Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Arguments for Incompatibilism" by Kadri Vihvelin |
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- Adams, Robert, 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 8: 211–31. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, Elizabeth, 1981, “Causality and Determination”, in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 133–147. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, David, 1983, What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Austin, J.L, 1961, “Ifs and Cans”, Philosophical Papers, London: Oxford University Press: 205–232. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A. J., 1954, “Freedom and Necessity”, in his Philosophical Essays, New York: St. Martin's Press: 3–20. Reprinted in Pereboom 1997. (Scholar)
- Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2008, “The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument,” Analysis, 68 (1): 13–22. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, Mark, 2004, “A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will”, Noûs, 38: 379–406. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Beebee, Helen, 2000, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 571–594. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument”, The Philosophical Review, 111: 235–241. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Local Miracle Compatibilism”, Noûs, 37: 258–277. (Scholar)
- Beebee, Helen and Mele, Alfred, 2002, “Humean Compatibilism”, Mind, 111(442): 201–23. (Scholar)
- Bennett, Jonathan, 2003, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Berofsky, Bernard, 1987, Freedom from Necessity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues”, in Kane 2002B, 181–201. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Global Control and Freedom”, Philosophical Studies, 131: 419–445. (Scholar)
- Bok, Hilary, 1998, Freedom and Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Broad, C.D., 1934, Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, Anthony, 2008, “Retooling the consequence argument,” Analysis, 68 (1): 10–13. (Scholar)
- Campbell, Joseph, 2005, “Compatibilist Alternatives”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35: 387–406. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Free will and the necessity of the past,” Analysis, 67 (2): 105–111. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Reply to Brueckner,” Analysis, 68 (3): 264–269. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss,” Analysis, 70 (1): 71–76. (Scholar)
- Carlson, Erik, 2000, “Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity”, Noûs, 34: 277–290. (Scholar)
- Carroll, John, 1994, Laws of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Nailed to Hume's Cross?”, Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J. Hawthorne, T. Sider, D. Zimmerman (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 67–81. (Scholar)
- Chisolm, Roderick, 1964, “Human Freedom and the Self”, The Lindley Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- Clarke, Randolph, 1993, “Towards a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will”, Noûs, 27: 191–203. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action”, Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 19–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 13–24. (Scholar)
- Darrow, Clarence, 1924, The trial of Leopold and Loeb, page reference is to “The Trial of Compulsion” in Attorney for the Damned: Clarence Darrow in the Courtroom, Arthur Weinberg (ed.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 16–86. (Scholar)
- Dennett, Daniel, 1984 , Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, Daniel & Taylor, Christopher, 2002, “Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities”, in Kane 2002B, 257–277. (Scholar)
- Double, Richard, 1991, The Non-Reality of Free Will, New York: Oxford Univerity Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “How Rational Must Free Will Be?”, Metaphilosophy, 23: 268–278. (Scholar)
- Earman, John, 1986, A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Ekstrom, Laura, 2000, Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- Fara, Michael, 2008, “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism”, Mind, 117 (468): 843–865. (Scholar)
- Finch, Alicia and Warfield, Ted. A., 1998, “The Mind Argument and Libertarianism”, Mind, 107 (427): 515–28. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin, 1983, “Incompatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 43: 121–37. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Freedom and Miracles”, Noûs, 22: 235–252. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Responsibility and Manipulation”, Journal of Ethics, 8: 145–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 327–342. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Ultimacy and Alternative Possibilities”, Philosophical Studies, 144 (1): 15–20. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin, and Todd, Patrick, 2011, “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks”, The Philosophical Review, 120 (1): 97–115. (Scholar)
- Flint, Thomas, 1987, “Compatibilism and the Argument from Unavoidability”, Journal of Philosophy, 74: 423–40. (Scholar)
- Foley, Richard, 1979, “Compatibilism and Control over the Past”, Analysis, 39: 70–74. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, Harry, 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 820–39. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988 and Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988 and Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, The Importance of What we Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Gallois, Andre, 1977, “Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism”, Philosophical Studies, 32: 99–105. (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 1966, “Might We Have No Choice?” in Freedom and Determinism, K. Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, 87–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, “The Conditional Analysis of Freedom”, in van Inwagen 1980, 171–186. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “A Defense of Incompatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 44: 391–400. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Graham, Peter A, 2008, “A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 140 (1): 65–82. (Scholar)
- Haji, Ishtiyaque, 2009, Incompatibilism's Allure, Ontario: Broadview Press. (Scholar)
- Hall, Ned, 2000, “Causation and the Price of Transitivity”, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 198–222. (Scholar)
- Hitchcock, Christopher, 2001,“The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs”, Journal of Philosophy, 98: 273–99. (Scholar)
- Hobart, R.E., 1934, “Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It”, Mind, 63: 1–27. (Scholar)
- Hoefer, Carl, 2002, “Freedom from the Inside Out”, in Time, Reality, and Experience, Craig Callender, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201–222. (Scholar)
- Holbach, Baron, 1770, “The Illusion of Free Will”, from The System of Nature; page reference is to the reprint in The Experience of Philosophy, D. Kolak and R. Martin (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 176–181. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence, 1985, “Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 47: 339–56. (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul,1987, Asymmetries in Time, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Huemer, Michael, 2000, “Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument”, The Philosophical Review, 109: 525–544. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee”, The Philosophical Review, 113 (3): 411–416 (Scholar)
- James, William, 1884, “The Dilemma of Determinism”, An Address to the Harvard Divinity Students; page reference is to the reprint in The Will to Believe and Other Esssays, New York: Dover Publications, 1956, 145–183. (Scholar)
- Kane, Robert, 1989, “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism”, in O'Connor 1995, 115–150. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”, Journal of Philosophy, 96: 217–240. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- Kane, Robert, 2005, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kane, Robert, (ed.), 2002A, Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002B, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kapitan, Tomis, 1991, “Ability and Cognition: a Defense of Compatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 63: 231–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities”, Analysis, 56: 102–110. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom”, Philosophical Perspectives 14 (Action and Freedom), James Tomberlin (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 81–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?”, in Kane 2002B, 127–157. (Scholar)
- Lamb, James, 1977, “On a Proof of Incompatibilism”, The Philosophical Review, 86: 20–35. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”, Journal of Philosophy, 90: 497–516. (Scholar)
- Lehrer, Keith, 1968, “Cans without Ifs”, Analysis, 29: 29–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, “Preferences, Conditionals, and Freedom”, in Metamind, K. Lehrer (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, 79–95. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–52 (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow”, Noûs, 13: 455–76. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”, Theoria, 47: 113–21. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Against Overlap”, in On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell, 198–209. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Finkish Dispositions”, Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 143–158. (Scholar)
- Loewer, Barry, 1996a, “Humean Supervenience”, Philosophical Topics, 24: 101–27. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996b, “Freedom from Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will”, Philosophical Topics, 24: 91–112 . (Scholar)
- Loss, Roberto, 2009, “Free Will and the Necessity of the Present”, Analysis, 69 (1): 63–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Fatalism and the Necessity of the Present: Reply to Campbell”, Analysis, 70 (1): 71–76. (Scholar)
- Lycan, William, 2003, “Free Will and the Burden of Proof”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 53: 107–122. (Scholar)
- Mackie, Penelope, 2003, “Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise”, Noûs, 37: 672–689. (Scholar)
- Markosian, Ned, 1999, “A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80: 257–277. (Scholar)
- McKay, Thomas and Johnson, David, 1996, “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism”, Philosophical Topics, 24: 113–22. (Scholar)
- McKenna, Michael, 2001, “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38: 37–52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents”, Philosophical Topics, 32: 169–192, John Fischer (ed.). (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (1): 142–159. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments? — Getting the Dialectic Right”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88 (3): 429–443. (Scholar)
- Mele, Alfred, 1995, Autonomous Agents, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Free Will and Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Ethics, 12 (3–4): 263–286. (Scholar)
- Merricks, Trenton, 2009, “Truth and Freedom”, The Philosophical Review, 118 (1): 29–57. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E. , 1912, “Free Will” in Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 6. (Scholar)
- Nagel, Thomas, 1979, “Moral Luck”, in his Mortal Questions , New York: Cambridge University Press, 24–38. (Scholar)
- Narveson, Jan, 1977, “Compatibilism Defended”, Philosophical Studies, 32: 83–88. (Scholar)
- Nelkin, Dana, 2001, “The Consequence Argument and the Mind argument”, Analysis, 61: 107–115. (Scholar)
- Nelkin, Dana and Rickless, Samuel, 2002, “Warfield's New Argument for Incompatibilism”, Analysis, 62: 104–107. (Scholar)
- Oakley, Shane, 2006, “Defending Lewis's Local Miracle Compatibilism,” Philosophical Studies, 130 (2): 337–349. (Scholar)
- O'Connor, Timothy, 1993, “On the Transfer of Necessity”, Noûs, 27: 204–218. (Scholar)
- –––,1995, “Agent Causation”, in O'Connor 1995, 173–200. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
- –––, 2000, Persons and Causes: the Metaphysics of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pereboom, Derk, 1995, “Determinism al Dente”, Noûs, 29: 21–45. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Living Without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Defending Hard Incompatibilism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 228–247. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008 “A Hard-line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (1): 160–170. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 2004, “Compatibilist Options”, in Freedom and Determinism, J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and D. Shier (eds.), MIT Press: Bradford Books, 231–254. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Can't We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer's My Way.” The Journal of Ethics, 12 (2): 157–166. (Scholar)
- Rosen, Gideon, 2002, “The Case for Incompatibilism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 699–706. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, Jonathan, 2008, “Causation and Laws of Nature: Reductionism”, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J. Hawthorne, T. Sider, D.Zimmerman (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 82–107. (Scholar)
- Schnieder, Benjamin, 2004, “Compatibilism and the Notion of Rendering Something False” Philosophical Studies, 117: 409–428. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “On What We Can Ensure,” Synthese, 162 (1): 101–115. (Scholar)
- Shabo, Seth, 2010, “Uncompromising Source incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 349–383. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1984, “Causality and Properties” in his Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays , London: Cambridge University Press, 206–233. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 2001, Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Slote, Michael, 1982, “Selective Necessity and the Free Will Problem”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 5–24. (Scholar)
- Sobel, Howard, 1998, Puzzles for the Will, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Scholar)
- Smilansky, Saul, 1993, “Does the Free Will Debate Rest on a Mistake?”, Philosophical Papers, 22: 173–187. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Free Will and Illusion, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, Michael, 1997, “A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility”, in Ethics and Practical Reason, G. Cullity (ed.), New York, Clarendon Press, 293–319. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Rational Capacities”, in his Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 114-135. (Scholar)
- Stone, Jim, 1998, “Free Will as a Gift from God: A New Compatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 92: 257–281. (Scholar)
- Strawson, Galen, 1986, Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 75: 5–24. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The Bounds of Freedom”, in Kane 2002B, 441–460. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F., 1962, “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 187–211. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
- Swartz, Norman, 1986, The Concept of Physical Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Taylor, Christopher, and Dennett, Daniel, 2002, “Who's Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities,” in The Free Will Handbook, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Taylor, Richard, 1960, Action and Purpose, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- –––, 1967, “Determinism”, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, New York: MacMillan. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, Metaphysics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- Tomberlin, James, (ed.), 2000, Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 14: Action and Freedom), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
- Turner, Jason, 2009, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87 (4): 565–587. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter, 1975, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism”, Philosophical Studies, 25: 185–99. Reprinted in Pereboom 1997 and Kane 2002. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1993, Metaphysics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2000, “Free Will Remains a Mystery”, in Tomberlin 2000, 1–19. Reprinted in Kane 2002B. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004A, “Freedom to Break the Laws”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 28: 334–350. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004B, “Van Inwagen on Free Will ”, in Freedom and Determinism, ed. J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and D. Shier, MIT Press: Bradford Books, 213–230. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “How to Think about the Problem of Free Will,” The Journal of Ethics, 12 (3–4): 327–341. (Scholar)
- Vargas, Manuel, 2004, “Libertarianism and Skepticism about Free Will: Some Arguments against Both”, Philosophical Topics, 32: 403–426. (Scholar)
- Vihvelin, Kadri, 1991, “Freedom, Causation, and Counterfactuals,” Philosophical Studies, 64: 161–184. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000a, “Libertarian Compatibilism”, in Tomberlin 2000, 139–166. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000b, “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30: 1–24. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account”, Philosophical Topics, 32: 427–450 (edited by John M. Fischer). (Scholar)
- –––, 2008a, “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism”, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, John Hawthorne, Theodore Sider, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 303–318. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 343–372. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2002, “Replies”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 707–727. (Scholar)
- Warfield, Ted. A., 2000, “Causal Determinism and Human Freedom are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism”, in Tomberlin 2000, 167–180. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Compatibilism and Incompatibilism: Some Arguments”, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 613–630. (Scholar)
- Watson, Gary, 1975, “Free Agency”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 205–220. Reprinted in Watson 2003 and 2004. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Free Action and Free Will”, Mind, 96: 145–72. Reprinted in Watson 2004. (Scholar)
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- Watson, Gary, (ed.), 2003, Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wegner, Daniel, 2003, The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press: Bradford Books. (Scholar)
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- Wolf, Susan, 1990, Freedom within Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Widerker, David, 1987, “On an Argument for Incompatibilism”, Analysis, 47: 37–41. (Scholar)
- Widerker, David and McKenna, Michael (eds.), 2003, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David, 1973, “Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism”, in Essays on Freedom and Action, Ted Honderich (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 31–62. Reprinted in Watson 2003. (Scholar)
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