Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Intuition" by Joel Pust
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Adams, Fred and Annie Steadman, 2004, “Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?”, Analysis, 74(2): 173–181. doi:10.1093/analys/64.2.173 (Scholar)
- Adleberg, Toni, Morgan Thompson, and Eddy Nahmias, 2014, “Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data”, Philosophical Psychology, 28(5): 615–641. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.878834 (Scholar)
- Alexander, Joshua, Ronald Mallon, and Jonathan M. Weinberg, 2010, “Accentuate the Negative”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(2): 297–314. doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0015-2 (Scholar)
- Alexander, Joshua and Jonathan M. Weinberg, 2007, “Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy”, Philosophy Compass, 2(1): 56–80. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00048.x (Scholar)
- Allman, John and Jim Woodward, 2008, “What are Moral Intuitions and Why Should we Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective”, Philosophical Issues, 18(1): 164–185. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00143.x (Scholar)
- Alston, William P., 1986, “Epistemic Circularity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47(1): 1–30. doi:10.2307/2107722 (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, The Reliability of Sense Perception, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 2008, Experiments in Ethics,
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- Arico, Adam, Brian Fiala, Robert F. Goldberg, and Shaun Nichols, 2011, “The Folk Psychology of Consciousness”, Mind and Language 26(3): 327–352. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01420.x (Scholar)
- Bach, Kent, 2002, “Seemingly Semantic Intuitions”, in Meaning and Truth, Joseph Klein Campbell, Michael O’Rourke and David Shier (eds.), New York: Seven Bridges Press, pages 21–33. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George, 1998, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 201–240. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance”, in Conceivability and Possibility, Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “The Incoherence of Empiricism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplemental Volume), 66: 99–138. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/66.1.99 (Scholar)
- Benacerraf, Paul, 1973, “Mathematical Truth”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19): 661–679. doi:10.2307/2025075 (Scholar)
- Bengson, John, 2013, “Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(3): 495–532. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00578.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “How Philosophers Use Intuition and ‘Intuition’”, Philosophical Studies, 171(3): 555–576. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0287-y (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “The Intellectual Given”, Mind, 124(495): 707–760. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv029 (Scholar)
- Bergmann, Michael, 2006, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Berker, Selim, 2009, “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37(4): 293–329. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01164.x (Scholar)
- Block, Ned, 1978, “Troubles with Functionalism”, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9: 261–325. (Scholar)
- BonJour, Laurence, 1998, In Defense of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bromberger, Sylvain, 1966, “Why-Questions”, in Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, Robert Garland Colodny (ed.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pages 86–121. (Scholar)
- Buckwalter, Wesley and Stephen Stich, 2014, “Gender and Philosophical Intuition”, in Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy (Volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199927418.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Cappelen, Herman, 2012, Philosophy Without Intuitions, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Cath, Yuri, 2012, “Evidence and Intuition”, Episteme, 9(4): 311–328. doi:10.1017/epi.2012.21 (Scholar)
- Christensen, David, 2007, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”, Philosophical Review, 116: 187–217. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”, Philosophy Compass, 4(5): 756–767. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x (Scholar)
- Chudnoff, Elijah, 2011a, “What Intuitions are Like”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(3): 625–654. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00463.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “The Nature of Intuitive Justification”, Philosophical Studies, 153(2): 313–333. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2 (Scholar)
- Clarke-Doane, J., 2015, “Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality”, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 10), Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0004 (Scholar)
- Cohen. Stewart, 1984, “Justification and Truth”, Philosophical Studies, 46(3): 279–295. doi:10.1007/bf00372907 (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 309–329. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.x (Scholar)
- Cullen, Simon, 2010, “Survey-Driven Romanticism”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(2): 275–296. doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0016-1 (Scholar)
- Cummins, Robert, 1998, “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 113–128. (Scholar)
- DePaul, Michael Raymond and William M. Ramsey (eds.), 1998, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Deutsch, Max, 2009, “Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference”, Mind and Language, 24: 445–466. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01370.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3): 447–460. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0033-0 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, The Myth of the Intuitive, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, Michael, 2006, “Intuitions in Linguistics”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(3): 481–513. doi:10.1093/bjps/axl017 (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Experimental Semantics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(2): 418–435. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00413.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong”, Inquiry, 58(7–8): 669–699. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2015.1084824 (Scholar)
- Earlenbaugh, Joshua and Bernard Molyneux, 2009, “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe”, Philosophical Studies, 145(1): 89–109. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9388-4 (Scholar)
- Feldman, Richard, 2007, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”, in Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, Louise M. Antony (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 16. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1989, Realism, Mathematics and Modality, New York: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Geddes, A., forthcoming, “Judgments About Thought Experiments”, Mind. (Scholar)
- Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23(6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin I., 1989, “Metaphysics, Mind and Mental Science”, Philosophical Topics, 17(1): 131–145. doi:10.5840/philtopics198917115 (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Cognition and Modal
Metaphysics”, in Alvin I. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy
Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “A Priori Warrant and
Naturalistic Epistemology”, in James E. Tomberlin (ed.),
Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 1–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, 1–26. (Scholar)
- Gopnik, Alison and Eric Schwitzgebel., 1998, “Whose Concepts are they, Anyway?: The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 75–92. (Scholar)
- Greene, Joshua, 2003, “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral
‘Ought’: What Are the Implications of Neuroscientific
Moral Psychology?”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4:
847–850. doi:10.1038/nrn1224 (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “The Secret Joke of
Kant’s Soul”, in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The
Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and
Development, W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press. (Scholar)
- Greene, Joshua D., R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M.
Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen, 2001, “An fMRI Investigation of
Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment”, Science,
293(5537): 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872 (Scholar)
- Grundmann, Thomas, 2007, “The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74: 69–87. (Scholar)
- Grundmann, Thomas and Joachim Horvath, 2014a, “Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations”, Philosophical Studies, 170(3): 525–533. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3 (Scholar)
- –––, 2014b, “Erratum to: Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations”, Philosophical Studies, 170(3): 535–536. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0294-z (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1977, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, Tamara, 1998, “Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 143–160. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, Tamara and Gerald Massey (eds.), 1991, Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Horvath, Joachim, 2015, “Thought Experiments and
Experimental Philosophy”, in The Palgrave Handbook of
Philosophical Methods, C. Daly (ed.), London: Palgrave Macmillan,
pages 386–418. doi:10.1057/9781137344557_16 (Scholar)
- Huemer, Michael, 2001, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Moral Intuitionism, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1): 30–55. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Benjamin W. Jarvis., 2009, “Thought Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction”, Philosophical Studies, 142(2): 221–246. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, The Rules of Thought, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Kagan, Shelly, 1989, The Limits of Morality, New York:
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198239165.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Kamm, F.M., 1998, “Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction”, Ethics, 108(3): 463–488. doi:10.1086/233822 (Scholar)
- Kauppinen, Antti, 2007, “The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy”, Philosophical Explorations, 10(2): 95–118. doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 (Scholar)
- Klein, Gary A., 1998, Sources of Power, Cambridge, MA:
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- Knobe, Joshua and Shaun Nichols, 2008, “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto”, in Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (eds), Experimental Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, pages 3–14. (Scholar)
- Koksvik, Ole, 2011, Intuition, Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University [Koksvik 2011 available from the author]. (Scholar)
- Kornblith, Hilary, 1998, “The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 129–142. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1978, “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(1): 37–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Philosophical Papers: Volume I, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Ludwig, Kirk, 2007, “The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31: 128–159. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x (Scholar)
- Machery, Edouard, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen P. Stich, 2004, “Semantic, Cross-Cultural Style”, Cognition, 92(3): 1–12. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2003.10.003 (Scholar)
- Mallon, Ron, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich, 2009, “Against Arguments from Reference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(2): 332–356. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x (Scholar)
- Malmgren, Anna-Sara, 2011, “Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgments”, Mind, 120(478): 263–327. doi:10.1093/mind/fzr039 (Scholar)
- Nadelhoffer, Thomas and Eddy Nahmias, 2007, “The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy”, Philosophical Explorations, 10(2): 123–149. doi:10.1080/13869790701305921 (Scholar)
- Nado, Jennifer, 2014, “Why Intuition?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(1): 15–41. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00644.x (Scholar)
- Nahmias, Eddy, D. Justin Coates, and Trevor Kvaran, 2007, “Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31: 214–232. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x (Scholar)
- Nahmias, Eddy, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner, 2006, “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(1): 28–53. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x (Scholar)
- Nichols, Shaun and Joshua Knobe, 2007, “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuition”, Nôus, 41(4): 663–685. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x (Scholar)
- Pryor, James, 2000, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Nôus, 34(4): 517–549. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 (Scholar)
- Pust, Joel, 2000, Intuitions as Evidence, New York: Garland/Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, 106(3): 227–258. doi:10.1023/a:1013356707899 (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity”, Dialectica, 58(1): 71–87. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00292.x (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1967, “Psychological Predicates”, in Art, Mind and Religion, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pages 37–48. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Russell 1912 available online] (Scholar)
- Schechter, Joshua, 2010, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1): 437–464. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00199.x (Scholar)
- Scholl, Brian J., 2007, “Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology”, Mind and Language, 22(5): 563–591. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00321.x (Scholar)
- Seyedsayamdost, Hamid, 2014, “On Gender and Philosophical Intuition: Failure of Replication and Other Negative Results”, Philosophical Psychology, 28(5): 642–673. doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.893288 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication”, Episteme, 12(1): 95–116. doi:10.1017/epi.2014.27 (Scholar)
- Siegel, Susanna, 2010, The Contents of Visual Experience, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305296.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Silva, Paul Jr., 2013, “Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism about Intuition”, Philosophical Studies, 164(3): 579–589. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9870-2 (Scholar)
- Smart, J.J.C., 1965, “The Methods of Ethics and the Methods of Science”, Journal of Philosophy, 62(13): 344–349. (Scholar)
- Sorensen, Roy A., 1992, Thought Experiments, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019512913x.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Sosa, Ernest, 1998, “Minimal Intuition”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 257–270. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition”, Philosophical Studies, 132: 99–107(1). doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9050-3 (Scholar)
- Stich, Stephen, 1988, “Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity”, Synthese, 74(3): 391–413. (Scholar)
- Street, Sharon, 2006, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”, Philosophical Studies, 127(1): 109–166. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, Nicholas L., 1984, “Moral Explanations”, in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, David Copp and David Zimmerman (eds.), MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
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- Swain, Stacey, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg, 2008, “The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(1): 138–155. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00118.x (Scholar)
- Sytsma, Justin and Jonathan Livengood, 2011, “A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(2): 315–332. doi:10.1080/00048401003639832 (Scholar)
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1976, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem”, The Monist, 59(2): 204–217. doi:10.5840/monist197659224 (Scholar)
- Unger, Peter, 1996, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195108590.001.0001 (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter, 1997, “Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 11: 305–319. (Scholar)
- van Roojen, Mark, 1999, “Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory”, Ethics, 109(4): 846–857. doi:10.1086/233950 (Scholar)
- Vogel, Jonathan, 2008, “Epistemic Bootstrapping”, Journal of Philosophy, 105(9): 518–539. doi:10.5840/jphil2008105931 (Scholar)
- Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, 2001, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophical Topics, 29(1–2): 429–460. doi:10.5840/philtopics2001291/217 (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg”, Philosophical Studies, 145(3): 465–476. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9406-6 (Scholar)