Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Intuition" by Joel Pust |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Adams, F. and A. Steadman, 2004, “Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?,” Analysis, 74: 173–181. (Scholar)
- Alexander, J., R. Mallon, and J. Weinberg, 2010, “Accentuate the Negative,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 297–314. (Scholar)
- Alexander, J. and J. Weinberg, 2007, “Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy,” Philosophy Compass, 2: 56–80. (Scholar)
- Allman, J. and J. Woodward, 2008, “What are Moral Intuitions and Why Should we Care About Them?: A Neurobiological Perspective,” Philosophical Issues, 18: 164–185. (Scholar)
- Alston, W., 1986, “Epistemic Circularity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47: 1–30. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, The Reliability of Sense Perception, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Appiah, A., 2008, Experiments in Ethics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Arico, A., B. Fiala, R. Goldberg, and S. Nichols, 2011, “The Folk Psychology of Consciousness,” Mind and Language 26: 327–352. (Scholar)
- Bach, K., 2002, “Seemingly Semantic Intuitions,” in Meaning and Truth, J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke and D. Shier (eds.), New York: Seven Bridges Press. (Scholar)
- Bealer, G., 1992, “The Incoherence of Empiricism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplemental Volume) 66: 99–138. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” in DePaul and Ramsey 1998. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance,” in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Benacerraf, P., 1973, “Mathematical Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–679. (Scholar)
- Bengson, J., forthcoming, “Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00578.x (early view by journal). (Scholar)
- Bergmann, M., 2006, Justification Without Awareness, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Berker, S., 2009, “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37: 293–329. (Scholar)
- Block, N., 1978, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in C. W. Savage (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9: 261–325. (Scholar)
- Bonjour, L., 1998, In Defense of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bromberger, S., 1966, “Why Questions,” in Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, R. Colodny (ed.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. (Scholar)
- Christensen, D., 2007, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review, 116: 187–217. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” Philosophy Compass, 4: 756–767. (Scholar)
- Chudnoff, E., 2011a, “What Intuitions are Like,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 625–654. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “The Nature of Intuitive Justification,” Philosophical Studies, 153: 313–333. (Scholar)
- Cohen. S., 1984, “Justification and Truth,” Philosophical Studies, 46: 279–295. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 309–329. (Scholar)
- Cullen, S., 2010, “Survey-Driven Romanticism,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 275–296. (Scholar)
- Cummins, R., 1998, “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium,” in DePaul and Ramsey 1998 (Scholar)
- DePaul, M. and W. Ramsey (eds.), 1998, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Deutsch, M., 2009, “Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference,” Mind and Language, 24: 445–466. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 447–460. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M., 2006, “Intuitions in Linguistics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57: 481–513. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Experimental Semantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 418–435. (Scholar)
- Earlenbaugh, J. and B. Molyneux, 2009, “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe,” Philosophical Studies, 145: 89–109. (Scholar)
- Feldman, R., 2007, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers without Gods, L. Antony (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1989, Realism, Mathematics and Modality, New York: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Gettier, E., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Analysis, 23: 121–123. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 1989, “Metaphysics, Mind and Mental Science,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 131–145. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Cognition and Modal Metaphysics,” in A. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology,” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 1–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, 1–26. (Scholar)
- Gopnik, A. and E. Schwitzgebel., 1998, “Whose Concepts are they, Anyway?: The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology,” in DePaul and Ramsey 1998. (Scholar)
- Greene, J., 2003, “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4: 847–850. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul,” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Greene, J., R. Sommerville, L. Nystrom, J. Darley, and J. Cohen., 2001, “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science, 293: 2105–2108. (Scholar)
- Grundmann, T., 2007, “The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74: 69–87. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1977, The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, T., 1998, “Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory,” in DePaul and Ramsey 1998. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, T. and G. Massey (eds.), 1991, Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Huemer, M., 2001, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Moral Intuitionism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 30–55. (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, J. and B. Jarvis., 2009, “Thought Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction,” Philosophical Studies, 142: 221–246. (Scholar)
- Kagan, S., 1989, The Limits of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kamm, F., 1998, “Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction,” Ethics, 108: 463–488. (Scholar)
- Kauppinen, A., 2007, “The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy,” Philosophical Explorations, 10: 95–118. (Scholar)
- Klein, G., 1998, Sources of Power, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Knobe, J. and S. Nichols, 2008, “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto,” in Experimental Philosophy, J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Koksvik, O., 2011, Intuition, Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University [preprint available from the author]. (Scholar)
- Kornblith, H., 1998, “The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients,” in DePaul and Ramsey 1998. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1978, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 37–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Philosophical Papers: Volume I, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ludwig, K., 2007, “The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31: 128–159. (Scholar)
- Machery, E., R. Mallon, S. Nichols, and S. Stich, 2004, “Semantic, Cross-Cultural Style,” Cognition, 92: 1–12. (Scholar)
- Mallon, R., E. Machery, S. Nichols, and S. Stich, 2009, “Against Arguments from Reference,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79: 332–356. (Scholar)
- Malmgren, A-S., 2011, “Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgments,” Mind, 120: 263–327. (Scholar)
- Nadelhoffer, T. and E. Nahmias, 2007, “The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy,” Philosophical Explorations, 10: 123–149. (Scholar)
- Nahmias, E., D. Coates, and T. Kvaran, 2007, “Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31: 214–232. (Scholar)
- Nahmias, E., S. Morris, T. Nadelhoffer, and J. Turner, 2006, “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 28–53. (Scholar)
- Nichols, S. and J. Knobe, 2007, “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuition,” Nôus, 41: 663–685. (Scholar)
- Pryor, J., 2000, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Nôus, 34: 517–549. (Scholar)
- Pust, J., 2000, Intuitions as Evidence, New York: Garland/Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions,” Philosophical Studies, 106: 227–258. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity,” Dialectica, 58: 71–87. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1967, “Psychological Predicates,” in Art, Mind and Religion, W. Capitan and D. Merrill (eds.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schechter, J., 2010, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 437–464. (Scholar)
- Scholl, B., 2007, “Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology,” Mind and Language, 22: 563–591. (Scholar)
- Siegel, S, 2010, The Contents of Visual Experience, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Silva, P, forthcoming, “Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism about Intuition,” Philosophical Studies. [preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Smart, J. J. C., 1965, “The Methods of Ethics and the Methods of Science,” Journal of Philosophy, 62: 344–349. (Scholar)
- Sorensen, R., 1992, Thought Experiments, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1998, “Minimal Intuition,” in DePaul and Ramsey 1998. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition,” Philosophical Studies, 132: 99–107. (Scholar)
- Stich, S., 1988, “Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity,” Synthese, 74: 391–413. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, N., 1984, “Moral Explanations,” in Morality, Reason and Truth, D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (eds.), MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Sunstein, C., 2005, “Moral Heuristics,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28: 531–542. (Scholar)
- Swain, S., J. Alexander, and J. Weinberg, 2008, “The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76: 138–155. (Scholar)
- Sytsma, J. and J. Livengood, 2010, “A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88: 1–18. (Scholar)
- Thomson, J. J., 1976, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist, 59: 204–217. (Scholar)
- Unger, P., 1996, Living High and Letting Die, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, P., 1997, “Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity,” Philosophical Perspectives, 11, 305–319. (Scholar)
- Van Roojen, M., 1999, “Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory,” Ethics, 109: 846–857. (Scholar)
- Vogel, J., 2008, “Epistemic Bootstrapping,” Journal of Philosophy, 105: 518–539. (Scholar)
- Weinberg, J., S. Nichols and S. Stich, 2001, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics, 29: 429–460. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg,” Philosophical Studies, 145: 465–476. (Scholar)
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