Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Impossible Worlds" by Francesco Berto |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Adams, R.M., 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 8: 211–31. (Scholar)
- Barwise, J., 1997, “Information and Impossibilities”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 488–515. (Scholar)
- Beall, JC, 2008, “Transparent Disquotationalism”, in Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.), 2008, Deflationism and Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 7–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities”, in Salerno (ed.), 2009, New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 105–25. (Scholar)
- Beall, JC and B. van Fraassen, 2003, Possibilities and Paradox. An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Berto, F., 2006, “Characterizing Negation to Face Dialetheism”, Logique et Analyse, 195: 241–63. (Scholar)
- Berto, F., 2007, How to Sell a Contradiction. The Logic and Metaphysics of Inconsistency, London: College Publications. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects”, Metaphysica, 9: 205–18. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis”, The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. (Scholar)
- Bremer, M., 2005, An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. (Scholar)
- Brogaard, B. and J. Salerno, 2007, “Why Counterpossibles are Not Trivial”, The Reasoner, 1: 5–6. (Scholar)
- Brown, B. and G. Priest, 2004, “Chunk and Permeate, a Paraconsistent Inference Strategy. Part I: The Infinitesimal Calculus”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33: 379–88. (Scholar)
- Cresswell, M., 1966, “The Completeness of S0.5”, Logique et Analyse, 9: 263–6. (Scholar)
- Divers, J., 2002, Possible Worlds, London-New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Divers, J. and J. Melia, 2002, “The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism”, Mind, 111: 15–36. (Scholar)
- Dunn, J.M., 1986, “Relevance Logic and Entailment”, in Gabbay and Guenthner (eds.), 1983–1989, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. III: 117–224. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1989, Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Goble, L., 2006, “Paraconsistent Modal Logic”, Logique et Analyse, 193: 3–29. (Scholar)
- Hegel, G.W.F., 1831, Wissenschaft der Logik, vols. 11 and 12 of Gesammelte Werke, in Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, hrg. von der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Meiner, 1968ff; English translation, Hegel's Science of Logic, New York: Humanity Books, 1969. (Scholar)
- Hintikka, J., 1975, “Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 475–84. (Scholar)
- Hyde, D., 1997, “From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts”, Mind, 106: 640–60. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1965, “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic II: Non-normal Modal Propositional Calculi”, in Addison et al. (eds.), 1965, The Theory of Models, Amsterdam: North-Holland: 206–20. (Scholar)
- Lemmon, E.J., 1957, “New foundations for the Lewis Modal Systems”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 22: 176–86. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1973, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 37–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W., 1994, Modality and Meaning, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Mares, E., 1997, “Who's Afraid of Impossible Worlds?”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 516–26. (Scholar)
- Mares, E. and A. Fuhrmann, “A Relevant Theory of Conditionals”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24: 645–65. (Scholar)
- Mortensen, C., 1989, “Anything is Possible”, Erkenntnis, 30: 319–37. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Peeking at the Impossible”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 527–34. (Scholar)
- Naylor, M., 1986, “A Note on David Lewis' Realism about Possible Worlds”, Analysis, 46: 28–9. (Scholar)
- Nolan, D., 1997, “Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 535–72. (Scholar)
- Priest, G., 1992, “What is a Non-Normal World?”, Logique et Analyse, 35: 291–302. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997a, “Editor's Introduction”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 481–7. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997b, “Sylvan's Box: A Short Story and Ten Morals”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 573–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Proudfoot, D., 2006, “Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35: 9–40. (Scholar)
- Rantala, V., 1982a, “Impossible Worlds Semantics and Logical Omniscience”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 35: 106–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982b, “Quantified Modal Logic: Non-Normal Worlds and Propositional Attitudes”, Studia Logica, 41: 41–65. (Scholar)
- Read, S., 1995, Thinking about Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rescher, N. and R.B. Brandom, 1980, The Logic of Inconsistency: a Study in Non-standard Possible Worlds Semantics and Ontology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Restall, G., 1997, “Ways Things Can't Be”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 583–96. (Scholar)
- Routley, R., 1979, “Dialectical Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics”, Erkenntnis, 14: 301–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “Philosophical and Linguistic Inroads: Multiply Intensional Relevant Logics”, in norman and Sylvan (eds.), 1989, Directions in Relevant Logics, Dordrecht: Kluwer, Ch. 19. (Scholar)
- Routley, R. and R.K. Meyer, 1973, “The Semantics of Entailment”, in Leblanc (ed.), 1973, Truth, Syntax and Modality, Amsterdam: North-Holland: 194-243. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “Dialectical Logic, Classical Logic, and the Consistency of the World”, Studies in Soviet Thought, 16: 1–25. (Scholar)
- Routley, R. and V. Routley, 1972, “Semantics for First Degree Entailment”, Nous, 6: 335–59. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N., 1984, “Impossible Worlds”, Analysis, 44: 114–7. (Scholar)
- Skyrms, B., 1976, “Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, 30: 323–32. (Scholar)
- Soames, S., 1987, “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content”, Philosophical Topics, 15: 47–87. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 1968, “A Theory of Conditionals”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph Series 2, repr. in Harper et al. (eds.), 1981, Ifs, Dordrecht: Reidel: 41–55. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Impossibilities”, Philosophical Topics, 24: 193–204. (Scholar)
- Vander Laan, D., 1997, “The Ontology of Impossible Worlds”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 597–620. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Counterpossibles and Similarity”, in Jackson and Priest (eds.), 2004, Lewisian Themes: the Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press. (Scholar)
- Varzi, A., 1997, “Inconsistency Without Contradiction”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 621–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Conjunction and Contradiction”, in Priest et al. (eds.), 2004, The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 93–110. (Scholar)
- Wansing, H., 1989, “Bemerkungen zur Semantik nicht-normaler möglicher Welten”, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 35: 551–7. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “A General Possible Worlds Framework for Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief”, Studia Logica, 49, 523–39. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Woods, J., 2003, Paradox and Paraconsistency. Conflict Resolution in the Abstract Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Yagisawa, T., 1988, “Beyond Possible Worlds”, Philosophical Studies, 53: 175–204. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Abstract Objects. An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 640–60. (Scholar)
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