the free will issue directly (which is itself a point of some significance). In contrast with this, Reid (1788) is perhaps Hume’s most effective and distinguished contemporary critic on this subject and his contribution remains of considerable interest and value. With respect to Hume’s views on free will as they relate to his more general irreligious intentions see Russell (2008 – esp. Chp. 16). Similar material is covered in Russell (2016). Garrett (1997) provides a lucid overview and careful analysis of Hume’s views on liberty and necessity, which includes discussion of the theological side of Hume’s arguments and concerns. Helpful introductions discussing recent developments in compatibilist thinking, which are of obvious relevance for an assessment of the contemporary value of Hume’s views on this subject, can be found in McKenna (2004) and Kane (2005). Among the various points of contrast not discussed in this article, Frankfurt (1971) is an influential and important paper that aims to advance the classical compatibilist strategy beyond the bounds of accounts of freedom of action. However, as noted in the main text of this article, the work of P.F. Strawson (1962, 1985) is of particular importance in respect of the contemporary significance and relevance of Hume’s naturalistic strategy. Finally, for discussions of Hume’s compatibilism as it relates to his theory of causation see, for example, Russell (1988), Russell (1995), esp. Chaps.1–3, Beebee & Mele (2002), Harris (2005), Chap. 3, Millican (2010), and Berofsky (2012).