Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Intention" by Kieran Setiya |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Anscombe, G. E. M., 1963, Intention, second edition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, G. E. M., 1983, ‘The Causation of Action,’ reprinted in Human Life, Action, and Ethics, M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds.), Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005, pp. 89–108. (Scholar)
- Audi, R., 1973, ‘Intending,’ Journal of Philosophy, 70: 387–403. (Scholar)
- Baier, A., 1970, ‘Act and Intent,’ Journal of Philosophy, 67: 648–658. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 1985, ‘Davidson's Theory of Intention,’ reprinted in Faces of Intention, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 209–224. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 1991, ‘Cognitivism about Practical Reason,’ reprinted in Faces of Intention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 250–264. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 2000, ‘Valuing and the Will,’ reprinted in Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 47–67. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 2009a, ‘Intention, Belief, and Practical Rationality,’ in Reasons for Action, D. Sobel and S. Wall (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13–36. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 2009b, ‘Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,’ Ethics, 119: 411–443. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 2009c, ‘Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,’ in Spheres of Reason, S. Robertson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–61. (Scholar)
- Broome, J., 2004, ‘Reasons,’ in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, R. J. Wallace et al. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28–55. (Scholar)
- Burge, T., 1988, ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge,’ Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649–663. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1963, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 3–20. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1970, ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’ Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 21–42. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1973, ‘Freedom to Act,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 63–81. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1978, ‘Intending,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 83–102. (Scholar)
- Davis, W., 1984, ‘A Causal Theory of Intending,’ reprinted in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 131–148. (Scholar)
- Davis, W., 2005, ‘Reasons and Psychological Causes,’ Philosophical Studies, 122: 51–101. (Scholar)
- Ferrero, L., 2006, ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink Tomorrow,’ in Rationality in Belief and Action, E. Baccarini and S. Prijic-Samarzija (eds.), Rijeka: Filozofski Facultet, pp. 95–127. (Scholar)
- Ginet, C., 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Grice, H. P., 1971, ‘Intention and Uncertainty,’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 5: 263–279. (Scholar)
- Hampshire, S., 1959, Thought and Action, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1976, ‘Practical Reasoning,’ reprinted in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 149–177. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1986, ‘Willing and Intending,’ in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, R. E. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 363–380. (Scholar)
- Holton, R., 2009, Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kolodny, N., 2008, ‘The Myth of Practical Consistency,’ European Journal of Philosophy, 16: 366–402. (Scholar)
- Langton, R., 2004, ‘Intention as Faith,’ in Agency and Action, J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 243–258. (Scholar)
- McCann, H., 1991, ‘Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,’ reprinted in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 204–222. (Scholar)
- Mele, A., 1992, Springs of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Moran, R. and Stone, M., 2009, ‘Anscombe on Expression of Intention,’ in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, C. Sandis (ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 132–168. (Scholar)
- O'Brien, L., 2007, Self-Knowing Agents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Paul, S., 2009, ‘How We Know What We're Doing,’ Philosophers' Imprint, 9: 1–24. (Scholar)
- Pears, D. F., 1985, ‘Intention and Belief,’ in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–88. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J., 1955, ‘Two Concepts of Rules,’ Philosophical Review, 64: 3–32. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 2005, ‘The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1: 1–28. (Scholar)
- Rödl, S., 2007, Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ross, J., 2009, ‘How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason,’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4: 243–281. (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Setiya, K., 2007a, Reasons without Rationalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Setiya, K., 2007b, ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,’ Ethics, 117: 647–673. (Scholar)
- Setiya, K., 2008, ‘Practical Knowledge,’ Ethics, 118: 388–409. (Scholar)
- Setiya, K., 2009, ‘Practical Knowledge Revisited,’ Ethics, 120: 128–137. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P., 1980–1, ‘Perception, Vision, and Causation,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 175–192. (Scholar)
- Tenenbaum, S., 2007, Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Thalberg, I., 1984, ‘Do Our Intentions Cause Our Intentional Actions?’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 21: 249–260. (Scholar)
- Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. D., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. D., 2007, ‘What Good is a Will?’ In Action in Context, A. Leist (ed.), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 193–215. (Scholar)
- Wallace, R. J., 1999, ‘Three Conceptions of Rational Agency,’ reprinted in Normativity and the Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 43–62. (Scholar)
- Wallace, R. J., 2001, ‘Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,’ reprinted in Normativity and the Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 82–120. (Scholar)
- Way, J., 2010, ‘Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason,’ Philosophical Studies, 147: 213–233. (Scholar)
- Wilson, G., 1989, The Intentionality of Human Action, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
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